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We could be on the verge of a global economic turning point, Bundesbank President Joachim Nagel said in an interview with the weekly newspaper “Die Zeit”. In this situation, we need more Europe, not less. Trump’s proposed trade tariffs could prove very painful for Germany. Should they be implemented, he said, we might even see negative economic growth next year. Mr Nagel considers European monetary policy to be on the right track.

Prior to the global financial crisis starting in 2007, the Eurosystem’s operational framework for implementing monetary policy used to be a corridor system. This involved the ECB Governing Council setting three interest rates, which usually had the same distance from each other. The rates of the deposit facility and the marginal lending facility formed the lower and upper bounds of the corridor, respectively. The relevant key interest rate on the main refinancing operations was the middle of the interest rate corridor. This system aimed to steer short-term money market rates close to the main refinancing operations rate.

The Eurosystem’s monetary policy from 2020 was shaped by the global outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the surge in inflation from 2021. This ultimately led to a series of Eurosystem policy rate hikes totalling 450 basis points (from July 2022 to September 2023).

With the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007 and the turmoil it brought about in the international banking system, trust between commercial banks increasingly dwindled, which significantly hampered the redistribution of liquidity via the interbank market that is necessary for a functioning corridor system. Banks in the euro area began to hoard liquidity or not lend it indiscriminately to banks that were in need of liquidity, meaning that the short-term money market no longer facilitated the smooth distribution of liquidity. The volatility of short-term interest rates went up significantly. As a result, the ECB Governing Council adopted a series of non-standard monetary policy measures, thereby changing the way in which the operational framework is used to implement monetary policy.

The Eurosystem’s monetary policy measures in the years following the European sovereign debt crisis were shaped, in particular, by a prolonged period in which inflation rates were well below the Eurosystem’s target. Against this backdrop, the ECB Governing Council decided, starting in 2014, to conduct various targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) and launch temporary monetary policy purchase programmes in addition to the existing operational framework.

On 13 March 2024, the ECB Governing Council decided on changes to the operational framework for implementing monetary policy. These changes will affect how central bank liquidity will be provided as excess liquidity in the banking system, while remaining significant over the coming years, gradually declines.

The European sovereign debt crisis was characterised by the fact that some euro area countries, owing to their high levels of debt – caused in part by efforts to counter the consequences of the global financial crisis – experienced difficulties refinancing their debt and, in some cases, lost access to capital market funding. In order to protect monetary policy transmission and safeguard sufficient liquidity provision for the financial system, the ECB Governing Council adopted various non-standard measures during the course of the crisis that went beyond the scope of the usual operational framework at that time.

German enterprises constitute net debtors vis-à-vis non-residents: Standing at €1,770 billion at the end of September 2024, their liabilities arising from financial operations and trade credits, exceeded their corresponding assets of €1414 billion by €356 billion. Compared with the previous month, this is a change of €16 billion.

Financial operations with foreign non-banks are of particular importance here, while those with foreign banks play a secondary role. The first group accounts for 75% of claims and 86% of liabilities. At 22% and 16% respectively, the share of trade credits in these total figures remains comparatively small.