



Bundesbank CP PKI for certificate class -advanced- Version 1.2

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Changehistory

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1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

The Deutsche Bundesbank issues Certificates to different end entities for various use cases.

The “PKI for Certificate Class -Advanced-“ issues certificates to the employees of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The particular constraint of this PKI is, that only smart cards (Dienstausweis) must be used as carriers for the certificates and keys on the end user's side.

This document as the Certificate Policy of the PKI provides the binding guidelines for the operation of the certificate authorities as part of the “Bundesbank PKI for Certificate Class -Advanced-“

The structure of this document follows the template specified in the RFC 3647.

Root CAs



CA Role	Root CA certificate class -advanced-
CA Name	Bundesbank Root CA -Advanced- 2023
CPS Identifier	1.3.6.1.4.1.2025.590.21.1.1
Lifetime	12 years
CRL-Lifetime	8 mounth
CRL-Publishing	offline / manual
OCS	none
Key Security	HSM
Location	Root CA appliance
Status	offline
Availability	PKI appliance

Subordinate CAs



CA Role	Issuing CA certificate class -advanced-
CA Name	Bundesbank Issuing CA for Users -Advanced- 2024
CPS Identifier	1.3.6.1.4.1.2025.590.21.1.2
Lifetime	6 years
CRL-Lifetime	6 days
CRL-Publishing	online / automatic
OCS	yes / private
Key Security	HSM
Location	Sub CA appliance
Status	online
Availability	PKI appliance cluster

Figure 1: Overview of PKI for Certificate Class -Advanced- of Deutsche Bundesbank

1.1.1 Certificate Accptance Framework of the ESCB

For Certificate Authorities, which are operated in coordination with the Certificate Accptance Framework of the ESCB, the requirements for the CAF must be met. Conformity must be described in the respective CPS and may include restrictions compared to this CP.

This CP defines rules for the Bundesbank certificate class -advanced-.

The Certificate Acceptance Framework defines sub classes to the certificate class -advanced-

- 1) advanced authentication
- 2) advanced signature
- 3) advanced encryption

A issuing CA that wants to be operated in compliance with the CAF must clearly define which of the subclasses it operates in its CPS.

1.2 Convention/Naming

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

1.3 Document Name and Identification

Name:	Certificate Policy Bundesbank PKI for Certificate Class -Advanced-
Version:	Version 1.2
Date:	10.10.2024
OID:	1.3.6.1.4.1.2025.590.21.1

Related CPS documents in the namespace at the time of publication.

CPS der Bundesbank Root CA -Advanced- G2	1.3.6.1.4.1.2025.590.21.1.1
CPS der Bundesbank Is- suing CA for Users -Ad- vanced-	1.3.6.1.4.1.2025.590.21.1.2

1.4 PKI Participants

1.4.1 Certification Authorities

The Bundesbank PKI for Certificate Class -Advanced- (BBk-PKI-Advanced) uses a two tier certification structure with a self-signed root certificate. The certification structure exist independent to any other certification structure operated by Deutsche Bundesbank. The Root CA is not cross signed.

The Root CA **must** only sign CA certificates. Subordinate CAs **must** only issue certificates for the subscribers named in point 1.4.3.

1.4.2 Registration Authorities

The registration authorities (RA) are responsible for:

- verifying the identity and authenticity of subscribers,
- registration procedure,
- documentation of registration procedure and
- suspension and revocation of certificates

Registration authorities may exist in all locations of the Bundesbank, where they are responsible for the procedures of registration and issuance of certificates to employees.

The authentication procedure is described in point 3.2.3.

1.4.3 Subscribers

Subscribers are natural persons only. Issuing CAs **must** document in their CPS who natural persons subscribers may be.

1.4.4 Relying Parties

Relying parties are IT systems and/or IT processes that use a certificate issued by the BBK-PKI- Advanced to verify authorization or authenticity of subscribers named in point 1.4.3.

The systems to be authenticated **must** be documented in the CPS.

1.4.5 Other Participants

No stipulation.

1.5 Certificate Usage

1.5.1 Appropriate Certificate Uses

The appropriate certificate use **must** be documented in the relevant CAs CPS. The certificates are exclusively used for Deutsche Bundesbank internal business purposes by subscribers listed in 1.4.3.

1.5.2 Prohibited Certificate Uses

Private use of certificates is prohibited.

1.6 Policy Administration

1.6.1 Organization Administering the Document

This CP is maintained by the operator of the BBk-PKI-Advanced and the responsible IT-unit. CPs are always verified by the Deutsche Bundesbank's IT security management.

1.6.2 Contact person.

Deutsche Bundesbank PKI Services

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40212 Düsseldorf	40002 Düsseldorf
Germany	Germany

Tel: +49 211 874 3257/2351

E-mail: pki@bundesbank.de

1.6.3 Person determining CPS Suitability for the Policy

CPs are always verified by the Deutsche Bundesbank's IT security management. The IT security management department is a high-level management body within the PKI.

The responsible unit verifies that each CPS complies with the guidelines in the respective CP.

1.6.4 CPS Approval Procedures

CPS documents are reviewed and approved and versioned by members of Deutsche Bundesbank's IT security management at the time of creation and after amendments.

CAs and their CPS documents that are to be included in the CAF must also be reviewed and accepted by the ESCB's PKI Assessment Body.

1.7 Definitions and Acronyms

See chapter 10.

2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities

2.1 Repositories

The Bundesbank publishes information about the BBk-PKI-Advanced on its website.

- <http://www.bundesbank.de> under Service ► Services for banks and companies ► PKI

or at this direct link:

- <https://www.bundesbank.de/en/service/banks-and-companies/pki/cp-cps>

It is also available on the intranet (access restricted to Bundesbank employees as well as external employees of this institution).

2.2 Publication of Certification Information

The Bundesbank publishes the following information.

- Root CA certificates with fingerprints
- CA certificates with fingerprints
- CRLs
- CPs and CPSs

2.3 Time and Frequency of Publication

Publication dates for CA/root CA certificates, CRLs and CP and CPS are as follows.

- CA/root CA certificates with fingerprints: as soon as they are generated.
- CRLs: after revocation, otherwise on a regular schedule (see point 4.9.7)
- CPs and CPSs: after generation/update

2.4 Access Controls on Repositories

Read access to the information listed under points 2.1 and 2.2 is not restricted. The PKI services department is responsible for write access.

3 Identification and Authentication

3.1 Names

3.1.1 Types of Names

The name of the certificate issued (Distinguished Name = DN) must comply with the X.509 standard. Optionally, certificates can contain Subject Alternative Names (SAN). The permitted types of names **must** be documented in the CPS.

3.1.2 Need for Names to be meaningful

The name of the certificate issued (DN) must uniquely identify the subscriber within the BBK-PKI-Advanced. The following rule applies.

- Certificates for natural persons must be issued in the subscriber's name.

3.1.3 Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

Anonymity or pseudonymity in certificate names is prohibited.

3.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

The DN is based on the x.509 standard.

Other types of names can be entered into the "Subject Alternative Name" field. The use of "Subject Alternative Names" must be indicated by the CA.

3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names

The responsible unit ensures that the names are unique. Issuing CAs **must** document and technically enforce the relevant rules guaranteeing the uniqueness of names in the CPS.

3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication and Role of Trademarks

As the names of the issued certificates (DN) refer to employees and persons with a contractual relationship with the Deutsche Bundesbank, the recognition of brands and trademarks is not relevant.

Generally speaking, the BBK-PKI-Advanced has no procedures for resolving brand disputes. Rather, such disputes are to be settled in the civil courts by the companies involved, taking into account the laws on brands and competition.

3.2 Initial Identity Validation

3.2.1 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

If the key material is generated by the applicant, the subscriber **must** prove that he/she is in possession of the private key. Proof is normally established by submitting a private key signed certificate signing request (SCSR) in PKCS#10 format.

3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity

Given that the names of the issued certificates (DN) refer to natural persons in the Deutsche Bundesbank, authentication of an organization identity is not required.

3.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity

Applicants (natural persons) must uniquely authenticate themselves to the respective RA when applying for a certificate.

The type of authentication and the type of proof given **must** be documented in the CPS of the Issuing CAs.

3.2.4 Non-verified Subscriber Information

Only information required to authenticate and identify the subscriber is verified. All other subscriber information is ignored.

3.2.5 Validation of Authority

This procedure is described in the respective CPS.

3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation

No stipulation.

At present no cross-certification with other organizations is planned.

3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests

3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-key

If a new subordinate CA is to be introduced to the PKI, it must be verified by the Root CA.

The Root CA **must** check if the Certification Practice Statement of the new subordinate CA complies with the CP.

The identification and authentication process for natural persons **must** be identical to the initial application process or be processed in case of self-service renewal Workflow.

3.3.2 Identification and Authentication for Re-key after Revocation

If a certificate is revoked, a new application is required.

3.4 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request

Requirements for applying revocation:

- Applicants (natural persons) **must** uniquely authenticate themselves when requesting revocation of a certificate. This can be done by ID card (password) or Bundesbank ID Card.
- If a uniquely authentication of the applicant is not possible certificate will be suspended.
- The applicant's identity is documented in the event of a revocation request.
- Reason and way of submitting of revocation request is documented.

4 Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1 Certificate Application

4.1.1 Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

Those subscribers listed in point 1.4.3 can submit a certificate application. The following natural persons are eligible to apply for certificates.

- Bundesbank employees,
- Persons with a contractual relationship with the Deutsche Bundesbank.

4.1.2 Enrollment Process and Responsibilities

An application for certificates involves a multistage registration process to the responsible unit. The following checks are made.

- Is the applicant authorized?
- Is the application complete, and correct?
- Is the DN unique?
- Has the person been authenticated?

4.2 Certificate Application Processing

4.2.1 Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

Subscribers **must** be identified and authenticated as described in section 3.2.

4.2.2 Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

Meeting the formal requirements does not constitute an entitlement to issuance of a certificate. The decision to issue certificates is entirely the decision of the responsible unit.

A certificate application **must** be rejected if the requirements defined in point 3.2.1 and 4.1.2 are not fulfilled.

Acceptance or rejection **must** be documented.

4.2.3 Time to Process Certificate Applications

The issuance of a certificate **must** be documented in the particular CPS for corresponding use case.

4.3 Certificate Issuance

4.3.1 CA Actions during Certificate Issuance

The following actions **must** be performed when certificates are issued:

- Verification of the certificate application
- Creation of the certificate
- Logging of relevant operations
- Informing the applicant about the creation of the certificate.

Issuing CAs **must** guarantee that certificates are only issued for the intended subscribers after checking their application. The issuing procedure and the tasks involved in issuing certificates **must** be documented in the CPS.

4.3.2 Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate

The form of notification and the applicable rules **must** be documented in the CAs CPS.

4.4 Certificate Acceptance

4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

The certificate is deemed to have been accepted once receipt confirmation has been received or once the certificate has been used.

4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA

The certificate **may** be published in a directory service.

4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

No stipulation.

4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage

4.5.1 Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage

Only the subscriber is entitled to use the private key.

4.5.2 Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

Relying parties are IT systems and/or IT processes which use the certificate only for the purposes stated therein. The relying party **must** check the trust of certificate chain and validity period of the certificate. Any limitation on the usage of certificates **must** be taken in account.

4.6 Certificate Renewal

A certificate **must** not be renewed on the basis of the existing key pair. Whenever a certificate is renewed, a new key pair **must** always be generated. See point 4.7.

Certificate renewal must not be performed for CA certificates.

4.7 Certificate Re-key

Whenever a certificate is renewed, a new key pair **must** be generated.

A CA certificate re-key **must** be handled as a new certificate application.

4.7.1 Circumstances for Certificate Re-key

Certification with re-keying is possible in the following cases.

- Routine re-keying
- if the validity of the certificate is about to expire or
- has just expired.
- Certificate application after a previous certificate has been revoked.
- The algorithms, key sizes or the validity periods of the certificate no longer provide adequate security, or the structure of the certificate urgently requires modification.

The newly issued certificate replaces the existing certificate. The issuing CA and RA **must** guarantee that the time during which a subscriber has access to certificates with the same purpose is limited.

4.7.2 Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key

Application by a subscriber is governed by the rules for new applications. See point 4.1.1.

If ad hoc certificate modification is required as a result of security issues relating to key sizes, validity periods or certificate structure, the responsible unit is responsible for informing PKI participants and prepare exchange of certificates. The rules for initial application apply. See point 4.1.1.

4.7.3 Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests

The rules for initial application apply. See point 4.2.

4.7.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

The rules for initial application apply. See point 4.3.2.

4.7.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-keyed Certificate.

The rules for initial application apply. See point 4.4.1.

4.7.6 Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA

The rules for initial application apply. See point 4.4.2.

4.7.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

The rules for initial application apply. See point 4.4.3.

4.8 Certificate Modification

Within the BBk-PKI-Advanced, a certificate is modified on the basis of an application and involves changing the key pair and modifying the content of the certificate as well as the technical parameters. A certificate modification always requires re-keying.

4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension

4.9.1 Circumstances for Revocation

A certificate **must** be revoked if at least one of the following circumstances arises.

- Information in the certificate is not or is no longer valid.
- The private key has been compromised.
- Loss of the Deutsche Bundesbank identity card.
- The subscriber is no longer authorized to use the certificate.
- The subscriber no longer requires the certificate.
- The subscriber does not comply with the obligations specified in the respective CP/CPS (see point 4.5).
- The private key of the issuing CA or of the RootCA has been compromised. In this case, all certificates issued by this CA are revoked as well.
- The algorithms, key sizes or validity periods of the certificate no longer provide sufficient security. The responsible unit reserves the right to revoke the certificates in question.

4.9.2 Who can Request Revocation?

4.9.2.1 Revocation of Root CA certificate

Only the Bundesbank IT security management must be entitled to process the revocation of the Root CA certificate, but every PKI participant may initiate a request for revocation.

4.9.2.2 Revocation of Sub CA certificates

Sub CAs are entitled, through their authorized representatives, to request the revocation of their own certificates at the superordinate CA, but only the Bundesbank IT security management must be entitled to permit the authorization.

4.9.2.3 Revocation of end-entity certificates

Only the subscriber for a certificate or an authenticated and authorized intermediary may request certificate revocation.

4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request

Prior to the revocation of a certificate, the issuing CA must verify that the revocation has been requested by the certificate's subscriber according to Section 4.9.2.

CA certificates must only be revoked as a result of a security incident on the basis of the regulations of the Incident Management processes. Any revocation of a CA certificate must be confirmed by a Risk Commission.

4.9.4 Revocation Request Grace Period

Revocation requests shall be submitted as soon as possible within a commercially reasonable time.

4.9.5 Time within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request

The maximum time for processing must be defined in the CPS of the respective CA.

4.9.6 Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties

Certificate status information is published using CRLs. Relying parties **must** use the most recent CRL to verify the validity of certificates.

4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency

The CRL validity period and publishing frequency is defined in the CPS of the respective CA

If the revocation of a certificate leads to the creation of a new CRL, this is published immediately and replaces the prevailing CRL irrespective of its original duration.

A new CRL **must** contain the information about revoked certificates until those certificates have expired.

4.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs

CRLs **must** be published as soon as they have been created.

4.9.9 Online revocation/status checking availability

CRLs from the responsible unit are published to the CRL Distribution Points. CDPs must be selected in such a way that all the designated subscribers have access to them.

Issuing CAs may additionally provide a revocation status check via OCSP.

Availability of this check, and each access to it, must be documented in the CPS.

4.9.10 Online Revocation checking Requirements.

Not applicable.

4.9.11 Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements available

Not applicable

4.9.12 Special Requirements Re-key Compromise

If a subscriber's private key is compromised, the corresponding certificate must be revoked immediately.

If a CA's private key is compromised, the CA certificate and all certificates that it has issued must be revoked.

4.9.13 Circumstances for Suspension

Temporary revocation, called suspension, of certificates is only possible in the following case:

- Short-term loss of a smartcard.
- The authentication of the applicant is not possible while requesting a revocation.

4.9.14 Who can Request Suspension?

A suspension request can be made by the subscriber, someone appointed by the subscriber, or his/her superior.

4.9.15 Procedure for Suspension Request

The suspension process is documented in the RA systems of the individual CA. More detailed information is entered in the Issuing CAs CPS.

4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period

Whenever suspensions are imposed, SubCAs must document the rules governing the maximum duration of a suspension.

4.10 Certificate Status Service

The responsible unit can provide a certificate status request service.

4.11 End of Subscription

A subscriber can end the subscription either by requesting for revocation of a certificate or by not applying for a new certificate once the current certificate has expired.

4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery

Key escrow and recovery is prohibited.

5 Facility, Management, and Operational Controls

5.1 Physical Controls

5.1.1 Site Location and Construction

The central (IT) components of the SubCAs are placed in access-protected areas within the Deutsche Bundesbank's data centers (DC). The Bundesbank operates a high-availability, redundant DC across two sites. One DC is certified to TÜV IT Level 4, and the second DC site is certified to DIN EN ISO 9001 as well as DIN ISO EC 27001.

The Root CAs are operated offline (without connection to a LAN). The whole hardware system is stored in a vault. The access to the components **must** be protected by mechanisms that enforce a four-eyes principle. The provision in a vault as well as backups **must** be designed in such a way that the necessary components are also available in the event of a disaster due to separate fire protection sections.

5.1.2 Physical Access

Physical access **must** support a multi-stage access control system.

5.1.3 Power and Air Conditioning

The power supply **must** meet the required standards. All online infrastructures **must** be installed at least in duplicate, completely separately from each other.

5.1.4 Water Exposures

The rooms **must** have adequate protection from exposure to water.

5.1.5 Fire Prevention and Protection

Fire prevention and fire alarm regulations **must** be observed.

5.1.6 Media Storage

Not applicable.

5.1.7 Waste Disposal

Waste disposal must comply with the Deutsche Bundesbank's safety regulations.

5.1.8 Off-Site Backup

An offsite backup should be implemented if the data storage is not operated in different data centers.

There is not an off-site data backup external to the data centers (e.g., at other service providers).

5.2 Procedural Controls

5.2.1 Trusted Roles

Trusted roles must be established to ensure that individuals are not able to change any of the security-critical components or view, generate or manipulate certificates or private keys without being noticed.

At least these roles must be implemented:

- Head of CA Operations
- Revisor
- IT Security Officer
- System Administrator
- Access Manager
- CA Operator
- RA Operator

CAs must document established roles in their CPS.

5.2.2 Number of Persons Required per Task

The implementation of a multiple-pairs-of-eyes principle when generating cryptographic keys can be found in the respective CPS.

At least these tasks **must** implement a multi person processing:

- HSM key ceremony
- Generation of CA keys
- Activation of Root CAs
- RA approval processes
- Recovery of CA data

5.2.3 Identification and Authentication for Each Role

The trusted roles approach is implemented using a number of technical and organizational measures. Roles **must** be identified and authenticated by using a smart card.

5.2.4 Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

By separating certain operational and administrative roles and duties, the approach ensures that no one person alone has complete control over the solution. The respective CPS **must** provide more detailed information.

5.3 Personnel Controls

5.3.1 Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements

In its operations, the responsible unit shall use experienced personnel who have the necessary IT expertise and specific knowledge of CA operations.

5.3.2 Background Check Procedures

The Bundesbank subjects' personnel in the responsible unit to an advanced security check with a view to sabotage protection in accordance with the Security Check Act (*Sicherheitsüberprüfungsgesetz – SÜG*).

5.3.3 Training Requirements

Personnel operating CAs for the responsible unit receive regular and ad hoc training. They are sensitized to the security relevance of their work.

5.3.4 Retraining Frequency and Requirements

Retraining is provided in particular when new or amended directives, IT systems and/or IT processes are implemented.

5.3.5 Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence

Routinely job rotation shall not occur.

For new personnel or assignment of new responsibilities the requirements in point 5.3.3 apply.

5.3.6 Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions

Unauthorized actions that endanger the security of the responsible unit or breach data protection requirements must be punished/prosecuted by the Human Resources Department.

5.3.7 Independent Contractor Requirements

Not applicable.

5.3.8 Documentation Supplied to Personnel

To ensure that they can conduct operations correctly, PKI personnel receive the following documentation.

- Certificate Policy (CP)
- Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
- Operating manuals
- User instructions
- Official rules and regulations

5.4 Audit Logging Procedures

All IT systems located in the Deutsche Bundesbank infrastructure **must** synchronize with an internal time source. The internal time-source using a DCF77 correlation receiver.

In case of offline operation, a manual procedure must be implemented.

5.4.1 Types of Events Recorded

CAs **must** monitor and securely store the following processes.

- System initialization
- System Login / Logoff
- CA activation
- Operator processes
- Certification applications
- User registration
- Key generation
- Certificate issuance
- Data backups
- Certificate publication
- Delivery of private key and certificate
- Revocation and suspension of applications
- Revocation and suspension of certificates
- CRL generation
- CRL publication

Any malfunctions or one-off operating situations must also recorded. Retention period is documented in point 5.4.3.

5.4.2 Frequency of Processing Log

The Bundesbank's Directorate General Internal Audit verifies that certification operations are as they should be as part of its risk-oriented audits. If there is suspicion of irregularities, a more detailed audit is conducted.

5.4.3 Retention Period for Audit Log

Retention period must be based on the times stipulated in law, audit compliance provisions, and other internal rules and regulations. The retention period is one year.

5.4.4 Protection of Audit Log

The logs **must** be protected against unauthorized access, manipulation and destruction.

5.4.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures

Log data **must** be backed up regularly along with other relevant data. Paper logs must be stored in lockable cupboards.

5.4.6 Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External)

The audit logs **shall** be transferred to a central audit log collection system (Log-Appliance) for archival and central evaluation.

5.4.7 Notification to Event-Causing Subject

If a security-critical event occurs, the responsible unit **must** notify the IT security management incidents as well as the system owner.

5.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments

There is an active and generally accepted vulnerability and patch-management policy in place at Deutsche Bundesbank

- Information about vulnerability from the vendors of hard- and software components of the PKI system **must** be observed by the system owners operating staff.
- Software updates **must** be installed at least once a year.
- Security patches and updates **must** be installed immediately.
- Generally, every workplace client gets systematically planned releases including security patches twice a year

5.5 Records Archival

5.5.1 Types of Records Archived

All data that are relevant for the certification process (see point 5.4.1) **must** be archived.

5.5.2 Retention period for Archive

The retention periods are defined in point 5.4.3.

5.5.3 Protection of Archive

The archives **must** be protected against unauthorized access, manipulation and destruction.

5.5.4 Archive Backup Procedures

Archive and backup procedures must be defined in the respective CPS of the CA.

5.5.5 Requirements for Time-Stamping of Records

Trustworthy timestamp sources **may** be implemented.

5.5.6 Archive Collection System (internal or external)

The responsible unit is responsible for archiving. Archives **must** not be stored externally.

5.5.7 Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information

Archived Information **must** be stored either encrypted or signed to accomplish a verification of the integrity of data.

File names must include date information of their origin.

5.6 Key changeover

When the certificate of a CA of the PKI is about to expire, a new key pair must be created and a new CA certificate must be generated. This process must be handled as a new certification application.

5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery

5.7.1 Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures

The IT security management defines the procedure to deal with security incidents and compromise of private keys.

5.7.2 Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data are corrupted.

If PKI component has faulty or manipulated computing resources, software and/or data that have an impact on the processes conducted by this entity, the system in question **must** be stopped immediately.

The system **must** be reset using software and data backups, and – after checks in safe mode – it is to be put back into operation. The faulty or modified system **must** be analyzed. If there is a suspicion of willful action, legal steps may be taken.

If certificates have been generated using incorrect data, the subscriber or the person responsible for the IT system and/or the IT process **must** be informed immediately, and the certificate must be revoked by the certification authority.

5.7.3 Entity Private key compromise Procedures

If a CA's private key is compromised, the corresponding certificate **must** be revoked immediately. All certificates issued by this certification authority must be revoked at the same time. All subscribers affected are to be notified immediately.

The entity in question is set up as a new CA with a new key pair. The certificate of the new CA is published and any subscriber certificates that were previously revoked are reissued.

5.7.4 Business Continuity Capabilities after a Disaster

A disaster recovery plan **must** be designed, tested und implemented to mitigate the effects of any kind of natural or man-made disaster.

Relevant standards as ISO2700x and ISO 22301 Business Continuity Management **should** be used as source of information.

5.8 CA or RA Termination

If the operations of the responsible unit or of a SubCA are terminated, the following measures must be taken.

- Notification of all subscribers as well as relying parties with a lead time of at least three months.
- Revocation of all certificates issued by the CA.
- Destruction of the CA's private keys.
- Publication of the corresponding CA and root CA CRLs.

6 Technical Security Controls

6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation

6.1.1 Key Pair Generation

The key material of CAs **must** be generated in a Hardware Security Module. All cryptographic modules used are certified to at least Common Criteria EAL 4+ or FIPS 140-2 Level 3.

Key material for natural persons must be generated on a smartcard certified to, at least, Common Criteria EAL 4+.

6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber

Private keys **must** be delivered to subscribers. See point 6.1.1.

6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

The subscriber delivers the public key within a Certificate Signing Request (CSR). The technical process of delivery **must** be described in the CPS.

6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

Certificates of CAs must be published in the repositories named in point 2.1.

The validation of the CA certificates fingerprint must include checking the certificate's fingerprint using a second communication channel.

6.1.5 Key Sizes

Key sizes and algorithms **must** be chosen according to the BSI TR-02102-1 or subsequent documents.

- CA keys **must** have a minimum of 4096 bits for RSA or 512 bits for ECC.
- End Entity keys **must** have a minimum of 2048 bits for RSA or 256 bits for ECC.

For ECC only NIST curves **should** be used for compatibility reasons

6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking

The following encryption algorithms are to be used.

- RSA 1.2.840.113549
- rsaEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1
- SHA256 RSA 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11
- SHA384 RSA 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12

- SHA512 RSA 1.2.840.113549.1.1.13
- ECC_CURVE_P256 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7
- ECC_CURVE_P384 1.3.132.0.34
- ECC_CURVE_P521 1.3.132.0.35
- ECDSA_SHA256 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2
- ECDSA_SHA384 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3
- ECDSA_SHA512 1.2.840.10045.4.3.4

6.1.7 Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field)

For CAs, the key usage purposes are.

- signing certificates 2.5.29.15.5
- signing CRLs. 2.5.29.15.6

For natural persons, the key usage purposes are.

- digital signature 2.5.29.15.0
- contentCommitment 2.5.29.15.1
- key encipherment 2.5.29.15.2
- data encipherment 2.5.29.15.3

See point 1.4.1.

6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

Private keys of Root-CA and SubCAs **must** be created inside and stored in HSMs. Private keys of natural persons **must** be created and stored on smart cards.

6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls

The cryptographic modules used **must** be certified at least to the level of Common Criteria EAL 4+ or FIPS 140-2 Level 3.

6.2.2 Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control

The CAs private key **must** only be used in the secure environment of an HSM. The CAs private key **must** never leave the HSM unencrypted. For Root CAs a processing of the private key uses **must** be secured by a n out of m multi-person control.

6.2.3 Private Key Escrow

Key escrow **must** be prohibited within or outside the Bundesbank.

6.2.4 Private Key Backup

Backups of private keys for CAs must be permitted only within the HSM's security system. Backups of private keys for natural persons **must not** be permitted.

6.2.5 Private Key Archive

Archiving of private keys **must not** be permitted.

6.2.6 Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module

Transfer of private keys belonging to CAs **must** only take place in an HSM dedicated to the same CA; the provisions of point 6.2.2 must be observed here.

Transferring private keys to a new HSM **must** be based on processes using an out of multi-person control.

The private keys stored on the smart card are used for natural persons. An export **must not** be possible.

6.2.7 Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module

See point 6.2.1.

6.2.8 Method of Activating Private Key

The activation of a CAs private keys **must** be described in the respective CAs CPS

Private keys belonging to natural persons **must** be activated by entering a PIN.

6.2.9 Method of Deactivating Private Key

The method of deactivation of a CAs private keys **must** be described in the respective CAs CPS.

Smartcards with key materials of natural persons must be locked after an incorrect PIN has been entered three times. The re-activation (unlock) of the smartcard after suspension must be realized by the challenge and response technique. A workflow is needed to inform the service desk of the smartcard lock. After that the service desk contacts the affected employee and starts the challenge and response technique.

6.2.10 Method of Destroying Private key

Once the validity of the CA's private key has expired or this key has been revoked, the key must be deleted from the HSM environment. Private keys and further key material stored in a HSM leaving the PKI Environment must be destroyed by using a factory reset procedure, as dictated by the HSM vendor.

6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating

See point 6.2.1.

6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

6.3.1 Public Key Archival

All public keys generated by the responsible unit are archived in the CA's database.

6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods

The certificates issued by the BBk-PKI-Advanced have the following validity periods.

- Root CA certificates maximum of 12 years
- CA certificates maximum of 6 years
- User certificates maximum of 3 years

6.4 Activation Data

6.4.1 Activation Data Generation and Installation

Activation data for CAs private keys **must** be generated using HSM devices. The activation smartcards for multi-person control **must** be PIN protected.

The PIN policies **must** follow Deutsche Bundesbank PIN and password regulations.

Activation data are a by-product of the generation of the certificates for natural persons. The subscriber **must** create his/her own PIN during the issuance process.

6.4.2 Activation Data Protection

Natural persons **must** sign a confidentiality agreement with regard to activation data by initial allocation of the Deutsche Bundesbank identity card.

Activation data of Root CA private key **must** be protected by two-factor authentication and multi- person control.

Activation data of Issuing CAs must be stored encrypted and transferred while start process of CA service. Decryption of activation data must only be possible using a corresponding HSM.

6.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation Data

Not applicable.

6.5 Computer Security Controls

6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements

All of the responsible unit's IT systems **must** be run according to the applicable IT security guidelines and **must** be competently protected against manipulation and espionage. See point 5.4.8.

6.5.2 Computer Security Rating

The security measures **must** be state of the art. A threat analysis **must** be conducted regularly, at least every two years.

6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls

6.6.1 System Development Controls

The Deutsche Bundesbank's IT risk management process **must** be apply when planning and/or developing the solution.

6.6.2 Security Management Controls

See point 6.5.1.

6.6.3 Life Cycle Security Controls

Any IT systems or components that are replaced are disabled in such a way that the functions thereof and data contained therein cannot be misused.

In addition, any changes to IT systems or components must always go through the Deutsche Bundesbank's IT risk management process.

6.7 Network Security Controls

See point 6.5.1.

6.8 Time-Stamping

The time **must** be synchronous on all IT-systems (see point 5.5).

Timestamping **may** be implemented.

7 Certificate, CRL, and OCSP Profiles

7.1 Certificate Profile

7.1.1 Version Number(s)

The BBk-PKI-Advanced issued certificates **must** conform with the X509v3 standard.

7.1.2 Certificate Extensions

CAs **must** document the allowed certificate extensions in the CPS

See 6.1.5, 6.1.6, 6.1.7

7.1.3 Name Forms

See points 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.

7.1.4 Name Constraints

See point 3.1.

7.1.5 Certificate Policy Object Identifier (OID)

See 1.3

7.1.6 Usage of Policy Constraints Extension

Not applicable.

7.1.7 Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics

Not applicable.

7.1.8 Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension

Not applicable.

7.2 CRL Profile

7.2.1 Version Number(s)

The BBk-PKI-Advanced must issue CRLs conforming to X.509 version 2 in accordance with RFC 5280 point 5

7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions

The CRLs **must** include the following CRL extensions and CRL entry extensions:

- Authority Key Identifier
- CRL Number
- CA Version
- Reason Codes
- Revocation Date
- Certificate Serial Number

Other extensions **may** be used.

7.3 OCSP Profile

Issuing CAs **may** provide OCSP services.

7.3.1 Version Number(s)

OCSP Version 1 defined in RFC6960 **must** be supported.

7.3.2 OCSP Extensions

The OCSP profiles **must** be defined in the CPS of the respective Issuing CA.

8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

An audit and compliance check must be done on a regular frequently basis

The technical framework and operational processes of the PKI is part of the regular internal audit pursuant to the Bundesbank's rules for such procedures. The audit results are not published.

Initial risk management process is documented in point 6.6.

8.1 Frequency or Circumstances of Assessment

As a rule, internal audits and inspections are conducted at regular intervals. Assessments will take place, among other things, with the following changes:

- change of version,
- installation of new releases
- replacement of components

If there are no reasons for an earlier assessment, an assessment **must** take every three years.

8.2 Identity/Qualifications of Assessor

Internal audits are conducted by the Directorate General Audit and the responsible unit's management. The inspectors have sufficient knowledge and expertise in the field of public key infrastructure to be able to conduct the audits.

8.3 Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity

Assessor's must not be involved in the responsible unit's production process. Self-assessment **must** be prohibited.

8.4 Topics Covered by Assessment

All topics relevant to the PKI **must** be inspected. The topics covered in the inspection are at the discretion of the inspector.

8.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency

If any deficiencies are determined, these **must** be rectified as quickly as possible by the CA in consultation with the inspector. The inspector **must** be informed once these deficiencies have been rectified.

8.6 Communication of Results

The results of the assessment will not be published

9 Other Business and Legal Matters

9.1 Fees

No fees will be charged.

9.2 Financial Responsibility

The Deutsche Bundesbank fortifies its operational resilience and integrity through the proactive implementation of comprehensive risk mitigation strategies. The Bank's commitment to establishing robust contingency frameworks and securing requisite reserves serves to effectively address potential disruptions.

Invoking the principle of protection of established rights under the Basic Law, this framework gives rise to an institutional guarantee within the state's structure. Consequently, the principle of self-insurance is applicable to the Bank as delineated in DB 1-16, Chapter 18, and Handbook 2-231.

In the exercise of its responsibilities, the Deutsche Bundesbank fundamentally pursues a policy of risk avoidance and limitation by instituting risk-reducing measures, which are articulated through its general. Nevertheless, the Bank adheres to the principle of self-insurance, complemented by an operational liability insurance policy amounting to €10,000,000.

9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information

9.3.1 Scope of Confidential Information

All information and data about BBK-PKI-Advanced subscribers and participants that are not covered by point 9.3.2 are considered confidential.

9.3.2 Information not within the Scope of Confidential Information

All information and data that are contained in published certificates and CRLs, either explicitly (e.g. e-mail addresses) or implicitly (e.g. data about certification), or that can be derived from them, are not considered confidential.

9.3.3 Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information

The responsibility to protect confidential information lies with the BBK-PKI-Advanced.

9.4 Privacy of Personal Information

9.4.1 Privacy Plan

Personal information is stored and processed as stipulated in legal data protection provisions.

9.4.2 Information Treated as Private

All information about the responsible unit's subscribers and participants is treated as confidential.

9.4.3 Information not Deemed Private

The provisions defined in point 9.3.2 apply.

9.4.4 Responsibility to Protect Private Information

Responsibility for protecting personal information lies with the responsible unit.

9.4.5 Notice and Consent to Use Private Information

The subscriber gives the responsible unit consent to use personal information insofar as this is required for it to render its services. In addition, all information that is not deemed confidential may be published.

9.4.6 Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process

The responsible unit stores and processes personal information as stipulated in legal data protection provisions. Such information is disclosed to government entities only if corresponding rulings are presented that are in line with legal provisions.

9.4.7 Other Information Disclosure Circumstances

No other information disclosure circumstances are envisaged.

9.5 Intellectual Property Rights

The Deutsche Bundesbank owns the intellectual property rights to this document. The document can be passed on to third parties as it stands.

9.6 Representations and Warranties

9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties

The BBk-PKI-Advanced undertakes to follow the provisions of this CP.

9.6.2 RA Representations and Warranties

The BBk-PKI-Advanced and those authorities involved in registration undertake to follow the provisions of this CP.

9.6.3 Subscriber Representations and Warranties

The subscriber undertakes to take all necessary measures to protect his/her private keys and to comply with the Bundesbank's rules for handling certificates and smart cards.

9.6.4 Relying party Representations and Warranties

The relying party's obligations are defined in point 4.5.2. S/he must also follow his/her organization's certificate guidelines.

9.6.5 Representations and Warranties of other participants

Not applicable.

9.7 Disclaimer of Warranties

As a rule, no warranties are assumed. The Deutsche Bundesbank does not guarantee availability of the PKI services.

9.8 Limitations of Liability

If, when implementing the agreement, the Bundesbank culpably violates an essential contractual obligation which is of major importance in an individual case, it is liable for the damages thereby caused. In the case of minor negligence, the Bundesbank's liability is limited to damages characteristic for the type of agreement in question.

The Bundesbank is only liable for renegeing on other commitments if it is culpable of gross negligence. The limitation of liability vis-à-vis merchants and government institutions specified in subsection 1, sentence 2 also applies to gross negligence committed by vicarious agents.

The exclusion or limitation of liability specified above does not apply to liability for damages resulting from injury to life, body or health; in such cases the Bundesbank is liable in accordance with the statutory provisions.

In the event that the Bundesbank is liable in accordance with the above subsections, the extent of its liability, pursuant to section 254 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), shall be determined by the degree to which its own culpability, in relation to other factors, contributed to causing the damage.

9.9 Indemnities

If the certificate and the corresponding private key are improperly used or if the use of key material is based on information that was incorrectly provided during the application process, the Deutsche Bundesbank is released from liability.

9.10 Term and Termination

9.10.1 Term

This CP comes into force on the day it is published, as defined in chapter 2.

9.10.2 Termination

This document is valid until it is replaced by a new version or until the BBK-PKI-Advanced operations are terminated.

9.10.3 Effect of Termination and survival

The responsibility to protect confidential and personal information remains unaffected by the consequences of terminating this CP.

9.11 Individual Notices and Communications with participants

No rules in this respect have been made in this CP/CPS.

9.12 Amendments

9.12.1 Procedure for Amendment

Amendments to the CP are published in a timely manner prior to entering into force.

9.12.2 Notification Mechanism and Period

The current version of the CP published on the intranet applies to Bundesbank as well as external employees of this institution.

9.12.3 Circumstances under which the OID must be Changed.

The OID will not be amended before the end of the CA's period of validity.

9.13 Dispute resolution Provisions

It is up to the Deutsche Bundesbank to decide whether arbitration proceedings should be launched.

9.14 Governing Law

The place of jurisdiction is Frankfurt am Main.

9.15 Compliance with Applicable Law

This CP is governed by German law. The certificates issued by the BBk-PKI-Advanced are not compliant with qualified certificates as defined in the eIDAS Regulation.

9.16 Miscellaneous Provisions

9.16.1 Entire Agreement

All provisions of this CP/CPS are valid between the BBK-PKI-Advanced and the subscribers. If a new version is issued, this replaces all previous versions. There are no verbal or subsidiary agreements.

9.16.2 Assignment

There is no provision for transfer of rights.

9.16.3 Severability

If individual provisions of this CP/CPS are or become invalid, this shall not affect the remaining provisions of this CP/CPS. Likewise, if a provision is missing, this shall not affect the validity of the CP/CPS. In place of the ineffective provision, an effective provision shall be deemed to be agreed that comes closest to the original intention or that would have been determined in line with the meaning and purpose of the CP/CPS had this point been covered therein.

9.16.4 Enforcement

Any legal disputes arising from the BBk-PKI-Advanced operations are subject to the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The place of enforcement and jurisdiction is Frankfurt am Main.

9.16.5 Force Majeure

The Deutsche Bundesbank accepts no liability for the violation of an obligation, for default or for non-fulfilment under this CP if this results from an underlying event that is beyond its control (e.g., force majeure, war, network outage, fire, earthquake or other catastrophes).

9.17 Other Provisions

Not applicable

10 Abbreviations

2FA	Two-factor authentication
BBk	Deutsche Bundesbank
BBk-PKI-Advanced	Deutsche Bundesbank PKI Advanced
BSI	Federal Office for Information Security (<i>Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnologie</i>)
C	Country (part of the Distinguished Name)
CA	Certification Authority
CN	Common name (part of the Distinguished Name)
CP	Certificate Policy of a PKI
CPS	Certification Practice Statement
CRL	Certificate Revocation List (Signed list belonging to a CA that contains revoked certificates.)
CRLDP	CRL distribution point
DC	Data center
DN	Distinguished name
DName	Distinguished name
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EMAIL	E-mail address (part of the Distinguished Name)
EBCA	European Bridge CA, link between individual organizations' public key infrastructures
HSM	Hardware Security Module
LDAP	Light Directory Access Protocol, repository service
O	Organization (part of the Distinguished Name)
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID	Object identifier
OU	Organizational unit (part of the Distinguished Name)

PIN	Personal Identification Number
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
RA	Registration Authority
RFC	Request for Comment, documents for global standardization Root CA Highest CA of a PKI
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SSL	Secure Socket Layer, protocol to ensure secure communication between a client and a server.
x.500	Protocols and services for ISO compliant repositories
x.509v3	Certification standard