## YCC in Japan

# Junko Koeda and Bin Wei *discussion by Hanno Lustig*

Waseda and FRB Atlanta

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
# **Timeline BoJ policies**

 Japan had been stuck in a low-growth regime since the mid-1990s.

- 1. 1999: the BoJ commits to holding short-term rates at zero.
- 2. 2001: the BoJ starts LSAPs.
- 3. 2012: the BoJ steps up LSAPs.
- 4. 2016: the BoJ shifts to yield curve control (YCC). (signaling/announcement effect)
  - 2016: Target yield of 0% for 10-year JGB.
  - 2021: BoJ raises cap to 0.25% for 10-year JGB.
  - ▶ 2022: BoJ raises cap to 0.5% for 10-year JGB.
  - 2023: BoJ raises cap to 1% for 10-year JGB.
  - 2024: BoJ abandons YCC.


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## Japanese Government Bond Purchases.



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# Japanese Government Bond Holdings.



# YCC In Japan

- Koeda and Wei (2024): Technical question; How did the BoJ pull this off?
- Distinguish between YCC Purchases and QE Purchases.
- High-frequency event-study approach:
  - Only narrow effects of YCC Purchases on yields.
  - Broader impact of YCC announcements on yields. (signaling/announcement effect)
- Dynamic Term Structure Models for JGBs.
  - Neoclassical/No-arbitrage models with perfectly elastic demand.
    - BoJ provides perfectly inelastic demand at set rates for JGBs.
- Alternative: Demand-based asset pricing models a la Koijen, Yogo and Koijen, Yogo and Richmond: Substitution between JGBs and other securities.

# Japanese Government Bond Purchases.



(1) Volume of Orders at the Best-ask Price

JGB Market dysfunction?

- Volume on benchmark JBG \/
- Market depth \sqrsys
- ▶ Price Impact *>*


(Liquidity Indicators in JGB Market, March 29 2024, BoJ)

# **Price Discovery**

- Broader question: is YCC a good idea?
- How much active price discovery is going on in JBG market?
- Are bond traders pricing news about fundamentals into bond prices or news about BoJ's willingness to buy more JGBs?

# Fiscal Backdrop

- Advanced economies experiencing demographic transition and growth slowdown.
  - Governments projected to run large deficits and run up debt/output ratio as a result.
- Japan at leading edge of transition: cumulative primary deficit of 131% of GDP between 1997 and 2023.



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#### **BOJ Balance Sheet**

- ▶ BOJ launched QE in 2001
- BOJ adopted YCC in 2016

% of GDP, Year End	1997	2010	2023
Assets			
Domestic Loans	4.2%	8.6%	17.1%
Bonds & T-Bills	<b>9.6</b> %	<b>15.5</b> %	<b>99.2</b> %
Equities	0%	0.4%	<b>10.7</b> %
Liabilities			
Currency	10.8%	17.2%	21.6%
<b>Bank Reserves</b>	0.6%	<b>4.5</b> %	<b>90.9</b> %
Others	0.1%	0.4%	10.3%

# Consolidated Balance Sheet (BoJ + Gen Gov't + PFIs)

Shortening Duration of Liabilities.

% of GDP, Year End	1997	2010	2023	97 to 23 Diff
Assets				
Gold, SDRs, and Deposits	6.6%	8.3%	19.1%	12.6%
Domestic Loans	<b>102.8</b> %	<b>68.2</b> %	<b>60.7</b> %	<b>-42.1</b> %
Other Domestic Securities	5.7%	22.9%	0.7%	-4.9%
<b>Domestic Equities</b>	<b>12.1</b> %	22.4%	<b>41.9</b> %	<b>29.7</b> %
Foreign Securities	<b>6.8</b> %	<b>22.9</b> %	<b>56.1</b> %	<b>49.3</b> %
Sum	133.9%	144.7%	178.5%	44.6%
Liabilities				
Currency	10.8%	17.2%	21.6%	10.9%
Bank Reserves	0.6%	4.5%	<b>90.9</b> %	<b>90.3</b> %
Bonds & T-Bills	<b>44.9</b> %	<b>172.0</b> %	<b>117.3</b> %	72.3%
Loans	55.1%	48.9%	35.9%	-19.2%
Deposits FILF	<b>46.4</b> %	<b>0.9</b> %	<b>1.9</b> %	-44.6%
Sum	158.6%	<b>248.1</b> %	273.0%	114.4%
Net Liabilities	24.7%	103.3%	94.5%	69.8%

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# Duration Mismatch on Japanese Gov't Balance Sheet

- Carry trade of 1.7 × GDP: Government expects to earn an additional 3.1% of GDP from its risky investments.
  - Risky maturity transformation on a large scale by borrowing at *floating rates* and investing in *long-duration* assets.
  - Q.E. is essentially a giant floating-for-fixed swap.
- Duration mismatch on JP's consolidated government balance sheet.
  - A decrease in real rates increases government's spending possibility set, because
    - 1. Net debt position has negative duration,
    - 2. But its future surpluses have long duration.
- Extra fiscal capacity created (destroyed) when rates decline (increase).
- Real rates can't go up (without destroying fiscal capacity).

## Traditional Macro View

- Advanced economies experiencing
  - 1. Demographic transition (see, e.g., Auclert et al., 2021) and
  - 2. Secular stagnation (see, e.g., Eggertsson et al., 2016).
  - 3. Increase in inequality (Mian et al., 2020)
- Forces lead to lower equilibrium long-run real rates (neutral w.r.t. monetary and fiscal policy).
- Creates extra fiscal capacity (Blanchard, 2019; Mehrotra and Sergeyev, 2021)
- Economies bump into ZLB and CBs deploy large-scale asset purchases and YCC to lower long-term nominal rates.
  - Guided by r\* estimates. (Laubach and Williams, 2003, 2016; Holston et al., 2017)

# Alternative (Complementary) View

- Advanced economies experiencing:
  - 1. Demographic transition
  - 2. Secular stagnation
- Forces lead to large governments deficits.
- Financial repression: Governments resort to measures to lower real rate on government debt *in order to create extra fiscal capacity*.
  - CBs deploy large-scale asset purchases and YCC just to lower long-dated real rates .
  - Government debt appears expensive.
- ► Heterogeneity in duration of HH fin. wealth ⇒ increased wealth inequality (Auclert, 2019; Greenwald et al., 2022)

# Japanese Financial Repression

- Prior to 2001: Cheap funding for government.
  - Participation by HH in capital markets was expensive (Hoshi and Kashyap, 1999).
  - HH Trapped in deposits:
    - Interest rate ceilings on deposits.
    - HH Deposits at Japan Post and pension fund reserves required to fund FILF (Fiscal Investment and Loan Program).
- Post-2001 liberalization: Alternative sources of cheap funding.
  - Replacing FILF deposits with bank reserves at BoJ: BoJ starts large scale asset purchases (2001)
  - BoJ starts YCC (interest rate ceiling) (2016).
  - Domestic market segmented by large CIP deviations.

# Japanese HH Balance Sheet: Trapped in Deposits.

	Japan		U.S.	
% of GDP, Year End	1997	2023	1997	2023
Assets				
<b>Currency and Deposits</b>	128%	189%	42%	61%
Other Securities	16%	5%	30%	22%
Equities	16%	46%	125%	199%
Insurance & Pension	63%	90%	110%	118%
Liabilities				
Loans	65%	62%	62%	69%

- Compare duration of c y to duration of financial wealth  $\theta$ .
- The welfare gain: (Greenwald et al., 2022; Fagereng et al., 2022):

Welfare 
$$gain_j(\theta, z) \approx \left(D^{c-y} - D^{\theta}\right) \theta_0 \times d\log R.$$

- Assumption: Euler equation holds.
- We compute  $D^{c-y}$  for X-section of Japanese households.
- Large Welfare losses for young non-participants.

## Conclusion

- Japanese government engaged in risky maturity transformation.
- Japanese government has engineered large maturity mismatch between surpluses and (net) debt.
- Duration mismatch on government balance sheet: fiscal capacity boost from lower real rates
- Duration mismatch on HH balance sheet: large welfare losses (gains) for young non-participants (older participants)

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