Do Survey Expectations of Stock Returns Reflect Risk-Adjustments?

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Summary

- Objective: to rationalize documented departures of subjective expectations from rational expectations.
 - For instance, investors' return expectations are pro-cyclical, whereas in RE framework representative investor perceives counter-cyclical expected returns.

Summary II

- Two potential explanations:
 - Risk-neutral expectations: outcomes are weighted by their probabilities X the marginal utility associated with each outcome

 More weight to outcomes in high MU states.
 - Ambiguity aversion or concerns about model misspecification: give rise to pessimism bias.

Summary III

 Testable implication 1: expected returns should equal the risk-free rate.

 Testable implication 2: survey expected returns should be downward biased relative to RE of returns.

Summary IV

 Use data from a variety of surveys, spanning CFOs, wealthy investors, and professional investors.

Find little support for either hypothesis.

 Instead, "In boom times, [...] investors are too optimistic. Following crashes, [...] investors are too pessimistic."

Comments

- Very interesting topic and paper, carefully done.
- Growing literature on survey measures of expectations, subjective expectations, and departures from the FIRE framework.
- Contribution 1: come up with testable implications of two prominent rationalizations of departures from FIRE.
- Contribution 2: document empirical properties of subjective expectations of financial asset returns.

Comments II

Authors briefly discuss point vs. density forecasts.

 Can still derive measures of central tendency from DFs; better inter-personal comparability.

 Pessimism Hp. could have testable implications for the tails/skewness of the subjective density forecasts.

Comments III

 What is the psychological mechanism that leads agents to assign a higher probability to outcomes in high MU states? Is it riskaversion? Robust control considerations?

 How does this hypothesis relate to the pessimism hypothesis?

Comments IV

 Do any of these surveys have a panel dimension? (Assume Duke CFO survey does)

 Could think of additional tests of rationality, involving individual revisions of expectations and forecast errors.

Comments V

- The conditional tests of the risk-neutral expectations hypothesis use the P/D ratio as a conditioning variable.
 - Would be good to see robustness using other possible conditioning variables, e.g. state of the economy.
- "In boom times, [...] investors are too optimistic.
 Following crashes, [...] investors are too pessimistic."
 - Seems consistent with diagnostic expectations.