

House Price Expectations and Housing Choice

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Motivation and Research Question


- Large swings in house prices in many advanced economies.
- Potential explanations for these dynamics
 - supply-side: savings glut, fall in lending standards
 - demand side: (ir-)rational expectations about future house prices
- Our question: what is the role of expectations in a house-price boom and bust cycle?
- Our contribution:
 - empirical: panel data set on expectations and choices
 - structural: model consistent with panel data

Empirics


Data

- The survey data is from the DNB Household Survey, conducted annually since 1993. The survey is representative for the Dutch population (≈ 4500 households). Households participate for several years. Housing question only since 2003.
- Survey (and administrative) data on income, assets and liabilities.
- Expectation questions
 1. Own house price
 2. Aggregate house price


House Price Growth in the Netherlands




House Price Growth and Expectations




Distribution of Expectations: 2 types



Attentive Households: track market



Behavior of attentive vs inattentive households



- Inattentive almost flat probability to buy
- Attentive respond strongly to house prices.

Model

Model set-up

- Life-cycle model

$$E_t^i \left[\sum_{j=1}^J \beta^j U(C_{it+j}, S(\tilde{H}_{it+j})) + \beta^{J+1} B(\tilde{W}_{it+J+1}) \right]$$

$\beta \in (0, 1)$ discount factor, $B(\tilde{W}_{it+J+1})$ utility from bequest.

- Discrete housing

– Owner-Occupied: $H_{it} \in \mathcal{H}$ where $\mathcal{H} = \{h^0, \dots, h^{N_h}\}$

– Rental: $\tilde{H}_{it} \in \tilde{\mathcal{H}}$ where $\tilde{\mathcal{H}} = \{\tilde{h}^0, \dots, \tilde{h}^{N_{\tilde{h}}}\}$

- Mortgages

– LTV limit $-A_{it} \leq \lambda_m P_t H_{it}$

– Minimum repayment per period $A_{it} \geq [1 + r_M - \phi(r_M, j)] A_{it-1}$

- Budget constraint

$$C_{it} + A_{it} + P_t H_{it} + \mathbb{1}_{\{H_{it} \neq H_{it-1}\}} \theta (1 - \delta) P_t H_{it-1} + \mathbb{1}_{\{\tilde{H}_{it} > 0\}} \tilde{P}_t \tilde{H}_{it} = Y_{it} + (1 + r_b + \mathbb{1}_{\{A_{it-1} < 0\}} \zeta) A_{it-1} + (1 - \delta) P_t H_{it-1}$$

- Labor income

$$Y_{it} = g(j_{it}) \chi_{it} \varepsilon_{it}$$

$$\chi_{it} = \chi_{it-1}^\rho \nu_{it}$$

Recursive formulation:

$$V_t(X_t) = \max \{ V_t^{adj}(X_t), V_t^{noadj}(X_t), V_t^{rent}(X_t) \}$$

Utility specification

$$U(C_t, S(H_t, \tilde{H}_t)) = \frac{[C_t^{1-\sigma} S(H_t, \tilde{H}_t)^\sigma]^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma}$$

where $S(\cdot)$ is linear in its first two arguments and given by:

$$S(H_t, \tilde{H}_t) = \omega H_t + \tilde{H}_t \quad \text{where} \quad \omega \geq 1$$

The specification for utility due to bequests follows De Nardi (2004),

$$B(\tilde{W}) = \vartheta_1 \frac{(\tilde{W} + \vartheta_2)^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma}$$

Calibration

Parameter	Interpretation	Value in Data
Fixed Parameters		
Demographics		
j	Period length in years	1
J	Length of life	80
J^{ret}	Retirement age	65
J^{born}	Age of newborns	25
Income Process		
$\{g(j_t)\}$	Deterministic age profile polynomial order	4
rr	Replacement rate	0.80
ρ	Autocorrelation of persistent component	0.9669
σ_ζ^2	Variance of persistent shock	0.0146
σ_ε^2	Variance of transitory shock	0.2908
Financial Instruments		
r_b	Risk-free rate	0.03
ζ	Mortgage loan markup	0.01
λ_m	Maximum LTV ratio on mortgage loans	0.90

6 parameters calibrated internally: Discount factor β ; 3 bequest-related parameters ω , ϑ_1 , ϑ_2 ; housing bins \mathcal{H} , $\tilde{\mathcal{H}}$

Targeted Moment	Data	Model
Average financial assets	-0.454	-0.248
Home-ownership rate	0.748	0.773
Median $NW_{j=75}$ / Median $NW_{j=50}$	1.444	1.330
Percent of bequest HHs in bottom half of NW dist.	0.112	0.080
Housing/Net Worth 10th percentile	0.700	0.797
Housing/Net Worth mean	0.916	0.948
Housing/Net Worth 90th percentile	1.000	1.000
Rent / Income 10th percentile	0.178	0.054
Rent / Income 50th percentile	0.316	0.133
Rent / Income 90th percentile	0.554	0.277

Model rent-to-price ratio 0.12, instead of 0.07 (data).

Temporary Equilibrium - intuitive

- Recall that we observe the sequence $\{\Phi_t\}$.


$$\underbrace{P_t \tilde{H}_t}_{\text{Data}} = P_t \int \underbrace{h_t}_{\text{Model}}(P_t, \tilde{P}_t, A_{it-1}, H_{it-1}, Y_{it}, j_{it}, r_t, E_t^i(\Pi_{t+1}^H)) \underbrace{d\Phi_t}_{\text{Data}}$$

- Use model to derive the sequence $\{P_t\}^{TE}$


- Compare with $\{P_t\}^{data}$

Results


Model mechanism: expected capital gains



Equilibrium prices: model vs data



Heterogenous vs. homogenous expectations



Conclusions and next steps

- Evidence for *attentive* and *inattentive* households wrt house prices.
- Attentive households track the market.
- Expectations matter for choices.
- Model outcomes track data qualitatively but still too volatile.
- Heterogeneity matters (homogenous expectations version does worse).
- More formal (regression-based) comparison of model and data at household level.

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