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Contents

Abbreviations and symbols

e Estimated
p Provisional
pe Partly estimated
r Revised
… Data available at a later date
. Data unknown, not to be published or not meaningful
0 Less than 0.5 but more than nil
– Nil

Discrepancies in the totals are due to rounding.

Commentaries

Economic conditions

Underlying trends

Strong economic growth expected in 2015 H1

The first quarter of 2015 is likely to have seen a further sharp increase in German economic output following its surprisingly strong expansion at the end of 2014. A continuation of this buoyant upward cyclical movement is indicated for the second quarter as well. The main drivers in this context are external demand, private consumption and, to a lesser extent, housing construction. Furthermore, there are signs of something of an upturn in corporate investment. The consumer climate, which has been sustained for some time now by a positive labour market outlook and large wage increases, has gained significant momentum of late owing to considerable energy-related gains in purchasing power and additional government transfers. The fourth quarter of 2014 saw a distinct increase not only in private consumption, however, but also in the household saving ratio. The additional real scope for expenditure was therefore not yet being fully utilised. The sharp rise in retail sales in January indicates that this is now increasingly the case.

Industry

Underlying upward trend in industrial output …

In seasonally adjusted terms, there was no further increase in industrial output in January compared with its December level, which was revised upwards markedly by ¾%. The key factor here was probably a "bridge day" effect, signs of which were particularly evident in the automotive sector. The figure was still 1% up on the average level of the fourth quarter, which indicates the underlying upward trend in industrial output. Compared with the final quarter of 2014, the largest increase was in capital goods production at +1¼%, followed by intermediate goods at +¾% and consumer goods at +½%.

… and in orders received

The intake of orders in German industry in January was a seasonally adjusted 4% down on the month. Its level in December was extremely high, however. Orders on an average of December and January were thus 1¼% higher than in October and November. This applied equally to domestic orders, orders from the rest of the euro area and orders from non-euro-area countries. The key factor here was a larger volume of major orders. Orders of capital goods went up by 2% and orders of intermediate goods by ¾%. This contrasted with a ¾% decline in orders of consumer goods.

Higher export sales, perceptible rise in real imports

Industrial sales in January were 1¼% up on the month after seasonal adjustment. Compared with the average of the previous quarter, the increase was 1¾%. Growth in export sales (+2¾%) was significantly larger than the increase in domestic sales (-½%). The rise in non-euro-area countries (+3½%) was sharper than in the rest of the euro area (+1½%). Seasonally adjusted exports of goods in January did not quite match the figure for the final quarter of 2014 (-¾%). On a more informative two-month comparison of December and January against October and November, however, there was an increase of 1%. In nominal terms, imports in January were likewise somewhat down on their level in the previous quarter (-½%). In real terms, however, they picked up markedly, chiefly on account of the decline in oil prices.

Construction

Strong increase in construction output, somewhat fewer construction orders

Seasonally adjusted construction output in January was 5% higher than the figure for December, which had already undergone a sharp upward revision. Compared with the average of the final quarter of 2014, there was an increase of 4¾%. Output in the main construction sector rose by 2%, buoyed by the comparatively mild winter weather. Orders received in the main construction sector in the final

Economic conditions in Germany*

Seasonally adjusted

Period	Total	of which: Domestic	of which: Foreign	Main construction
	Orders received (volume); 2010 = 100			
	Industry			
2014 Q2	108.6	103.8	112.5	109.4
Q3	108.7	101.7	114.4	106.8
Q4	111.0	104.0	116.7	106.4
Nov	108.6	100.7	115.1	106.0
Dec	113.4	105.8	119.5	107.7
2015 Jan	109.0	103.2	113.8	...

Period	Total	of which: Intermediate goods	of which: Capital goods	Construction
	Output; 2010 = 100			
	Industry			
2014 Q2	109.6	106.1	116.1	107.7
Q3	109.4	105.2	116.5	106.9
Q4	110.2	106.0	117.3	106.8
Nov	109.9	105.5	117.2	107.0
Dec	111.2	107.3	118.1	106.7
2015 Jan	111.2	106.9	118.7	112.0

Period	Exports	Imports	Balance	*Memo item* Current account balance in € billion
	Foreign trade; € billion			
2014 Q2	280.30	228.13	52.17	51.49
Q3	287.10	229.60	57.50	61.15
Q4	291.14	230.83	60.31	60.44
Nov	95.67	77.40	18.27	17.28
Dec	98.35	76.84	21.51	20.89
2015 Jan	96.28	76.62	19.66	22.13

Period	Employment	Vacancies[1]	Unemployment	Unemployment rate in %
	Labour market			
	Number in thousands			
2014 Q2	42,621	479	2,901	6.7
Q3	42,701	494	2,903	6.7
Q4	42,789	518	2,865	6.6
Dec	42,811	527	2,842	6.5
2015 Jan	42,853	532	2,832	6.5
Feb	...	534	2,812	6.5

Period	Import prices	Producer prices of industrial products	Construction prices[2]	Consumer prices
	Prices; 2010 = 100			
2014 Q2	103.8	105.9	109.5	106.6
Q3	103.7	105.7	110.0	106.9
Q4	102.7	105.4	110.1	106.6
Dec	101.3	105.0	.	106.3
2015 Jan	100.2	104.3	.	105.9
Feb	...	104.3	.	106.5

***** For explanatory notes, see Statistical Section, XI, and Statistical Supplement, Seasonally adjusted business statistics. **1** Excluding government-assisted forms of employment and seasonal jobs. **2** Not seasonally adjusted.

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quarter of last year – more recent data are unavailable – did not quite equal their level in the third quarter, showing a decline of ¼%. This was due to a fall in orders, mainly from the public sector but also from industry, which was not entirely offset by the extremely strong increase in demand for housing construction.

Labour market

Employment continues to rise

The upturn in the labour market became stronger at the beginning of the year. The number of persons employed in Germany in January increased by a seasonally adjusted 42,000 on the month and thus somewhat more sharply than at the end of 2014. The year-on-year rise amounted to 408,000, or 1.0%. According to the provisional figures of the Federal Employment Agency, which are probably overstated owing to changes in the reporting procedure, the number of employees subject to social security contributions showed an increase of 2.0% on the year in December. The leading indicators for the labour market of Ifo and the Federal Employment Agency signal that the upward trend is continuing.

Continued fall in unemployment

February saw a further marked fall in the official employment figure. After seasonal adjustment, there was a decline of 20,000 on the month, which was similar to the average of the preceding months. This gives an annual fall in unemployment of 121,000. The unemployment rate at the end of the period under review was 6.5%. The labour market barometer of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) was unchanged in February and points to a slight decline in unemployment for the next few months.

Prices

Crude oil prices fall again

Crude oil prices fell again in the first half of March after going back up for a time in February, but did not undershoot their low of US$47 in the second week of January. In February, a

barrel of Brent crude cost US$59 on average, which was still around 45% lower than its level one year earlier. As this report went to press, Brent crude was trading at US$54. The premium on crude oil futures was US$4¼ for deliveries six months ahead and US$7¾ for delivery 12 months ahead.

Import prices significantly lower, producer prices unchanged

Due to oil price movements, import prices in January were perceptibly lower than in the previous month after seasonal adjustment. If energy is excluded, they went up owing to the impact of the euro's appreciation, however. Producer prices for domestic sales fell in January and remained unchanged in February. Compared with December, the year-on-year decline widened markedly to 4.4% in January in the case of import prices and to 2.1% in February for industrial producer prices.

Sharp month-on-month rise in consumer prices

Chiefly as a result of the recovery in crude oil prices, consumer prices in February showed a sharp seasonally adjusted increase of 0.6% on the month. Along with energy, food products also became more expensive and the prices of services showed a marked rise, mainly on account of package holidays. There was also a slight rise in the prices of industrial goods, and housing rents continued their subdued upward trend. The earlier year-on-year decline as measured by the national consumer price index (CPI) turned into an annual increase of 0.1% and moderated to -0.1% as defined by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). If energy is excluded, the CPI and HICP rates are 1.0% and 0.9% respectively.

Public finances[1]

Statutory health insurance scheme

Finances of statutory health insurance scheme back in negative territory

According to provisional data, the statutory health insurance scheme recorded a deficit of just under €2½ billion in 2014 following a surplus of almost €2 billion one year previously. The clear deterioration, despite sharp inflows of contributions, was due to the generally high level of growth in expenditure, which was intensified in particular by reversing the temporary increase in the manufacturers' discount on pharmaceuticals. The situation was aggravated further by a €1 billion cut in the central government grant, which had already been lowered by €2½ billion in 2013. The finances of the statutory health insurance institutions shifted from a surplus of just over €1 billion in 2013 to a deficit of the same amount in 2014. The health insurance fund went from recording a surplus of €½ billion in 2013 to a deficit of just over €1 billion in 2014. Thus the statutory health insurance institutions' reserves fell to a total of €15.5 billion and those of the health insurance fund to €12.5 billion.[2]

Finances of statutory health insurance institutions worsened due to steep climb in expenditure

At almost 4½%, the statutory health insurance institutions' revenue increased sharply for 2014 as a whole. In addition to a year-on-year rise of 4% in the transfers from the health insurance fund, which are fixed in advance, other revenue was also considerably higher.[3] Growth in expenditure was even more robust (at just over 5½%) owing, among other things, to an increase of just over ½% in the number of insured persons. At almost 10%, growth in spending on pharmaceuticals was particularly strong because the increase in the statutory

1 In the short commentaries on public finances, the emphasis is on recent outturns. The quarterly editions of the Monthly Report (published in February, May, August and November), by contrast, contain a detailed description of public finance developments during the preceding quarter. For detailed data on budgetary developments and public debt, see the statistical section of this report.
2 Each statutory health insurance institution is required to hold minimum reserves of one-quarter of a month's expenditure at year-end, which amounts to around €4 billion in total (section 261 (2) of the Social Security Code Book V). The minimum reserves of the health insurance fund are one-fifth of a month's expenditure, which currently amounts to just over €3 billion (section 271 (2) of the Social Security Code Book V).
3 However, this also includes differences between the amounts that the health insurance fund recorded as having transferred and the amounts that the statutory health insurance institutions recorded as having received, which also reflect changes in the institutions' mutual claims and liabilities. This difference led to a decrease in revenue of just under €½ billion in 2013 but an increase of the same amount in 2014. It is thus possible that the cash balance has deteriorated by almost €1 billion more overall.

Finances of the statutory health insurance scheme*

€ billion, quarterly



Source: Federal Ministry of Health. * Health insurance fund and health insurance institutions (consolidated). Preliminary quarterly results (KV45).

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Statutory health insurance scheme Overview of finances for 2014*

€ billion

Revenue		Expenditure	
Health insurance fund (HIF)			
Contributions	188.14	Transfers to HII	199.62
Central government grants	10.39	Administration	0.05
Other revenue	0.01		
Deficit	**1.13**		
Total	199.67	Total	199.67
Health insurance institutions (HII)			
Transfers from HIF	199.62	Spending on benefits	193.53
Additional contributions	0.00	Administration	9.97
Other contributions	0.96	Other expenditure	1.83
Central government grants to AHII	0.11		
Other revenue[1]	3.44		
Deficit	**1.20**		
Total	205.33	Total	205.33
Statutory health insurance system as a whole			
Contributions	189.10	Spending on benefits	193.53
Central government grants	10.50	Administration	10.02
Other revenue	3.45	Other expenditure	1.83
Deficit	**2.33**		
Total	205.37	Total	205.37

* Preliminary quarterly results (KV45). AHII = agricultural health insurance institutions. **1** Including the difference compared with the transfers recorded by the health insurance fund as well as claims and liabilities.

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manufacturers' discount was essentially reversed at the start of 2014. A substantial rise in payments for hearing aids contributed to the very sharp increase in spending on therapeutic treatment and aids (8%). Spending on sickness benefit picked up again and amounted to 9%. Growth in spending on out-patient and in-patient care (at just over 4% and almost 4½%, respectively) was disproportionately low, but still higher than growth in income subject to compulsory insurance contributions. Overall, the main factor behind the statutory health insurance institutions' deficit is not that the autumn 2013 calculations underestimated the level of transfers from the health insurance fund that would be needed to cover expenditure, but that these calculations did not contain the premium payouts and voluntary benefits (totalling €1 billion) of some institutions.[4]

Health insurance fund's deficit lower than expected due to favourable employment developments

The health insurance fund recorded growth in revenue of just over 3% in 2014. Revenue from contributions was up by almost 4%, but the cut in the central government grant had a dampening effect. Employees' contributions rose by just over 5% due to the very favourable developments in employment subject to social security contributions and *per capita* earnings. However, at just over 2½%, growth in pensioners' contributions was significantly weaker overall, despite a much more dynamic second half of the year driven mainly by benefit increases for pensioners. Thus the health insurance fund's deficit was €2 billion lower than expected when the transfers to the statutory health insurance institutions were fixed in autumn 2013 because developments in employment subject to social security contributions have proven to be considerably more favourable than forecast at that time.

According to the figures calculated by the group of statutory health insurance estimators, the statutory health insurance scheme's deficit

4 In total, the statutory health insurance institutions paid out just under €¾ billion in premiums to their members, which was slightly more than in 2013.

Favourable macroeconomic developments likely to rein in expanding deficit in 2015

is set to expand in 2015. The health insurance fund now transfers only revenue generated from the general contribution rate of 14.6% to the statutory health insurance institutions. Members no longer have to pay the uniform special contribution of 0.9% of income subject to compulsory contributions. Statutory health insurance institutions may set an individual additional contribution rate to cover their funding gap. At the start of 2015, this amounted to just over 0.8% on average. There is thus a difference of around €1 billion compared with the additional contribution rate of 0.9% that the group of statutory health insurance estimators calculated as necessary to cover expenditure. If their expenditure estimate proves to be correct, the statutory health insurance institutions will record a deficit of at least €1 billion. Statutory health insurance institutions may also record spending on voluntary additional benefits; however, premium payouts are no longer permitted following the changeover to income-related additional contributions. The health insurance fund's deficit has been forecast to total €2½ billion as the cut in the central government grant (to €11½ billion instead of the regular €14 billion) is to be offset by using the health insurance fund's reserves. As things currently stand, wages and salaries subject to compulsory contributions may well increase at a sharper pace than assumed by the group of statutory health insurance estimators in autumn 2014, chiefly owing to more favourable developments in employment. This would rein in the expansion of the deficit expected for 2015.

Public long-term care insurance scheme

Surplus in 2014 as a whole close to 2013 level

The public long-term care insurance scheme recorded a surplus of just under €½ billion in 2014, meaning that the result fell only slightly on the year. While revenue rose by just under 4%, expenditure was up a little more at almost 4½% even though there were no major special factors in 2014. Employees' contributions rose by just under 4½% due to favourable labour market and wage developments. The rise in pensioners' contributions was much slower (at just over 2½%) despite an acceleration in the second half of the year due, not least, to benefit increases in the statutory pension insurance scheme. Overall, the public long-term care insurance scheme's reserves were topped up to €6½ billion.

Finances of the public long-term care insurance scheme*

€ billion, quarterly



Source: Federal Ministry of Health. * Preliminary quarterly results (PV45).
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In 2015 higher contribution rates also for precautionary fund to spread contribution burden more evenly over time

On 1 January 2015, the contribution rate was raised from 2.05% to 2.35% (plus an extra 0.25% in each case for childless persons). This will generate additional receipts of just over €3½ billion, two-thirds of which are earmarked for higher expenditure, while the remaining third is to be used to set up a separate reserve. Additional receipts equivalent to one-tenth of a percentage point of the contribution rate will be paid into a precautionary fund administered by the Bundesbank. A capital stock is to be built up by 2034 which will then be gradually depleted and could curb the ex-

Sales and purchases of debt securities

€ billion

Item	2014 January	2014 December	2015 January
Sales	2.5	– 23.9	12.0
Domestic debt securities[1]			
of which			
Bank debt securities	3.7	– 7.3	9.1
Public debt securities	– 4.7	– 16.9	0.7
Foreign debt securities[2]	5.3	0.3	11.3
Purchases			
Residents	0.1	– 4.9	3.2
Credit institutions[3]	– 4.1	– 15.5	11.5
Deutsche Bundesbank	– 1.5	0.0	– 0.7
Other sectors[4]	5.7	10.5	– 7.6
of which			
Domestic debt securities	0.1	8.8	– 10.4
Non-residents[2]	7.7	– 18.7	20.1
Total sales/purchases	7.8	– 23.6	23.3

1 Net sales at market values plus/minus changes in issuers' holdings of their own debt securities. **2** Transaction values. **3** Book values, statistically adjusted. **4** Residual.

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pected rise in the contribution rate over the subsequent period of around 20 years by approximately one-tenth of a percentage point. Of course, this will only be possible if the government refrains from using these growing financial reserves for any other purpose and if the invested funds yield earnings that more or less keep pace with the growth rate of gross wages and salaries. The public long-term care insurance scheme will inevitably record annual surpluses – which will initially amount to just over €1 billion – while the reserve is being built up.

Securities markets

Bond market

Net sales in the German bond market up

Issuing activity in the German bond market picked up again considerably in January 2015. Overall, bonds worth €141.7 billion were issued, compared with €99.8 billion in December 2014. After deducting redemptions, which increased slightly on the previous month, and taking account of changes in issuers' holdings of their own debt securities, the volume of outstanding domestic bonds rose by €12.0 billion. Foreign debt securities worth €11.3 billion net were placed in the German bond market, so that total sales of debt securities in the German market in January amounted to €23.3 billion.

Increase in credit institutions' capital market debt

Credit institutions increased their capital market debt in the reporting month by €9.1 billion net. On balance, this was predominantly attributable to debt securities issued by specialised credit institutions, the outstanding volume of which rose by €9.6 billion. Furthermore, a smaller amount (€0.9 billion) of mortgage Pfandbriefe was also issued. By contrast, there were net redemptions of other bank debt securities, which can be structured flexibly (€1.1 billion), and public Pfandbriefe (€0.2 billion).

Net issuance of corporate bonds

In January, domestic enterprises issued bonds worth €2.3 billion net, compared with €0.2 billion in the previous month. On balance, these new issues chiefly involved securities with a maturity of more than one year.

Negligible net public sector issuance

The public sector issued own debt securities of €0.7 billion net (December 2014: net redemptions in the amount of €16.9 billion). This was due, on balance, exclusively to the countries that increased their capital market debt by €1.0 billion. Central government capital market debt, on the other hand, was down by €0.3 billion net. In this context, it primarily redeemed ten-year Federal bonds (Bunds) in the amount of €7.7 billion. This contrasted with net issuance of two-year Federal Treasury notes (Schätze) worth €4.0 billion, Federal notes (Bobls) worth €3.5 billion and 30-year bonds worth €1.6 billion.

Purchases of debt securities

Non-resident investors were the main net buyers in the German bond market, adding €20.1 billion worth of German debt securities to their portfolios. Domestic credit institutions,

too, purchased bonds (totalling €11.5 billion net), with the focus mainly on foreign securities. By contrast, domestic non-banks sold debt securities worth €7.6 billion net.

Equity market

Negligible net issuance in the German equity market

There was virtually no issuing activity in the German equity market in January. Domestic listed companies issued just €0.1 billion worth of shares overall. The outstanding amount of foreign equities in Germany increased by €0.7 billion. Equities were purchased, on balance, exclusively by domestic credit institutions (€7.1 billion), which were primarily interested in domestic securities (€8.8 billion). By contrast, non-resident investors and domestic non-banks reduced their holdings by €5.9 billion and €0.4 billion net respectively.

Mutual funds

German mutual funds record significant inflows of funds

In the reporting month, domestic mutual funds recorded significant inflows of €21.9 billion, €18.1 billion of which were to specialised funds reserved for institutional investors. Of the various asset classes, mixed security-based funds, in particular, were able to attract new subscriptions (€10.2 billion), as were, albeit to a lesser extent, bond funds (€4.6 billion), equity funds (€2.7 billion), funds of funds (€2.2 billion) and open-end real estate funds (€1.0 billion). In January, foreign investment companies sold shares worth €2.1 billion in the German market. As in the previous month, mutual fund shares were purchased mainly by domestic non-banks (€20.1 billion). Furthermore, domestic credit institutions and non-resident investors purchased mutual fund shares for €2.4 billion and €1.5 billion net respectively.

Balance of payments

Decreased current account surplus

The German current account recorded a surplus of €16.8 billion in January 2015. The result was €9.2 billion below the level of the previous month. This was primarily attributable to lower net receipts on invisible current transactions, which comprise services as well as primary and secondary income. The surplus on the goods account likewise narrowed.

Fall in surplus on the goods account

In January, the surplus on the goods account fell by €2.5 billion to €15.8 billion. Exports of goods were on a par with the previous month's level, while imports of goods increased significantly.

Lower surplus on invisible current transactions

In January, the surplus on invisible current transactions declined by €6.8 billion to €1.0 billion, with the balances of both the primary income and the services accounts deteriorating. Net receipts on primary income contracted by €3.9 billion to €7.7 billion. This was mainly due to a normalisation of other income following the payment of agricultural subsidies in December – as is standard practice at year's end – under the EU budget. The decline was, however, dampened by the rise in interest receipts from long-term debt securities. Expenditure within this investment category had also declined sharply, however this was more than offset by higher dividend payments. In the services account, the €0.8 billion surplus recorded in December reversed to a deficit of €2.4 billion, largely as a result of reduced receipts from IT services. Moreover, receipts from research and development services and charges for the use of intellectual property declined more sharply than expenditure, and travel expenditure increased again. By contrast, the deficit arising from secondary income fell slightly by €0.3 billion to €4.4 billion.

Net inflows in portfolio investment

The international financial markets were influenced in the opening month of this year by the announcement of extensive asset purchases by the Eurosystem as well as political developments in Greece. Against this backdrop, Ger-

Major items of the balance of payments

€ billion

Item	2014 Jan[r]	2014 Dec[r]	2015 Jan[p]
I Current account	+ 14.2	+ 26.0	+ 16.8
1 Goods[1]	+ 16.0	+ 18.3	+ 15.8
Exports (fob)	90.0	88.9	88.7
Imports (fob)	74.1	70.6	72.8
Memo item			
Foreign trade[2]	+ 14.7	+ 18.9	+ 15.9
Exports (fob)	90.5	90.1	89.9
Imports (cif)	75.8	71.2	74.0
2 Services[3]	– 2.8	+ 0.8	– 2.4
Receipts	16.2	22.1	16.8
Expenditure	19.0	21.3	19.2
3 Primary income	+ 5.2	+ 11.6	+ 7.7
Receipts	15.6	21.3	17.2
Expenditure	10.4	9.7	9.5
4 Secondary income	– 4.2	– 4.7	– 4.4
II Capital account	+ 1.5	– 0.7	0.0
III Financial account (increase: +)	+ 1.3	+ 24.4	– 5.5
1 Direct investment	+ 9.5	+ 22.3	+ 8.2
Domestic investment abroad	+ 0.3	+ 11.5	+ 5.9
Foreign investment in the reporting country	– 9.2	– 10.9	– 2.3
2 Portfolio investment	+ 9.0	+ 24.4	– 3.4
Domestic investment in foreign securities	+ 9.8	+ 4.4	+ 12.4
Shares[4]	+ 2.2	+ 5.0	– 1.0
Investment fund shares[5]	+ 2.4	– 0.9	+ 2.1
Long-term debt securities[6]	+ 3.5	+ 4.1	+ 7.2
Short-term debt securities[7]	+ 1.8	– 3.8	+ 4.1
Foreign investment in domestic securities	+ 0.8	– 20.0	+ 15.7
Shares[4]	– 7.6	– 0.3	– 5.9
Investment fund shares	+ 0.7	– 0.9	+ 1.5
Long-term debt securities[6]	– 7.5	– 13.1	+ 5.4
Short-term debt securities[7]	+ 15.2	– 5.6	+ 14.7
3 Financial derivatives[8]	+ 2.6	0.0	+ 4.6
4 Other investment[9]	– 19.4	– 20.4	– 15.3
Monetary financial institutions[10]	– 8.2	+ 7.5	– 24.3
of which			
Short-term	– 10.1	– 4.2	– 29.8
Enterprises and households[11]	+ 0.3	– 23.6	+ 5.2
General government	+ 1.0	– 1.3	+ 4.5
Bundesbank	– 12.6	– 3.0	– 0.7
5 Reserve assets[12]	– 0.4	– 2.0	+ 0.4
IV Errors and omissions[13]	– 14.4	– 0.9	– 22.3

1 Excluding freight and insurance costs of foreign trade. **2** Special trade according to the official foreign trade statistics (source: Federal Statistical Office). **3** Including freight and insurance costs of foreign trade. **4** Including participation certificates. **5** Including reinvestment of earnings. **6** Long-term: original maturity of more than one year or unlimited. **7** Short-term: original maturity of up to one year. **8** Balance of transactions arising from options and financial futures contracts as well as employee stock options. **9** Includes in particular loans and trade credits as well as currency and deposits. **10** Excluding the Bundesbank. **11** Includes the following sectors: financial corporations (excluding monetary financial institutions) as well as non-financial corporations, households and non-profit institutions serving households. **12** Excluding allocation of special drawing rights and excluding changes due to value adjustments. **13** Statistical errors and omissions, resulting from the difference between the balance on the financial account and the balances on the current account and the capital account.

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man cross-border portfolio investment generated net capital imports of €3.4 billion in January. Non-resident investors acquired German securities worth a total of €15.7 billion net. On balance they disposed of German shares (€5.9 billion) while substantially increasing their holdings of domestic debt securities (€20.1 billion), showing a marked preference for money market paper (€14.7 billion net) and private bonds (€7.7 billion). By contrast, they parted with German public sector bonds to the tune of €2.3 billion net. German investors increased their foreign securities holdings by €12.4 billion in January. While they disposed of equities (€1.0 billion net), they mainly purchased bonds (€7.2 billion) and money market paper (€4.1 billion) on balance abroad.

Direct investment: net capital outflows

In January, direct investment generated net capital exports totalling €8.2 billion. This was chiefly prompted by resident enterprises investing €5.9 billion abroad and non-resident investors scaling back their investment in Germany by €2.3 billion net. Resident investors reinvested almost as many funds in foreign equity investments (€4.7 billion) as they made available to affiliated enterprises via reinvested earnings (€4.8 billion); conversely, they reduced their intra-group lending (€2.9 billion). Non-resident investors, too, supplied German enterprises with funds via equity capital (€2.2 billion) and reduced the extent of lending within the group (€4.5 billion).

Net capital imports in other investment

Other statistically recorded investment comprising loans and trade credits (where these do not constitute direct investment) as well as bank deposits and other investments saw net capital imports of €15.3 billion in January. This was caused by substantial inflows of funds on the part of monetary financial institutions (€24.3 billion net). By contrast, enterprises and households along with general government spent €5.2 billion and €4.5 billion net respectively on investments abroad. The Bundesbank's net claims vis-à-vis non-residents showed a slight decrease (€0.7 billion). This was the result of a significant increase, for the first time in

several months, in the Bundesbank's claims (€54.4 billion) on TARGET2 balances. Furthermore, the Bundesbank's cross-border liabilities rose by €55.1 billion, chiefly on account of higher deposits being placed by foreign monetary authorities and international organisations in Bundesbank accounts. In the rest of the banking sector, cross-border claims and liabilities arising from interbank-transactions rose considerably in January.

Reserve assets

The Bundesbank's reserve assets increased – at transaction values – by €0.4 billion in January.

Approaches to strengthening the regulatory framework of European monetary union

The financial and sovereign debt crisis has confronted the euro area and its member states with major challenges, and has yet to be overcome. Reforms have been carried out and measures taken in many policy spheres. However, earlier calls to create a political or fiscal union and to fundamentally reform the EU treaties seem to have been silenced by the decision to set up a banking union. There appears to be insufficient political support for a significant transfer of sovereign powers from the national to the European level. As long as that remains the case, it is crucial to shape and strengthen the existing regulatory framework of monetary union over the medium to long term in such a way that it can reliably and lastingly deliver on its promise to act as a union of stability.

Despite all the coordination mechanisms in place, the euro-area member states have more or less free rein in economic and fiscal policy. Conversely, individual member states are responsible for their own debt, and both monetary financing and joint liability are prohibited. This accords with the fundamental principle that governments – and investors – should be accountable for their own actions. This implies that monetary union also has to be able to withstand the extreme scenario of a member state becoming insolvent. The original framework did not take adequate account of this aspect or, notably, its repercussions for financial stability. Although numerous reforms have been launched to combat the crisis, in many areas they have tipped the balance towards increased elements of joint liability. All in all, a number of challenges still lie ahead on the road to constructing a more cohesive framework that can better prevent future crises and, in particular, ensure that monetary policy remains focused on price stability.

This article outlines various approaches to making the European monetary union more resilient to crises in future. Strengthening financial stability is a key part of this process, and should include steps to curb the risks that sovereign solvency problems pose to particularly systemically important banks, eg by reducing the preferential regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures in the medium term and eliminating it altogether in the long term. Equally, the negative impact of bank distress on sovereigns should be minimised. To achieve this, banks' loss-absorbing capacity needs to be further strengthened. Where necessary, orderly resolution must be possible even for large, interconnected financial institutions without tapping public funds. In the area of fiscal policy, budgetary surveillance and the implementation of fiscal rules should be improved, and consideration given to an overhaul of the institutional framework. It also appears necessary to reinforce the disciplining effect of the financial markets on fiscal policy and to develop crisis management mechanisms which reduce moral hazard. Stability-oriented monetary policy crucially relies on its ability to resist pressure to step into the breach for overindebted banks or sovereigns.

Overview

Sovereign debt crisis an acid test for monetary union

The financial and sovereign debt crisis was an acid test for monetary union. At the height of the crisis, some member states lost access to the capital market, and there was speculation that some countries might exit the euro or even that monetary union itself was in jeopardy. While the situation in Greece has flared up again, the acute threats on the financial markets have receded on the whole, and the macroeconomic outlook has brightened. Nonetheless, the public finance situation in some member countries remains problematic. Just under half of the member states are still posting excessive deficits, and government debt has reached extremely high levels in some countries. At the same time, economic growth in the euro area is low. Although unemployment has been trending downwards since mid-2013, it remains very high. Structural reforms are necessary, and the private sector, which is still burdened by very substantial debt levels, needs to deleverage. The task of acute crisis management has largely been left to the central bank. Although the raft of non-standard monetary policy measures have helped to contain the crisis and its repercussions, in some areas, the central bank is now operating at the very limits of its mandate. Among other measures, the Eurosystem has launched purchase programmes which are expressly targeted at the government bonds of countries facing high risk premiums.[1] It has greatly expanded the collateral framework for monetary policy refinancing operations and taken contingency measures to provide massive liquidity.

Article focuses on proposals to stiffen monetary union's resilience to crises and better safeguard the role of monetary policy

This article first reviews the key causes of the crisis and the shortcomings it revealed in the regulatory framework underpinning European monetary union. Next, it briefly outlines the action taken in selected fields to prevent similar crises from occurring in future (see pages 15 to 37). It then looks at various complementary proposals to contain ongoing sources of risk and to fundamentally improve the monetary union's resilience to crises going forward. A key aim in this must be to allow monetary policy to focus on its mandate and its core objective of safeguarding price stability and prevent it from being misappropriated to solve problems in other policy areas. The article focuses on the need to fill in important missing links in the areas of financial stability (see pages 22 to 29), which has proved to be an Achilles' heel in the current regulatory framework, and fiscal policy, which lay at the heart of the sovereign debt crisis (see pages 29 to 34). In addition, it touches upon macroeconomic policy aspects (see pages 34 and 35) and monetary policy facets (see pages 35 and 36).

Loopholes in the original regulatory framework, and reforms launched

Pillars of the existing regulatory framework

Maastricht Treaty safeguarded stability-oriented monetary policy by giving central bank a clear mandate, extensive independence and …

The euro-area regulatory framework for monetary and economic policy, enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, is founded on two pillars.[2] First, the Eurosystem was granted extensive independence and given a clear mandate to focus on the objective of price stability. It was concurrently forbidden to lend to government entities or to directly purchase government debt instruments (prohibition of monetary financing). These strictures were designed to prevent the objective of price stability from being subjugated to competing political interests. The rationale behind this was the insight that a clear focus on stable prices is, in the long term, the best way for monetary policy to contribute to sustainable economic growth and lasting high employment and that central bank

1 This applies to the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) and the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs).
2 See European Union (2010), consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights, and European Commission (2015), Economic and monetary union and the euro – For stability, growth and prosperity across Europe, The European Union Explained, publication series.

independence must be legitimised by a clear and narrowly defined mandate.

… providing incentives to achieve sound public finances through …

Second, the Maastricht Treaty sought to safeguard the Eurosystem's independence not just on paper but also in practice. Thus where an imprudent fiscal policy threatens to drive a state to insolvency, even a theoretically independent central bank can come under substantial pressure to avert the high short-term economic costs of a sovereign insolvency by resorting to monetarisation. To avoid this danger, public finances should be sound enough to fully ensure the government's solvency at all times without the need for support from the central bank.

… fiscal rules and …

The intention was to safeguard sound public finances in the euro-area member states in two ways. First, budget rules were agreed – including, notably, ceilings on government deficit and debt ratios. A budgetary surveillance procedure was set up to identify and promptly correct problematic developments. Sanctions were established to penalise sustained and severe infringements of the rules. However, there are no tools at the European level for direct corrective intervention in national budgets.

… the disciplining effect of the financial markets

Second, it was hoped that market mechanisms would provide key incentives for sound fiscal policy.[3] It was thus assumed that markets would impose interest rate premiums on countries pursuing unsound public finances so as to compensate investors for increased risk, which in turn would encourage fiscal policymakers to apply fiscal discipline. Not least to allow this corrective mechanism to take effect, a "no bail-out" clause for both the member states and the monetary union as a whole was introduced alongside the prohibition of monetary financing. The fiscal framework of the Maastricht Treaty thus centres on the individual responsibility of both investors and national fiscal policies; it rules out monetary policy measures aimed at shoring up fiscal sustainability and bail-outs at the expense of the union as a whole or of other member states. These provisions are designed to ensure that policymakers also bear the consequences of their decisions (balance between liability and control). Implicitly, the possibility *in extremis* of a member state that is unwilling or unable to service its debt becoming insolvent is therefore integral to the framework of European monetary union.

Shortcomings of the original regulatory framework

Insufficient incentives for strict implementation of fiscal rules and …

This regulatory framework failed to prevent the sovereign debt crisis. Although the fiscal rules are, in principle, a suitable means of strengthening fiscal discipline, they were not rigorously implemented and enforced in the past. In addition, amendments and exemptions made the rules opaque and undermined their binding force.[4] Consequently, it was difficult for the general public to judge whether there was a valid excuse for specific infringements of the limits. Even before the financial and economic crisis erupted in 2008, member states often failed to adhere to the fiscal rules, and there was little political pressure to comply. Many countries' public finances were therefore already in fairly poor shape in the run-up to the crisis. The true problems were also obscured to some extent by inadequate statistical data. Creative accounting and, in Greece's case, prolonged, massive massaging of the official figures sometimes portrayed the public finance situation in an overly positive light.

… inadequate statistical data

Not enough attention paid to impact of macroeconomic imbalances, …

Doubts about the solvency of some governments during the debt crisis were not solely the result of unsound fiscal policy developments, however. In the first ten years of monetary union, major macroeconomic imbalances had built up in some member states. As domestic demand and unit labour costs grew relatively

3 See Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union (1989), Report on economic and monetary union in the European Community.
4 For example, France and Germany blocked an escalation of their excessive deficit procedures in 2003. As a result, the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact were diluted in 2005.

strongly and some countries' real estate markets boomed, price competitiveness deteriorated substantially, dependence on capital imports rose and the factors of production became increasingly concentrated in sectors with a domestic focus. The interest rate environment encouraged a sharp rise in household and corporate debt, which was mainly funded via domestic banking systems. All in all, the sustainability of the prevailing economic situation was substantially overestimated, as were income prospects and the long-term value of many investments and assets. Public budgets initially benefited significantly from the strong domestic demand, robust wage growth and more favourable funding conditions. But the public finance situation then worsened with the onset of the crisis as huge corrections had to be made to macroeconomic imbalances, misallocations came to light and the outlook for growth deteriorated dramatically. The original assessments of the structural budget position and the available fiscal leeway thus proved *ex post* to be far too optimistic.[5]

… support measures for financial institutions, …

In a number of countries, extensive government measures to shore up financial institutions contributed to a huge deterioration in the situation and outlook of public finances. These institutions encountered financial distress in the wake of the financial and economic crisis because the high household and corporate debt they had co-financed turned out to be unsustainable. The governments concerned mostly argued that an injection of public money into these institutions and the associated conversion of private into public debt was the only way to avert a threat to the stability of the financial system.

… insufficient disciplining of fiscal policy by the financial markets, …

Overall, it was a long while before the financial markets began discriminating more strongly between sovereigns (and banks) with different credit quality profiles. Prior to the onset of the financial and economic crisis, long-term interest rates on sovereign bonds showed hardly any spread, and fiscal policymakers were undaunted by the prospect of rising risk premiums. One reason for this may have been that the markets believed from the outset that a sovereign insolvency was highly unlikely and that a European rescue operation would be launched if the situation were to deteriorate sharply. Another reason was that the markets seemingly misjudged the sustainability of macroeconomic growth and thus the underlying robustness of some countries' public finances. Once they began to reappraise individual states' public finances, however, interest rate spreads widened sharply and abruptly in some cases as the markets increasingly lost confidence in the sustainability of debt levels. Some countries failed to counter these developments rapidly and sufficiently through a radical and credible switch in their fiscal policy stance.

… and dangers posed by unsound public finances to financial stability

This left some sovereigns facing the prospect of solvency problems. In addition, large amounts of funds were withdrawn from the banking systems in a number of euro-area countries. Given substantial dangers to financial stability in the euro area, exemptions to the rules were made so as to permit bilateral financial assistance from other euro-area states, and support packages were adopted. In the face of intense pressure, the Eurosystem decided to expand its traditional toolkit by adding unconventional instruments, some of which stretched the limits of its mandate. While these measures prevented the crisis from coming to a head and took the weight off the countries receiving support, they also weakened the accountability of sovereigns and investors as well as the credibility of the no-bail-out rule. Pressure on politicians to push through more extensive institutional reform in the euro area eased off. The introduction of emergency measures, which were not envisaged when monetary union was launched, was chiefly driven by concerns that a sovereign default in the European monetary union might impair financial stability not only in

5 For more detailed information on this issue, see various articles in Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, January 2014.

the country affected but also right across the euro area. These dangers were underestimated when monetary union was set up.

Reforms implemented or initiated

Some reforms already implemented or initiated in the fields of financial market regulation, …

A raft of reforms have been put in place since the onset of the crisis to more effectively avert future crises or make them easier to manage. Measures were implemented in the fields of financial market regulation and banking supervision in an effort to eliminate the need for governments to use public money to rescue distressed banks, especially those which are potentially systemically important ("too-big-to-fail" problem). A major objective is to lessen the danger of a mutually reinforcing feedback loop between banks and public finances (sovereign-bank nexus). Measures taken to this end include a dedicated resolution regime for banks. This notably envisages bailing in shareholders and creditors to bear a portion of the losses of a resolved credit institution, thereby obviating or minimising the need for government support measures.[6] The resolution regime is complemented by rules aimed at improving banks' resilience. These chiefly comprise rules enhancing the quantity and quality of capital to be held by all banks but especially by systemically important institutions. Other reform components are designed to diminish systemic risk. For instance, macroprudential instruments such as a countercyclical capital buffer and variable capital requirements for retail and commercial real estate lending can be deployed in future to combat an accumulation of risk in the financial system.[7]

… banking supervision and bank resolution, …

In the fields of banking supervision and bank resolution the launch of the new banking union will spark major changes, not least with a view to protecting public finances from contagion from financial sector distress.[8] The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) was put in place to harmonise prudential standards across all the participating member states. Amongst other things, it is hoped that this will counteract the temptation for national supervisors to give their domestic banking sector a competitive edge by regulating it lightly, whereas the resulting risks to stability could well spill over to other jurisdictions where they might have to be borne by governments. The provisions concerning bank recovery and resolution and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) likewise seek to make injections of public money the exception rather than the rule in future. The envisaged liability cascade for bank resolutions is broadly similar to normal insolvency proceedings in that shareholders will be first in line to bear losses, followed by creditors. As a rule, these two groups will be fully liable for any capital shortfall remaining after the write-down and conversion of relevant capital instruments, although they are not to be worse off than under normal insolvency proceedings. If the ailing bank's shareholders and creditors cover at least 8% of the liabilities, the resolution fund can then, in isolated cases, contribute towards funding the resolution. The resolution fund's resources are divided into national compartments which will be progressively mutualised over a period of eight years. If these measures prove to be insufficient, public funds can be drawn upon as a last resort.[9] National public funds will need to be the primary source of funding until a common fiscal backstop (the design of which still needs to be agreed upon during the transitional period) is up and running. If the member state in question is unable to raise sufficient funding, it has the option of requesting assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) subject to certain conditionality. As a last

6 The key attributes of effective resolution regimes agreed at the global level were implemented in the European Union by way of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). For more information see Deutsche Bundesbank, Europe's new recovery and resolution regime for credit institutions, Monthly Report, June 2014, pp 31-55.
7 Additional buffers are in place for systemically important banks.
8 For more information see Deutsche Bundesbank, Launch of the banking union: the Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe, Monthly Report, October 2014, pp 43-64.
9 For more information see Deutsche Bundesbank, The envisaged role of public funds in European bank resolution, Monthly Report, June 2014, pp 53-54.

resort, a facility has also been put in place to recapitalise banks directly using ESM funds, subject to strict conditionality, if the provision of further ESM assistance loans would pose a threat to the sustainability of sovereign debt.[10] Finally, the envisaged harmonisation of national deposit guarantee schemes is designed to strengthen the single market and improve depositor protection.

… budgetary surveillance, …

In the fiscal field, fiscal policymakers announced at the height of the crisis that the existing budgetary rules would be tightened as a *quid pro quo* for the granting of extensive financial support, and they adopted measures to avoid a repeat of the misguided developments that had occurred in the years preceding the crisis. Amendments to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) came into force at the end of 2011 which notably allowed sanctions to be imposed on euro-area countries which miss the medium-term goal of achieving a structurally close-to-balance government budget. Similarly, financial sanctions can now be imposed more quickly on member states which fail to carry out the prescribed measures to correct an excessive deficit. The 2011 legislation also introduced special majority voting requirements which make it more difficult for the Council to reject a sanction recommended by the European Commission. The Commission's role was strengthened because it was thought at that time that it would take a harder line than the Council. The amended SGP also specifies how government debt-to-GDP ratios in excess of the 60% ceiling are to be reduced, besides introducing measures that will enhance the quality of budgetary statistics. Furthermore, the 25 EU member states which adopted the Fiscal Compact have committed to enshrining in their respective national legislation uniform budgetary objectives that are largely on a par with the European requirement to achieve a structurally balanced budgetary position in the medium term.

… crisis resolution mechanism …

The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), which were initially set up as temporary fiscal assistance mechanisms, were superseded by the ESM. This permanent support fund can provide temporary liquidity assistance for illiquid, albeit not overindebted sovereigns in situations where it is thought that a failure to provide assistance would jeopardise financial stability in the euro area as a whole or in an individual member state. Countries requesting ESM liquidity assistance are generally required to sign up to adjustment programmes that are subject to economic and fiscal policy conditionality.[11]

… and macroeconomic surveillance

In the macroeconomic field new macroeconomic imbalance procedures (MIP) were introduced.[12] They are aimed at helping to avoid, identify and, where necessary, eliminate looming or existing macroeconomic imbalances in the member states if those imbalances might impair economic stability in the relevant member state, the euro area and the European Union (EU). Much like the SGP mechanism, financial sanctions can also be imposed under the MIP if a member state repeatedly fails to cooperate in correcting an excessive imbalance.

Many reforms heading in the right direction but more needs to be done

Many of the reforms mentioned above take on board the lessons learned from the crisis and may contribute to preventing and resolving future crises. These initiatives are likely to have fostered financial system stability, reduced the threat posed by the banking sector to national government finances and made investors more accountable for their investment decisions. The upshot of these measures, such as the introduction of fiscal support funds, the single bank resolution fund and a number of Eurosystem measures, has been to distinctly increase the

10 For more information see Deutsche Bundesbank, Implications of the banking union for financial stability, 2014 Financial Stability Review, pp 69-88.
11 The first assistance programme for Greece in spring 2010 was funded by bilateral loans granted by euro-area countries. For more information see Deutsche Bundesbank, Towards a European Stability Mechanism, Monthly Report, February 2011, pp 64-65.
12 For more information see Deutsche Bundesbank, Economic policy coordination in the European Union, 2012 Annual Report, pp 36-39.

degree of joint liability within the euro area. While European-level surveillance and coordination were stepped up at the same time, their design and implementation were and are unsatisfactory in some cases, and there is good reason to seriously doubt that the rules as they currently stand will be strictly applied.[13] In effect, member states' autonomy in economic and fiscal policy matters has been left largely intact. All in all, the reforms do not go far enough, and, with the exception of the banking union, the increase in mutualised liability has not been matched by the introduction of broader joint control mechanisms.[14] This would suggest that the euro area is inadequately protected against fresh financial turmoil and the attendant risk of monetary policy being swayed by fiscal policy.

Template for further reform

Two templates conceivable for a regulatory framework with reduced moral hazard: a decentralised approach …

Broadly speaking, two different models can serve as a template for a regulatory framework for monetary union that features reduced moral hazard. Both models should ensure that policymakers also bear responsibility for the consequences of their decisions (balancing liability and control). The first of these models follows a decentralised approach and is rooted in the Maastricht Treaty. Apart from the single monetary policy, it is premised on extensive national accountability of member states. While it is true that European rules can encroach on this autonomy (in fiscal matters, for example), the European level ultimately has no power to intervene directly in national affairs. The notion of leaving decision-making powers largely at the nation-state level is consistent with the no-bail-out rule (which lays down that a member state's debts cannot be assumed by other member states or the community) and the possibility of a member state defaulting.[15]

The other template centres on the idea of economic and fiscal policy integration – in effect, fiscal or political union. This approach maintains a balance of liability and control by matching the increased mutualisation of risk with a surrender of (at least fiscal) sovereignty to a central European level.[16] Calls to move forward in this direction came from various quarters at the height of the crisis.[17] A cohesive fiscal or political union backed by a large political majority across all countries and sharing a common economic policy vision – a federation of states – would certainly be less vulnerable to crises overall than a currency union composed of autonomous member states if the latter does not appear capable of withstanding the insolvency of individual states. However, following the decision to set up a banking union, the politicians seem to have lost any interest in ramping up the pace of integration or embracing fundamental treaty change, apparently because they do not believe that such steps, and especially the extensive surrender of national sovereignty, will enjoy majority backing in the member states.

… and a fiscal union that mutualises risk and transfers budgetary sovereignty

Spotlight on strengthening the decentralised model

As long as that remains the case, the focus of future reforms will need to be on improving the resilience of the existing framework, but there

13 See, for example, Deutsche Bundesbank, Fiscal developments in the euro area, Monthly Report, May 2014, pp 68-72; and Deutsche Bundesbank, The implementation of fiscal rules in the European monetary union, Monthly Report, December 2014, pp 8-10.
14 See, for example, German Institute for Economic Research, Zukunft der Währungsunion, DIW Wochenbericht 24/2014, pp 527 ff; Deutsche Bundesbank, European Council decisions on the prevention and resolution of future sovereign debt crises, Monthly Report, April 2011, pp 53-58; Deutsche Bundesbank, Banking union: a useful addition for Europe in the medium term, 2012 Financial Stability Review, pp 82-83; Deutsche Bundesbank, Implications of the banking union for financial stability, 2014 Financial Stability Review, pp 69-88.
15 For further background information on this article, see German Council of Economic Experts, Stabile Architektur für Europa – Handlungsbedarf im Inland, 2012/13 Annual Economic Report, pp 102 ff; and Gegen eine Rückwärtsgewandte Wirtschaftspolitik, 2013/14 Annual Economic Report, pp 156 ff.
16 See also A Sapir and G Wolff, Euro-area governance: What to reform and how to do it, Bruegel policy brief, 2015/01. Effective control of joint liability instruments would be impossible without first surrendering the relevant decision-making competence. See expert group on a debt redemption fund and eurobills, final report, 31 March 2014.
17 See H van Rompuy, J Barroso, J-C Juncker and M Draghi, Towards a genuine economic and monetary union, Report to the European Council, December 2012.

is no getting round the fact that rules can only ever fulfil their purpose if they are rigorously applied in practice. Bearing this in mind, the following sections outline approaches that seek to strengthen the existing regulatory framework based on national accountability. The guiding principles of this framework are enshrined in the European treaties and as such constitute the foundations of European monetary union. Specifically, these are the no-bail-out clause, extensive economic and financial autonomy of the member states, their citizens and investors, and the *de jure* and *de facto* independence of monetary policymakers in pursuing their primary objective of ensuring monetary stability. The sections below consider at length key steps towards better safeguarding financial stability (see pages 22 to 29) and ensuring sound public finances (see pages 29 to 34) before briefly discussing options for improving macroeconomic coordination and the role of monetary policy (see the summary on page 23).

Steps towards safeguarding financial stability

Safeguarding financial stability key to curbing threat of monetary policy coming under pressure

Sound public finances in the member states and a path of macroeconomic development that is devoid of serious and persistent imbalances are important prerequisites for safeguarding financial stability in the euro area. However, extensive safeguarding of financial stability requires that it remains robust even if individual member states fail to prevent the emergence of macroeconomic imbalances or to rein in ballooning sovereign debt that might leave that country teetering on the brink of default. This objective primarily targets the banking system, given its particular systemic importance for the stability of the financial system. But other potentially systemically important areas of the financial system, such as the shadow banking system, need to be addressed as well.[18] Regulators and supervisors play a pivotal role in the prevention of systemic crises in the financial sector. Yet if financial institutions nonetheless encounter stress, the onus is on monetary policymakers to step in with temporary liquidity assistance for banks that are illiquid but not overindebted. The task of the resolution authority and, at the end of the day, fiscal policymakers, by contrast, is to either recapitalise overindebted financial institutions by bailing in their shareholders and creditors, or to wind them up in an orderly fashion where a failure to do so would jeopardise the stability of the financial system. Part of the rationale for this is that this task involves large-scale decisions affecting the redistribution of funds and debts. If fiscal policymakers fail to fulfil this task, monetary policymakers may come under pressure to step into the breach.

Sovereign-bank contagion nexus must be effectively severed in both directions

Two objectives need to be achieved in order to stem the spillover of risk from the government to the banking sector and *vice versa*. First, financial stability needs to be maintained even in the unlikely yet conceivable worst-case scenario of a haircut being imposed on sovereign bonds. Shoring up financial stability in this way is crucial for upholding the principle of national responsibility and the no-bail-out clause. Second, the risk of contagion channelling in the other direction – from banks to sovereigns – likewise needs to be effectively curbed.

Reducing the risk of contagion from the banking sector to the government sector

Banks' loss-absorbing capacity is key to stopping spillover of risk from banking to government sector

The bulk of the measures rolled out so far to safeguard financial stability address the spillover of risk from banks to sovereigns. Although some progress has been made, further action still needs to be taken. To further reduce the risk of contagion, it needs to be ensured that systemically important banks, in particular,

18 The shadow banking system can in general be defined as credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system. See Financial Stability Board, Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation, Recommendations of the Financial Stability Board, Report, October 2011, p 1.

Summary of selected recommendations and measures

Financial stability	Fiscal policy	Economic policy
Strengthen banks' loss absorbency: capital requirements and/or leverage ratio Consistently deploy and refine macro-prudential toolkit Improve integration of equity and debt markets – Uniform legal framework – Diversified lending Segregate monetary policy and banking supervision Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) – Adequate bail-in-able capital – Apply bail-in rules strictly, and stringently wind down non-viable banks – Common fiscal backstop with national loss retention Properly regulate financial system outside the banking sector (eg shadow banks), too	Set up independent budgetary surveillance institution Fiscal regime – Simpler and clearer rules, strictly applied – Uniform and transparent surveillance – Reduce discretionary leeway – Step up automatic corrective measures – Strengthen role of debt ratio ESM – Conditional liquidity assistance – Interest rate mark-ups for assistance – Stronger role in insolvency process – Non-standard fiscal measures to avert or mitigate haircuts	Review imbalance procedure and adapt if necessary once sufficient experience has been gathered; implement strictly Streamline and enhance transparency of European coordination mechanisms Take account of cross-border effects, but no fine-tuning of economic policy by central authority
Deprivilege sovereign bonds – Capital backing – Large exposure limits – Adapt liquidity rules Revise sovereign bond contracts – Collective action clauses with single-limb aggregation – Automatic maturity extension if ESM assistance granted Create framework for more orderly sovereign insolvency		

Monetary policy	
Keep focus on core objective of price stability Define mandate narrowly so as to legitimise independence Do not undermine unity of liability and control in other areas or distort market processes	Assume no responsibility for financial stability risks caused by sovereigns' and banks' solvency problems Avoid engineering joint liability for sovereign solvency risks via central banks' balance sheets Institutional segregation of monetary policy and banking supervision

Deutsche Bundesbank

have deep loss-absorbing capacity. This increases, for example, with higher capital, which absorbs losses and thus allows business operations to be continued. Some critics claim that stricter capital adequacy requirements drive up banks' funding costs and might, as a result, stunt macroeconomic growth.[19] As a rule, however, any higher funding costs are matched by macroeconomic benefits stemming from the potential improvement in financial stability. However, where higher funding costs result from the fact that tighter capital requirements eliminate or reduce implicit government guarantees, this is no reason not to impose stricter capital standards. At the end of the day, this merely removes an inappropriate subsidisation of banks' debt financing.

19 This line of argument is open to doubt, however. The Modigliani-Miller theorem, for instance, holds that, given perfect markets, an enterprise's funding costs are unrelated to its form of funding. A rising equity capital ratio lowers the uncertainty of payment flows for shareholders and creditors alike, thus reducing the risk premium for both forms of funding. This offsets the additional cost involved in holding a higher proportion of (more expensive) equity capital. While it is true that market frictions, an asymmetric distribution of information or taxes may well drive up the cost of equity, empirical research suggests that the additional costs are not substantial. See also European Central Bank (2011), Common equity capital, banks' riskiness and required return on equity, Financial Stability Review, pp 125-131.

Capital requirements should be critically reviewed

In order to increase banks' loss-absorbing capacity, the new capital requirements under Basel III should be critically reviewed.[20] Such a review should notably examine whether the risks that are not captured or are insufficiently captured in the risk models are adequately backed by capital (eg by the various capital buffers). It is not least in the light of such risks that the risk-weighted capital requirements were supplemented by the introduction of an instrument that is explicitly not risk-based, ie the leverage ratio. From 2018, it will be possible to convert this ratio from a monitoring metric to a binding measure. In this case, too, it should be reviewed whether the minimum requirement of 3% currently being tested by the Basel Committee is appropriate.

Macroprudential monitoring plays a supporting role, but is not a panacea

Macroprudential monitoring and policy play a part in making the financial system more resilient and also in adequately curbing cyclical developments of systemic risk. The instruments created for this at the European and national levels at least for the banking sector, such as the countercyclical capital buffer, the systemic risk buffer, and the option of higher risk weights for certain exposures, are essentially suitable for countering undesirable developments in a relatively focused way. The effectiveness of macroprudential policy will, however, hinge on how willing policymakers actually are to rigorously deploy the instruments and to tackle unwelcome developments, including in the face of political pressure if necessary, and on the extent to which any evasive actions can be thwarted. It would be wrong to place exaggerated expectations on macroprudential policy. It has only a limited ability to counter misguided developments originating from risky national economic or fiscal policy, as it cannot tackle the root causes. Tax legislation in many member states, for example, currently favours debt financing over equity financing. This tends *per se* to weaken firms' capital base, which means that bank loans can more quickly become non-performing in the event of negative shocks. In turn, this weakens the stability of the financial system. While, in this regard, macroprudential policy can strengthen the resilience of the banking sector and damp the cyclical dynamics of the financial system, the tax policy bias remains in place. The existence of macroprudential instruments therefore cannot be used as an argument for laxer regulation in other areas or for less prudent economic policy. This constraint is further underscored by the fact that the macroprudential instruments that are currently available predominantly seek to contain undesirable developments that originate in the banking sector. The task of extending the macroprudential toolkit to other areas such as the insurance sector or the shadow banking system is still in the early stages.

Positive effects could also emanate from a capital markets union and …

The concept of a capital markets union is currently being debated as a way of advancing integration of the debt markets and, above all, the equity markets. Dismantling the barriers and restrictions related to this can play a role here. This could allow the impact of asymmetric shocks to be more widely spread and better cushioned within the EU via the financial markets. The desired stronger diversification between capital market-based and bank-based financing would have a similar effect.

… more diversified bank lending

In addition, more diversified bank lending in the euro area would disperse risk more widely and thus strengthen the banking sector with regard to problems confined to individual member states. Domestic banks, for example, would be less affected by the consequences of misguided fiscal policy developments in a country extending to the extreme risk of a haircut on government debt which, moreover, would normally be accompanied by a recession and a rising wave of credit defaults in that country. However, the prerequisite for this is that credit risk does not rise on account of diversification.

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20 The requirements envisage a basic capital ratio of at least 8% of risk-weighted assets. Additionally, however, banks will need in future to hold various capital buffers on top of the minimum requirements in order to reduce the risk of the minimum capital requirements being undershot. Capital surcharges for systemically important financial institutions will also be introduced.

Independent and stringent banking supervision another central pillar

Comprehensively securing financial stability requires independent and stringent banking supervision. Conferring responsibility for banking supervision on a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) was a first key step.[21] In order to avoid conflicts of interest with monetary policy, however, in the longer term banking supervision should not be based at the ECB but instead at an independent institution that has the final say in supervisory matters, or at the very least, the decision-making structures for monetary policy at the ECB should be clearly separated from those for banking supervision. Against this backdrop, plans should be made to amend European primary law.

Quicker market exit of insolvent banks and entry of new banks

A country's economic recovery can also be speeded up by making it easier for insolvent banks to exit the market and for new banks to enter the market. Uniform and accelerated insolvency proceedings throughout Europe for households and enterprises could reduce uncertainties by facilitating faster identification of banks' actual balance sheet position.

SRM needs adjusting to ensure efficient bank resolutions

Some adjustment is required to the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which is designed to facilitate the orderly resolution also of systemically important financial institutions without recourse to government support measures. Given the extremely complex decision-making framework, there is considerable doubt as to whether bank resolutions can be carried out efficiently in the tight timeframe envisaged.[22] This points to a continuing need to amend primary European law with a view to creating the legal basis for a genuine European resolution authority with efficient autonomous decision-making powers.

Need for government support measures for banks should be minimised through rigorous implementation and …

There is still a considerable need for improvement to ensure that the risk of bank insolvencies is actually borne by the investors and to effectively reduce the probability and extent of future strains on public budgets from the financial sector. What is particularly problematic is that applying the bail-in tool to creditors involves great discretionary scope. On top of this, it is uncertain how far the political announcement that the banking sector will be called on to finance losses where necessary, possibly by way of *ex post* levies, will be followed up. In order to reliably ease the burden on public budgets and to ensure that investors increasingly bear risks themselves, there are a number of conceivable approaches besides the higher capital ratios already discussed. For instance, in the actual implementation of resolutions it is crucial that banks which are a gone concern really are rigorously resolved without using taxpayers' money. This will allow a track record to be established that negates the lingering expectation of an implicit government guarantee.

… sufficient bail-in-able debt

In addition, the bail-in of creditors could be made more credible *ex ante* by obligating banks to hold sufficient capital and debt that is reliably available for bail-in in a loss event.[23] This is the objective of the minimum requirements for loss-absorbing capacity – or total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) – which the Financial Stability Board (FSB) is aiming to introduce for global systemically important financial institutions; these requirements are intended to make sure that there are sufficient levels of liable capital and debt in a resolution event. For this to succeed, however, it must be ensured that the draft presented by the FSB in November 2014 is not watered down in the ongoing

21 For more information, see Deutsche Bundesbank, Launch of the banking union: the Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe, Monthly Report, October 2014, pp 43-64.

22 For more information, see Deutsche Bundesbank, Europe's new recovery and resolution regime for credit institutions, Monthly Report, June 2014, pp 31-55.

23 The Expert Advisory Committee to the Federal Ministry of Finance has put forward a proposal on this. According to this proposal, a significant requirement of bail-in-able capital would be that it may not be held by banks either directly or indirectly (eg via credit default swaps (CDSs)), in order to avoid the risk of contagion across the banking system. Furthermore, a clear trigger for a liability event should be defined in bond contracts, and debt should then automatically be converted into equity (comparable to "coco bonds"). Finally, it would have to be ensured that other debt positions are not automatically exempted from bail-in owing to the existence of these bail-in bonds. See Expert Advisory Committee to the Federal Ministry of Finance, Stellungnahme zur aktuellen Entwicklung der Europäischen Bankenunion – Plädoyer für ein glaubwürdiges Bail-in, 01/2014.

consultation process.[24] Furthermore, regulatory requirements must restrict other banks from holding TLAC instruments in order to avoid contagion effects. The Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD) also contains minimum requirements for liable equity and debt, in the form of minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL).[25] For this element of liability to be credible *ex ante* in a resolution event, however, it would have to be assured that, as well as own funds, the liabilities covered by the minimum requirements, in particular, can actually be drawn on in the event of a resolution. Potential contagion channels in the financial system would have to be closed as far as possible. At the same time, the discretionary scope for decision-making in a resolution event would need to be more clearly limited.

Common fiscal backstop that minimises moral hazard

The additions to the safeguards that have already been implemented at the upstream stages discussed in this article are intended to rule out government support measures if possible. Nonetheless, a credible fiscal backstop may be required as the final step of the liability cascade to enable orderly resolutions also of systemically important financial institutions, if necessary, and to avoid excessive uncertainty in the markets. This would prevent central banks from being pressured to keep failed banks alive by providing extensive and sustained liquidity and thus avoid resolutions entailing considerable risk to financial stability. To align liability and control in the field of banking supervision, it would essentially be conceivable, following the transfer of banking supervision from the national to the European level, to likewise put in place a fiscal backstop at the European level. However, a prerequisite for this is that the legacy risks on banks' balance sheets that accrued under national responsibility are comprehensively rectified first. What is more, the backstop would have to be structured in a way that avoids moral hazard that would discourage sound public finances and a sustainable economic policy. The influence of national economic and fiscal policy on risks in the national banking system grows inversely to banks' degree of diversification across national borders. A risky economic and fiscal policy would tend to be fostered if the attendant risks were fully communitised, whereas temporary advantages arise chiefly at the national level. Depending on the perceived severity of these moral hazard problems and the assessment of the effectiveness of the corrective action through diversification, bail-in, the European budget and economic surveillance procedures and macroprudential policy, a more or less extensive degree of national loss retention for the costs of resolving a bank supervised at the European level would make sense.[26]

Shadow banking sector must not become a new source of systemic risk

A final requirement for comprehensively securing financial stability is that no systemic risk builds up in other areas of the financial market, for example in what is known as the shadow banking sector. Specifically, macroprudential instruments should be developed – in a similar way as for the banking sector – with respect to the improvement and further harmonisation of the framework conditions for decentralised structures in the financial system (eg for non-bank-based direct and indirect corporate financing), which is currently another objective of the capital markets union, in order to counteract any undesirable developments resulting therefrom.

Reducing the risk of contagion from the government sector to the banking sector

Equally as important as reforms relating to spillover risk from banks and the financial system to the government sector are reforms concerning

24 See Financial Stability Board, Adequacy of Loss-Absorbing Capacity of Global Systemically Important Banks in Resolution, Consultative Document, November 2014.
25 For more information, see Deutsche Bundesbank, Europe's new recovery and resolution regime for credit institutions, Monthly Report, June 2014, pp 31-55.
26 For more information, see Deutsche Bundesbank, The envisaged role of public funds in European bank resolution, Monthly Report, June 2014, pp 53-54.

Eliminating spillover risk from the government to the financial sector also in the event of sovereign insolvency

contagion risk in the opposite direction – ie from the government sector to banks and the financial system. These reforms should aim to make financial stability more independent of the development of public finances and highly likely to remain robust even in the scenario of a restructuring of government liabilities. This would also ease the pressure on monetary policy to take on responsibility for ensuring financial stability or sovereign debt sustainability. A core approach to tackling this issue likewise encompasses banking and financial market regulation. The objective of any changes must be to limit banks' sovereign exposure risk to such an extent that even strongly interconnected, systemically important banks can either absorb fiscal stress events up to and including a comparatively extensive haircut on government debt or else ensure that they can be resolved in an orderly manner if necessary. It is important in this context to take account of second-round effects that arise because a sovereign default is usually accompanied by a slump in economic activity and a growing number of non-performing loans to private debtors in the country concerned.

Approaches to limiting banks' sovereign exposure risk

Approaches to limiting the risk posed to the banking system by sovereign exposures include risk-appropriate capital backing for government bonds, a limit on the volume of sovereign exposures held by a bank (large exposure limits) and treatment of such assets under the liquidity regulation that is commensurate with their actual degree of liquidity. A great deal could be achieved here simply by ending, or at least substantially scaling back, the regulatory exemptions thus far afforded to sovereign debt from capital adequacy requirements and large exposure limits.[27] At present, capital essentially does not have to be held against banks' exposures to sovereigns in national currency, even though the sovereign debt crisis has clearly demonstrated that sovereign debt is by no means risk-free. Sovereign exposures have so far broadly been exempted from the existing large exposure limits, too. The large exposure rules are designed to prevent concentration risk in the banking system, with the aim being to stop a bank from running into difficulties itself when a debtor defaults.[28]

Changing contractual terms of government bonds also worth considering

The consequences for banks of a haircut on government debt could possibly be further reduced by changing the contractual terms of sovereign debt instruments. The aim would be to create a sufficient volume of national bonds with relatively good credit quality for banks even in times of stress, and, if possible, to transfer the default risk more from bank balance sheets to other areas of the financial market where any losses from a haircut will not lead to a systemic financial crisis. One option worth examining is the potential benefit of dividing individual national government bonds into first-loss and second-loss tranches as a complement to the amendment of banking regulations discussed above.[29]

Approaches to improving sovereign insolvency procedure can strengthen financial stability somewhat

Alongside banking regulation, a contribution to financial stability can also be made by approaches that, faced with the potential sovereign default of a euro-area state, envisage the timely initiation, rapid execution and predictable structuring of a relevant insolvency procedure. Without such mechanisms, there are incentives for both the debtor country and its creditors to postpone a sovereign debt haircut. The government of the debtor country fears a loss of votes and image as well as negative repercussions for the domestic financial system. Creditors of short-dated claims can currently press for the haircut to be delayed long enough

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27 The Basel Committee has already begun reviewing the privileged treatment of sovereign exposures in the regulatory requirements.

28 For more information, see Deutsche Bundesbank, Reducing the privileged regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures, 2014 Annual Report, pp 23-40.

29 Mandatory risk diversification by bundling the bonds of all euro-area states into a single bond, as suggested by the Euro-nomics group, does not appear necessary for this. See Euro-nomics group, European safe bonds (ESBies), mimeo, 30 September 2011. Rather, the Euro-nomics group's proposal involves some joint liability elements, which run counter to the guiding principle of the regulatory framework of European monetary union. Appropriate risk diversification can be better achieved through appropriate banking regulation, as outlined above.

that their claims are satisfied in full.[30] This makes it more difficult to rapidly restore sovereign solvency, prolongs uncertainty in the financial markets about the pending steps and increases the economic costs of a sovereign debt overhang via the knock-on effects on the real economy.[31] Reform approaches to mitigating the negative impact of sovereign insolvencies on the stability of the financial system should therefore be aimed at the timely triggering of sovereign insolvency and at putting in place a reliable, efficient and transparent procedure for rapidly restoring sovereign solvency.[32] Overall, however, it must be ensured that contract fulfilment and legal principles are upheld and that countries are in no way enabled to extricate themselves too easily from contractual arrangements with regard to sovereign debt.

CACs introduced in 2013 could be stiffened

Since 1 January 2013, all government bonds issued by euro-area states with a maturity of more than one year have had to contain collective action clauses (CACs).[33] These aim to ensure efficient restructuring of outstanding liabilities if the need arises by making it easier to make changes to the key terms and conditions of a bond series that are binding for all creditors. To this end, the clause stipulates that the majority required to modify the terms and conditions for the individual bond series falls if a qualified majority across all bond series votes for a modification. This reduces any incentive for investors to hold out for full settlement of their claims at the cost of the entire group of creditors (holdout problem). However, this "two-limb" procedure cannot prevent a financially strong investor from blocking the restructuring of an individual bond series by acquiring a blocking minority. In the longer term, a solution to this could be a "single-limb" aggregated voting procedure, whereby a qualified majority across all government bonds issued is sufficient to trigger a binding debt restructuring for all bonds regardless of the voting results for individual bond series.[34]

In order to deter holdouts more effectively, the standardised bond contracts of euro-area states could additionally be critically reviewed with a view to restricting the *pari passu* clause.[35] In principle, this clause is designed to ensure the equal treatment of bondholders by issuers.[36] At the very least, however, existing ambiguities of interpretation should be eliminated so that

Modified pari passu clause would mitigate holdout problem

30 Creditors of short-dated claims who have a blocking minority could, for instance, credibly signal that they do not consent to a potential debt restructuring.
31 The current debate about a haircut in Greece is taking place against a fundamentally different backdrop. Private creditors in Greece have already incurred a haircut, and the vast bulk of Greek debt now comprises assistance loans from public creditors. Although Greece's debt ratio is still exceedingly high, extensive debt relief was provided by the very low interest rate charged on the assistance loans (from an economic perspective, granting very low interest rates and forgoing redemption payments for a protracted period are very similar to partial debt forgiveness). The sustainability of Greek public finances is therefore significantly less strained than the debt ratio alone suggests thanks to this very limited interest burden. According to the European Commission's latest forecast, Greek interest expenditure in relation to gross domestic product in the current year, for instance, is below that of Ireland, Italy and Portugal, even though Greece's debt ratio is significantly higher.
32 See, for example, the Expert Advisory Committee to the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (2011), Überschuldung und Staatsinsolvenz in der Europäischen Union, Gutachten Nr. 01/11; Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform, Revisiting Sovereign Bankruptcy, Discussion Paper, October 2013; and C Fuest et al, Die Krise im Euroraum nachhaltig überwinden, Study by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) for Vereinigung der Bayerischen Wirtschaft (vbw), April 2014.
33 See EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, Collective Action Clause Explanatory Note, 26 July 2011, and Model Collective Action Clause Supplemental Explanatory Note, 26 March 2012. The integration of CACs into the bond terms and conditions of regional and local government entities of member states is not mandatory, however.
34 See International Monetary Fund, Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, IMF Policy Paper, 2 September 2014.
35 In the global context, the IMF has attempted to strengthen contract-based debt restructurings by tabling not only proposals for model clauses with the option of a single-limb majority requirement, but also proposals for redesigning the pari passu clause, and has recommended their use in future international bond issues. See International Monetary Fund, loc cit. The IMF proposals are based on the model clauses, revised shortly beforehand, issued by the International Capital Markets Association (ICMA). See ICMA, Standard Aggregated Collective Action Clauses ("CACs") for the Terms and Conditions of Sovereign Notes, August 2014, and ICMA, Standard Pari Passu Provision for the Terms and Conditions of Sovereign Notes, August 2014.
36 It has only limited significance for sovereign issues as the concept of rank presupposes the option of liquidating the issuer's assets (and the subsequent distribution of the insufficient proceeds to the creditors). The liquidation of an insolvent sovereign's assets is hard to reconcile with the modern concept of a sovereign state and the inalienability of its sovereign rights, however.

creditors who reject a debt restructuring (holdout creditors) cannot invoke the *pari passu* clause to build up potential pressure by threatening to block payments to the restructured bonds. This reduces the holdout incentive for creditors and hence reinforces the incentive for all creditors to agree to a restructuring. As a result, the risk of a disorderly sovereign default diminishes.[37]

Regulated insolvency procedure for euro-area states could further reduce adverse effects on financial stability

In addition, a framework and procedure could be developed in the longer term which would allow government bonds to be restructured in a more orderly and structured way than is currently the case.[38] This could curb uncertainty about the steps required to restore sovereign solvency and mitigate systemic contagion effects and negative repercussions for financial stability. Any liquidity restrictions for the debt instruments that are to be restructured, the impact on the domestic real economy and the level of the debt haircut required could potentially be limited further. Regardless of such a framework, however, it must be ensured that financial stability is safeguarded to the greatest extent possible also in the not inconceivable event of a disorderly sovereign insolvency.

ESM could be given prominent role in insolvency procedure

In connection with a potentially more orderly framework for sovereign insolvencies, the ESM could be given a greater role, and could contribute to balancing the interests of debtors and private creditors as well as to achieving speedier agreement on restructuring. Sovereign debtors may in any case apply for liquidity assistance from the ESM, subject to certain conditions, until they regain access to the capital market. The prospect of such liquidity assistance is likely to make it easier for the debtor country to agree to a restructuring. Creditors will probably submit to a haircut more readily if ESM assistance is credibly pegged to structural reforms and fiscal consolidation, thus giving them greater assurance that their remaining claims will then actually be settled.

Approaches to anchoring a stability-oriented fiscal policy

Increase incentives for sound fiscal policy

Under the existing regulatory framework of the European monetary union, responsibility for fiscal policy lies mainly with the member states. They decide on the specific design of fiscal policy and also on whether the national government debt is ultimately serviced. This wide-ranging autonomy in decision-making is essentially consistent with the no-bailout principle. A central aim of stability-focused reforms in the field of fiscal policy must be to increase the incentives to pursue sound public finances.

Improve budgetary surveillance and implementation of fiscal rules

Independent European fiscal authority could aid better implementation of rules

With regard to the fiscal rules, the main problem is not so much that they are fundamentally unsuitable, but more that they are seldom designed and implemented systematically. This is illustrated, for example, by the European Commission's recent decisions to make greater use of the flexibility of the rules in future to further relax the requirements and also to loosen the requirements for sovereigns that clearly did not comply with the European Council's recommendations. At present, the Commission has a crucial role in monitoring budget developments and interpreting the European fiscal rules. Despite its formal independence, however, it faces considerable political pressure and also pursues many different objectives simultaneously. A new European fiscal authority, which, similarly to the autonomous national fiscal councils, has

37 Holdout incentives could also be effectively curbed without modifying the pari passu clause if the payment streams of the parties taking part in a restructuring are immunised against the claims of creditors that have elected not to participate in the restructuring. See Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform, loc cit. Another change to the terms and conditions of government bonds is proposed below (see pp 30 and 31) with the automatic extension of the maturity when ESM assistance is granted.
38 See, for example, F Gianviti et al (2010), A European mechanism for sovereign debt crisis resolution: a proposal, Bruegel Blueprint Series, Volume 10.

a clear mandate obligating it to solely assess budgetary developments in terms of compliance with the fiscal rules should be better able to ensure objective monitoring as well as to conduct transparent and comprehensible analysis. The new body could take over the Commission's role in the procedure and would be less exposed to the risk of making inappropriate compromises at the expense of budgetary discipline.

Simple and transparent rules create reliability and promote effective budgetary surveillance

Regardless of this institutional issue, the fiscal rules can be made more effective by making them much simpler and clearer. This would allow both the general public as well as the political opposition in the respective countries to clearly identify any breaches of the rules. This aspect is a key condition for the rules to have stronger binding force, as such public accountability ensures that the rules have a disciplining effect on the political decision-makers. It would also be necessary to make all data publicly accessible, to largely eliminate the discretionary scope laid down in the existing rules for setting fiscal targets and assessing compliance with them, and to tightly restrict and clearly define exemptions from the rules. Since responsibility for ensuring sound public finances remains with the member states, it appears advisable to restrict any European-level requirements more than before to the anticipated consolidation requirement and the deadlines for its implementation. The fundamental aim of the envisaged overhaul of the rules should not be to try and take account of every conceivable specificity by structuring the rules even more granularly, but instead to emphasise clear upper limits and thus strengthen the ability to implement the rules. Ultimately, the crucial assessment gauge should not be the (supposed) efforts of a member state, but rather the outcome. In this context, there must be a degree of acceptance that the rules cannot completely cover every single eventuality and that not all unexpected developments will be excused. What must be borne in mind is that the fiscal rules constitute agreed upper limits and that member states actually have extensive room for manoeuvre as long as the rules are complied with.[39]

Automatic correction mechanisms worth considering

Safeguarding sustainability by means of simple and transparent fiscal rules could be further reinforced by setting the scope of consolidation in the event of missed targets in such a way that not only is the deficit corrected, but the increased debt incurred in the meantime on account of the deviation is also reversed. The binding force of the European budgetary rules could also be decisively enhanced if member states, in advance of any breaches, define concrete measures that will then enter into force more or less automatically and can be replaced, at most, by fully specified, offsetting measures.[40]

Promote incentives for financial markets to press for sound fiscal policy

Disciplining effect of financial markets key incentive for sustainable fiscal policy

The actual or potential imposition of interest rate premiums on countries pursuing unsound public finances remains an important incentive for sustainable national fiscal policies in the euro area. This requires that creditors really are exposed to the full risk of any investment in government debt instruments and that they assess this risk appropriately.[41] Corresponding interest rate signals will then encourage governments to adopt a sustainable fiscal policy.

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39 For more information, see Deutsche Bundesbank, Fiscal developments in the euro area, Monthly Report, May 2014, pp 68-72.

40 Sustainably safeguarding stable public finances could also be achieved by introducing direct (tiered) rights of intervention at the European level in cases of severe and persistent breaches of the fiscal rules. These could also take the form of surcharges on common taxation instruments or deductions from certain spending categories, which are to be stipulated by the member states in advance and the amount of which will vary depending on the size of the breach. However, such rights of intervention imply a distinct reduction in national fiscal sovereignty (and hence an approach that is not discussed further in this article) and is highly unlikely to find a consensus at this point in time.

41 The prerequisites for adequately assessing the risks of an investment in government debt instruments include reliable statistics, the timely provision of relevant information, and transparent processes and methodology in the context of budgetary surveillance.

However, if financial market participants expect fiscal or monetary rescue measures in the event of a crisis, this diminishes the perceived default risk of a misguided national fiscal policy, and market participants will, at best, require only small country-specific risk premiums. This weakens the disciplining effect of the financial markets from the outset.

Restoration of no-bail-out principle and compliance with the prohibition on monetary financing

Against this background, it is important that the principle of individual responsibility on the part of investors and member states is firmly re-established in future. There must be no prospect that the no-bail-out principle or the prohibition of monetary financing by central banks may ultimately be ignored. A key prerequisite for this, however, is that risks to financial stability posed by a threatening sovereign insolvency are adequately contained by the aforementioned reforms (see pages 22 to 29), as the fear of a financial market collapse is ultimately what led to these principles being relaxed during the financial crisis.[42]

Orderly sovereign insolvency procedure for euro-area countries improves credibility of the no-bail-out principle and strengthens investor liability

The collective action clauses introduced for euro-area countries in 2013 can not only contribute to greater financial stability, as explained, but are also a first important signal that investors will face a sovereign debt haircut if a country becomes overindebted. This signal could be underscored by proposals, already mentioned in the context of strengthening financial stability, to reform the contractual terms of government bonds and introduce a more orderly insolvency regime for euro-area states. This could also bolster the credibility of a debt haircut as it would mitigate the implications for the financial system and the losses for the real economy, thus making the haircut easier to push through politically. At the same time, it must be ensured that the insolvency of a debtor state is not seen as an easy option. The imposition of conditions on economic and fiscal policy by a coordinating body, such as the ESM, could prove useful in this regard, as explained below.

Automatic extension of government bond maturity if ESM assistance granted

Inserting a clause into government bond contracts that automatically extends the bond's maturity if ESM assistance is granted could also be a useful addition. This would be an effective means of preventing private creditors from receiving full repayment of short-dated bonds at the expense of providers of public assistance. Moreover, private investors would be aware that they would be involved in any subsequent haircut. Their risk would rise accordingly, which would probably help to strengthen the disciplining effect of financial markets on fiscal policy.[43]

Eliminating preferential treatment of government bonds in banking regulation would promote risk-based interest rates

The aforementioned amendments to banking regulation – risk-based backing also of government bonds, adjustments in categorising assets under liquidity rules and inclusion of public-sector bonds in large exposure rules – should additionally help to reinforce the disciplining effect of financial markets on fiscal policy. Eliminating the existing preferential capital treatment of government debt instruments would curb banks' demand for sovereign debt instruments, particularly from countries with poorer creditworthiness.[44] Overall, the measures should increase risk spreads for government bonds that have a higher probability of default and therefore make it less attractive for these countries to expand their borrowing. This would increase their incentive to pursue stability-oriented fiscal and economic policies as a declining debt ratio would hold out the prom-

42 Even if monetary policy generally has a certain role to play in safeguarding financial stability, it is limited by the prohibition of monetary financing, which places sovereign solvency protection beyond the scope of its mandate. Moreover, in a conflict of interests, the objective of maintaining price stability takes precedence over seeking to contribute to financial stability. For more information see Deutsche Bundesbank, The importance of macroprudential policy for monetary policy, Monthly Report, March 2015, pp. 39-71.

43 For more information see Deutsche Bundesbank, Proposal for an effective private sector involvement for bond issues from mid-2013 onwards, Monthly Report, August 2011, pp. 68-71 and Bank of England, Sovereign default and state-contingent debt, Financial Stability Paper 27, November 2013.

44 See European Systemic Risk Board, ESRB report on regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures, March 2015.

ise of securing more favourable financing terms.

Flaws in financial market constraints on governments' propensity to borrow

In the past, the ability of financial markets to effectively constrain the borrowing propensity of fiscal policymakers was limited by two key flaws. First, investors were very tardy in reacting to a deterioration in a country's fiscal sustainability and then tended to react very abruptly.[45] The resulting rising interest burden, especially for sovereigns with substantial short-term borrowing, often made it harder for fiscal policymakers to take timely countermeasures. This being so, it would be better for states to fund their routine financing needs through longer-term debt as this would give them more time to react in the event of abrupt market reassessments. Second, in some cases fiscal policymakers were themselves slow to react to the interest rate signals. The aforementioned proposals should help to mitigate these problems. Even so, there will still very likely be limitations to the disciplining effect of financial markets – as of fiscal rules – in the future. It therefore seems prudent to pursue both avenues in order to achieve sound government finances in the long term.

Need for a crisis resolution mechanism free from moral hazard

Crisis resolution mechanism should aim for the swift restoration of solvency

Despite reforms to the fiscal policy framework and supplementary measures to improve financial stability, the possibility of member states encountering solvency difficulties in future, along with the emergence of attendant systemic risks, cannot be ruled out. A credible crisis resolution mechanism is required for this contingency. Ideally, it should neither create moral hazard for national fiscal policymakers nor undermine the no-bail-out principle, and hence the disciplining effect of financial markets on fiscal policy. It should prevent systemic contagion effects in the financial sector and related spillover effects on the real economy. The fundamental objective should be the swift restoration of confidence in a country's solvency.

For illiquid countries: reform and consolidation programme and, if need be, supplementary liquidity assistance from public institutions

The appropriate course of action depends on whether the state in question is merely illiquid, with a fundamentally manageable debt situation, or overindebted.[46] In the first scenario, it may be possible to secure the state's capital market access and solvency simply by agreeing a sustainable reform and consolidation programme. However, even if a country is merely illiquid, such a programme typically needs to be implemented before capital market confidence in the country's long-term ability and willingness to pay can be restored. It is therefore likely that temporary assistance from the ESM or other public institutions, or a debt moratorium, will additionally be required. Central banks are prohibited from making a financial contribution to the crisis resolution mechanism because of the prohibition on monetary financing.

For overindebted countries: one-off wealth levy worth considering as crisis resolution instrument

If a country is overindebted, the first thing that must be done is to map out a sustainable debt reduction path. This is also a prerequisite for receiving liquidity assistance from the ESM. If debt sustainability is gravely endangered and unlikely to be achieved through conventional consolidation measures and reforms, extraordinary fiscal measures should also be considered in order to avert a sovereign debt haircut if possible. Particularly in cases in which the overindebted country is also home to considerable private wealth, a one-off redistribution of assets within that country might well be considered, for exemple, before any attempts are made to restructure its outstanding debt. This could, say, take the form of a one-off levy on

45 See European Central Bank, The determinants of euro area sovereign bond yield spreads during the crises, ECB Monthly Bulletin, May 2014, pp. 67-83.

46 In practice, it is very difficult to differentiate between illiquidity and overindebtedness. Thus far, all euro-area countries that have received help from an assistance programme have been assumed to be illiquid but solvent. While the majority of these countries have since successfully ended their programmes and have been able to return to the capital market, a haircut was carried out on private holdings of Greek government bonds barely two years after the start of the Greek programme.

residents' net assets. Such a move could make a noticeable contribution to ensuring the sustainability of a country's debt situation. In principle, this would hold the electorate accountable for its voting behaviour and sensitise it to the significance of such votes. This should increase incentives to strive for a fiscal policy that is fundamentally stability-oriented. If a country is increasingly unable or unwilling to repay its debts, the possibility of a one-off wealth levy being required as part of either an adjustment programme or a debt restructuring can prevent the debtor state (and thus its electorate) from looking for a quick fix to its debt burden at the expense of the country's creditors.[47]

Regulated procedure preferable for sovereign haircut event

If an overindebted country does carry out a debt haircut, a regulated procedure within the framework of a properly structured sovereign insolvency regime – potentially with the ESM as the coordinating body – as described above would be preferable to an unregulated approach. If the ESM defines fiscal and economic policy conditionality under this framework and makes the provision of liquidity assistance dependent on compliance with it, this could also potentially make it easier for private creditors to agree to a required debt haircut. In addition, the conditionality would counteract any incentives the debtor state may have to seek a quick-fix solution at the creditors' expense and would therefore also discourage unsound fiscal policy in the first place.

Beneficial automatic maturity extension of euro-area government bonds when ESM assistance is granted

As proposed above, the inclusion of a standard clause in euro-area government bond contracts stipulating automatic maturity extension in the event that ESM assistance is granted is particularly beneficial in this context. It not only improves the disciplining effect of financial markets on fiscal policy, but also significantly reduces the volume of public assistance required, as financial investors would remain liable for their investment decision if ESM assistance were to be granted.[48] Thus they can still be called upon if a subsequent debt restructuring becomes necessary.

ESM assistance loans must be free of moral hazard

ESM assistance loans to bridge temporary liquidity difficulties should be strictly tied to compliance with the reform and consolidation programme agreed with the given country. Even a change in government in the state receiving the assistance or in the creditor countries must not be allowed to fundamentally call these agreements into question. Reliable conditionality is an essential prerequisite for tackling the root causes of solvency problems and for the country in question to regain trust and access to the capital markets through its own efforts. It is also of key importance for gaining the confidence of the assistance-providing countries, which in effect provide *ex ante* loans without a repayment guarantee. Perceptible interest rate mark-ups on the refinancing costs of assistance loans should likewise provide governments with incentives to swiftly consolidate their public finances in order to lower the risk spreads as soon as possible and return to the capital markets. In addition, in order to protect taxpayers in creditor member states, public funds should generally be excluded from any subsequent restructuring, as is currently agreed in the case of ESM assistance loans.

Overall package improves sustainability of public finances and limits systemic risks of a sovereign haircut

Overall, the proposed measures for a more rigorous implementation of the European budgetary rules, the strengthening of the role of financial markets as a counterweight to fiscal policymakers' propensity to borrow and an improved crisis resolution mechanism may help to achieve greater sustainability in public finances. In conjunction with the aforementioned supplementary reforms to strengthen the financial system's loss-absorbency and to improve the resolvability of systemically important banks, these measures would contain the systemic risk arising from a not inconceivable sovereign debt

47 For more information see Deutsche Bundesbank, A one-off capital levy: a suitable instrument for solving national solvency crises within the current EMU framework?, Monthly Report, January 2014, pp. 49-51, and G Kempkes and N Stähler, A one-off wealth levy? Assessing the pros, the cons and the importance of credibility, Fiscal Studies, forthcoming.

48 For the duration of the maturity extension period, funds would only be required to finance the deficits and no longer to redeem maturing government bonds.

haircut and underpin the credibility of the no-bail-out principle.

Prevent or correct misguided macroeconomic developments

National sovereignty not infringed even by the excessive imbalance procedure

The introduction of the procedure for monitoring and correcting macroeconomic imbalances has provided monetary union with an important crisis-prevention tool that was previously lacking. Its objective is to counteract cross-border risks and economic policy developments that cause negative spillover effects on other member states and, in particular, on the functioning of monetary union. The reform was carried out within the existing legal and institutional framework, which means it does not encroach on the legally enshrined national sovereignty in the area of economic policy. The implementation of the economic policy recommendations of the European level therefore depends on the willingness and ability of member states to take these into consideration within the framework of their national economic policies. An advantage in this context is that, in the course of monitoring, macroeconomic imbalances can be identified by means of transparent analysis as this reveals problems to voters and capital market players, who can then put pressure on policymakers to take remedial action.

Still too early for robust evaluation of procedure

At the end of November 2014, the European Commission published a communication on the review of the EU's new economic governance regulations.[49] The gist of the communication, which seems reasonable, is that it is too early to draw meaningful conclusions regarding the impact of the procedure because of the short period in which it has been in force. This is underscored by the fact that, in a number of EU countries, macroeconomic imbalances were already in the process of being corrected by the time the excessive imbalance procedure was implemented in 2011, so that the procedure can only be put to the test in future periods in which imbalances first arise.

Inadequate use of the procedure by the Commission and overreliance on member states' reform promises

It must be said, however, that the European Commission's evident reluctance to fully utilise the steps available under the procedure merits a critical assessment. Thus the number of countries in which it has identified an excessive imbalance has risen from zero in 2012 to five in 2015. Yet the European Commission has not initiated excessive imbalance procedure in a single case to date, and this year, too, it has not yet issued any proposals to initiate such a procedure. Furthermore, when assessing the extent of imbalances, the Commission places too much importance on member states' reform promises, whereas experience shows that they are then only partially implemented or not implemented at all.[50]

Acceptance at national level an unresolved problem

A general problem, which ultimately also applies to the excessive imbalance procedure, is the often low acceptance in the individual member states of economic policy recommendations formulated at EU level, which are often seen as encroachments on national sovereignty. As part of its review, the Commission therefore calls for incentives for better implementation of the reform recommendations by the member states, though it fails to spell out what form these incentives should take. It should also be noted that the European level's diagnostic capability is not necessarily superior to that of the member states. This would suggest that the subsidiarity principle should apply as extensively as possible in order to prevent attempts by the Commission at macroeconomic fine-tuning. That being said, a purely national view that neglects the negative consequences for other member states and monetary union as a whole can be equally problematic. For example, a smaller country might opt to pursue a risky structural policy – such as growing a large financial sector – if it sees po-

49 See European Commission, Economic Governance Review, November 2014.
50 See European Central Bank, Economic Bulletin, 2/2015, pp. 53 ff.

tential advantages at the national level, while offloading a large portion of the negative risks onto the Community, for example via the banking union.

Financial incentives to reform unconvincing

The proposal made in the debate on the potential deepening of economic and monetary union to use extensive financial payments to overcome national resistance to Brussels' reform recommendations seems unconvincing.[51] Among other things, this would create incentives to put up fierce initial resistance to reforms and then subsequently demand large amounts of financial compensation in return for implementation. It would be rather difficult to justify a situation in which funds are granted when unsound developments arise and are corrected but not when unsound developments are avoided in the first place.

Stronger integration of national parliaments potentially helpful

Experience has shown that a comprehensive reform process in an affected member state can only really get off the ground and be successful if a large proportion of national policymakers and voters are convinced of the need for the recommended adjustments and are also prepared to see them through. A stronger integration of national parliaments could therefore be helpful. However, future amendments to the coordination mechanism should avoid making procedures altogether too complicated.

The role of monetary policy

Focus on price stability in compliance with market principles

The primary objective of the European System of Central Banks is to ensure price stability, and this is why it was granted independence, particularly from national governments. An essential counterpart to this independence is a monetary policy approach that is focused as narrowly as possible on the ESCB's price stability mandate and kept at arm's length from fiscal activities. Moreover, monetary policymakers must pursue this objective in compliance with market principles. The European treaties, which also govern the Eurosystem, are rooted in the principle that free competition is a prerequisite for the efficient allocation of resources. This makes it essential that monetary policymakers do not contribute to an imbalance between liability and control in other policy areas.

Monetary policy must not be misused to neutralise market forces

In other words, monetary policymakers must ensure in the course of their activities that responsibility for liquidity management ultimately remains with the commercial banks and that banks' funding costs are determined by market forces.[52] Banks which cannot raise funds on the money and capital markets, or which can do so only at prohibitive expense, must not be kept on life-support indefinitely by the central bank. Otherwise this could lead to a misallocation of resources.

Institutional segregation of monetary policy and banking supervision needed in the long term

Banking supervision should not be based at the ECB but instead at an independent institution that has the final say on supervisory matters, or at the very least, the decision-making structures for monetary policy and banking supervision at the ECB should be clearly segregated so as to avoid conflicts of interest between the two policy areas. Against this backdrop, the aim should be to amend European primary law in the long term to achieve an institutional separation of monetary policy and banking supervision at the European level.[53]

Monetary policy must not undermine the regulatory framework for fiscal policy

Just like the abovementioned comments on private responsibility for risks in the financial system, where monetary policy interacts with fiscal policy, the risks taken by fiscal policymakers are the responsibility of national governments and must be shouldered by the member states themselves. This means that, in this respect, too, monetary policy must not be allowed to

51 On this proposal see European Commission, A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union: Launching a European debate, Communication from the Commission, November 2012.
52 For more information see Deutsche Bundesbank, Implications of the Eurosystem's monetary operations during the financial crisis, Monthly Report, April 2014, pp. 37-59.
53 For more information see Deutsche Bundesbank, Launch of the banking union: the Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe, Monthly Report, October 2014, pp 43-64.

undermine the disciplining impact of the market. Measures aimed, for example, at reducing the financing costs of individual member states affected by rising risk spreads should be viewed critically in this context. Equally, monetary policymakers must not use the central bank's balance sheet to communitise sovereign debts via the back door.

Monetary policy and macroprudential policy

As both monetary policy and macroprudential policy target the financial sector, interactions between these two policy areas are inevitable. At the current juncture, however, there is only limited experience and scant knowledge in respect of macroprudential instruments as to their mode of operation, calibration and interaction both among themselves and with monetary policy. Nevertheless, the recent past has shown that the monetary policy stance can influence, in particular, the risk-taking propensity of financial market participants. Monetary policymakers should therefore also duly consider the implications of their decisions for the stability of the financial system as a whole. However, they can only do so within the scope of their mandate. Ultimately, this suggests that monetary policy should be applied symmetrically over the financial cycle and that policymakers should also weigh up medium and long-term risks to price stability. Such a symmetric monetary policy could help prevent financial market participants assuming too much risk.[54]

Conclusions

Establishing a coherent economic policy framework …

The crisis has pinpointed the need to reform the regulatory framework of monetary union. Many reforms and changes have since been implemented, often as short-term reactions to stress events. One of the fundamental questions raised is whether a fiscal or political union could be a viable objective. Given the evident lack of political support for such a scheme in the member states, it would seem that this path, along with comprehensive changes to EU primary law, is no longer on the agenda. As long as this remains the case, the existing regulatory framework must be made as crisis-proof as possible in the medium to long term.

… requires corrections and additional measures in various areas

The current constellation of growing joint liability, euro-area-wide risks to financial stability from potential unsound developments in individual member states, and extensive national autonomy in economic and fiscal policy is contradictory and unstable. This makes monetary union susceptible to new crises, and there is a risk of monetary policymakers being pressured into subjugating the objective of price stability to other general concerns such as securing financial stability or sovereign solvency, which are actually the responsibility of other political actors. If the current basic principles governing economic policy in the euro area, such as extensive national autonomy in economic and fiscal policy, continue to prevail, corrections and additional measures will therefore be required in various areas.

Strengthen financial stability through better loss-absorbency and improved resolvability of banks and ending the privileged status of government bonds in banking regulation

In terms of financial stability, further measures to strengthen banks' loss-absorbency and to improve the resolvability of financial institutions could promote a situation in which state funding for distressed banks is only required in extreme cases in order to avert a systemic crisis. It is equally crucial to curtail negative spillover effects of unsound public finances on financial stability. For this to happen, it is essential that a sovereign debt haircut can be carried out in future without raising fears of a systemic financial crisis. Only then will the no-bail-out principle applicable to other states, the Community, and monetary policymakers be credible and only then will financial markets more adequately assess the risk of a state being unable or unwilling to repay its debts. In this regard, considerable progress could be made if the existing favourable treatment of government debt securities in banking regulation were to be pared back in the medium term and abolished in the long term. Banks' exposures to sovereigns

54 For more information see Deutsche Bundesbank, The importance of macroprudential policy for monetary policy, Monthly Report, March 2015, pp. 39-71.

would then also require risk-appropriate capital backing and be subject to rules on large exposure limits.

Improve fiscal rules, strengthen disciplining role of financial markets and overhaul crisis resolution mechanism

In the area of fiscal policy, budgetary surveillance could be transferred to an independent institution mandated exclusively to safeguard sound public finances. In addition, the European fiscal framework, particularly the Stability and Growth Pact, should be tightened and, above all, actually implemented. If the Community level is not to be granted rights of intervention into the budgetary sovereignty of member states, then the disciplining effect of financial markets on fiscal policy will play an important role, irrespective of the fiscal rules. Lastly, the current crisis resolution mechanisms should be improved. For example, government bond contracts could be adjusted (single-limb collective action clauses, *pari passu* clause, automatic maturity extension upon the granting of ESM assistance), and a framework could be established to make sovereign insolvency procedures as orderly as possible. The ESM could be given an important role in this context.

Too early to reliably assess the need for further action on macroeconomic imbalances

In terms of macroeconomic developments, the introduction of the procedure for monitoring and correcting macroeconomic imbalances already represents a significant step forward. It is not yet possible to say with any certainty whether further reforms will be required, although so far the European Commission has adopted a fairly lax approach to implementation. Possible options to improve the acceptability of the Commission's recommendations by the member states include stronger integration of national parliaments and a streamlined and focused design of the rather complex European coordination frameworks.

Proposed reforms would take the pressure off monetary policymakers and contribute to a stability-oriented monetary union

All in all, the proposed reforms in the areas of financial stability and fiscal policy, in particular, would mitigate the risk of monetary policymakers being pressured into carrying out tasks outside or at the very limits of their mandate. In the upshot, this could make an important contribution to securing a stability-oriented monetary union.

The importance of macroprudential policy for monetary policy

The global financial crisis has sparked intense debate amongst economists regarding the future shape and role of monetary policy. Certain elements of the pre-crisis monetary policy consensus remain valid even today – in particular, the continued paramount significance of price stability. By contrast, one issue that remains open is the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability.

Although no definitive answers can be expected as yet, some initial insights have been gained. There is a broad consensus that a new policy area with its own set of instruments is needed in order to safeguard financial stability. The swift establishment of an effective macroprudential policy therefore continues to have high priority. As both monetary policy and macroprudential policy measures initially affect the financial sector, interaction between these two policy areas is inevitable. However, at the current juncture, experience and knowledge of the functioning of macroprudential instruments, their calibration and the way in which they interact with each other and with monetary policy are rather limited. A monetary policy geared towards price stability in the medium term is no guarantee on its own for the prevention of unwelcome developments in the financial markets that could spill over into the real economy and ultimately endanger price stability. The recent past has shown that the monetary policy stance can influence financial market players' propensity to take risks, in particular.

Monetary policymakers must therefore also duly consider the effect of their decisions on the stability of the financial system as a whole. This suggests two things: first, that monetary policy is symmetrically designed over the financial cycle – that is to say, a monetary policy stance that is generally stricter during upswings even in the absence of inflationary pressures and is aggressively eased in the short term during marked downturns, but a less persistent expansionary monetary policy stance following a period of economic downturn – and, second, a trade-off between medium and longer-term risks to price stability. A symmetrical monetary policy in this vein could help to avoid a situation in which financial market participants take on too much risk.

In principle, monetary policy could also explicitly pursue financial stability as an objective in its own right. However, in addition to political-economic reasons, the primary obstacles to this are excessively high expectations placed on the effectiveness of monetary policy instruments with regard to safeguarding financial stability and a still-limited understanding of the way in which these two policy areas interact.

The Eurosystem's monetary policy strategy is sufficiently flexible to respond appropriately to future challenges. A fundamental change in strategy is not required. More work should be done on implementing an effective macroprudential policy; this would not only improve the stability of the financial system as a whole but also maintain the conditions in which the single monetary policy is able to ensure price stability in accordance with its mandate.

Introduction

Financial crisis has shown that price stability is not enough to ensure financial stability

The global financial crisis has challenged the prevailing monetary policy paradigm. For example, it has shown that low inflation rates and comparatively moderate business cycle fluctuations are not always sufficient to ensure financial stability.[1] Although a number of different monetary policy measures were implemented all over the world following the outbreak of the global financial crisis, these were not always able to prevent a deep and prolonged recession. It is not least because several central banks were forced to resort to non-standard measures due to a zero lower bound on interest rates that sooner or later became binding that intense debate has been sparked amongst economists regarding the future shape and role of monetary policy.

Key elements of the pre-crisis monetary policy consensus remain intact, however

Despite many differences in opinion, certain elements of the pre-crisis monetary policy consensus remain valid: these include the continued paramount significance of price stability, the key role played by the independence of central banks and, in connection with that, the importance placed on a high degree of transparency of monetary policy.[2]

By contrast, relationship between monetary policy and financial stability needs to be revisited in wake of crisis …

By contrast, one issue that remains open is the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability. Views on the topic range from a categorical separation of both policy areas and taking greater account of financial market developments in future monetary policy all the way to the proposal that monetary policy explicitly put the objective of financial stability on a plane with that of price stability.

… and, in doing so, macroprudential policy needs to be taken into account …

As unwelcome developments within the financial system were the key factors behind the scale and persistence of the global financial crisis, new institutional conditions have emerged that need to be considered when examining the issue above. These include the establishment of macroprudential institutions and the development of an effective set of instruments to go with them. This is intended to reduce systemic risk and strengthen the resilience of the financial system as a whole.[3]

… as it interacts with monetary policy

As both monetary policy and macroprudential policy initially affect the financial sector, interaction between these two policy areas is inevitable. For example, banks' lending is not only important for monetary policy transmission but is also relevant to macroprudential policy. This opens up the possibility of monetary and macroprudential policy measures complementing each other, but also harbours the danger of a clash between the two. Therefore, neither policy area can blithely ignore the other completely. The future transmission of monetary policy is likely, in principle, to be changed by macroprudential policy – that is to say, by its institutional structure and the use of its instruments.

Knowledge of macroprudential policy and how it interacts with monetary policy is still limited

This article will provide an overview of the current academic and political debates on the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy, from which normative conclusions will be drawn. In doing so, it must be noted that, at the current juncture, experience and knowledge of the functioning of macroprudential instruments, their calibration and

1 In this article, financial stability is defined as the financial system's ability to perform its key macroeconomic functions (eg payments, assumption and management of risk, liquidity provision, credit intermediation), especially in periods of stress and upheaval.
2 "… [I]t is important to state the obvious: the baby should not be thrown out with the bathwater." See T Bayoumi, G Dell'Ariccia, K Habermeier, T Mancini-Griffoli and F Valencia (2014), Monetary Policy in the New Normal, IMF Staff Discussion Note, SDN/14/3, p 5.
3 Another major reform in Europe with respect to financial stability was the launch of the European banking union. One of the central pillars of the banking union is the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which commenced operations in November 2014. This entailed the transfer of extensive microprudential and macroprudential powers to the European Central Bank. See Deutsche Bundesbank, Launch of the banking union: the Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe, Monthly Report, October 2014, pp 43-64; Deutsche Bundesbank (2014), Implications of the banking union for financial stability, Financial Stability Review 2014, pp 69-88.

the way in which they interact with each other and with monetary policy is still rather limited.[4]

Empirical evidence and lessons learned from the crisis

Empirical evidence for the euro area

Inflation rates, inflation expectations and GDP were stable prior to outbreak of financial crisis, …

Prior to the outbreak of the global financial crisis, the inflation rate in the euro area hovered at around 2% (see adjacent chart). Long-term inflation expectations were similarly stable. Until the crisis broke out, the low volatility of the (expected) inflation rate was accompanied by minor fluctuations in business cycle developments, especially in gross domestic product (GDP).

… while financial variables underwent major fluctuations

By contrast, other macroeconomic aggregates and financial variables underwent major fluctuations. For example, the relationship between asset prices and investment and overall economic development in the euro area rose steadily on the whole until the onset of the crisis. This growth was funded by a sharp increase in lending.

Economic and credit cycles out of step prior to the crisis

Thus, the economic and financial cycles did not develop along the same lines prior to the outbreak of the crisis, as signalled by the credit cycle, a major component of the financial cycle (see chart on page 42). While the credit cycle concept is based on the conventional business cycle, it examines patterns of private debt rather than of GDP. The credit cycle is often defined as the medium-term component of credit aggregate fluctuations.[5] Credit cycles differ from classic business cycles in terms of their greater amplitude, in particular. In addition, according to many economists, credit cycles last longer than business cycles, averaging a duration of eight to 30 years.[6] The significance of the credit cycle rests on the observation that peaks in the cycle are often followed by financial crises.

Consumer prices in the euro area*

Monthly; year-on-year percentage change



Source: Eurostat. * HICP.
Deutsche Bundesbank

Sharp increase in lending prior to crisis generated systemic risk

As recent experience has clearly shown, a sharp increase in lending coincided with commercial banks occasionally increasing their leverage ratio to a level that, as the financial crisis has demonstrated, resulted in systemic risk.[7] The elevated leverage ratio led to a rise not only in the credit and liquidity risk of individual financial institutions but also, given the scale of interbank links, in the risk to which the financial system as a whole is exposed. In particular, maturity transformation assumed extraordinarily

4 See C M Buch (2014a), Challenges of evaluating economic policy measures, speech delivered at the academic ceremony of the Otto-von-Guericke University in Magdeburg to mark the 412th birthday of Otto von Guericke; C M Buch (2014b), Macroprudential policy: what do we need to know?, in A Houben, R Nijskens and M Teunissen (eds), Putting Macroprudential Policy to Work, De Nederlandsche Bank, Occasional Studies, Vol 12-7.

5 Credit cycles have long been associated with financial crises. See H P Minsky (1986), Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press. See also M Drehmann, C Borio and K Tsatsaronis (2012), Characterising the financial cycle: don't lose sight of the medium term!, BIS Working Paper, No 380; S Claessens, M A Kose and M E Terrones (2011), Financial Cycles: What? How? When?, IMF Working Paper, No 11/76.

6 See D Aikman et al (2014), Curbing the credit cycle, Economic Journal, DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12113. The authors investigated the spectral density function (spectrum) and concluded that medium-term frequencies were dominant. In addition, the medium-term cycle dovetails better with crisis periods. There is still no consensus on how to determine the duration of credit cycles. A conventional business cycle lasts between around one-and-a-half and eight years.

7 See T Adrian and H S Shin (2014), Procyclical leverage and Value-at-Risk, Review of Financial Studies, Vol 27, pp 373-403.

Short and medium-term components of credit and business cycles*

Quarterly data



Sources: ECB ("ECB Balance Sheet Items", loans of domestic MFIs to the non-financial private sector in the euro area, outstanding loan amounts at the end of the quarter) and OECD ("Main Economic Indicators", real GDP and the consumer price index to determine real outstanding loan amounts). * The Christiano-Fitzgerald band pass filter is used to extract the cycles. The short-term component is specified to be 1.5 to 8 years compared with 8 to 30 years for the medium-term component.

Deutsche Bundesbank

high proportions. When short-term loans were no longer prolonged following the outbreak of the crisis, many financial institutions were immediately forced to liquidate their assets in fire sales.[8]

Dissimilarity in credit cycles throughout euro area suggests macroprudential policy should be organised at national level

The synchronicity of credit cycles will be an important factor in the future design of macroprudential policy in the euro area and in the potential role of monetary policy in safeguarding financial stability. Synchronicity is unlikely in the euro area at the present time (see chart above).[9] Centralised, cyclical policy measures alone – be they part of macroprudential policy or monetary policy – are therefore unlikely to be efficient. This is also why macroprudential policy in the euro area is, in general, organised at the national level (see the section on the new institutional set-up in the euro area and the EU on page 49).

8 This experience has led the international community to attach particular importance to lending to non-financial enterprises and households within the context of macroprudential regulation.

9 See B Meller and N Metiu (2015), The Synchronization of European Credit Cycles, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, forthcoming.

Key lesson learned from the crisis: macroprudential policy as a policy area in its own right

Experience gained during financial crisis is putting "pre-crisis consensus on monetary policy", …

Following the outbreak of the global financial crisis, central banks all over the world stabilised the international financial system and business cycle developments by cutting interest rates and implementing a raft of non-standard monetary policy measures. Experience gained during the crisis is putting not only financial supervision but also the "pre-crisis consensus on monetary policy" to the test.[10] In simplified terms, this can be characterised as follows: price stability, operationalised by stabilising the inflation rate at around 2% in the medium term, was conceived as the primary monetary policy objective. Managing short-term interest rates was considered an adequate means of achieving this objective, with the interest rate floor deemed a theoretical curiosity with little practical relevance. Forecasts made by central banks played a major role in monetary policy decision-making.

… which typically assumed efficient financial markets, to the test

Under this paradigm, efficient capital markets were generally assumed; imperfections in the financial markets and their potential macroeconomic effects were largely disregarded. Temporary inefficiencies were considered possible, but the majority view was that monetary policy, with its interest rate instrument, could effectively do little to counteract such problematic developments. Considering how difficult it is to promptly and reliably identify certain unsound developments in the capital markets – in the form of asset price bubbles, for instance – the majority view until the outbreak of the financial crisis was that monetary policy could not control asset prices, therefore also making it unable to prevent the emergence of such bubbles, nor should it burst any asset price bubbles that may arise. A "benign neglect" approach[11] was thus adopted: monetary policymakers should only respond if, due to capital market developments, real economic adjustments were expected that not only suggested a revision of inflation and economic forecasts but also signalled an undesirable deviation from monetary policy objectives. In the event of an unwelcome, abrupt, downward revision, monetary policy was to cushion the negative effects by supplying the financial sector with sufficient liquidity. It was thought that monetary policymakers should intervene only once a financial crisis was already taking place, minimising the macroeconomic damage through resolute interest rate cuts. Microprudential supervision – which focuses on individual financial institutions – was regarded as an adequate means of preventing financial crises.

Synchronicity of credit cycles*

Dissimilarity (1-correlation)



Source: B Meller and N Metiu (2014), The Synchronization of European Credit Cycles, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, forthcoming. * "Dissimilarity" on the y-axis is measured by "1-correlation of the medium-term component of the credit cycles of two countries". The countries that are most similar are connected to each other to form groups, which are then linked to other groups of countries that are most similar to them.

Deutsche Bundesbank

Crisis has shown that microprudential supervision alone is not enough

Experience gained during the crisis has, however, highlighted the fact that microprudential supervision alone is not sufficient to guarantee the stability of the financial system because it ignores the repercussions of developments at the level of individual institutions on the entire

10 See Deutsche Bundesbank, The implications of the financial crisis for monetary policy, Monthly Report, March 2011, pp 53-68.

11 See B Bernanke and M Gertler (1999), Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review 84, pp 17-51; B Bernanke and M Gertler (2001), Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?, American Economic Review 91, pp 253-257; S Gilchrist and J Leahy (2002), Monetary Policy and Asset Prices, Journal of Monetary Economics 49, pp 75-97.

financial system.[12,13] In addition, it has become apparent that the macroeconomic damage following the outbreak of a severe financial crisis can only be partly stemmed by monetary policy after the fact.

Aim of macroprudential policy is to stabilise financial system as a whole

In order to stem the risk of financial crises in future, the stability of the financial system as a whole is therefore now a policy objective in its own right. Macroprudential supervision is responsible for making a crucial contribution to this goal. One of its tasks is to help ensure that all financial market participants keep in mind the consequences of their actions on the stability of the financial system. Macroprudential policy is now established at an institutional level as a policy area in its own right. Ideally, it works in two ways. On the one hand, it helps curb incentives for excessive risk-taking *ex ante*. The instruments used should help ensure that market participants take account of the contribution that they are making to systemic risk with their decisions (see the box on welfare-theoretical thoughts on pages 45 to 48). On the other hand, various macroprudential instruments increase the financial system's resilience, thereby reducing its vulnerability to shocks and, in that respect, minimising the total macroeconomic costs of a financial crisis. Since a large number of different distortions and misaligned incentives in different areas (eg real estate market, general government debt) can entail the risk of instability, this new policy area requires its own set of instruments to be able to contain specific problems in the financial sector.[14] These instruments include a range of capital surcharges, such as countercyclical capital buffers for banks, and potential loan-to-value ratios for mortgage loans. In a more general sense, incentive-compatible deposit insurance schemes or functioning bank insolvency legislation could also count as macroprudential instruments.

The well-measured, well-communicated use of macroprudential instruments contributes to macroeconomic stability and, in this respect, should make it easier in future for monetary policy to perform its task and reduce the likelihood of the need to cut interest rates to their lower bound and implement widespread non-standard measures in the event of a crisis escalating.

Although macroprudential and monetary policy ideally complement each other, interaction between the two policy areas needs to be analysed

The new institutional set-up in the euro area and the EU

As a general rule, responsibility for macroprudential policy lies with member states

As a general rule, responsibility for macroprudential policy in the EU lies with individual member states (see chart on page 49). However, upon the launch of the SSM[15] in November 2014, the ECB was entrusted with not only microprudential supervisory powers but also certain macroprudential information and intervention rights in relation to the SSM member states. It is to be notified in advance of any planned macroprudential intervention at the national level because of possible cross-border effects. However, the ECB also has the power to tighten measures.[16]

ECB is responsible for banking supervision in cooperation with national supervisory authorities

The ECB has been responsible for banking supervision in the SSM member states since November 2014. However, it works in cooperation with the national supervisory authorities rather than performing all supervisory tasks itself: the ECB has assumed direct supervision of the 123 institutions classified as significant, with responsibility for the supervision of the remaining institu-

12 Traditional banking supervision aims to ensure the stability of individual institutions. This means that risks to the overall financial system, and thus to the economy as a whole, arising from individual institutions that are experiencing distress are not the main focus.
13 See M K Brunnermeier (2009), Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, Journal of Economic Perspectives 23, pp 77-100; J Weidmann (2014a), All for one and one for all? The role of microprudential, macroprudential, and monetary policy in safeguarding financial stability, speech delivered at the Bundesbank Symposium on Financial Stability and the Role of Central Banks, Frankfurt am Main, 27 February 2014.
14 See IMF (2013), op cit. The emergence of a financial crisis cannot be completely ruled out in future, either. However, the objective of joint efforts must be to minimise the likelihood of such a break to the greatest extent possible and create conditions in which aggregate losses are kept as small as possible.
15 All euro-area countries are SSM member states. Other EU countries can opt into the SSM.
16 See Deutsche Bundesbank, Financial Stability Review 2013, pp 102-104.

Welfare-theoretical thoughts on possible monetary policy objectives

In order to arrive at an optimal monetary policy for complex economies which are characterised by a large number of frictions and market imperfections, use is often made of theoretical models. An analysis of that kind is based on a welfare function which, based on the respective model, contains those variables that are to be stabilised by economic policy measures. When optimising the welfare function, the model structure – and therefore the way in which economic policy measures affect the economy (ie the transmission process) – has to be taken into account as a restriction. It is possible, within the model framework of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, to derive for a given structure of the model economy the appropriate objectives for different policy actors. The relevant target function is derived from the utility functions of the actors in this model economy and is an approximate representation of overall economic welfare. Which of the economic variables the decision-makers of certain policy areas ought to observe then results from the arguments that are contained in this (micro-founded) target function (eg inflation rate or output gap). An optimal policy is one that maximises welfare assuming that the conditions of equilibrium that describe the dynamics of the model are satisfied at all times.

Thus, taking financial market frictions into account can affect two points in the analysis of optimal policy: the welfare function and the equations that describe the dynamics of the model. However, it is not necessarily the case that frictions in the financial sector lead to a change in both the model dynamics and the welfare function. In this box, a simple New Keynesian model is used to show, first, the consequences only of modifying the model dynamics and, subsequently, also the consequences of modifying the welfare function. Only monetary policy is considered and further possible policy actors and instruments are disregarded. It is assumed that only the interest rate is available as a monetary policy instrument in order to achieve an optimal economic development for a given structure of the model economy. In principle, it is possible to examine the optimal policy of different policy areas, for example monetary, fiscal and/or macroprudential policy, within the scope of a welfare analysis (see the box on pages 56 to 61).

General equilibrium models with frictionless financial markets generally come to the conclusion that a monetary policy that focuses primarily on safeguarding price stability maximises welfare. This is reflected in the usual approximation of overall economic welfare for these models:[1]

$$\mathrm{E}_0 \sum_{\mathrm{t}=0}^{\infty} \beta^{\mathrm{t}} \mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{t}} \approx -\Omega \mathrm{E}_0 \sum_{\mathrm{t}=0}^{\infty} \beta^{\mathrm{t}} \left[\pi_{\mathrm{t}}^2 + \lambda_{\mathrm{x}} \left(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{t}} - \mathrm{x}^* \right)^2 \right].$$

The part in square brackets consisting of quadratic terms indicates those variables according to which monetary policymakers ought to gear their measures: the inflation rate, π_t, and the output gap, x_{t} (x_{t} is usually defined as the difference between the actual output and the output that would occur if prices were flexible).[2] Given that the relative importance of stabilising the output gap – reflected in the parameter λ_{x} – is typically low,[3] the primary focus of monetary policy on price stability is to be justified with these analyses.

1 See also M Woodford (2003), Interest and Prices – Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy, Princeton University Press. In the above formula, E_0 represents the expectation operator in period $t=0$, β is the relevant discount factor, U_t is the utility function at period t and both Ω and λ_x are positive parameters which are derived from the model structure.
2 Owing to the quadratic structure, each deviation from a given target value is to be minimised: in the case of the inflation rate, this is (for reasons of simplicity) the value zero and, in the case of the output gap x^*, an optimal value resulting from the model structure; ideally, this value is likewise zero.
3 See also M Woodford (2003), op cit.

The question that now arises is whether the same result is obtained when financial market frictions are taken into account in the model: in other words, does a welfare analysis which takes into account frictions in the financial sector lead to justification for monetary policy to stabilise the financial sector directly in addition to focusing primarily on price stability if no other instruments – macroprudential policy in particular – are available? To answer this question, we refer in this box to recent research which integrates financial market frictions into a general equilibrium model and derives a micro-founded loss function.[4,5]

It should first be noted that taking frictions in the financial sector into account evidently leads to modifications in the structure of the respective model compared with the standard New Keynesian model in which only price rigidities represent a significant friction. This is reflected, in a first step, in changing equilibrium conditions that describe the dynamics of the model.[6,7] Consequently, this leads to changes in the transmission process, and potential additional sources of shocks arise which have to be taken into account when deriving and, eventually, actually implementing the (optimal) monetary policy.

Based on the notion that the expectation value of a squared variable, $\mathrm{E}(\mathrm{X}^2)$, such as appears, for example, in the above-mentioned welfare function, can be broken down into a (squared) level term (mean), $\mathrm{E}(\mathrm{X})^2$, and a variance term, $\mathrm{Var}(\mathrm{X})$,[8] it is possible to examine the consequences of the modifications described above for a given welfare function. In contrast to the standard model, the changes as described above to the dynamics of the model can typically lead to a non-trivial trade-off between achieving the goal of the level term of the loss function and of the variance term of the loss function (which is affected by the probability and the scale of the crisis). This is particularly significant if the scale of financial frictions (and therefore the risk and scope of a financial crisis) is model-endogenous and so also depends on monetary policy itself. By contrast, it could also be assumed that the financial frictions follow an exogenous process. The result of this is that the variance term of the loss function cannot be influenced by monetary policy, which is in keeping with typical assumptions of the standard model. The above-mentioned trade-off decision between the mean and the variance would therefore not be relevant in the case of exogenous frictions.

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4 See also C T Carlstrom, T S Fuerst and M Paustian (2010), Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model with Agency Costs, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol 42, No 6, pp 37-70; V Cúrdia and M Woodford (2009), Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy, Columbia University, mimeo; F De Fiore and O Tristani (2012), Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model of the Credit Channel, The Economic Journal 123, pp 906-931.

5 Put very generally, financial market frictions occur, in particular, when there is no complete set of state-contingent Arrow-Debreu securities that is able to specify payouts for all potential developments and through which complete risk sharing would be possible. See also E M Leeper and J M Nason (2014), Bringing Financial Stability into Monetary Policy, Indiana University, mimeo.

6 In the simplest variant of a New Keynesian general equilibrium model, these conditions are described by two equations: first, the so-called IS curve, which results from the optimal consumption decision of households and describes the aggregate demand side of the economy, and second, the so-called New Keynesian Phillips curve, which represents aggregate supply, derived from the optimal pricing decision of monopolistic firms under the assumption of price rigidities. In both equations, acting in a forward-looking manner, and therefore forming expectations, plays a crucial role.

7 Amongst other things, the financial frictions are reflected in all the models used here as a so-called cost-push term in the New Keynesian Phillips curve. This produces a conflict of objectives between stabilising inflation and stabilising the output gap if the cost-push terms deviate from their stationary equilibrium values due to exogenous or endogenous developments.

8 In particular, the following applies. $E(X^2|A) = E(X|A)^2 + Var(X|A)$, where X represents a macroeconomic variable and A a given monetary policy orientation. The left (and therefore also the right) side of the equation can be transferred to the corresponding terms in the loss function. See also N Kocherlakota (2014), Discussion of 2014 USMPF Monetary Policy Report, speech delivered at the "2014 US Monetary Policy Forum" of the "Initiative on Global Markets" of the University of Chicago, Booth School of Business, New York, NY, 28 February 2014.

If, on the other hand, the risk of a crisis increases model-endogenously due to an expansionary monetary policy stance, this affects the variance. The higher variance can be countered, however, by adopting a more restrictive monetary policy stance. Although this would lead to a deviation in the case of the mean (as a result of which the inflation rate target would, strictly speaking, be missed), the likelihood and/or the scale of a crisis would be reduced; this in turn would lower the variance (that of inflation, in particular). This gives the central bank the incentive to take action against developments in the financial markets that would increase the risk and scale of a crisis (leaning against the wind (LATW) policy), although that would result in a (temporary) deviation of the "classic" welfare-relevant variables (inflation and output gap) from their target values.[9]

Considerations so far indicate, then, that it can be desirable for the central bank to pursue a policy of LATW solely on account of the model dynamics that are affected by financial frictions. This (indirect) bearing of monetary policy on financial stability can exclusively be explained by the fact that monetary policymakers have an eye on the classic target variables of monetary policy – inflation and possibly the output gap – yet are faced with a specific transmission process. It is crucial in this respect that the financial frictions are model-endogenous, which can occur due to mechanisms such as those described by the risk-taking channel, for example.

In addition to the change in transmission, taking frictions in the financial sector into account can make itself felt in a second step in the form of a modification of the approximated welfare function. The common denominator in the research studies considered here is that the above-mentioned equation of a target function in the standard model is, as a general principle, extended by additional variables; these variables "represent" the important frictions in the financial sector:[10]

$$\mathrm{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \mathrm{U}_t \approx -\Omega \mathrm{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[\pi_t^2 + \lambda_x \left(x_t - x^* \right)^2 + \lambda_\Phi \Phi_t^2 \right].$$

In this equation, the welfare-relevant financial variables that are contained in the respective models are summarised by the vector in the last term, ie Φ_t.[11] This variable takes a different form in each of the different models: the interest rate level (De Fiore and Tristani, 2012), the interest rate spread (Cúrdia and Woodford, 2009; De Fiore and Tristani, 2012), the real consumption of resources in the financial sector (Cúrdia and Woodford, 2009) or the risk premium (Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian, 2010).[12] Thus, the results from these models suggest that welfare is maximised not only by primarily stabilising the inflation rate but also by stabilising selected variables of the financial sector as an objective in its own right. The different frictions that exist within the respective models are therefore reflected not only in the dynamics of the model but also in the loss function, which makes the (potential) conflict of objectives between the

9 See also M Woodford (2012, Inflation Targeting and Financial Stability, NBER Working Paper 17967), which analytically derives within a New Keynesian model with (endogenous) financial frictions a LATW motive as an element of optimal monetary policy.

10 This occurs, in particular, when the frictions in the financial sector are determined endogenously in the model. If the financial frictions follow an exogenous process, the additional term in the loss function cannot be affected by policy measures and is therefore not relevant for optimisation.

11 The models examined here specifically display the following financial market frictions. Borrowers are faced with a condition with regard to providing collateral due to a principal-agent ("hold-up") problem, which leads to so-called agency costs (Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian, 2010); they are not free to enter into financial contracts at their discretion, but only into those with the intermediation sector, for whose work real resources are necessary and which is faced with an asymmetric distribution of information; this gives rise to an interest rate premium (Cúrdia and Woodford, 2009). Information asymmetries between the lender and the borrower as well as the possibility of the customer becoming insolvent result in an interest rate premium (De Fiore and Tristani, 2012).

12 In addition, the models also generate combinations of these variables as well as correlation terms, eg of the financial variables with the output gap.

variables transparent.[13] However, in the research work mentioned above – as in the case of the output gap – the relative importance of the financial market variables, λ_{Φ}, is relatively low from an economic viewpoint. This result should be considered provisional given that research in this field is still at a very early stage. Moreover, it should be noted that the models used here make several simplifications to be able to derive a micro-founded loss function. They disregard, in particular, different economic mechanisms that typical models for policy analysis display to be able to describe the observed data as accurately as possible (for example, sluggish wage-setting).

Thus, these concluding thoughts indicate that, in the theoretical perspective presented here, the direct stabilisation of financial market variables may possibly rank as an objective in its own right alongside the stabilisation of the classic variables. However, it should be noted that the target function is an approximation of general societal welfare and that the objectives need not be achieved exclusively through monetary policy. In fact, as the main text illustrates, there are strong arguments as to why the stabilisation of welfare-relevant variables of the financial sector should be transferred to macroprudential policy, in particular.

13 The fact that certain macroeconomic variables appear in the loss function does not necessarily mean that there is a conflict of objectives; only in combination with model dynamics is a conflict of objectives to be found. As is explained above, the models considered here display cost pressure terms in the New Keynesian Phillips curve, which means that a conflict of objectives can indeed arise.

tions continuing to fall within the remit of the national supervisory authorities.[17]

Unlike monetary policy, macroprudential policy can take account of national factors

The national authorities therefore have more macroprudential surveillance powers than either banking supervision or monetary policy powers. Unlike monetary policy, which is uniform throughout the euro area, macroprudential policy can differ from member state to member state and take account of national factors. In-depth knowledge of national financial systems is thus required to correctly manage how instruments are applied. At the same time, as the macroeconomic (and fiscal) costs of a systemic crisis – notably the real economic costs – are incurred primarily at the national level, responsibility for macroprudential policy should also rest at the national level. The ECB's ability to tighten measures mitigates the danger of delays or inaction on the part of national authorities when measures need to be implemented (inaction bias). This reduces the risk of other member states being affected by excessively lax policy.

However, the specific institutional structure of macroprudential policy still provides no information on the relationship between this policy area and monetary policy. For a comprehensive breakdown of this relationship, the fundamental interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy needs to be identified and analysed in detail.

Interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy

Price stability and financial stability are mutually complementary over the long term. Over the short to medium term, however, these two objectives can clash. For instance, macroprudential instruments designed to contain certain developments within the financial sector can run

17 See Deutsche Bundesbank, Financial Stability Review 2014, pp 69-88.

Although monetary policy and macroprudential policy are complementary in the long run, they may clash in the short and medium run

counter to monetary policy intentions. But monetary policy measures, too, can temporarily run counter to financial stability. (A conceivable case in point is that, at the zero lower bound on interest rates, monetary policymakers could be tempted to maintain an accommodative monetary policy stance whereas, from a macroprudential policy viewpoint, it might appear to make sense to tighten the reins in order to curb excessive asset price growth.) The recent past has shown that the monetary policy stance can influence financial market players' risk appetite, in particular. This so-called "risk-taking channel", largely unnoticed before the financial crisis, should therefore be explained in more detail below.

Financial agents' risk appetite[18]

An "overlap" of monetary policy and macroprudential policy …

Monetary policy and macroprudential policy "overlap" significantly in a central – and generally economically desirable – function of the financial system: the taking up, management and sharing of economic risks.

… is created by the risk-taking channel

Summarised in brief: the risk-taking channel describes how an expansionary monetary policy, notably in the form of low policy rates, incentivises commercial banks or other financial market players to take excessive risk.[19] In this channel, an expansionary monetary policy leads not only to an increase in lending – as is generally described in the context of other monetary policy transmission channels – but can also lead to an increase in the overall riskiness of lending. If, all in all, "too many" risky projects are being funded, this can increase the likelihood of a financial crisis.

Risk-taking channel can operate in at least three ways …

Thus, the monetary policy risk-taking channel describes how monetary policy measures, especially a change in the policy rate or the interest rate path, can alter the perception of risk or risk tolerance.[20] It thus encompasses the impact of monetary policy measures on the perceived or measured risk of investment portfolios, asset valuation and funding costs.[21] Un-

The new institutional set-up in the euro area



The chart shows how responsibility for monetary policy, macroprudential policy and banking supervision in the euro area is divided between the national level (central banks/supervisory authorities) and the supranational level (ECB/Eurosystem). While the Eurosystem is responsible for monetary policy, national central banks can exert influence over it via the ECB Governing Council. The ECB and national central banks/supervisory authorities share responsibility for macroprudential policy. Essentially, responsibility for banking supervision rests with the ECB. The ECB has assumed direct supervision of institutions classified as significant, with responsibility for the supervision of the remaining institutions falling within the remit of the national authorities. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and European Banking Authority (EBA) can exert influence over macroprudential policy and banking supervision.

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18 For further details, see, in addition, Deutsche Bundesbank, Low interest rates – risks to financial stability?, Financial Stability Review 2014, pp 13-34.
19 A reminder is in order here that a low policy rate is not necessarily per se associated with an expansionary monetary policy stance. That depends in decisive measure on the level of the "natural rate of interest", ie on the interest rate which is compatible with price stability. For more on the meaning of risk appetite, see the box on pp 50-54.
20 See C Borio and H Zhu (2012), Capital Regulation, Risk-Taking and Monetary Policy: A Missing Link in the Transmission Mechanism?, Journal of Financial Stability 8, pp 236-251.
21 G Dell'Ariccia, L Laeven and R Marquez (2014), Real Interest Rates, Leverage, and Bank Risk-Taking, Journal of Economic Theory 149, pp 65-99, develop a microeconomic partial equilibrium model for which generally two assumptions suffice for the existence of a risk-taking channel: the first being that of limited liability and the possibility of commercial banks to choose the risk of their portfolios by themselves. However, since the portfolio's risk is not directly observable to creditors, the commercial bank's capital structure plays a decisive role. The second is that commercial banks' financing costs are a function of the level of a risk-free reference rate. On the basis of these assumptions, risk appetite is determined largely by three forces or aspects, some of which go in opposite directions: a pass-through effect, a risk-shifting effect and the level of indebtedness. It turns out that a reduction in the risk-free interest rate generally leads to increased risk-taking (see Proposition 2). See also I Angeloni and E Faia (2013), Capital regulation and monetary policy with fragile banks, Journal of Monetary Economics 60, pp 311-324, and A Abbate and D Thaler (2014), Monetary Policy Effects on Bank Risk Taking, mimeo.

Effects of monetary policy on risk taking[1]

The studies available to date on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy are based on detailed data for individual loans and support the existence of such a monetary policy transmission mechanism,[2] particularly in European countries.[3] The benefit of using loan microdata is that the existence of the risk-taking channel can be clearly identified, but leaves open the question regarding the effects of the monetary policy risk-taking channel on the behaviour of banks as a whole – and therefore also its macroeconomic relevance.

In the following, data on heterogeneity in the banking sector are used to investigate the overall impact of changes in monetary policy on risk taking. The following analysis examines new loans and credit spreads across different bank types and credit risk categories. As no comparable data are available for the euro area, the analysis is carried out for the United States.

The banking data are taken from the Federal Reserve's quarterly "Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL)". This survey collects data on the gross volume of new loans (in US dollar) granted during the first full business week of the second month in each quarter. The STBL contains information on loan volumes and credit terms. This information is available for all commercial banks as well as for three bank categories: large domestic banks, small domestic banks, and US branches and agencies of foreign banks. The sample period spans from the second quarter of 1997 to the second quarter of 2008, ending at the point where monetary policy hits the zero lower bound. By using data on new loans, it is possible to take into account the fact that the risk-taking channel describes the incentives to engage in *ex ante* riskier projects. Finally, the STBL contains information on how banks perceive the credit risk of new loans. As part of the survey, banks are asked to assign new loans to one of four categories of increasing risk. The discussion below focuses on new loans categorised as either "low risk" or "high risk".[4] Based on these data, we are thus

Federal funds rate and loan portfolio risk composition



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1 This text is based on C M Buch, S Eickmeier and E Prieto (2014), In search for yield? Survey-based evidence on bank risk taking, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol 43 (C), pp 12-30.
2 See, in particular, G Jiménez, S Ongena, J L Peydró and J Saurina (2014), Hazardous times for monetary policy: What do twenty-three million bank loans say about the effects of monetary policy on credit risk?, Econometrica, Vol 82, Issue 2, pp 463-505, as well as I Vasso, S Ongena and J L Peydró, Monetary policy, risk-taking and pricing: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment, Review of Finance, forthcoming.
3 Jiménez et al (2014) op cit for Spain; P Gaggl and M Valderrama (2010), Does a Low Interest Rate Environment Affect Risk Taking in Austria?, Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Issue 4, pp 32-48 for Austria; Geršl, Jakubík, Kowalczyk, Ongena and Peydró (2012), Monetary conditions and banks' behaviour in the Czech Republic, mimeo for the Czech Republic; Apel and Claussen (2012) op cit for Sweden.
4 For detailed information on the STBL's structure, see T F Brady, W B English and W R Nelson (1998), Recent changes to the Federal Reserve's survey of terms of business lending, Federal Reserve Bulletin, August 2014, pp 604-615.

Effects of an expansionary monetary policy shock* on new loans in various risk categories



***** Policy rate cut by 25 basis points. **1** 68% confidence intervals are shown. The upper curve in each chart shows the 84% band, whereas the lower curve represents the 16% band.

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able to use information on *ex ante* risk taking from the bank manager's perspective.

The chart on page 50 shows the development of high-risk loans as a share of total lending, as well as developments in risk premiums and the federal funds rate. It shows that high-risk lending was particularly prevalent, and that risk premiums were particularly low when the federal funds rate was at low levels for a prolonged period in the mid-2000s. This provides an initial indication of a possible negative relationship between high-risk loans and the policy rate. This phase (the mid-2000s) is therefore considered separately in the following analysis.

The factor-augmented vector autoregressive model

Assuming that the vector of banking variables collected from the STBL (X_t) follows an approximate dynamic factor model (Bai and Ng 2002, Stock and Watson 2002),[5]

5 J Bai and S Ng (2002), Determining the number of factors in approximate factor models, Econometrica, Vol 70, Issue 1, pp 191-221, as well as J H Stock and M W Watson (2002), Macroeconomic forecasting using diffusion indexes, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Vol 20, Issue 2, pp 147-162.

Effects of an expansionary monetary policy shock* on the risk premiums of new loans in various risk categories



* Policy rate cut by 25 basis points. **1** 68% confidence intervals are shown. The upper curve in each chart shows the 84% band, whereas the lower curve represents the 16% band.

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where each time series x_{jt} is determined by the $r \times 1$ vector of common factors F_t and a time series-specific component e_{jt}, then:

$$x_{jt} = [\lambda_j^{F-MP\prime}\lambda_j^{(1)MP\prime}]'F_t + e_{jt}\forall t < \tau_1$$
$$x_{jt} = [\lambda_j^{F-MP\prime}\lambda_j^{(2)MP\prime}]'F_t + e_{jt}\forall \tau_1 \leq t \leq \tau_2$$
$$x_{jt} = [\lambda_j^{F-MP\prime}\lambda_j^{(1)MP\prime}]'F_t + e_{jt}\forall t > \tau_2.$$

F_t can be broken down into two parts: a set of observable factors G_t and a set of unobservable factors H_t. Therefore, the following applies: $F_t = [H_t' \; G_t']'$. It is assumed that G_t comprises the differences of the logarithms of GDP (Δy_t) and of the GDP deflator (Δp_t) as well as the level of the federal funds rate (ffr_t). The unobserved banking factors (H_t) are estimated (details on the estimation can be found in Buch et al, op cit) and summarise the banking variables. The factors are assumed to follow a first-order vector autoregressive model.

$\lambda_j^{F-MP\prime}$ represents the $(r-1) \times 1$ vector of loadings for variable j associated with all (observable and unobservable) factors, with the exception of the policy rate. These loadings are constant over time. $\lambda_j^{(k)MP\prime}$ is the scalar loading of the jth variable associated with the policy rate, which differs across regimes $k = \{1,2\}$. Hence, the banking vari-

ables' reactions to movements in the policy rate are dependent on the monetary policy regime. The prolonged phase of low interest rates (the "too-low-for-too-long" period) from τ_1 = 2003 Q1 to τ_2 = 2005 Q4 is assumed to be the period when monetary policy was excessively accommodative (Taylor 2013).[6] The second regime refers to the remaining period.

Results

The charts on pages 51 and 52 show the dynamic effects (impulse response functions) of loans and risk premiums to shocks which lower the federal funds rate by 25 basis points in the two regimes. For reasons of clarity, the charts show 68% confidence intervals and the results for high-risk and low-risk loans only.

The results suggest that in "normal times", only small domestic banks significantly increase new lending to high-risk borrowers following an expansionary monetary policy shock (see the chart on page 51). The composition of loans granted by small banks shifts towards riskier loans. However, risk premiums are not increased to compensate for changes in the risk composition of loan portfolios (see the chart on page 52). Instead, banks shift their new loan portfolios towards riskier loans and charge a lower risk premium. The reduction in the credit spread of high-risk loans is, in fact, greater than that of low-risk loans. Borio and Zhu (2012)[7] state the following with regard to the risk-taking channel: banks are willing to take on greater risks without raising their risk premiums to compensate for these risks. Although large domestic banks issue more new high-risk loans in absolute terms, the composition of their loan portfolios does not change significantly. Foreign banks do not change their risk composition when policy rates are not excessively low.

Loan impulse responses to a monetary policy shock (of the same magnitude) do, however, differ significantly during a prolonged phase of low interest rates from those during a normal period (see the chart on page 51). The results show that between 2003 and 2005, additional risk taking is not only found for small but also for foreign banks. The risk premiums on high-risk loans decline for small and foreign banks, which suggests that these institutions did not increase their risk premiums to compensate for the higher risk of the new loans (see the chart on page 52). As with the normal regime, there is no evidence of a change in the risk-taking behaviour of large domestic banks here either.

Our finding that the risk appetite of foreign banks increases in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock in a "too-low-for-too-long" period supports the findings of Bruno and Shin (2013) as well as Shin (2012).[8] These authors emphasise the role that large European banks played in fuelling the US credit boom in the mid-2000s. They argue that expansionary monetary policy in the United States and the regulatory structure in Europe that allowed high debt leverage enabled European banks to take on excessive risks in the United States. Anecdotal evidence provided in Shin (2012) shows that foreign banks used cheap, short-term US dollar funding to in-

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6 See J B Taylor, A review of recent monetary policy. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade, Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, 5 March 2013. The results are not very sensitive to the exact timeframe of the "too-low-for-too-long" period.

7 C Borio and H Zhu (2012), Capital regulation, risk taking and monetary policy: A missing link in the transmission mechanism?, Journal of Financial Stability, Vol 8, Issue 4, pp 236-251.

8 V Bruno and H S Shin, Capital Flows and the Risk-Taking Channel of Monetary Policy, Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming, as well as H S Shin (2012), Global banking glut and loan risk premium, mimeo, Princeton University.

vest in toxic assets generated by the shadow banking system. The results presented here complement these findings insofar as they show that the increase in risk appetite was not confined solely to the securities markets, but was also apparent in the traditional lending business.

All in all, these findings provide strong evidence of the existence of an active monetary policy risk-taking channel. Furthermore, the results suggest that the effects of monetary policy on the risk-taking behaviour of banks are particularly pronounced during prolonged phases of low interest rates.

Related work on the effects of monetary policy on risk taking in a macroeconomic environment complements the present study and corroborates its findings. Bekaert et al (2014)[9] show that a loose monetary policy significantly reduces risk aversion (in terms of market-based measures), assuming, however, a constant dynamic relationship. Eickmeier et al (2014)[10] document that risk taking is particularly pronounced in periods of low uncertainty. In such periods, an expansionary monetary policy leads to reduced funding costs and stimulates lending (and therefore business investment and output) more strongly than in times of high uncertainty.

9 G Bekaert, M Hoerova and M Lo Duca (2013), Risk, uncertainty and monetary policy, Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Vol 60, Issue 7, pp 771-788.
10 S Eickmeier, N Metiu and E Prieto (2014), Monetary policy propagation and uncertainty, mimeo, Deutsche Bundesbank.

like other monetary transmission channels, such as the interest rate channel or exchange rate channel, the risk-taking channel is less tightly circumscribed; rather, it comprises a variety of mechanisms.[22] It can therefore operate in at least three ways.[23]

… through the valuation of assets, income streams and payment flows, …

First, monetary policy decisions affect the valuation of assets, income streams and payment flows. This means that a reduction in monetary policy rates will generally lead to an increase in asset prices and income streams,[24] which for their part reduce (consciously or unconsciously) the perception of risk and/or increase risk tolerance. In a prolonged period of low interest rates, risk tolerance can rise undesirably sharply and market participants, in an environment of low volatility, can erroneously seriously underestimate the risk of an interest rate move.

… via the search for yield …

Another way the risk-taking channel can operate is through an undesirably intensive search for yield, in that a reduction in the monetary policy interest rate will generally lower nominal yields; this means, for instance, that those financial market agents whose long-term liabilities are nominally fixed by contractual terms are willing to tolerate higher-risk investment in the expectation of achieving a higher return. Financial market agents could, for instance, bypass relatively safe government bonds and invest instead in higher-risk, higher-return securities.[25]

22 See M Apel and C Claussen (2012), Monetary Policy, Interest Rates and Risk-Taking, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2, pp 68-83.
23 See C Borio and H Zhu (2012), op cit.
24 This aspect of the risk-taking channel bears a certain resemblance to the "financial accelerator" in that, due to credit market imperfections, a reduction in the monetary policy rate will ultimately also lead to an increase in borrowing and in aggregate demand, therefore even amplifying the original monetary policy stimulus through feedback effects. For more, see B Bernanke, M Gertler and S Gilchrist (1999), The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework, published in J B Taylor and M Woodford (eds), Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol 1C, pp 1341-1393.
25 See R Rajan (2005), Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?, Jackson Hole 2005 Symposium Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

… and expectations concerning monetary policy measures in a crisis

The third and final way of activating the risk-taking channel is through monetary policy communication. The justified outlook of a sharp cut in the policy rate in a crisis will lead market participants to expect that they can receive all of the profits associated with heightened risk if they are successful but will not have to bear the costs in full in the event of a loss. In this respect, the crucial factor is not the low interest rate *per se* but market participants' expectations that the central bank will behave in a specific way. A more or less explicit promise by monetary policymakers to provide support in the event of a financial crisis encourages the development of collective moral hazard, which can contribute to financial instability.[26]

Three different perspectives on the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy

Experience and knowledge of macroprudential instruments is still limited, …

At the current juncture, experience and knowledge of the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments, their calibration and their interaction with each other and with monetary policy are still rather limited. Therefore, model simulations are highly necessary in order to study these questions (see the box on interaction on pages 56 to 61).

… which is why there is still no consensus on the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy

It should therefore come as no surprise that no consensus on the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy has been reached as yet. As a matter of fact, the current discussion in the literature can be broken down into different points of view,[27] the main differences between which boil down to their answers to a series of key questions: How effective is the new macroprudential framework in safeguarding financial stability? How dependent are risk appetite or risk-taking on the monetary policy stance? (And, as a corollary, to what extent can monetary policy fuel a financial crisis?) How great is the danger that a monetary policy regime which also takes the safeguarding of financial stability into account in its decisions will undermine the credibility of a central bank in achieving its price stability objective?

Idealised perspective

Idealised perspective: monetary policy should be oriented to narrowly defined objective of price stability, while macroprudential policy should be focused on the objective of financial stability

The first perspective holds that monetary policy should remain focused on price stability – with the option, if desired by society, of adding the objective of stabilising the output gap or the utilisation of resources. Macroprudential policy, on the other hand, should stick to financial stability and use its own toolkit to achieve that goal.

The key difference compared with the pre-crisis consensus lies in establishing an effective macroprudential policy

This means that the key difference compared with the pre-crisis consensus lies in establishing an effective and credible macroprudential policy. Monetary policy can then, as before, focus exclusively on the objective of price stability. However, it should take into account the (institutional) changes in the transmission mechanism resulting from the application of the macroprudential toolkit. This toolkit should not be used for the general management of aggregate demand and thus not be directly geared to macroeconomic targets (inflation, utilisation of resources), for which monetary policy is responsible, in particular, as the policy measures taken would then cause distortions by possibly necessitating (inefficient) changes in behaviour going above and beyond their actual target. In this perspective, targeted monetary policy and macroeconomic policy mutually enhance each other's effectiveness.[28] The idealised perspective is founded on the assumption that each policy area – especially the newly created area of macroprudential policy – is capable of redu-

26 See E Farhi and J Tirole (2012), Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts, American Economic Review 102, pp 60-93.
27 See F Smets (2013), Financial Stability and Monetary Policy: How Closely Interlinked?, Sveriges Riskbank Economic Review 3, pp 121-160. For an abridged version, see F Smets (2014), Financial Stability and Monetary Policy: How Closely Interlinked?, International Journal of Central Banking 10, pp 263-300.
28 The idealised perspective is reflected, for instance, in the macroeconomic model presented in F Collard, H Dellas, B Diba and O Loisel (2014), Optimal Monetary and Prudential Policies, University of Bern, mimeo.

Model-based analysis of the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy

The financial crisis has shown that price stability alone is not enough to ensure financial stability. As a response to the experiences of the recent financial crisis, a new policy area – that of macroprudential policy – has been established and designed with the aim of countering risks for the financial system as a whole. Yet this does not necessarily mean that monetary policy should not contribute to financial stability at all. As the different views outlined in the main text show, there is still disagreement about the extent to which monetary policy should be taking general developments in the financial markets into account. Nor is there any consensus in the literature about the form that the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy should take from a welfare-theoretical viewpoint.

In light of this, two questions are analysed below on a theoretical model basis. Does macroprudential policy have a positive impact on welfare? Should monetary policy respond to developments in the financial markets despite the existence of macroprudential policy?

To answer these questions, models have to be used which feature both a financial sector and a point of departure for monetary and macroprudential policy. In recent years, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have established themselves as the standard analytical tool for monetary policy issues. In these models, monetary policy has, because of nominal rigidities (such as price or wage rigidity), an effect on real variables.[1] These abstract and stylised models are also referred to as New Keynesian models. Accordingly, the models used here are based on a New Keynesian framework as in Christiano et al (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2007).[2]

By contrast, there is as yet no generally acknowledged analytical framework for macroprudential issues. This is true with regard to the choice both of the model class and of the macroprudential instruments; in most cases, banks' capital is used as the instrument.[3] Nor does there exist a generally accepted model framework which allows for the analysis of the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy. Endeavours have increasingly been undertaken recently to include financial intermediaries or markets and, proceeding from them, so-called financial frictions in New Keynesian models. New modelling variants have been developed since the financial crisis, in particular, though none of them have so far established themselves as a standard. Against this backdrop, three different models are included in the analysis. These models differ substantially in how they model the banking sector and financial frictions in order to take the model uncertainty described above into account.[4,5]

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1 See M Woodford (2003), Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy, Princeton University Press; and J Galí (2008), Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to the New Keynesian Framework, Princeton University Press.
2 See L J Christiano, M Eichenbaum and C L Evans (2005), Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy, Journal of Political Economy 113, pp 1-45; and F Smets and R Wouters (2007), Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach, American Economic Review 97, pp 586-606. The models show price and wage rigidity, habit formation in consumption, adjustment costs in investment and variable capital utilisation. These specifications are needed in order to harmonise the model results with empirical data.
3 In the following analysis, only the capital requirements for banks are examined as a macroprudential instrument. Consequently, financial stability policy is presented in a rather stylised manner.
4 For more information about the need not to derive policy recommendations from individual models alone, see M Hellwig, After the Reform of Banking Regulation: Has the Financial System Become Safe?, Keynote Address for de Nederlandsche Bank Conference, June 2014.
5 Each of the models was estimated using Bayesian methods in order to base the welfare analysis on a realistic shock structure. To this end, data on GDP, consumption, inflation, investment, banks' capital, wages, short-term interest rates, lending rates for loans to households and enterprises, lending volumes to households and enterprises, deposit rates, deposit volumes and house prices for the euro area between the first quarter of 2000 and the second quarter of 2008 are used (sources: Eurostat and ECB). See C Choi, R Gerke, D Kienzler and J Tenhofen (2014), On the interaction of monetary and macroprudential policy, mimeo.

Stylised representation of the financial sector in model variant A



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In this way, it is possible to examine whether robust statements about the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy can be derived across different modelling variants.

Model variant A is based on Gerali et al (2010).[6] The financial sector is characterised by banks with pricing power; they incur adjustment costs when deposit and lending rates vary. Households and enterprises are faced with credit constraints that are determined by the collateral that is available (real estate and capital goods). Banks must observe a given capital ratio and incur costs if they fall below or exceed it. The capital ratio is the macroprudential policy instrument. The chart above shows a stylised representation of the financial sector in this model.

Variant B models the financial market based on Gertler et al (2012).[7] Banks can procure funding via households in the form of short-term debt instruments (deposits) as well as capital increases. In addition, banks can accumulate capital by retaining earnings. A so-called principal-agent problem between households and banks gives rise to an endogenous credit constraint for the financial intermediary. Banks can use securities to their own private advantage, motivating households to limit the funds they make available to financial intermediaries. This credit constraint gives banks the incentive to accumulate capital by retaining earnings. The point of departure for macroprudential policy constitutes an overall capital ratio which banks take into account in their optimisation strategy. The chart on page 58 shows a stylised representation of the financial sector in this model.

6 See A Gerali, S Nerri, L Sessa, and F M Signoretti (2010), Credit and banking in a DSGE model of the euro area, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 42, pp 107-141.
7 See M Gertler, N Kiyotaki and A Queralto (2012), Financial Crises, Bank Risk Exposure and Government Financial Policy, Journal of Monetary Economics 59, pp 17-34.

Stylised representation of the financial sector in model variant B



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Model variant C is based on a paper by Benes and Kumhof (2011).[8] Here, costs arise for banks when they verify the default of a borrower. Because the lending rate is set independently of the actual future economic development, banks may incur losses from lending to enterprises if the actual development deviates from the development that had been expected. A fine is imposed on banks which fail to achieve the capital ratio set by macroprudential policymakers. This again motivates banks to accumulate capital through retained earnings. The chart on page 59 shows a stylised representation of the financial sector in this model.

The interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy is examined on the basis of simple rules for setting interest rates and the cyclical adjustment of capital requirements for banks.[9] In the monetary policy rule, the nominal interest rate R_t is adjusted in response to the changing inflation rate π_t, output growth $\frac{y_t}{y_{t-1}}$ and, where applicable, real credit growth $\frac{b_t}{b_{t-1}}$. Moreover, the interest rate is set depending on the interest rate level of the previous period, which smoothes the interest path to a certain extent.[10]

$$R_t = (R_{t-1})^{\rho_R}\left\{\overline{R}\pi_t^{\kappa_\pi}\left(\frac{y_t}{y_{t-1}}\right)^{\kappa_y}\left(\frac{b_t}{b_{t-1}}\right)^{\kappa_b}\right\}^{1-\rho_R}\epsilon_{R,t}$$

The parameters ρ_R, κ_π, κ_y and κ_b determine the strength of the response to changes to the relevant variables. The variable ε_R represents a monetary policy shock and $\overline{R}$ the equilibrium real interest rate.

8 See J Benes and M Kumhof (2011), Risky Bank Lending and Optimal Capital Adequacy Regulation, IMF Working Paper 11/130.

9 The choice of cyclical capital requirements for banks as a macroprudential instrument is driven by various factors. For instance, this instrument has high practical relevance as part of the Basel III regime. For this reason, it is often discussed in the literature (see, for example, P Angelini, S Neri and F Panetta, 2014, The Interaction between Capital Requirements and Monetary Policy, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 46, pp 1073-1112; or J Benes and M Kumhof, 2011, op cit). From a technical viewpoint, all three models used here have a common point of departure for setting cyclical capital requirements for banks; this is not the case for other instruments such as loan-to-value-ratios.

10 Empirical studies of monetary policy rules typically find a statistically significant coefficient for the interest rate level of the previous period, which is also the case in the estimation carried out for this study. This result may be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, it could be the result of an optimal monetary policy, which is usually characterised by very sluggish interest rate movements. On the other hand, the academic literature holds that central banks possibly want to avoid large interest rate changes in order to prevent disruptions in the financial markets. See also C E Walsh (2010), Monetary Theory and Policy, 3rd edition, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Stylised representation of the financial sector in model variant C



Deutsche Bundesbank

According to the macroprudential rule, the capital requirements m_t respond to credit growth and to the capital requirements of the previous period (in order to avoid fluctuations of the instrument that are "too volatile").

$$m_t = (m_{t-1})^{\rho_m} \left\{ \overline{m} \left(\frac{b_t}{b_{t-1}} \right)^{\varphi_b} \right\}^{1-\rho_m}$$

The parameters ρ_m and φ_b determine the strength of the response to changes to the relevant variable and $\overline{m}$ represents the capital requirements in equilibrium.

A grid search is carried out to find for each of the models the combination of parameters for the two rules that achieves the highest welfare.[11] The utility function of households serves as the welfare criterion. The values of the smoothing parameters are fixed in the two policy rules, ρ_R and ρ_m.[12] In this way, the grid search is carried out for the parameters κ_π, κ_y, κ_b and φ_b.[13]

The following has to be borne in mind when interpreting the results. If the welfare-maximising parameter constellation shows a positive parameter φ_b (and, at the same time, the parameters in the monetary policy rule are different from zero), macroprudential policy as well as monetary policy plays a part in increasing welfare. If the welfare-maximising parameter constellation shows a positive κ_b, monetary policy should take credit growth in its interest rate rule and, therefore, also developments in the financial market directly into consideration.

The model simulations (see the table on page 60) indicate how important the modelling of the structure of the banking sector is with regard to the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy as well as to the importance of financial market variables in the monetary policy rule.

11 A grid search involves creating a grid for the parameters to be varied and calculating the welfare criterion for each possible combination of parameters. A comparison of the values of the welfare criterion identifies the combination of parameters that achieves the highest value for the welfare criterion. The welfare criterion is the recursive formulation of the expected value of the sum of discounted period-utility functions.

12 These two parameters are fixed on the basis of mathematical restrictions. The smoothing parameter in the monetary policy rule ρ_R is set at its estimated value. This possibility is not available for ρ_m, as the models are estimated without a macroprudential rule. The reason for this is that the estimation period for the models ends prior to the financial crisis at a time when macroprudential policy was not yet practised in Europe. That is why this parameter was set at 0.5 following an agnostic approach. A positive value for this parameter may be explained by a wish not to cause too much uncertainty and volatility by abruptly changing the capital requirement for banks.

13 Perturbation methods are applied to solve the models. To this end, a second-order Taylor approximation is used in each case to allow for an ordering of welfare results for different parameter constellations. For the area of possible parameter values, see the table on p 60.

Optimal values for the coefficients in the monetary policy and macroprudential rule*

Model	Monetary policy rule			Macroprudential rule
	κ_π	κ_y	κ_b	φ_b
Model A[1]	1.75	0	0.38	0
Model B	2.25	0.4	0	22.5
Model C	1.01	0.11	0.2	40

* Note: The range of possible parameter values is set as follows. As in S Schmitt-Grohé and M Uribe (2007, Optimal Simple and Implementable Monetary and Fiscal Rules, Journal of Monetary Economics 54, pp 1702-1705) the inflation parameter in the monetary policy rule ranges from 1 to 3 and the parameter for output growth and for credit growth in the same rule from 0 to 3. In the macroprudential rule, the parameter for credit growth is varied from 0 to 40. Given credit growth of 1%, a value of 40 would be equivalent to an increase in the capital ratio by 2 percentage points. **1** Angelini et al (2004, op cit) use the same model framework as model A. However, in contrast to the study under consideration, they find a positive optimal value of the credit growth coefficient in the macroprudential rule (here: 0). The analyses are not directly comparable with each other, however. Angelini et al ((2004), op cit) use an ad hoc loss function and rule out the possibility of a reaction to a financial market variable on the part of monetary policy.

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According to model variant A, it is optimal from a welfare viewpoint if monetary policy responds to credit growth with interest rate changes yet macroprudential policy does not change the capital requirements in response to changes in credit growth. Beyond that, monetary policy ought to respond only to changes in inflation. In model variant B, monetary policy should adjust the interest rate in response to changes in both inflation and output. Macroprudential policy should respond relatively strongly to developments in credit growth, whereas monetary policy should not respond to credit growth. In model variant C, on the other hand, monetary policy should respond to credit growth in tandem with a strong response from macroprudential policy. By contrast, the response on the part of the monetary policy interest rate to output growth should be weak, and the response to the inflation rate should be as weak as possible in order to just achieve a stable equilibrium.[14]

Thus, it is not possible to make a universally valid statement with regard to the optimal interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy across the different models. In light of these results, policy recommendations that are based on only one model must be considered problematic. At the same time, the results support the relevance of the research agenda with regard to financial market frictions and the interaction between different policy areas. Only if the modelled financial market and its imperfections are capable of reflecting the most important aspects of the reality as regards specific issues and time periods can reliable model-based policy recommendations be made.[15]

Finally, it is important to bear in mind the limited meaningfulness of DSGE models with regard to the issues considered here. The aim of macroprudential policy is to identify systemic risks at an early stage and, ideally, to avert them. However, the present class of DSGE models typically cannot capture systemic risk; and the newly developed DSGE models which include systemic risk are still too abstract to be able to capture the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy.[16] The class of DSGE models dealt with here was developed to represent relatively small fluctuations of the model variables around a stable long-term equilibrium ("steady state"). This means that important features of financial crises – such as an abrupt drop in asset prices, fire sales of securities or runs on financial mar-

14 According to the Taylor principle, the inflation coefficient in the monetary policy rule has to be greater than one in order to achieve a stable equilibrium. The more than proportional reaction by the nominal interest rate to changes in the inflation rate implies raising the real interest rate where shocks have a positive effect on the inflation rate and a decrease of the real interest rate where shocks have a negative effect.

15 As E M Leeper and J M Nason (Bringing Financial Stability into Monetary Policy, CAMA Working Paper 72/2014) emphasise, there is, generally speaking, no such thing as the "most important" financial frictions. Rather, the importance of the frictions varies over time and depends on the state of the economy.

16 See M K Brunnermeier and Y Sannikov (2014), A Macroeconomic Model with a Financial Sector, American Economic Review 104, pp 379-421; or J Bianchi (2011), Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle, American Economic Review 101, pp 3400-3426.

ket institutions – can only be described to a limited extent.[17] In this sense, the analyses presented here are to be considered as positive.[18] Proceeding from the observation that macroprudential institutions were established for very good reasons, the implications of this policy (or individual segments of it, such as capital requirements for banks) are examined with regard to the macroeconomic effects and their interaction with monetary policy.[19]

17 See E M Leeper and J M Nason (2014), op cit. For more recent theoretical studies on macroprudential policy, see H Gersbach and J-C Rochet (2012), Aggregate Investment Externalities and Macroprudential Regulation; Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 44, pp 73-109; H Gersbach and J-C Rochet (2013), Capital Regulation and Credit Fluctuations, mimeo.
18 See Angelini et al (2014), op cit.
19 See P Angelini, S Neri and F Panetta (2014), op cit.

cing the key problems in its area precisely and effectively.

Idealised perspective largely rejects idea that monetary policy should address financial stability issues

In this perspective, monetary policy makes no meaningful contribution to the development of financial imbalances, such as through market players' excessive risk appetite, which means that the risk-taking channel is viewed as insignificant. The monetary policy rate is regarded as an ineffective tool for containing, far less avoiding risks to financial stability. Were monetary policy responsible for price stability and financial stability at the same time, this would result in a conflict of objectives, and would create the danger that safeguarding financial stability would undermine credibility regarding the objective of price stability.[29]

Extended perspective

Others regard the first perspective explained above as an ideal scenario that would practically never materialise in the real world.[30] Although they, too, believe that monetary policy should fundamentally be geared to the relatively narrowly defined objective of price stability, they think that monetary policy should not focus – as was the case before the crisis – too narrowly on achieving a short-term inflation target,[31] as that hinders monetary policy from combating longer-term financial imbalances (such as pronounced credit cycles), which would ultimately be at odds with price stability

Extended perspective: monetary policy should keep an eye on long-term threats to price stability caused by financial imbalances

29 A theoretical model of the potential incentive for a central bank with the dual objectives of price stability and financial stability to respond less decisively to inflation pressure is presented in K Ueda and F Valencia (2014), Central bank independence and macro-prudential regulation, Economics Letters 125, pp 327-330.
30 "… an ideal benchmark in which both policies operate perfectly, … this benchmark is most likely unattainable, …", see IMF (2013), The interaction of monetary and macroprudential policies, pp 4-5.
31 See also Deutsche Bundesbank (2011), The implications of the financial crisis for monetary policy, Monthly Report, March 2011, pp 53-68, and C Borio (2014), Monetary policy and financial stability: what role in prevention and recovery?, BIS Working Paper No 440.

over the medium to long term as well.[32] Much as in the idealised perspective, the objective of financial stability should be achieved primarily by macroprudential policy, using macroprudential tools. However, unlike the idealised perspective, the extended perspective assumes that it is impossible to eliminate an excessively pronounced financial cycle and thus risks to financial stability with these tools alone.[33]

Monetary policy should take financial stability into consideration in a systematic manner and thus be more "symmetrical" than before, …

This represents a not-inconsiderable modification for the conduct of monetary policy: it should not be focused, as before, exclusively on achieving a short-run inflation target but must now systemically incorporate the financial cycle into its decisions in order to safeguard price stability in the long run as well. A monetary policy stance that is generally stricter during upswings, even in the absence of inflationary pressures, and is aggressively eased in the short term during marked downturns, but a less persistent expansionary monetary policy stance following a period of economic downturn, would lead to a "more symmetrical" monetary policy design.[34] Even if, in the short term, the monetary policy stance were to cause the target variables to differ from their desired values – especially from the objective of price stability – this would justify the associated costs by avoiding future, yet larger deviations – such as in the form of a crisis.[35] Although aggressive monetary policy action is proposed specifically for managing crises – that is, during the business cycle downturn – the meat of crisis resolution lies in "repairing" the balance sheets in the private sector, meaning, above all, eliminating the debt overhang. Monetary policy is regarded as being less suited to this task; instead, conducting a prolonged expansionary monetary policy could bring to bear primarily the risks and side-effects of such measures.[36]

… which also protects it from a futile battle against balance sheet recessions

Even if recourse is taken to non-standard monetary policy measures, monetary policy makers' options for dealing with such a recession caused by overindebtedness are restricted.[37] To that extent, they are also limited in their ability to create the conditions for a self-sustaining upswing – at least in the aftermath of severe financial crises. The extended perspective therefore stresses the danger of overloading monetary policy in the context of severe financial crises. Its proponents therefore believe that it is appropriate to combat the financial excesses of a boom using monetary policy tools in order to avoid such overloading later on. The (preventive) contribution of monetary policy to ensuring financial stability is therefore regarded as necessary in order to protect credibility regarding the price stability objective.

Financial stability requires a longer-term policy horizon

In terms of monetary policy, financial stability is interpreted as an intermediate objective along the road to the ultimate objective of sustainable price stability,[38] and therefore requires an extended policy horizon. The main reason this is necessary is that, in a typical case, the interval between the build-up of a systemic risk and

32 "The key concept is that of sustainable price stability." See C Borio (2014), op cit, p 12.
33 Scepticism concerning the effectiveness of macroprudential policy is voiced in a variety of ways. The expressions and sources of this scepticism are manifold: risks to financial stability are difficult to measure; the analytical framework for assessing transmission channels is underdeveloped; experience of the specific calibration of the instruments is lacking; institutional and political-economic considerations need to be looked at; there are doubts as to whether all forms of financial frictions can even be addressed using macroprudential instruments. See C Borio (2014), op cit; M Feroli, A K Kashyap, K Schoenholtz and H S Shin (2014), Market Tantrums and Monetary Policy, Chicago Booth Working Paper, No 14-09; C A E Goodhart (2014), Lessons for Monetary Policy from the Euro-Area Crisis, Journal of Macroeconomics 39, pp 378-382; J C Stein (2014), Incorporating Financial Stability Considerations into a Monetary Policy Framework, speech delivered at the International Research Forum on Monetary Policy, Washington, DC, 21 March 2014; M Woodford (2012), Inflation Targeting and Financial Stability, NBER Working Paper 17967.
34 See C Borio (2014), op cit, p 9. See the box on pp 45-48 for more on the question of whether, on average, the inflation target is achieved "in spite of that".
35 See N Kocherlakota (2014), Discussion of 2014 USMPF Monetary Policy Report, speech delivered at the "2014 US Monetary Policy Forum" of the "Initiative on Global Markets" of the University of Chicago, Booth School of Business, New York, NY, 28 February 2014; J C Stein (2014), op cit; and M Woodford (2012), op cit.
36 See C Borio (2014), op cit, p 13.
37 See C Borio (2014), op cit, pp 12-13. In this context, the term "balance sheet recession" often comes up. It denotes a recession which is primarily marked by the reduction of a debt overhang; see R C Koo (2003), Balance Sheet Recession: Japan's Struggle with Uncharted Economics and its Global Implications, John Wiley and Sons, Singapore.
38 See also IMF (2013), op cit.

a crisis is considerably longer than the monetary policy horizon resulting from the conventional battle against inflation.[39] The main point here is to weigh up the risks and not to mechanistically stretch out the forecast horizon.[40] In upswing phases, this could counteract the build-up of financial imbalances and hence longer-term price instabilities.

Monetary policy contributes to the build-up of financial imbalances through risk-taking channel

In this perspective, monetary policy can contribute to the build-up of financial imbalances since the monetary policy stance generally impacts on the risk appetite of financial intermediaries, therefore affecting the stability of the financial sector and, by extension, the outlook for price stability. The monetary policy interest rate is accordingly regarded as effective in at least containing risks to financial stability even though financial stability can only be ensured in conjunction with macroprudential policy.[41]

Integrated perspective

Integrated perspective: separation of monetary policy and macroprudential policy not appropriate

Proponents of the third perspective argue that even the extended perspective calls for an excessively strict and inappropriate separation of the two policy areas. The aims of price stability and financial stability and the instruments and transmission mechanism of monetary policy and macroprudential policy, they hold, are so closely interwoven that monetary policy cannot focus on the narrow objective of price stability. For instance, non-standard monetary policy measures such as securities purchase programmes not only have direct intended monetary policy effects but also, through "stealth recapitalisation" of ailing financial institutions, impact on financial stability, which in turn feeds back indirectly into price stability.[42] Moreover, macroprudential measures affect lending (with the immediate objective of ensuring financial stability), which impacts on money creation and thus on price stability.[43] The integrated view thus advocates using both macroprudential and monetary policy instruments (standard and non-standard) in order to ensure financial stability – and, at the same time, price stability. Strictly speaking, it therefore does not make sense to classify the tools by target area but is even, if anything, counterproductive.[44] Rather, both policy areas need to cooperate closely.

Therefore, gear monetary policy instruments to encompass financial stability objective as well

This perspective represents the most radical departure from the pre-crisis consensus. Although its proponents also hold that establishing a macroprudential framework and making it as effective and credible as possible is the right path, achieving this objective should not be used to justify monetary policymakers' fixation on price stability. Financial market events should always be part of monetary policy considerations. Monetary policy instruments are held to be indispensable as means of containing or avoiding financial imbalances. If, despite the joint efforts of monetary policy and macroprudential policy, a crisis nevertheless does break out, a "bottleneck approach" should be taken, ie supporting those sectors that suffer most from a debt overhang and whose balance sheets were hit the hardest. Without such policy measures, the result could be liquidity spirals and "fire sales", culminating in a self-reinforcing deflationary spiral.[45]

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39 See also IMF (2013), op cit, p 16; C Borio (2014), op cit, p 9.

40 "… balance of risks in the outlook." See C Borio (2014), op cit, p 9.

41 The fact that monetary policy is regarded as less vulnerable to regulatory arbitrage also matters; in other words, "… it gets in all of the cracks"; for more, see J C Stein, Overheating in Credit Markets: Origins, Measurement, and Policy Responses, speech delivered at the symposium "Restoring Household Financial Stability after the Great Recession: Why Household Balance Sheets Matter", St Louis, Missouri, USA, 7 February 2013, p 17.

42 See M K Brunnermeier and Y Sannikov (2014a), The I Theory of Money, Princeton University, mimeo.

43 See M K Brunnermeier and Y Sannikov (2014b), Monetary Analysis: Price and Financial Stability, ECB Forum on Central Banking, May 2014, p 12.

44 See E M Leeper and J M Nason (2014), Bringing Financial Stability into Monetary Policy, Indiana University, mimeo, pp 44 ff. The authors argue that, in the interests of a complete assessment, fiscal policy is also needed alongside monetary policy and macroprudential policy. See also M Hellwig (2014), Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, Banking Supervision, and Central Banking, Preprints of the MPI for Research on Collective Goods 2014/9.

45 In this connection, some also recommend that central banks also act as a "market-maker of last resort" in a crisis. See W Buiter and A Sibert (2008), The central bank as the market-maker of last resort: from lender of last resort to market-maker of last resort, in A Felton and C Reinhart (eds), The first global financial crisis of the 21st century, pp 171-178.

Integrated perspective regards risk-taking channel as extremely effective

According to this view, monetary policy impacts on the build-up of risks to financial stability.[46] Finally, the integrated perspective holds that, if policymakers are overly fixated on the goal of price stability, the danger of "financial dominance" arises following the outbreak of a severe financial crisis (see box on pages 65 to 67).[47] If monetary policy does not (preventively) make an adequate contribution to protecting financial stability, the potential result is that the fragility of the financial sector in a crisis could force monetary policy to be too loose in terms of price stability, as otherwise the continued existence of many financial institutions would be in doubt and thus additional adverse impacts on economic developments could be expected. The intensive preventive contribution of monetary policy to ensuring financial stability is regarded as necessary in order to protect credibility regarding the price stability objective.

Challenges involved in making monetary policy more focused on financial stability

Still no consensus on the various perspectives

At present, there are still no signs of a consensus or of a majority emerging in favour of one particular perspective. One contributory factor in this is that macroprudential policy is a relatively new policy area. It would therefore be unrealistic to expect conclusive answers to already be available to the many issues that have been discussed to date.

Conceptual and organisational reasons argue in favour of a greater involvement of monetary policy in safeguarding financial stability, …

The explanations above regarding the extended and integrated perspective contain a number of arguments in favour of a greater involvement of monetary policy in safeguarding financial stability. In addition to these conceptual aspects, it could also be advantageous from an organisational perspective for monetary policy to play a role in addressing financial stability issues. This would sidestep the problems that exist with regard to the flow of information and coordination between financial stability and price stability-oriented policy. Furthermore, by placing financial stability within the remit of monetary policy, responsibility for financial stability would lie with an independent institution, namely the central bank, which already has experience and expertise in the area of macroeconomic developments and financial markets.[48]

… which would, however, also be associated with political-economic challenges and possible undesired economic side-effects

A greater involvement of monetary policy in safeguarding financial stability does, however, present a challenge for central banks for a number of reasons. First and foremost, our current understanding of the interrelationships between the financial and the real economic sector is still limited. Moreover, the effectiveness of the monetary policy interest rate as an instrument in preventing financial stability risks is likely to be limited, especially in the euro area, not least owing to the lack of synchronicity of credit cycles in the single currency area. And even if these arguments are not taken into account, political-economic considerations, which ultimately affect the credibility of monetary policy, and possibly also undesired economic side-effects from gearing monetary policy more strongly towards financial stability, still present a challenge.

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46 The central starting point for asset price changes is the change in risk premiums (see J H Cochrane (2011), Presidential Address: Discount Rates, Journal of Finance 66, pp 1047-1108). Various studies accordingly explain how monetary policy measures affect risk premiums. See R J Shiller, J Y Campbell and K L Schoenholtz (1983), Forward Rates and Future Policy: Interpreting the Term Structure of Interest Rates, Brookings Papers on Economics Activity, pp 173-223; M Gertler and P Karadi (2015), Monetary Policy Surprises, Credit Costs, and Economic Activity, AEJ: Macroeconomics 7, pp 44-76; S G Hanson and J C Stein, Monetary policy and long-term real rates, Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming. In this connection, reference is also made to the "volatility paradox", according to which, precisely in apparently tranquil times of low fundamental risk, systemic risk is built up – owing to, for instance, excessive indebtedness – which then erupts in economic crises. See also M K Brunnermeier and Y Sannikov (2014c), A Macroeconomic Model with a Financial Sector, American Economic Review 104, pp 379-421.

47 For more see M K Brunnermeier and Y Sannikov (2014b), op cit, pp 11-12. For more on financial dominance, see also M Hellwig (2014), op cit. A simplified way of explaining financial dominance is when monetary policy, following the outbreak of a severe financial crisis, perceives itself as being forced (or is actually forced) to gear its monetary policy toolkit to stabilising the financial sector, running the risk of setbacks in its efforts to achieve the objective of price stability.

48 See F Smets (2013), op cit.

"Financial dominance" as a potential problem for monetary policy

Given the overlap between the fields of monetary policy and macroprudential policy, the two policy areas' measures may complement or, under certain circumstances, come into conflict with each other. Within a theoretical model framework, this box will illustrate possible interdependencies between the two policy areas, with particular focus on potentially destabilising developments in private debt.[1] Notably, we will identify which configuration of the two policy measures enables a stable model solution and therefore generally stable economic development.[2] To allow for a transparent depiction of central mechanisms and the related results, it should be noted that the stylised model used here and the associated analysis are based on, in some cases, strong assumptions. This also means that the model's output may not be directly transferable to the current economic situation, and caution is therefore advisable.

The analysis is based on a model framework similar to that of Benes and Kumhof (2011).[3] The credit market examined in this analysis is subject to frictions, as the success of projects carried out by enterprises is uncertain at the time of borrowing, while the liability of these enterprises is limited in the event of default. Enterprises depend on credit financing for conducting investment projects, which they receive from banks. The banks finance loans using equity and deposits acquired from households. Enterprises are subject to the risk of not being able to meet their loan repayment obligations. Given the assumption that loan contracts cannot be made contingent on the success of the enterprises' projects, unexpectedly high default rates are reflected negatively in the banks' balance sheets.

The assumption of a complete deposit insurance scheme, funded by tax revenues, means that deposits are risk-free for households. Therefore, compared with deposits, equity is the more expensive form of funding for financial intermediaries. This means that without regulatory intervention – ie without regulatory capital requirements – the model economy would be inherently unstable on account of its incentive structure: the banks would seek to achieve full debt financing and could fund more or less any loan amount. In this economy, only macroprudential policy intervention lays the foundation for stable macroeconomic development. The macroprudential instrument employed is a binding bank capital requirement, ie banks are required to hold a minimum percentage of their credit volume as equity.[4] In addition, the model contains price rigidities and a monetary policy institution. This allows us to examine the interplay between the macroprudential policy described above and monetary policy.

The present model can be compared to a prototypical New Keynesian model without financial frictions. In this kind of standard model, the "Taylor principle" is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a determinate, stable solution.[5] The principle states that monetary policymakers should raise their policy instrument (the nominal short-term interest rate) by more than 1 percentage point if the inflation rate rises by 1 percentage point. Intuitively, this means that, if monetary policymakers react

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1 Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models are used to examine the transmission of shocks in an economy and to describe the impacts of policy decisions on economic agents (households, enterprises and banks).
2 The present analysis relates to a specific example of interaction and policy instruments; many other frictions and instruments are conceivable.
3 See J Benes and M Kumhof (2011), Risky Bank Lending and Optimal Capital Adequacy Regulation, IMF Working Paper WP/11/130.
4 Unlike with the Benes and Kumhof (2011) model, downward deviation from the minimum capital ratio is not possible here.
5 See M Woodford (2001), The Taylor rule and optimal monetary policy, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol 91, pp 232-237.

Determinacy regions of the model as a function of the policy rule parameters



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strongly enough to inflation, the real interest rate will increase in response to higher inflation (in technical terms, the coefficient on inflation in the policy rule is greater than one). As a result, aggregate demand will fall, which will ultimately cause the inflation rate to contract. In this kind of standard model, monetary policymakers are thus able to stabilise inflation by following the Taylor principle.

However, the model framework used here takes into account financial market frictions, meaning that interest rate changes imply additional effects which, in turn, may impact on the stability of the economy. In this regard, it is particularly important that the loan contracts mentioned above are written in the form of nominal contracts. Consequently, an inflation rate rise in the present model leads to a reduction in the real debt burden if the nominal lending rate remains unchanged. Taken in isolation, this has a stabilising effect on corporate debt. Generally speaking, both monetary policy and macroprudential policy can therefore have an effect on debt dynamics under the present model framework. For example, macroprudential policy is able to use a higher bank capital ratio to curb lending, while monetary policy can lower the debt burden by allowing for inflation. Conversely, there is also a possibility in this scenario of a monetary policy based on the Taylor principle having a destabilising effect if, given high debt levels, very low inflation causes the real debt level to rise further (Fisher's "debt-deflation theory").

Such a situation can arise, in particular, if banks are not required to maintain a sufficient capital buffer during a boom and, as a result, issue too many loans to enterprises, which may lead lending down an unstable path. In the context of the present model, this means that macroprudential policy does not respond or does not respond strongly enough to debt, allowing lending to strengthen and ultimately pressuring monetary policymakers to stabilise the real debt burden by raising inflation (otherwise there would be no stable equilibrium in the present model). In other words, to keep the debt level sustainable, inflation is generated by a violation of the Taylor principle.[6] Monetary policy then finds itself in a situation that can be described as "financial dominance".

A simulation study can be used to illustrate the concept of financial dominance. This involves examining a range of parameter values for both the monetary policy rule and the macroprudential rule. These parameter values reflect the sensitivity of the policy to indicator variables and therefore to certain economic developments. The monetary policy rule is expressed as follows:

$$\frac{R_t}{R} = \left(\frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi}\right)^{\tau_\Pi},$$

where R_t is the short-term nominal interest rate and Π_t is the inflation rate. Variables without the subscript t denote variables in long-term equilibrium. The coefficient τ_Π

6 Similarly, the term "fiscal dominance" was already coined by Leeper (1991, Equilibria under Active and Passive Monetary and Fiscal Policies, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol 27, Issue 1, pp 129-147) when he showed that monetary policymakers can be forced to pursue a policy which violates the Taylor principle when fiscal policy is unsustainable.

represents the policy instrument's sensitivity to inflation. The macroprudential rule is given by the following formula:

$$\frac{\phi_t}{\phi} = \left(\frac{b_t}{b}\right)^{\zeta_b},$$

where ϕ_t represents the bank capital ratio and b_t designates lending; the coefficient ζ_b controls the macroprudential instrument's sensitivity to private debt.

The result of the analysis is presented in the chart on page 66. The horizontal axis shows the coefficient of the macroprudential rule (ζ_b), while the vertical axis represents the coefficient of the monetary policy rule (τ_Π).[7] The chart is divided into four quadrants, two of which reflect parameter combinations that lead to a determinate, stable solution and therefore to generally stable economic development. These are the blue shaded areas in the bottom left and top right quadrants. As long as the coefficients of the policy rules are either both low or both high, a determinate and stable model solution exists. In the first scenario, following Leeper (1991), macroprudential policy is described as active and monetary policy as passive, whereas in the second scenario, monetary policy is characterised as active and macroprudential policy as passive.

What is the intuition behind this classification? If, for example, macroprudential policy is active, ie ζ_b is (too) low, the capital requirements for banks are comparatively low, which leads to excessive lending. The economy is in a state of financial dominance, as the burden of stabilising the debt level is ultimately imposed on monetary policy. A determinate, stable solution is presented in the bottom left quadrant. As macroprudential regulation does not sufficiently stabilise the debt level, monetary policy is forced into the passive policy category. More specifically, this means that, in order to arrive at a stable equilibrium, the central bank responds to inflation rate changes with a less than one-to-one change in the interest rate. As a result, the violation of the Taylor principle reflects the fact that monetary policy gives priority to financial stability: it uses inflation to stabilise debt.

In the top left quadrant, however, monetary policy follows the Taylor principle: the coefficient in the policy rule is greater than one, $\tau_\Pi > 1$. However, macroprudential policy does not respond strongly enough to debt in this quadrant either. This results in an unsustainable level of debt, and an explosive solution shows up in this quadrant of the model.

Provided the central bank continues to follow the Taylor principle, these results show that, within the model framework presented, macroprudential policy also needs to respond strongly enough to debt in order to ensure stable macroeconomic growth. Otherwise, in our analytical framework, an equilibrium would be reached only in situations of financial dominance. (Ultimately, the model analysis only presents the implications of certain policy circumstances. Any strategic action taken by the parties concerned is not modelled.) As a result, monetary policymakers would be forced to allow more inflation than if financial stability were irrelevant.

As specific assumptions apply to the model used here, the applicability of the mechanisms and results to the current economic situation is limited. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that it is important to continue to work intensively on establishing the most effective macroprudential policy possible, so that monetary policy can focus on its primary objective of price stability.

7 It should be noted that the coefficient in the macroprudential rule ζ_b differs from the regulatory capital ratio ϕ_t.

Risks to credibility resulting from a financial stability-oriented monetary policy

Strengthening the role of monetary policy in financial stability issues could jeopardise its credibility owing to …

The credibility of a central bank is of paramount importance. It plays a crucial role in steering expectations and thus in determining the effectiveness of monetary policy.[49] It must therefore be ensured that strengthening the role of monetary policy in financial stability issues does not jeopardise its credibility. Credibility could be affected in a number of ways.

… conflicting objectives, …

First, the integration of monetary policy in financial stability issues harbours the risk (at least temporarily) of additional conflicting objectives (see also the box on welfare-theoretical thoughts on pages 45 to 48). Monetary policy could, for example, be faced with a situation where the objective of ensuring price stability requires a more relaxed (or a tighter) monetary policy stance, whereas the objective of safeguarding financial stability requires a tighter (or a more relaxed) stance. This would necessitate a deviation, at least temporarily, from one or both of the two objectives. Although monetary policy is already familiar with the problem of conflicting objectives brought about, for example, by supply shocks, which influence the outlook for prices and the economy in different directions in the short term, the communicative demands resulting from a greater integration of financial stability issues are likely to increase further. If the central bank does not succeed in communicating that a possible deviation from an objective does not imply that this objective is being "watered down" or abandoned, but is merely the outcome of a trade-off decision resulting from a temporary conflict of objectives, this could undermine the credibility of monetary policy.[50] This would result in a less effective monetary policy.

… time-inconsistency problems …

Second, the objective of ensuring financial stability could give rise to a time-inconsistency problem for monetary policy.[51] If monetary policy is responsible for both price stability and financial stability and if the latter is influenced by private-sector debt, for instance, it may initially be desirable for monetary policy to pursue a low inflation rate. However, following the onset of a financial shock, which gives rise to a high level of private-sector debt, for example, monetary policymakers could, under certain conditions, decide to reduce the real debt burden further down the line by allowing a higher rate of inflation.[52] It is therefore essential that monetary policy continues to fulfil its obligation of maintaining price stability.

… and circumstances which compromise monetary policy independence

Third, monetary policy's independence could be jeopardised if it focuses too heavily on financial stability issues. The independence of monetary policy is, however, a fundamental institutional prerequisite for ensuring its credibility.[53] Gearing monetary policy solely towards the goal of price stability facilitates the political acceptance of central bank independence as the inflation target and the associated instrument, the short-term interest rate, can be clearly defined and assessed.[54] This is not the case for the objective of financial stability, however. On the contrary,

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49 See A Cukierman (1992), Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence, MIT Press; M Bordo and P Siklos (2014), Central Bank Credibility, Reputation and Inflation Targeting in Historical Perspective, NBER Working Paper 20693. For information on steering expectations, see Deutsche Bundesbank, Price-level targeting as a monetary policy strategy, Monthly Report, January 2010, pp 31-45.

50 For further information on central bank communication and its relevance to monetary policy, see A S Blinder, M Ehrmann, M Fratzscher, J De Haan and D J Jansen (2008), Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence, Journal of Economic Literature 46, pp 910-945.

51 The general problem is that a policy which is deemed to be optimal and is announced as such at a certain point in time is no longer optimal at a later point in time once the private economic agents have adjusted to the announcement and thus the policy is no longer implemented. For a classic definition of the time-inconsistency problem, see F Kydland and E Prescott (1977), Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, Journal of Political Economy 87, pp 473-492.

52 See K Ueda and F Valencia (2014), op cit.

53 A central bank can only steer inflation expectations if the market players can trust that monetary policy decisions have the sole aim of achieving the central bank's objectives and are not influenced by political considerations. For an overview, see S Fischer (1995), Central Bank Independence Revisited, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 85, pp 201-206.

54 See O Blanchard, G Dell'Ariccia and P Mauro (2013), Rethinking Macro Policy II: Getting Granular, IMF Staff Discussion Note 13/03.

several variables are taken into consideration in this case (credit growth, asset prices, debt etc) the desired levels of which are *a priori* not determined; moreover, their attainment is difficult to assess and they cannot be associated mechanistically with the objective of financial stability.[55] In addition, by having to get involved in any solvency issues of private economic agents or other countries whilst trying to achieve its objective of financial stability, monetary policy moves closer to the domain of quasi-fiscal activities.[56] This inevitably raises the question as to the democratic legitimacy of monetary policy, as it is exercising fiscal tasks that are reserved for elected representatives. These aspects could generate political pressure which could undermine the independence and thus the credibility of the central bank with regard to its objective of ensuring price stability.

It must be ensured that the risks to credibility do not materialise

From a monetary policy perspective, it has to be ensured that the risks to credibility set out here, which result from a greater integration of monetary policy in financial stability issues, do not materialise. Conflicting objectives can be explained by means of careful communication and can thus be rendered manageable, as is already common practice in the core area of monetary policy in the event of supply shocks, for instance. The problem of time inconsistency has to be avoided by way of institutional arrangements, so that monetary policy sticks to its past announcements. Monetary policy independence can be protected by refraining from defining financial stability as a monetary policy objective in its own right.

Undesired side-effects of a financial stability-oriented monetary policy

A greater integration of monetary policy in financial stability issues could also entail economic costs …

The calls for a more symmetrically designed monetary policy with regard to credit cycles are the subject of much debate, even after the experience of the financial crisis. The view is sometimes taken that the costs of a greater integration of monetary policy in financial stability issues, especially in the form of a tighter stance than would actually be necessary to achieve the objective of price stability within a given policy horizon (sometimes referred to as a "leaning against the wind" (LATW) policy), would outweigh the benefits.[57,58]

… and it is not a priori clear whether a policy of this kind always achieves its desired effect, …

Furthermore, a policy of this kind is criticised as it cannot necessarily be assumed *a priori* that it will always achieve its desired effect. In actual fact, it cannot be categorically ruled out, for example, that a LATW strategy will increase households' real debt burden instead of reducing it as intended (this can occur, for instance, if nominal debt reacts more sluggishly to an increase in interest rates than the price level or disposable income). A LATW policy could prove to be problematic, at least for some sectors (such as those that are characterised by a comparatively high level of debt).[59]

… which, however, does not justify the categorical refusal of such a policy

These objections do not imply *per se* that LATW cannot make a contribution towards stabilising the financial sector as a whole. In this respect, they by no means justify the categorical refusal of a LATW policy. They do, however, illustrate that a greater integration of monetary policy in ensuring financial stability can be associated

55 See A Houben, J Kakes and G Schinasi (2004), Towards a framework for financial stability, De Nederlandsche Bank, Occasional Studies 2; C M Buch, (2014a, b), op cit.
56 See H Pill (2013), Central Banking After the Crisis: Challenges for the ECB, in R Baldwin and L Reichlin (eds), Is Inflation Targeting Dead? Central Banking After the Crisis, CEPR e-book, pp 95-102.
57 It was recently argued taking model simulations for Sweden as an example that a LATW strategy would result in a distinctly higher unemployment rate without the likelihood of future crises being notably reduced. See L Svensson (2014), Inflation Targeting and "Leaning against the Wind", International Journal of Central Banking 10, pp 103-114. This assessment is controversial, however. See P Jansson, Swedish monetary policy after the financial crisis – myths and facts, speech at the SvD Bank Summit 2014, Stockholm, 3 December 2014.
58 Doubts as to the costs of a LATW policy outweighing the benefits can be indirectly seen in a recently published statement by the Federal Reserve. In this statement, monetary policy is rated as the final instrument that should be used to safeguard financial stability if macroprudential measures in the stricter sense fail to achieve the desired effect. See L Brainard, The Federal Reserve's Financial Stability Agenda, speech held on 3 December 2014.
59 See L Svensson (2013), "Leaning Against the Wind" Leads to Higher (not Lower) Household Debt-to-GDP Ratio, mimeo.

with economic costs (see also the box on welfare-theoretical thoughts on pages 45 to 48).

The secondary effect of the risk-taking channel is probably dominated by the first order effect

It is also possible under certain circumstances that the risk-taking channel points in the "opposite" direction (second order risk shifting effect).[60] A monetary policy tightening could, for example, increase the likelihood of individual financial market players defaulting owing to a rise in financing costs and incite them to take greater risks in order to achieve higher (expected) yields.[61] As a general rule, the empirical literature on risk-taking does, however, emphasise the fact that the secondary effect presented here is dominated by the first order effect. An increase in interest rates is therefore generally associated with a reduction in the incentive to take risks (see the box on risk propensity on pages 50 to 54).

The benefits of a monetary policy geared more strongly towards financial stability have to outweigh the real economic costs

The objections cited here illustrate that a greater integration of monetary policy in safeguarding financial stability can by all means entail costs for the real economy. These costs, which can be interpreted as an insurance premium, should be kept to a minimum by structuring such a policy to prevent them from outweighing the benefits of having a more resilient financial system. These objections do not justify a categorical rejection of a greater involvement of monetary policy in safeguarding financial stability *per se*; they do, however, illustrate that a greater integration of monetary policy in financial stability issues needs to be considered along with other factors and thus ultimately brings about new challenges.

Assessment and outlook

Role of monetary policy is controversial

In the period prior to the global financial crisis, debate concerning the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability was largely restricted to the question of whether it is advantageous to use the policy rate to burst financial market bubbles at an early stage. However, experience gained in the wake of the crisis have led to a shift and an expansion in the focus of the debate. The debate surrounding the role of financial stability is now no longer concentrated primarily on interest rate policy but on macroprudential policy. That being said, the issue as to whether monetary policy should play a greater role than to date in safeguarding financial stability is still controversial. The interdependencies between monetary and macroprudential policy play a significant role in this debate. Owing to the lack of experience in this area, there is a considerable need for further analyses of the impact of monetary policy on financial stability and of the effectiveness of macroprudential policy. An initial assessment can nevertheless be made on the basis of current debates and research findings.

There is a consensus that macroprudential policy needs to be quickly established

There is a broad consensus that a new policy area with its own set of tools is indispensable in order to safeguard financial stability. The tools of monetary policy alone are too undifferentiated to do justice to the complexity of the task of ensuring financial stability. This is why it remains a top priority to establish and strengthen the effectiveness of macroprudential policy.[62] Macroprudential policy would then be in a position to create the framework conditions for a stability-oriented monetary policy by setting the right incentives and ensuring sufficient resilience in the financial sector. In particular, it is important to ensure that monetary policy does not fall into the "financial dominance" trap. Conversely, a monetary policy which has the

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60 Dell'Ariccia et al (2014), op cit, for example, show that in the event of exogenous debt leverage, commercial banks have an incentive to take greater risks with an increasing monetary policy interest rate.

61 An example based on a US financial institution (New Century Financial Corporation) shows that this institution adjusted its business model following a series of interest rate rises by, inter alia, loosening its credit standards and shifting the focus of its business operations, also geographically. This resulted in an increase in loan portfolio risk. See also A Landier, D Sraer and D Thesmar (2011), The Risk-Shifting Hypothesis, TSE Working Paper Series, No 11-279. See also C M Buch, S Eickmeier and E Prieto (2014), Macroeconomic factors and micro-level bank behavior, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 46, pp 715-751.

62 See J Weidmann (2014a), op cit; J Weidmann (2014b), The macroeconomic importance of capital markets, speech at the annual reception of the Deutsches Aktieninstitut e.V., Frankfurt am Main, 22 May 2014.

primary objective of ensuring price stability can make use of the tools at its disposal to establish important preconditions for stable financial markets.

Macroprudential policy should be employed in a targeted manner and should not be reinterpreted as a national instrument for managing demand,[63] as this is ultimately the responsibility of other policy areas. Economic policy challenges which result from the heterogeneous nature of the euro area should not be tackled using macroprudential instruments unless these are directly linked to financial stability. Macroprudential policy should therefore be strictly geared towards financial stability.

Monetary policy should be designed symmetrically

A monetary policy which focuses on price stability in the medium term is unable to prevent the occurrence of undesirable developments in the financial markets, which could spill over to the real economy and thus jeopardise price stability. The recent past has shown that the monetary policy stance can influence, in particular, financial market players' propensity to take risks. Monetary policymakers should therefore also consider the effect of their decisions on the stability of the financial system as a whole. This suggests a symmetrical monetary policy stance over the financial cycle – in other words, a monetary policy stance that tends to be stricter in upswings, even in the absence of inflationary pressure, and is aggressively eased during a marked downturn, but a less persistent expansionary policy stance following a period of economic downturn – and thus a trade-off between medium and longer-term risks to price stability.[64] A symmetrical monetary policy along those lines should help to avoid a situation in which financial market participants take on too much risk.

Price stability in the medium term must continue to be monetary policy's primary objective

An alternative or complementary argument in favour of more symmetry could result from an objective function of monetary policy which explicitly takes account of financial stability (see the box on page 45). The political-economic reasons mentioned in the text and, in particular, the limits of the monetary policy instruments do, however, give the impression that an expansion of the list of objectives is not expedient. If financial stability were to be adopted as an additional, separate monetary policy objective, it would also harbour the risk of raising unrealistic expectations regarding the effectiveness of the monetary policy instruments.

The Eurosystem's monetary policy strategy is sufficiently flexible to incorporate financial stability issues

The Eurosystem's monetary policy strategy, which could be placed somewhere between the idealised and the extended perspective, is sufficiently flexible to provide a targeted response to future challenges. A fundamental change in strategy is not required. Nevertheless, given the limited experience with and knowledge of the functioning of macroprudential instruments as well as their interaction with monetary policy, the Eurosystem should further develop the relevant analytical framework. This is, in principle, already contained in the monetary pillar of the Eurosystem's monetary policy strategy.

Further work needs to be done in terms of implementing an effective macroprudential policy. This would not only improve the stability of the financial system as a whole but also create the conditions in which the single monetary policy is able to ensure price stability in accordance with its mandate.

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63 See C M Buch (2014c), Alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen? Die Ziele makroprudenzieller Regulierung, speech at the Banken- und Unternehmensabend event which took place at the Bundesbank's Regional Office in Bavaria.
64 See Deutsche Bundesbank (2011), op cit.

German balance of payments in 2014

The German economy's current account surplus expanded very strongly in 2014 to reach a new post-war-high of 7½% of GDP. This was driven by a significantly increased surplus in the trade account. The average net surplus from cross-border investment income over the past two years was below the high amounts recorded in 2011 and 2012. Although Germany's net external position continued to rise, the positive effect of this on the investment income sub-account was more than offset by the further decline in the average interest rate and the narrowing yield spread on the assets side.

Following a stagnant outcome in 2013, export sales by German enterprises picked up noticeably again in 2014. Given the relatively subdued level of global economic activity, this can be attributed to regional and product range effects. Countries experiencing comparatively strong economic growth such as the United States, the United Kingdom and China displayed a markedly higher demand for German-made automobile products as well as for pharmaceuticals and, to a degree, machinery and equipment. The trade surplus was additionally boosted by substantial terms-of-trade effects. These resulted during the period under review from the lower cost of imported commodities, especially the plummeting crude oil price towards the end of the year. In real terms, the volume of imported goods increased faster than exports on the back of buoyant domestic economic activity. When making a macroeconomic assessment, it is important to bear in mind that the higher German current account surplus in 2014 was largely generated by exogenous developments in the external setting.

The increase in the current account surplus was accompanied by a marked rise in Germany's financial account surplus, thanks largely to higher net capital exports from direct investment. These outflows were chiefly fuelled by German firms' higher direct investment abroad, whereas foreign enterprises only marginally expanded their presence in Germany. Portfolio investment was heavily influenced in 2014 by the abundant liquidity provided by the Eurosystem and expectations of large-scale asset purchases for monetary policy purposes (quantitative easing). This constellation was reflected by sharply declining yields in Germany, continued high demand from domestic investors for foreign securities, and comparatively weak demand from abroad for German debt securities. In the other investment sub-account, cross-border flows of capital broadly offset one another. In this context, the Bundesbank's TARGET2 claims decreased slightly on balance last year. Cross-border cash transactions were recorded in the balance of payments for the first time; recent estimates make it possible to gauge figures retrospectively for the period since 2002, when euro banknotes and coins were introduced.

Current account

Underlying trends in the current account

Current account surplus rises to 7½% of GDP

In 2014, Germany's current account balance climbed strongly by €37½ billion to almost €220 billion. At 7½% of gross domestic product (GDP), this figure represents a new record post-war high for Germany both in absolute and percentage terms, topping the previous peak of 2012 by ¾ percentage point. Statistically, more than half of this increase in the current account surplus was accounted for by the further marked increase in the trade surplus.

Germany's current account

As a percentage of GDP



1 Special trade according to the official foreign trade statistics, including supplementary trade items, which also contain freight and insurance costs as a deduction from imports.

Deutsche Bundesbank

According to provisional information, net revenue from cross-border investment income – which has developed into an additional strong current account earner over the past decade – again lifted the overall surplus during the reporting period after having contracted discernibly in 2013. However, the two-year investment income total over 2013 and 2014 fell short of the high figure achieved in 2011 and 2012. The traditionally large deficits on services (including travel) and in the secondary income balance narrowed perceptibly.[1]

EU macroeconomic imbalance procedure tightened

In 2014, the current account surplus again clearly exceeded the stipulated upper threshold of 6% of GDP up to which positive balances are generally deemed unproblematic under the EU macroeconomic imbalances procedure (MIP), after coming close to the defined ceiling in 2013 (6½%). The European Commission considers Germany's persistently high current account surplus, along with the low level of investment spending, to be the main indications of a macroeconomic imbalance in Germany. Having found the economic policy response to be inadequate, the Commission sharpened its overall criticism in its 2015 appraisal, stating that there was a need for intensified monitoring and decisive policy action to address Germany's macroeconomic imbalances (see also the box on page 75).

External environment generating strong expansionary effect

The very steep rise in the current account surplus in 2014 highlights the major impact that substantial changes in the global environment have on Germany's external account. German exports are currently being boosted not so much by the broad dynamics of global economic activity as by regional and product-

1 The Bundesbank updated its balance of payments methodology in July 2014 in line with the updated Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In addition to more detailed breakdowns and the inclusion of transactions that were not previously recorded, this resulted in new sub-account classifications and changes in terminology. See Deutsche Bundesbank, Changes in the methodology and classifications of the balance of payments and the international investment position, Monthly Report, June 2014, pp 57-68.

European Commission steps up the macroeconomic imbalance procedure for Germany

The European Commission has stepped up the macroeconomic imbalance procedure for Germany. On 26 February 2015, the Commission published an assessment[1] stating that there has been no tangible improvement in the trends of imbalances identified previously and that the policy response has been insufficient so far. Germany is now no longer in the second but in the third of the six macroeconomic imbalance procedure categories. The German economy is thus considered to have macroeconomic imbalances which require monitoring and decisive policy action.

In its 2015 in-depth review,[2] the Commission believes that the German economy's current account surplus, which it projects to increase to 8% of gross domestic product in 2015, is still the main indication that macroeconomic imbalances exist in Germany. In addition to the currently substantial terms-of-trade gains, this surplus is thought to be a result of the domestic export industry's strong competitiveness and of high revenues from investment abroad but also to reflect the fact that this has not been offset by increased domestic demand. While private consumption has increased, investment is still considered to be disappointingly low. This is the second point that the Commission identifies as being a key indicator of macroeconomic imbalances. It cites consistently weak investment in machinery and equipment, a loss of momentum in residential investment and insufficient public investment as specific factors dragging on growth.

The Commission believes that Germany's macroeconomic imbalances harbour systemic risks for the euro area. While euro-area partners benefit from Germany's success in trade, the weak domestic investment, falling potential growth and dependence on external conditions pose risks to both Germany and the euro area. At the same time, the Commission acknowledges that Germany's current account surplus in relation to its euro-area partners has fallen to less than a quarter of the total surplus, indicating an on-going rebalancing process in the euro area. The Commission believes that Germany can make a key contribution to reducing imbalances in the euro area by using its considerable total savings overhang for much-needed investment in modernising and developing its infrastructure.

A further reason for the Commission to step up the macroeconomic imbalance procedure is that it believes Germany, overall, has not sufficiently addressed the 2014 country-specific recommendations. Germany has made limited progress in pursuing growth-friendly fiscal policy whilst preserving a sound fiscal position, in reducing disincentives in the labour market (especially with regard to second earners) and in improving competition in the services sector. On the other hand, the Commission acknowledges that Germany has made some progress in keeping the overall costs of transforming the energy sector to a minimum.

1 See European Commission, 2015 European Semester: Assessment of growth challenges, prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, and results of in-depth reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011.
2 See European Commission, Country Report Germany 2015 Including an In-Depth Review on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances.

Germany's foreign trade within and outside the euro area

€ billion



Source of unadjusted figures: Federal Statistical Office. Deutsche Bundesbank

specific demand trends. In tandem with plummeting oil prices, this caused the foreign trade balance to surge and *inter alia* obscured the fact that domestic demand in Germany picked up perceptibly in 2014. This, coupled with a similar surge in German industry's demand for intermediate goods, generated strong real import growth. Indeed, the European Commission itself expects domestic demand to continue to climb both in 2015 and 2016. This is another reason why there is currently no need to implement short-term stimulus measures in Germany. Instead, the emphasis should be on improving the longer-term growth outlook. This should include reviewing whether the prevailing institutional framework has contributed to Germany's aggregate savings overhang and to what extent remedial measures may be required.

No narrowing of trade surplus vis-à-vis euro-area countries in 2014 …

For some years now, the very high overall surpluses recorded in the German trade and current balances have obscured the fact that the surpluses on trade in goods and services with other euro-area countries have narrowed considerably compared with their peak level of 2007. During the reporting period, both balances widened somewhat compared with 2013. However, this is not surprising given that economic output in several of the countries worst hit by the crisis is now improving from a low base level. German enterprises remain well positioned in European markets. The slightly elevated wage and price trend evident in Germany has thus far only resulted in a moderate adjustment of the country's price competitiveness. The adjustment processes usual within a currency union are still ongoing. Nevertheless, the share of the current account balance that is statistically attributable to transactions within the euro area (1¾% of GDP) already no longer signals a major imbalance.

… but gap vis-à-vis non-euro-area countries much wider

By contrast, at 5¾% of GDP, Germany's current account surplus vis-à-vis non-euro-area countries has now reached a sizeable level. The figure has more than doubled compared with 2007. Expanding foreign trade surpluses in the years that followed the great recession were instrumental in building up the high surplus position. In the context of a strongly rebounding global economy, exports played a key role in this build-up between 2010 and 2012. In the past two years, given the comparatively modest pace of growth in the world economy it was primarily the substantial terms-of-trade gains that further boosted the foreign trade balance. The recent depreciation of the euro is unlikely to have had much impact on exports during the period under review. The euro's lower external value, as a factor tending to foster export opportunities to non-euro-area countries, should be viewed *per se* as an upside

risk for the foreign trade surplus, not least in the near future.

Goods flows and balance of trade

Higher foreign trade balance again chiefly due to terms-of-trade effects

German foreign trade picked up noticeably in 2014. On an annual average, nominal exports of goods were 3¾% up on 2013, when they declined slightly (-¼%). Although goods imports recorded a nominal rise of just 2% following a ¾% drop in 2013, price effects had a strong dampening impact due to the in some cases substantial falls in global commodity prices. In real terms the volume of goods imported by Germany went up by an estimated 4¼%. The upshot was that the foreign trade surplus expanded by €22 billion to reach a new record high of €217 billion. This lies well above the previous peak figure of €195 billion which was reached in 2007. Statistically, more than three-quarters of the increase during the reporting period arose from the marked improvement in the terms of trade, whereas less than one-quarter was generated by the higher net export volume. Terms-of-trade effects therefore played a significant role for a second consecutive year.

Growth in exports to EU states driven mainly by higher sales to UK and central and east European countries

EU member states made a comparatively large contribution to German export growth in 2014, with sales of goods to non-euro-area EU countries recording a particularly sharp increase. Thus exports to the United Kingdom as well as to central and east European EU countries outside the euro area rose by more than one-tenth. Exports to the euro area also rebounded considerably (+2¾%). After two years of declining exports, this reflects the incipient economic recovery in the countries hardest hit by the crisis. In addition, the demand for German-made goods also picked up in France and Italy after slackening in 2013. Exports to the Netherlands went up again during the reporting period. By contrast, the value of goods imported from Germany by other neighbouring countries such as Austria and Belgium once again fell short of the level recorded in 2011, which was the peak year in the current business cycle.

Price and volume effects on the German foreign trade balance*

€ billion



Source of unadjusted figures: Federal Statistical Office.
* Decomposed using the Shapley-Siegel index.
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Particularly big rise in exports to USA and China

Exports to countries outside the EU saw a moderate increase in 2014 (1½%). The result was certainly influenced by the fact that exports to Russia contracted by almost one-fifth on account of the perceptible economic downturn in that country and externally imposed sanctions. On the other hand, exports to the United States and China, which along with the United Kingdom[2] are the main partners in German industry's business dealings with non-euro-area countries, increased by one-tenth on average. Furthermore, strong stimuli were imparted by the newly industrialised economies in Asia and the OPEC member countries, while exports to the south and east Asian emerging market

2 These three countries account for more than one-fifth of all German goods exports and for one-third of its exports to countries outside the euro area.

Foreign trade by region

%

Country/ group of countries	Percentage share	Annual percentage change		
	2014	2012	2013	2014
Exports				
Euro area (18)	36.6	– 3.4	– 1.0	2.8
Other EU countries	21.4	3.3	2.3	10.2
of which				
United Kingdom	7.4	11.8	3.0	11.4
Central and east European EU countries (7)[1]	10.6	0.0	2.0	11.0
Switzerland	4.1	2.2	– 4.1	– 1.4
Russia	2.6	10.6	– 6.0	– 18.1
USA	8.5	17.9	2.7	7.5
Japan	1.5	13.4	– 0.4	– 0.9
Newly industrialised economies in Asia[2]	3.1	4.5	1.8	7.6
China	6.6	2.9	0.2	11.3
South and east Asian emerging market economies[3]	2.2	11.7	– 6.6	0.3
OPEC	3.0	18.3	3.0	9.0
All countries	100.0	3.3	– 0.2	3.7
Imports				
Euro area (18)	38.3	0.0	1.0	2.6
Other EU countries	19.9	– 1.1	3.4	6.5
of which				
United Kingdom	4.6	– 4.3	– 0.7	– 0.5
Central and east European EU countries (7)[1]	12.4	1.3	5.7	10.6
Switzerland	4.3	2.1	1.4	2.6
Russia	4.2	4.6	– 3.6	– 6.9
USA	5.3	5.2	– 4.9	0.0
Japan	2.1	– 7.1	– 11.0	– 2.2
Newly industrialised economies in Asia[2]	2.4	– 6.0	– 3.4	3.4
China	8.7	– 1.3	– 5.1	6.4
South and east Asian emerging market economies[3]	3.3	– 0.5	1.5	6.2
OPEC	1.4	28.5	– 5.8	– 25.1
All countries	100.0	0.4	– 0.9	2.1

1 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania. **2** Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan. **3** India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam.
Deutsche Bundesbank

economies remained broadly unchanged in 2014. For the second year in a row, exports to Japan struggled to match the greatly elevated volume achieved in 2012. Similarly, German foreign trade once again received no positive impetus from Switzerland.

Higher export earnings across product range

In 2014, export earnings were up on the year in all the major categories of goods. There was an especially pronounced increase in exports of consumer goods, sales of which by German exporters had already risen robustly in previous years. Pharmaceutical products played a key role in this. After dipping in 2013, exports of capital goods likewise jumped by a significant margin, with particularly marked growth in sales of motor vehicles to important markets such as China and the United Kingdom. Exports of motor vehicles to other euro-area countries also expanded for the first time since 2011. This was accompanied by a perceptible increase in sales of computer, electronic and optical products. By contrast, the rise in exports of machinery was below average, although US business grew considerably.

Robust real growth in imports …

The perceptible broad-based expansion in German output was reflected in a pronounced increase in real imports of goods. Imports of consumer goods grew considerably in a buoyant consumer environment, with domestic demand for pharmaceutical products being especially prominent. Given the German economy's close integration into the international division of labour[3], rising output, particularly in the industrial sector, served to push up imports of intermediate goods. After stalling in 2013, imports of motor vehicles recorded very sharp growth in 2014. This was accompanied by a less marked but still discernible increase in imports of machinery; this is consistent with the fact that investment in machinery and equipment during the reporting period was up from its depressed level in 2012 and 2013. Energy imports

3 See Deutsche Bundesbank, The German economy in the international division of labour: a look at value added flows, Monthly Report, October 2014, pp 27-42.

Foreign trade by selected categories of goods in 2014



Source of unadjusted figures: Federal Statistical Office. Deviations from 100% due to rounding.
Deutsche Bundesbank

fell sharply in nominal and also in real terms. One reason for this was the reduced demand for heating fuel on account of the very mild winter weather at the beginning of the year.

… benefited exporters inside and outside the euro area equally

Countries within and outside the euro area benefited similarly from the German economy's upturn in import demand in real terms. The nominally smaller increase in imports from non-euro-area countries was due *inter alia* to the higher share of energy imports attributable to this group of countries. The fall in energy prices clearly affected the trade result with major energy exporters such as Russia and the OPEC member countries, whose deliveries to Germany shrank by 7% and as much as one-quarter respectively in nominal terms. German imports from the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan remained sluggish. By contrast, imports from the newly industrialised Asian countries and the south and east Asian emerging market economies rose considerably following two rather lacklustre years. In 2014, Chinese suppliers likewise largely recouped the losses in sales to the German market they had sustained over the preceding two years. The upturn in industrial activity, spearheaded by car production, boosted imports from central and east European countries in connection with the established component supply chain.

Trade figures in current account larger than foreign trade data for various reasons; …

The foreign trade sub-account does not, however, directly reflect the overall contribution to the current account made by trade in goods. This is because the foreign trade methodology captures goods flows once they physically cross a border and measures their value at Germany's border, whereas trade in goods as recorded in the balance of payments is essentially based on change in ownership.[4] As the supplier's border is uniformly taken as the place of performance for exports and imports alike, goods imports give rise to a valuation difference compared with the foreign trade figures. Statistically, import cif costs[5] accounted for €22 billion of the difference between the figures for trade in goods and foreign trade during the reporting period. These costs have no bearing on the current account balance, however, if transportation is performed by foreign freight carriers, in which case they are recorded as expenses under the services account. In 2014, these amounted to €17 billion.

The difference between the trade in goods and foreign trade figures is also due partly to the

4 See also Deutsche Bundesbank, Change in the methodology and classifications of the balance of payments and the international investment position, Monthly Report, June 2014, pp 57-68.
5 In international trade, the abbreviation "cif" (cost, insurance and freight) stands for the freight clause that includes transport and insurance costs.

… with rising net income from merchanting being of particular economic significance

net merchanting earnings that are generated whenever domestic enterprises buy goods abroad and resell these without importing them to Germany. The volume of such transactions has increased sharply in recent years, with the automotive industry showing a particular preference for this form of international division of labour. In 2014, this generated a net positive contribution of €20½ billion to trade in goods. After factoring in other additions and subtractions such as goods flows related to cross-border commission processing, the 2014 balance from trade in goods shows a surplus of €229½ billion, compared with €207½ billion one year earlier.

Breakdown of invisibles

Overall services deficit somewhat smaller …

The deficit on cross-border services totalled €39 billion in 2014, which was €5½ billion less than in 2013. This improvement was caused mainly by a jump in receipts from services related to the production and distribution of goods, while expenditure on such services rendered by non-residents contracted.

… chiefly due to commercial and enterprise-related trade in services

In recent years, the transport services subaccount has increasingly posted a deficit; in the year under review, this deficit grew by €1 billion to €13 billion. International trade in computer, telecommunications and information services, which have ballooned over the past decade, posted a surplus of €2½ billion in 2014, whereas in the past receipts from and expenditure on such services largely cancelled out. A significantly lower deficit was posted by professional and management consultancy services, which include commercial services that traditionally show a deficit. The negative balance of maintenance and repair services narrowed in 2014 as a combined result of higher revenue and lower expenditure. Such expenditure, which was reported mainly by German car manufacturers – presumably in connection with warranties – fell by more than €2 billion[6] in 2014. Foreign firms spent more on the cross-border licensing of intellectual property than did their German counterparts (€+4½ billion). While one-third of revenue in this sector now comes from emerging market economies and developing countries, up to now German firms have resorted almost exclusively to using intellectual property products registered in industrialised countries. Cross-border research and development services generate a stable surplus for Germany; in 2014, this amounted to +€3½ billion, the bulk of which was again attributable to the United States.

Only moderate rise in foreign travel spending

German residents' expenditure on foreign travel in 2014 amounted to €69½ billion, up by more than 1% on 2013. In keeping with the strong consumer demand, spending on private travel increased further by 1¼%, after already recording marked growth between 2011 and 2013. Conversely, foreign travel for business purposes fell well below the previous year's figure (-2%). The travel sub-account recorded receipts of €32½ billion, up by 5%, while the overall deficit shrank by €1 billion in 2014 to €37 billion.

Investment income balance strongly affected by yield effects

Germany accumulated a surplus of €67 billion from cross-border primary income in 2014. The year-on-year increase of €6½ billion fully offset the decline seen in 2013. Since provisional data are prone to revision, the sharp rise at the current end should not be overinterpreted. That said, one finding that should prove statistically robust is that the surplus for the past two years is significantly smaller than that reported for the previous two-year period. The primary income balance is largely determined by the volume of income flowing to residents from their investments abroad and the amount German debtors transfer to other countries. In recent years the investment income account has made a major positive contribution to the current account balance. This was due in part to the

6 The intertemporal comparison of data up to 2012 is limited, not least with respect to expenditure, as it is virtually impossible to retrospectively calculate this newly defined item in the services account on the basis of the data collected using the old reporting templates. In view of their nature, these services are likely to have been listed up to 2012 under the item "other business services".

Effects on the cross-border investment income balance: asset accumulation, portfolio shifts and changes in yields

The balance of cross-border investment income stood at €65 billion (or 2¼% of GDP) in 2014, making it the second-largest asset item in the German current account after the goods trade surplus. Just ten years ago, investment income and spending were roughly equal. Germany's investment income flows to and from the rest of the world result from the amount and composition of external assets and liabilities as well as the income yields paid on assets and liabilities. The growth in Germany's investment income surplus is primarily thought to be linked to the considerable rise in net external assets. However, an analysis that disaggregates asset classes additionally reveals many different effects which vary in strength across subperiods.

The starting point of the analysis is a breakdown of the change in the investment income balance into accumulation and yield effects. The accumulation effect measures the isolated influence of changes in net external assets (eg through net capital exports associated with current account surpluses, but also through valuation effects) on the investment income balance. Yield effects generally result from the interplay between the fluctuations in income yields on the asset and liability sides of the external assets account. From an analytical perspective, subdivision into a yield level effect and a differential effect is worthwhile. The yield level effect captures the effects of changes in the international yield level, reflecting the precise impact they have on the average rate of interest on German foreign investments. If the average rate of interest on liabilities to non-resident investors does not run parallel to this, this ultimately results in differential effects.

Furthermore, it must be noted that individual asset classes usually generate different yields. Portfolio shifts can therefore change the average yields on assets and liabilities. This phenomenon is accommodated through shift effects for both the yield level and differential effect. The latter does not, however, solely comprise the effects of changes in the yield differential in individual asset classes (pure yield differential effect). A contribution to the aggregated differential effect is also made when – against the background of a differing composition of external assets and liabilities – the yield levels of individual asset classes develop in different ways (leverage effect).

The breakdown of the change in the investment income balance into the effects described above is based on the income and spending flows as well as the asset and liability holdings of 11 yield-bearing asset classes in the German balance of payments and the international investment position.[1] For the entire period from 1999 to 2014,[2] the main finding is that, in mathematical

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1 Specifically, the following asset classes are considered: 1) direct investment: a) equity capital, b) loans; 2) securities: a) equities, b) investment fund shares, c) short-term debt securities, d) long-term debt securities; 3) other investment: a) monetary financial institutions, b) enterprises and individuals, c) general government excluding the Bundesbank, d) Bundesbank excluding TARGET2, e) TARGET2. The remaining components of net external assets are not considered in this analysis, as they either do not generate any income as defined in the balance of payments statistics (financial derivatives and cash) or the relevant income data are not available over the entire analysis period (reserve assets). The breakdown in discrete time is implemented using the Shapley-Siegel index. See L Shapley (1953), A value for n-person games, in: H W Kuhn and A W Tucker (eds), Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol 2, Princeton University, pp 307-317; and I H Siegel (1945), The generalized "ideal" index-number formula, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 40, pp 520-523.

2 For 2014, the period from 2013 Q4 to 2014 Q3 is used provisionally for the investment income, since information on amounts outstanding for the international investment position is currently available until 2014 Q3 only.

Breakdown of the change in the German investment income balance

€ billion, average annual amounts



1 Final figures for the international investment position as at 2014 Q3.

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terms, the accumulation of net external assets accounted for just over half of the improvement in the investment income balance. The rest was attributable to yield effects.[3] The swing in the yield differential in favour of German foreign assets had a strong positive impact. Although the decline in the general yield level counteracted the improvement in the investment income balance, the effect of this was relatively minor over the entire period.

In the period between 1999 and 2014, four periods that each display characteristic trends can be identified. The first subperiod (1999 to 2003) covers the final phase and bursting of the dotcom bubble, which resulted in a significant decline in cross-border direct investment, in particular. The global economic slowdown after the turn of the millennium led to persistent economic stagnation in Germany given the structural weaknesses at the time. The second subperiod (2003 to 2007) was – in a global sense – dominated by a fairly strong upturn. During this time, structural reforms were implemented in Germany, culminating in more employment-intensive growth. In addition, domestic enterprises' activities abroad increased considerably in this period. The effects of the financial crisis on the investment income balance are related, on the one hand, to the pronounced cyclical volatility between 2008 and 2010 and, on the other hand, to international investors' changed investment behaviour owing to new assessments of risk/return profiles. The European sovereign debt crisis escalated until mid-2012, after which tensions eased. Against this backdrop, the phase from 2007 to 2012 is separated from the

3 In the yield calculation undertaken here, investment income is based on average annual amounts outstanding (ie the arithmetical mean of the outstanding value at the end of the reporting year and at the end of the previous year). The amounts outstanding are valued at the market prices and exchange rates at the end of the reporting period, meaning that changes in amounts outstanding essentially also incorporate valuation effects. The influence of exchange rate fluctuations is likely to be of minor significance for the yield calculation, since income payments are normally made in the currency in which the investment is denominated, and are posted to the investment income balance sheet during the year on an accrual basis. Theoretically speaking, the yield calculation remains undistorted by market price effects under the assumption that market valuations of the investments match expected future income. Since this cannot be assumed in every case and for all periods, investment income flows are based on amounts outstanding adjusted for market price effects in an alternative calculation which, however, only extends back to 2005 for reasons of data availability. In qualitative terms, this procedure does not change the plus or minus sign or the relative significance of the accumulation and yield effects. In quantitative terms, the accumulation effect would have to be somewhat greater and the differential effect slightly smaller in the period from 2007 to 2012.

subsequent years. This delineation also appears necessary from a statistical perspective because the figures for 2013 and 2014 still contain a comparatively high proportion of estimates.

The investment income balance sheet recorded an average annual deficit of €19 billion between 1999 and 2003. This deficit arose because, on average, a higher yield was paid on liabilities to non-residents than German investors received for their practically equivalent holdings of foreign assets. The relatively minor change in the investment income balance of -€3½ billion was almost exclusively attributable to a slightly negative accumulation effect. Yield changes had no notable effect on the balance.

Between 2003 and 2007, German investment income rose on balance by a significant €56 billion to +€35½ billion in 2007. The accumulation effect as well as both yield effects made a positive contribution to this. The biggest contribution, of +€27½ billion, was provided by the improvement in the yield differential. A crucial factor here was that the profitability of both direct investment and of investment fund shares and long-term loans held by German investors improved distinctly compared with those of non-residents in Germany. Also of significance was the fact that the yield level for asset classes in which the German economy as a whole had entered into a net creditor position (such as equity capital for direct investment) tended to rise more sharply than others (+€8 billion). As the climbing German current account surpluses since 2002 were also reflected in constantly growing net external assets (a rise of €502 billion between 2003 and 2007), the accumulation effect played a significant role in the increase in German investment income, adding €25 billion. The slightly higher yield level was of little consequence compared with the other determining factors, contributing +€3½ billion.

Key indicators for the German investment income balance



1 Direct investment, securities and other investment excluding cash, financial derivatives and reserve assets. **2** Yield corresponding to the ratio of investment income to the annual average international investment position. **3** Yield on assets less yield on liabilities. **4** Final figures for international investment position as at 2014 Q3.

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German net investment income again increased clearly between 2007 and 2012, rising by €26½ billion to +€62 billion in 2012 despite a temporary slump in 2008. To some extent, there were countervailing contributions from accumulation and yield effects. The accumulation effect made a distinctly positive contribution of +€11 billion. In spite of the larger current account surpluses as against the 2003 to 2007 period, this contribution was no longer as high, since Germany's net exter-

nal assets did not grow to the same extent as the cumulative financial account balances between 2007 and 2012 owing to valuation effects, other adjustments and changes to statistical conventions.[4] The yield level effect continued to have a clear braking effect on the increase in investment income, reducing the figure by €8½ billion, as the international interest rate level declined considerably following the expansionary monetary policy measures implemented in response to the global recession. A crucial factor here was that all asset classes, but particularly other investment by monetary financial institutions (MFIs), generated distinctly lower income than before.

By contrast, the differential effect boosted Germany's investment income balance after the onset of the crisis (+€24 billion), primarily on account of safe haven flows as part of investors' altered risk perception. The largest item originates from the price effect of safe haven flows, which were expressed in the increase in the pure yield differential (+€32½ billion). This was chiefly attributable to yield changes in the bond market, in which the effective interest rate decreased from 3¾% to 2¼% on the liability side between 2007 and 2012, while the reduction on the asset side was significantly smaller, going from 4¾% down to 4¼%. The yield differential was adversely affected, however, because the interest rate on German net creditor positions, such as other investment by MFIs and investment fund shares, was lower than in the previous period (-€6½ billion).

The significant portfolio shifts after the onset of the crisis had no negative influence on the investment income balance. On the asset side, the items that primarily gained in importance were TARGET2 claims, other investment by public sector entities excluding the Bundesbank, long-term debt securities and direct investment, especially at the expense of other investment by MFIs and of equities. One reason for this can be found in a structural shift away from bank financing resulting, amongst other things, from new capital requirements under Basel III. First and foremost, however, institutional mechanisms within the euro area and the process of combating the crisis ensured that the private sector's share in external assets shifted in favour of public sector entities – particularly the Bundesbank's TARGET2 claims. However, the effect on the total balance of the rise in TARGET2 claims was more than offset in mathematical terms by the reduction in low-interest-bearing asset classes, such as other investment by MFIs, in favour of more profitable ones, such as direct investment and long-term loans.[5]

From 2012 to 2014, the German investment income balance improved only slightly, by €2 billion, according to current figures. Against the background of the German net external position recording clear increases (+€523 billion) owing to valuation effects amongst other factors, the accumulation effect was again considerable in this period (+€13 billion). However, dampening effects were felt from the continued drop in the yield level (-€3½ billion) and the deterioration in the yield differential (-€7½ billion). The latter was primarily attributable to a partial reversal of the crisis-related develop-

4 See also Deutsche Bundesbank, Discrepancy between changes in foreign assets and the cumulative financial account balance: unsuitable indicator of wealth losses, Monthly Report, May 2014, pp 48-50.
5 In the first step, TARGET2 claims are remunerated at the Eurosystem reference rate and generate investment income as defined in the balance of payments, which is recognised as Bundesbank income. This aspect is considered exclusively in this calculation. Since TARGET2 balances even out across all euro-area countries, they do not ultimately generate any monetary income for the Eurosystem as a whole and hence also for the Bundesbank. All of the Eurosystem's monetary income is netted and allocated at the end of the year only. The compensatory amount is recorded in secondary income for statistical purposes.

ment in the bond markets, which was reflected in a negative pure yield differential effect (-€8½ billion). By contrast, the effects of portfolio shifts from assets (+€4 billion) and liabilities (-€4 billion) towards equities and, on the asset side, towards long-term debt securities as well offset each other in terms of the investment income balance.

To explain the increase in the investment income surplus in the past ten years, it is not enough to look solely at the accumulation process for net external assets. The improvement in the yield differential between external assets and liabilities – especially with regard to equity capital for direct investment and long-term debt securities – had the effect of additionally boosting the surplus, at least until 2012. The shifts within German external assets and liabilities after the onset of the financial and sovereign debt crisis offset each other for the most part in terms of their overall effect on the investment income balance. Given the size of Germany's net external assets, cross-border investment income streams can be expected, on balance, to continue making clearly positive contributions to the current account in the coming years.

accumulation of a large pool of net foreign assets. But it also owed much to the improved yield spread, which worked in favour of German external assets, whereas the general decline in the yield level since the start of the financial crisis has had a dampening effect on investment income (see also the box on pages 81 to 85). In 2011 and 2012, the yield spread on the assets side proved particularly high as foreign investment had still been profitable on balance. This contrasted with markedly reduced spending by domestic debtors in the wake of declining interest rates and low risk premiums. Over the past two years, the overall yield on the assets side contracted much more than on the liabilities side, not least because of the easing of tensions in the international financial markets. This meant that, although net external assets were still growing, much less investment income was being generated on balance.

Smaller deficit from secondary income

The secondary income balance, which captures current transfers between Germany and the rest of the world, closed in 2014 with a deficit of €37½ billion. This was €3½ billion less than in 2013. Expenditure for the reporting period went down by 4% to €95 billion. This was preceded, however, by a four-year increase in outward current transfers amounting to a cumulated rise of two-fifths. At €56 billion, private-sector transfers in 2014 remained broadly unchanged[7] compared with the previous year, while public sector transfers declined by just over €4 billion to €39 billion in the wake of smaller transfers to the EU budget. Overall, current transfers received from the rest of the world in 2014 were on a par with the 2013 level.

7 Owing to the changeover to a new system of classification for the balance of payments, private receipts and expenditure are now much larger in the secondary income account. The reason for this balance sheet increase is that the figures now include net premiums (excluding insurance services provided) and payments on claims made by insurers, notably reinsurers.

Financial transactions

Underlying trends in financial transactions

Higher net capital exports

Mirroring the current account surplus, Germany again recorded high net capital exports in 2014. These amounted to €244 billion (compared with €208 billion in 2013). Over 50% of this amount was attributable to portfolio investment. The current low-interest-rate environment was reflected by domestic investors' greater interest in higher-yielding foreign securities. In return, German government bonds, which are considered particularly safe, remained in demand abroad, although their yields have fallen steadily across all maturity segments owing to the generous volumes of liquidity being provided by the Eurosystem and expectations of large-scale purchases of securities for monetary policy purposes (quantitative easing). The impact of direct investment on the financial account was significantly higher in 2014. Over the course of the year, direct investment accounted for around a third of net capital exports. Other investment also recorded capital outflows, but this figure was comparatively small. German financial corporations, in particular, supplied their foreign branches with additional funds. By contrast, the Bundesbank's TARGET2 claims decreased again over the year as a whole. Against the background of increasing uncertainty in the financial markets, however, they have recently been rising again.

Portfolio investment

Lower capital exports from portfolio investment

In portfolio investment, which often clearly reflects developments in the international financial markets, net capital exports amounted to €127½ billion in 2014, compared to €164½ billion in 2013. This decline is mainly attributable to a turnaround in foreign demand for German securities. While foreign investors sold German securities in 2013 on balance, they became purchasers again last year. Foreign investors increased their holdings of German securities by a total of €21½ billion in 2014, primarily through purchases of longer-dated debt securities and equities.

Net capital imports from public bonds, …

Cross-border turnover in German bonds fell further in 2014. This owed much to structural factors such as the decline in the outstanding volume of bank debt securities. This may also be a sign of greater demand from buy-and-hold investors for debt securities than before. Overall, foreign investors purchased €21½ billion worth of German bonds on balance last year. They continued to expand their holdings of public debt securities. Purchases of public-sector bonds exceeded sales by €30 billion last year. This is higher than the 2013 figure, but lower than the net inflows of funds recorded between 2010 and 2012 (€75 billion a year on average). This means that Germany is still considered a safe haven by international investors; however, given that Bund yields are falling, the safe-haven factor seems to have diminished compared with the acute crisis years from 2010 to 2012.

… but domestic private bonds show net capital exports

The trend towards high redemption rates for private-sector bonds seen in previous years continued. Foreign investors' holdings of these long-term debt securities fell by €8½ billion in 2014. A major contributory factor in this is that that the outstanding volume of bank debt securities issued in Germany has been declining for years. The net capital exports therefore probably primarily reflect the shrinking supply offered by domestic issuers.

No significant changes in domestic money market paper

Holdings of domestic money market paper in foreign investors' portfolios fell by €2½ billion in 2014. Net outflows of capital from trade in public-sector issues (€13½ billion) were broadly offset by net inflows of capital from private-sector short-dated debt securities (€11 billion). Non-residents' sales and redemptions of public short-dated bonds were probably driven by the low (and sometimes negative) yields and a dwindling supply.

Countervailing trends in domestic equities and mutual fund shares

Demand for German shares continued to rise in 2014, leading to a net capital import of €8½ billion. In 2014, the German equity market probably benefited from the pick-up in economic activity towards the end of the year and the relatively favourable share price developments. By contrast, foreign investors sold German mutual fund shares on balance in the context of higher cross-border turnover, which resulted in a net capital export of €5½ billion.

Growing net demand for foreign debt securities …

In inward transactions, German investors acquired foreign securities to the tune of €149½ billion net in 2014, which roughly matched the net outflows in 2013 (€143 billion). Long-term debt securities are traditionally the most popular form of investment in this context. Via such purchases, German investors invested €99 billion net abroad. The balance vis-à-vis the rest of the euro area remained largely unchanged. Domestic non-banks, which include insurance and investment firms, appeared to view the outlook for the countries most affected by the crisis somewhat more positively and expanded their stocks of corporate bonds issued by these countries, whereas German banks kept their holdings constant. In the second half of the year, in particular, German investors also bought larger volumes of fixed-income securities from the United States and the United Kingdom. Differences in the monetary policy stance may have been a factor in this. While the Federal Reserve wound down its quantitative easing programme in the fourth quarter, further expansionary monetary policy measures were adopted in the euro area. In the foreign exchange markets, this resulted in exchange rate shifts to the detriment of the euro. In contrast to US securities, bonds and notes issued by Japan, which further accelerated the expansion of the monetary base in 2014, were sold by domestic investors in the reporting year. All in all, net purchases of foreign currency bonds last year amounted to €17 billion (2013: €23½ billion). Bonds denominated in US dollars and Danish krone were in especially high demand.

Major items of the balance of payments

€ billion

Item	2012r	2013r	2014r
I Current account (balance)	+ 187.3	+ 182.0	+ 219.7
1 Goods[1]	+ 196.6	+ 207.6	+ 229.3
Exports (fob)	1,074.1	1,083.5	1,123.8
Imports (fob)	877.5	875.9	894.5
Memo item			
Foreign trade[2]	+ 189.8	+ 195.0	+ 216.9
Exports (fob)	1,095.8	1,093.1	1,133.5
Imports (cif)	905.9	898.2	916.6
2 Services (balance)[3]	− 35.9	− 44.8	− 39.1
of which			
Travel (balance)	− 35.4	− 37.7	− 36.8
3 Primary income (balance)	+ 66.8	+ 60.2	+ 66.9
of which			
Investment income (balance)	+ 62.2	+ 58.0	+ 65.0
4 Secondary income (balance)	− 40.1	− 41.1	− 37.4
II Balance on capital account	+ 1.4	+ 1.1	+ 2.8
III Balance on financial account[4]	+ 157.5	+ 207.9	+ 243.8
1 Direct investment	+ 35.6	+ 9.0	+ 83.2
2 Portfolio investment	+ 54.8	+ 164.5	+ 127.7
3 Financial derivatives[5]	+ 24.4	+ 24.3	+ 31.8
4 Other investment[6]	+ 41.4	+ 9.3	+ 3.7
5 Reserve assets[7]	+ 1.3	+ 0.8	− 2.6
IV Errors and omissions[8]	− 31.3	+ 24.8	+ 21.3

1 Excluding freight and insurance costs of foreign trade. **2** Special trade according to the official foreign trade statistics (source: Federal Statistical Office). **3** Including freight and insurance costs of foreign trade. **4** Increase in net external position: + / decrease in net external position: -. **5** Balance of transactions arising from options and financial futures contracts as well as employee stock options. **6** Includes in particular loans and trade credits as well as currency and deposits. **7** Excluding allocation of special drawing rights and excluding changes due to value adjustments. **8** Statistical errors and omissions, resulting from the difference between the balance on the financial account and the balances on the current and the capital account.

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Major items of the German balance of payments

Balances in € billion



1 Excluding transaction-related change in reserve assets; net capital exports: +.

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… counterbalanced by falling demand for foreign equities

At €10½ billion, the volume of foreign equities purchased by domestic investors was somewhat smaller in 2014 than in 2013 (€19 billion). Demand eased off noticeably in the second half of the year, in particular. This is likely to have been due to the deterioration of the global economic outlook in late summer and resurging uncertainty in the euro area towards the end of the year about Greece's economic policy course. However, a shift from equities into debt securities may also have played a role in respect of some countries. Portfolio shifts of this kind may have occurred with regard to investment in the USA and the UK where, as mentioned, demand for fixed-income securities rose in the second half of the year. Moreover, German shares significantly outperformed those of many other equity markets last year.

Higher net capital exports from investment fund shares …

In 2014, German investors increased their level of indirect securities investment through foreign investment funds. Net outflows amounted to €38½ billion in the reporting year (€32 billion in 2013). German investors continued to expand their holdings of mutual fund shares from the rest of the euro area, in particular. Capital exports to the rest of the euro area in this securities segment rose by 35% year on year.

… and financial derivatives

Financial derivatives (which are aggregated to form a single item in the balance of payments) showed a rise in net capital exports to €32 billion in 2014. This represents an increase of more than 30% on the previous year. Forward and futures contracts accounted for just under three-quarters of the net capital exports, while the remaining quarter was mainly attributable to options. Financial derivatives were primarily acquired by credit institutions (€21 billion) and financial corporations (€6½ billion). Forward and futures contracts relating to electricity and gas, which are now included in this item following the changeover to the new Balance of Payments Manual (BPM6), accounted for a transaction volume of €2½ billion.

Direct investment

Decline in global direct investment …

Given the fairly long-term nature of direct investment, the tense geopolitical situation led to slightly more subdued investment by enterprises in global terms. Thus the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated that global direct investment declined by 8% to less than US$1½ trillion.[8] However, there were marked regional disparities. Developing countries and emerging market economies, which were the most popular investment destinations in previous years, increased their volume of inward investment last year, too. This increase amounted to 4%, bringing their share of global investment inflows to 56%. In the transition countries, by contrast, direct investment was halved to US$45 billion owing, *inter alia*, to the Russia-Ukraine conflict and economic problems in a number of other countries. The group of industrial countries, too, recorded a significant decline of 14% (to around US$700 billion). This affected the United States, in particular, as a foreign enterprise reduced its participating interest in a major American telecommunications company. Given the considerable volume of the transaction, it had an impact on foreign direct investment in the USA as a whole. By

8 See UNCTAD, Global Investment Trends Monitor, No 18, 29 January 2015.

contrast, the EU's volume of inward direct investment went up by 13%.

… but increase in Germany

For Germany, direct investment in 2014 resulted in net capital exports of €83 billion, a nine-fold increase on 2013. On the one hand, this was due to the fact that foreign firms transferred less capital to Germany than at any time since 2004. However, this was due partly to an enterprise-specific development in intra-group credit transactions. Nonetheless, Germany remains an attractive location for foreign investors, which is evident from the strong inflows of foreign equity capital. On the other hand, German enterprises stepped up their investment abroad.

German direct investment abroad returns to high level

At €88½ billion, outbound foreign direct investment by German enterprises significantly exceeded the 2013 figure (€53½ billion). German firms mainly provided their foreign affiliates with more equity capital (€70½ billion), €22 billion of which was used to reinvest earnings generated abroad.[9] In addition, domestic enterprises' cross-border credit transactions resulted in outflows of €18½ billion. For one thing, German proprietors provided their affiliates abroad with loans, in particular. For another, foreign subsidiaries based in Germany provided credit to their parent companies abroad.

Strategic objectives for German direct investment abroad

German enterprises mostly pursue strategic objectives in terms of their direct investment abroad. According to a survey by the German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHK),[10] 83% of enterprises said they focused on expanding production capacity and boosting sales or customer services. A quarter of the enterprises surveyed reported that trade barriers were a further motivating factor for expanding their investment abroad. This applied particu-

Financial account

€ billion

Item	2012r	2013r	2014r
Financial account balance[1]	+ 157.5	+ 207.9	+ 243.8
1 Direct investment	+ 35.6	+ 9.0	+ 83.2
Domestic investment abroad[2]	+ 77.7	+ 53.4	+ 88.7
Foreign investment in the reporting country[2]	+ 42.1	+ 44.4	+ 5.5
2 Portfolio investment	+ 54.8	+ 164.5	+ 127.7
Domestic investment in foreign securities[2]	+ 109.7	+ 143.2	+ 149.4
Shares[3]	+ 11.7	+ 19.0	+ 10.6
Investment fund shares[4]	+ 21.7	+ 31.9	+ 38.3
Long-term debt securities[5]	+ 75.9	+ 87.8	+ 99.1
Short-term debt securities[6]	+ 0.5	+ 4.5	+ 1.4
Foreign investment in domestic securities[2]	+ 55.0	− 21.3	+ 21.7
Shares[3]	+ 2.3	+ 5.0	+ 8.3
Investment fund shares	− 3.4	+ 6.1	− 5.6
Long-term debt securities[5]	+ 56.2	− 9.5	+ 21.4
Short-term debt securities[6]	− 0.1	− 22.9	− 2.4
3 Financial derivatives[7]	+ 24.4	+ 24.3	+ 31.8
4 Other investment[8]	+ 41.4	+ 9.3	+ 3.7
Monetary financial institutions[9]	− 117.6	+ 101.6	+ 43.8
Long-term	− 37.7	− 33.8	+ 35.7
Short-term	− 79.9	+ 135.4	+ 8.1
Enterprises and households[10]	− 22.1	+ 18.6	− 18.8
Long-term	+ 0.4	+ 14.7	+ 6.2
Short-term	− 22.5	+ 3.9	− 25.0
General government	+ 80.8	+ 9.0	+ 19.6
Long-term	+ 13.9	+ 5.8	− 1.5
Short-term	+ 67.0	+ 3.2	+ 21.1
Bundesbank	+ 100.2	− 119.9	− 41.0
5 Reserve assets[11]	+ 1.3	+ 0.8	− 2.6

1 Increase in net external position: + / decrease in net external position: -. **2** Increase: +. **3** Including participation certificates. **4** Including reinvestment of earnings. **5** Long-term: original maturity of more than one year or unlimited. **6** Short-term: original maturity of up to one year. **7** Balance of transactions arising from options and financial futures contracts as well as employee stock options. **8** Includes in particular loans and trade credits as well as currency and deposits. **9** Excluding the Bundesbank. **10** Includes the following sectors: financial corporations (excluding monetary financial institutions) as well as non-financial corporations, households and non-profit institutions serving households. **11** Excluding allocation of special drawing rights and excluding changes due to value adjustments.

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9 In 2014, large M&A transactions were also announced, but these were not recorded in the balance of payments in the reporting year.
10 See DIHK Survey, Auslandsinvestitionen in der Industrie, spring 2014.

Direct investment

€ billion



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larly to sales markets in South America, Russia or south-east Europe. Cost considerations – first and foremost the potential to lower wage and energy costs – played a role for 21% of the enterprises. According to the study, these cost motives became more important in the context of Germany's current energy and labour market policy.

Europe major destination for German direct investment

The regional distribution of German direct investment largely reflects these motives. In 2014 the lion's share of direct investment, at €71½ billion, was targeted at other EU countries, which are also the main consumers of German products. According to the DIHK study, the EU has replaced China, which had ranked above it as a target for foreign expansion for four years, in the list of enterprises' preferred locations. German firms perceived an improvement in the competitiveness of their EU partner countries, making them a more attractive investment location. Furthermore, German enterprises increased their investment in China and South America in 2014. There was no major new investment in the United States owing to large losses sustained at a number of foreign enterprises, reflected by negative reinvested profits. Holding companies and manufacturing firms, especially in the automotive industry, were the main investors. By contrast, German credit institutions scaled back their foreign investment last year.

Decline in foreign investment in Germany

Non-resident investors only expanded their investment in Germany by a marginal €5½ billion in 2014. In 2013 foreign direct investment in Germany had amounted to €44½ billion. Intra-group credit transactions were responsible for this decline. While foreign enterprises had provided German firms with loans amounting to €37 billion net in 2013, they withdrew €17 billion from Germany last year. The decline was heavily influenced by the transactions made by a single foreign enterprise. This turnaround in cross-border lending was counterbalanced by a relatively sharp rise in equity capital, which led to inflows to Germany of €22½ billion on balance (2013: €7½ billion). This indicates that Germany remains an attractive corporate investment location for foreign investors.

Foreign holding companies active in Germany

Companies from Europe, in particular, reduced their investment in German affiliated enterprises, while investors from North America and Asia expanded their foreign equity investments. The decline in direct investment from the rest of Europe was largely due to the repayment of intra-group loans at a Dutch parent company. Holding companies were very active in terms of expanding equity capital in Germany, whereas foreign investors from the financial sector withdrew capital.

Other investment

Other investment showing net capital exports

Other investment, which comprises loans and trade credits (where these are not allocatable to direct investment) as well as bank deposits and other assets, again showed net capital exports amounting to €3½ billion in 2014. Both non-banks and the banking system recorded limited outflows of funds.

Small capital outflows from non-banks …

Over the year, countervailing transactions by non-banks roughly balanced each other out in net terms (net capital exports of €1 billion). In this context, government transactions resulted in net capital exports (€19½ billion). Government entities increased their short-term foreign bank deposits abroad (€12 billion) while simul-

Recording euro currency in the balance of payments and the international investment position

Up until now, shortcomings in statistical capabilities have prevented cross-border cash transactions and their offsetting entries from being recorded in the balance of payments (and in the international investment position, or IIP). These transactions include cash taken by seasonal and foreign workers to their home countries and capital transactions settled in cash. Cash travel expenditure by German residents and shipments of euro banknotes abroad by the Bundesbank or German credit institutions used to be given special treatment. Although statistical data were available for both these variables, only one accounting entry used to be made, either in the services sub-account or in the "Other investment" item under external assets held by the domestic banking system.[1] A matching offsetting entry on the liabilities side of the Bundesbank's balance sheet (to depict the corresponding outflows of banknotes) was not recorded because these outflows would have provided a distorted picture of the overall impact of aggregate cross-border cash transactions over a longer-term horizon. Instead, they were recorded under the "Net errors and omissions" item.

However, cash outflows attributable to travel and shipments of euro banknotes have been exceptionally strong since the introduction of the euro, with an aggregate of €357½ billion, or just over 70% of the Bundesbank's total net issuance, having since migrated abroad. The cumulative net effect of travel-related cross-border cash transactions is estimated at €201 billion. On top of that, euro banknote shipments have amounted to a cumulative €156 billion since January 2002. The bulk of this figure – just under 75% – is likely to have made its way directly to countries outside the European monetary union, while just over a quarter ended up in other euro-area countries.

The scale and persistence of cash outflows were thus one of the factors behind the systemically positive "errors and omissions" which have been evident hitherto in Germany's balance of payments. These amounted to an aggregate €247½ billion (prior to the recording of euro currency) between January 2002 and year-end 2014.

There are several reasons why the statistical records are now being adapted. The primary objective is to enhance the comparability of the statistical results provided by the different macrostatistical accounts at both the national and international level. As a case in point, Germany's financial accounts already take account of these transactions, as do some of the balance of payments statistics recorded by other euro-area countries, either because it was an ECB requirement or because it appeared worthwhile from a national perspective. Another contributory factor from a German vantage point is the fact that the systematically positive "errors and omissions" were making it increasingly difficult to interpret the statistical output. Additionally, it became increasingly clear in the meantime that the above sources of information could be used to implement a process that was suited to producing statistical data and which was also capable of painting a robust picture of foreign demand for euro currency[2] over a longer-term horizon, too.[3]

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1 Cash (and aggregate) travel expenditure abroad by residents is captured for both the rest of the euro area and for countries outside the European monetary union (EMU) by a household survey which the Bundesbank conducts as part of its balance of payments statistics. Furthermore, there are statistical sources that record shipments of euro banknotes by domestic credit institutions or by the Bundesbank to foreign banks. See also Deutsche Bundesbank, Recording cross-border cash transactions in the balance of payments, Monthly Report, March 2005, p 37.

2 Total cash outflows would comprise both banknotes and coins. However, foreign demand for German-issued euro coins cannot be captured statistically, and its value is negligible relative to that of the banknotes in circulation. Hence, any external liabilities the German government may have in its capacity as an issuer of euro coins are not recorded as a separate item.

3 See also Deutsche Bundesbank, Foreign demand for euro banknotes issued in Germany, Monthly Report, January 2011, pp 29-41. It should be noted, by way of explanation, that the term "foreign demand" means the net issues which have migrated abroad; these issues are not, however, necessarily still in circulation abroad because other euro-area central banks may have taken them out of circulation in the meantime.

Euro currency in the balance of payments and the international investment position

€ billion

1 Includes external liabilities resulting from cash issuance.

Deutsche Bundesbank

The starting point for estimating cross-border cash transactions is the aforementioned set of statistics on travel and banknote shipments. The travel survey conducted on the Bundesbank's behalf also provides data on cash expenditure abroad by German business and holiday travellers in euro currency. By applying the share of cash transactions observed for residents (which can be extracted from these data) to German travel receipts as well, it is possible to estimate a net outflow of cash from the travel account. A figure for net banknote shipments, meanwhile, can be obtained directly from the Bundesbank's surveys. Both components amount, on aggregate, to a net outflow of cash, which is captured for the respective reporting period in the balance of payments.[4] By adding up these flows over time, it is possible to calculate the total value of euro currency that has migrated abroad, on balance, since the beginning of 2002. This is the figure of €357½ billion mentioned earlier in this box, which is recorded as additional external liabilities of the Bundesbank in the IIP.[5]

The statistical recording of cross-border cash transactions is also closely related to the treatment of the items concerning banknotes in circulation in the Bundesbank's balance sheet, which takes account of the particular features of the European monetary union in terms of the issuance of banknotes within the Eurosystem.[6]

A distinction is made in the balance sheet between the banknotes in circulation[7] – as per the banknote allocation key – and the liabilities resulting from the distribution of the euro banknotes in circulation within the Eurosystem.[8] Hence, the external statistics for Germany need to record the following items.

– In Germany, the (estimated) volume of banknotes in circulation domestically is lower than the volume of banknotes in circulation as per the allocation key (€240½ billion).[9] At year-end 2014, the difference thus represents foreign demand for banknotes issued in Germany (€89½ billion), which the Bundesbank

4 Specifically, it is captured under "Other investment" liabilities of the Bundesbank, in the currency and deposits item.
5 This item was first recognised in the IIP at the end of March 2015, when the statistical data as at the end of the fourth quarter of 2014 were published.
6 As a general rule, banknotes represent a liability for the central bank that issues them. In the European monetary union, euro banknotes are brought into circulation by the Eurosystem, that is, jointly by the ECB and the national central banks. The resulting liabilities are apportioned to the ECB and the national central banks of the Eurosystem in line with the banknote allocation key.
7 The national liabilities resulting from the banknotes in circulation are calculated for each national central bank by multiplying the banknote allocation key by the total circulation in the euro area. The banknotes in circulation are a variable that is defined by law but is nonetheless designed to reflect realistic economic circumstances.
8 Euro-area countries whose actual net issuance is lower than the volume in circulation as per the allocation key carry a corresponding item on the assets side of their balance sheet. By definition, the offsetting items of all the euro-area countries (including the ECB) balance each other out on aggregate.
9 Domestic circulation is estimated as the difference between net banknote issuance by the Bundesbank and foreign demand calculated as outlined above.

carries in its balance sheet as external liabilities from banknote issuance.

– Overissuance of banknotes: This is calculated as the actual German issuance of banknotes (€508½ billion at year-end 2014), less banknote issuance as per the allocation key. Calculated thus, overissuance amounted to €268 billion. This figure is recognised in the external statistics as external liabilities from deposits by other national central banks with the Bundesbank.

All in all, the aforementioned foreign demand for German banknote issuance at year-end 2014 therefore amounted to €357½ billion (2013: €329 billion). A net capital import of €28 billion is recognised in the balance of payments to reflect the year-on-year increase recorded in 2014.

On the whole, it can be said that incorporating cross-border cash transactions into the statistics has a major impact on the balance of payments and on Germany's external liabilities. It results in additional net capital imports being captured, reduces "errors and omissions" and boosts the analytical value of the balance of payments, besides significantly shrinking Germany's net external position.

There is no doubt that recording cross-border cash transactions in the statistics improves the consistency and international comparability of external statistics. That being said, it is also evident that external statistics are being stretched to their limits in the context of the European monetary union. Economically, the liabilities arising from banknote issuance ought to be allocated to the Eurosystem as a whole; in actual fact, they are apportioned among the individual euro-area countries according to uniform accounting rules, which statisticians are now looking to replicate as closely as possible.

taneously reducing, in particular, their short-term liabilities to foreign creditors (€6 billion). Moreover, the outflows of funds from the cross-sectoral item "other equity" (€6 billion) are mainly attributable to government transactions; this position contains the German government's capital increase in the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). By contrast, transactions by enterprises and households resulted in capital inflows of €19 billion. On the one hand, they reduced their balances with foreign banks (€11½ billion). The reduction in short-term deposits, notably by non-financial corporations, was partly counterbalanced by a smaller expansion in long-term deposits by other financial corporations, in particular. On the other hand, firms and households reduced their long-term loans abroad (€6 billion).

… and the banking system

In the banking system as a whole, the net outflow of funds amounted to €3 billion. Unsecuritised foreign operations of German credit institutions led to significant net capital exports of €44 billion. For the first time since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, they especially expanded their interbank loans to the rest of the world (€84 billion). However, this did not involve an increase in loans to other banks, but rather the provision of funds to their own foreign affiliates in financial centres. Conversely, higher deposits from non-residents at German institutions resulted in an inflow of funds to the banking system (€32½ billion). The capital outflows from credit institutions contrasted with inflows resulting from the decline in the Bundesbank's external position (€41 billion). This was chiefly due to a reduction in claims in the large-value payment system TARGET2 (€49½ billion). This position had already recorded a significant decrease in 2013 (€145½ billion); before this, it had risen for six consecutive years, mainly as a result of the crisis. The change in the TARGET2 position last year reflected the fact that the markets considered the situation in most of the countries strongly affected by the crisis to have improved further;

these countries have evidently become more attractive in the context of investors' increased search for yield.

The Bundesbank's external liabilities also decreased, resulting in a net capital outflow (€9 billion). This was chiefly due to a large withdrawal of deposits from accounts held at the Bundesbank by a non-euro-area central bank. However, this contrasted with inflows of €28 billion arising from cross-border transactions involving euro banknotes. Owing to a lack of reliable data sources, these transactions were not previously recorded in the balance of payments; more recent estimates now make it possible for figures to be recorded retroactively for the period since the introduction of euro banknotes and coins in 2002.[11]

Reserve assets

Transaction-related changes in the reserve assets are shown as a separate item in the balance of payments. In 2014, they fell by €2½ billion owing to a decrease in the reserve position with the IMF and in the foreign reserves.

Transactions cause decline in reserve assets

The international reserve holdings were also influenced by balance sheet adjustments which, in line with internationally agreed accounting standards, are not recognised in the balance of payments. The end-of-year revaluation of the reserve assets at market prices resulted in a rise of €17½ billion in 2014, primarily as the result of valuation gains arising from the appreciation of the US dollar. These were reflected not only by exchange rate-related gains in the foreign reserves, but also by a clear upward valuation of the gold holdings. All in all, Germany's reserve assets rose by €15 billion in balance sheet terms in 2014; at the cut-off date of 31 December 2014, they amounted to €158½ billion.

However, balance-sheet adjustments had a positive impact on reserve assets

11 See box on pp 91-93.

Securities holdings statistics for analysing holdings of securities in Germany and Europe: methodology and results

The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in autumn 2008 made it clear that detailed information on what investors hold which securities, by whom they are issued and in what volume is vital for fulfilling the tasks of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Eurosystem national central banks. For this reason, in the fourth reporting quarter of 2013, securities holdings statistics were introduced across Europe; the national central banks submit these statistics on a security-by-security basis to the Securities Holdings Statistics Database, which is jointly operated by the Bundesbank and the ECB. These statistics comprise holdings of debt securities, shares and investment fund shares. On the one hand, sectoral data are recorded, with the securities holdings being broken down by economic sector and the investor's country of origin. This focuses on the securities of euro-area investors and paper issued by residents and held by investors outside the Eurosystem. On the other hand, the group data capture the own holdings of the largest banking groups in the euro area.

The Bundesbank's securities holdings statistics form the basis of the German contribution to the Securities Holdings Statistics Database. To compile these statistics, the Bundesbank collects group data from large German banking groups as well as sectoral data from all financial institutions domiciled in Germany. As the sectoral data have been available on a security-by-security basis since the end of 2005, it is already possible at present to conduct in-depth analyses and research projects on the scale and structure of securities holdings in Germany. This makes it possible to investigate the developments in securities holdings since the outbreak of the global financial crisis. The data furthermore provide information about the distribution of the volume of securities held in Germany among the various groups of investors. In addition, derived flow variables can be used to assess to what extent changes in holdings based on market prices are due to the securities transactions of individual groups of investors or to other developments such as price adjustments.

The introduction of harmonised securities holdings statistics and uniform processes for compiling data for the Securities Holdings Statistics Database at the European level further improves the comparability, quality and completeness of data. The information from across Europe allows a variety of flexible analyses to be conducted, in particular for risk-prone segments of the European financial system. The symmetrical access of the entire Eurosystem to all data is a significant factor as it ensures a uniform information base for decision-making processes of the European committees. Future developments in the securities holdings statistics of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) are closely linked to the provision of microdata for other statistical fields. For example, an expansion of group data is currently under consideration to enable securities holdings micro data to be analysed in connection with the granular information from the planned European credit register.

Subject matter and purpose of the German and European securities holdings statistics

Developments in securities holdings statistics

With its securities holdings statistics (formerly known as securities deposit statistics), the Bundesbank has been collecting data on securities holdings of financial institutions in Germany since 1962. The statistics were initially collected annually and comprised a limited quantity of aggregated data. Due to the growing importance of securities data for responding to monetary policy as well as micro and macroprudential issues, the statistics on securities holdings have been gradually expanded over the years. Since 2013, the data are collected on a monthly basis and, as the German contribution, are fed into the euro area's Securities Holdings Statistics Database. This database contains all the security holdings information supplied by central banks in the ESCB.

Legal principles and purpose of the collection

To ensure uniform statistical concepts and, thus, comparable security holdings data, Regulation ECB/2012/24 was adopted in conjunction with Guideline ECB/2013/7,[1] stating that the reporting scheme for securities holdings statistics in the euro area comprises the holdings of debt securities, listed shares and investment fund shares or units.[2] All holdings data are generally granular, which means that they are made available on a security-by-security basis. On the one hand, securities holdings are broken down by economic sectors in line with ESA 2010, and by the investors' country of origin (sectoral data). On the other hand, the data capture the securities holdings of large banking groups in the euro area (group data).[3] In the latter case, the relevant group parent transmits information on the individual entities' own holdings of securities.[4]

Purpose of securities holdings statistics

Besides the data on holdings of securities sent by the reporting agents, information on issuers, securities and prices made available through the Centralised Securities Database of the ESCB is also used to compile both the German and European securities holdings statistics.[5] Linking securities holdings and reference information makes it possible to conduct extensive analyses, including on risks relating to certain securities, issuers, investors, countries or selected currencies.

The securities holdings statistics represent an important source for the financial accounts in capturing the flow of funds in the European economies as well as for the net external position in showing the volume and structure of external assets and liabilities. The data are, moreover, used for the public finance statistics, which form the basis for calculating European countries' Maastricht debt level. In addition, the International Monetary Fund uses securities holdings data as part of the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey in order to close information gaps in cross-border securities transactions and holdings.

High investment volumes and complexity in securities markets

Demand for detailed information on securities holdings has remained at a high level since the onset of the global financial and sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. The large number and increased complexity of financial products on offer, the higher volume of investment in the securities markets as well as the impact of monetary and financial policy measures are reflected in the securities holdings statistics. For

1 Regulation ECB/2012/24 concerning statistics on holdings of securities and Guideline ECB/2013/7 concerning statistics on holdings of securities were published in the Official Journal of the European Communities on 1 November 2012 (OJ L 305, p 6) and 7 May 2013 (OJ L 125, p 17) respectively.
2 The term security and the distinctions between the various types of securities are in line with the definitions of the European System of Accounts (ESA) 2010.
3 The banking groups subject to reporting requirements are selected on the basis of the consolidated balance sheet totals pursuant to ECB guidelines on the transmission of consolidated banking data in banking supervision (see S Borgioli, A C Gouveia und C Labanca (2013), Financial Stability Analysis, Insights Gained from Consolidated Banking Data for the EU, ECB Occasional Paper Series No 140).
4 A banking group within the meaning of these statistics comprises the parent institution, ie a credit institution or a financial holding company, as well as all associated financial subsidiaries and branches which do not constitute insurance corporations. The basis of consolidation was determined in line with prudential supervisory regulations (see Directive 2006/48/EC).
5 See ECB, The Centralised Securities Database in Brief, February 2010.

Securities holdings statistics for Germany and Europe

Type of securities holdings statistics (on a security-by-security basis)	Sectoral data (by economic sector and the investors' country of origin)		Group data (Own holdings of large banking groups by individual entities)	
	Securities holdings statistics (Germany)	Securities Holdings Statistics Database (Europe)	Securities holdings statistics (Germany)	Securities Holdings Statistics Database (Europe)
Data recorded from reporting date	December 2005	December 2013	December 2013	December 2013
Frequency	Quarterly up to December 2012 reporting date; monthly since January 2013	Quarterly	Monthly	Quarterly
Coverage (2014 Q2)	Complete survey	Complete survey	7 groups	25 groups

Sources: Deutsche Bundesbank securities holdings statistics and the Securities Holdings Statistics Database.
Deutsche Bundesbank

example, the sectoral data in the Securities Holdings Statistics Database for euro-area investors contained around 0.6 million different securities as of the second quarter of 2014. Besides traditional financial products, such as shares and bonds, investors have been increasingly focusing on hybrid forms of investment and structured products such as asset-backed securities and contingent convertible bonds. At the European level, the sectoral data for the second quarter of 2014 show the holdings of residents of the respective euro-area countries reaching a total amount of €23,352 billion at market prices.[6]

Closing information gaps through the collection of statistics on a security-by-security basis

Limitations of aggregated information

Depending on the question to be studied, either aggregated or granular data can basically be suitable. Aggregates are often used to reduce complexity and to gain an overview by summarising detailed information. For example, it may be helpful to analyse the German stock index (DAX) in order to estimate market trends rather than looking at the individual company figures it contains. Yet, the higher each level of aggregation is, the more information is lost, which is not always desirable. However, to perform their functions, it is vital for the central banks in Europe and the ECB to be able to draw on data of a high statistical standard which are as free as possible of information gaps.

Changeover to granular data

The rapid technological progress of recent years in the area of information technology has opened up the possibility of large volumes of data being saved, prepared and flexibly analysed within a short space of time. This created an environment in which the European central banks and the ECB were able to replace aggregate information gathered with granular data based on individual securities and to meet the existing information requirements.

Micro data to meet varying requirements

Detailed micro data are increasingly gaining importance within the ESCB, not least due to the fact that they can be used as a basis for condensing into aggregate data at any time. Aggregates on securities holdings gathered elsewhere can be modelled using the data collected on a security-by-security basis. As a result, the additional collection of aggregate data for the purposes of monetary, currency and financial stability policy as well as for banking

6 See ECB, Who Holds What? New Information on Securities Holdings, ECB Economic Bulletin Issue 02/2015.

supervision generally no longer appears to be absolutely essential.[7] Moreover, granular securities holdings information makes it possible to respond flexibly to new requirements and, if necessary, to provide individually tailored statistics without having to change the underlying method of data collection. As the reporting procedure does not have to be adapted so often, this ultimately leads to cost savings for the reporting agents.

Detailed data make possible standardised procedures and enhanced quality assurance

The introduction of Europe-wide information on a security-by-security basis brings with it a cross-border standardisation of procedures. For example, data are now condensed centrally according to uniform rules, which has the effect of harmonising statistical aggregates. Furthermore, micro data are useful for data producers as they allow quality checks in greater depth. Also, it is possible to compare total holdings with the corresponding issuance volume on a security-by-security basis, for example to identify and rule out multiple reporting of a single securities holding.[8] A granular database also makes it possible to monitor individual positions over time, which is particularly informative if the relevant aggregates are determined on the basis of micro values.

Calculating transactions from changes in securities holdings

Securities holdings can be analysed over time using both total holdings and securities purchases and sales. Since recording all securities transactions that have actually been carried out would require considerable time and effort, a concept for deriving transactions from changes in securities holdings was developed for the securities holdings statistics. The availability of data on a security-by-security basis means that it is possible to separately calculate the determinants of flows in securities holdings, such as financial transactions and price and exchange rate adjustments. This makes it possible to capture the cumulative securities transactions of a given period with sufficient accuracy (see the box on pages 99 to 101).

Challenges of granular data

The introduction of statistics at the individual security level and the associated increase in the volume of data require investment in adequate information technologies as well as experts with the ability to obtain relevant information from the abundance of data. In addition, the amount of confidential micro data generally increases along with growing granularity. To guarantee data protection and security, the relevant technological and organisational precautions need to be made prior to such data collection.

Results of the securities holdings statistics (sectoral data)

Special features of data collection in Germany

For the statistics on securities holdings, just under 2,000 financial institutions domiciled in Germany report securities holdings for resident and non-resident customers as part of their custody business.[9] In addition, domestic banks provide information about their own holdings, irrespective of the country in which the securities are held. Besides the data to be collected for the Europe-wide Securities Holdings Statistics Database, the German sectoral data on banks' own securities holdings comprise additional information on book values, investment motives and repos. For their customer safe custody accounts, financial institutions also report the total number of securities deposits they manage broken down by the investors' economic sectors.[10]

7 See A L Lorier and F Restoy, Statistics for multi-purpose use: synergies between the central banking and supervisory functions, Seventh ECB Statistics Conference, Towards the Banking Union. Opportunities and challenges for statistics, 15 October 2014, http://www.ecb.int.

8 Multiple reporting of securities holdings can, for example, occur in the context of securities repurchase transactions and lending where a security is temporarily transferred from the original holder (transferor/lender) to a third party (transferee/borrower).

9 Reporting requirements apply to all domestic monetary financial institutions (excluding money market funds), investment companies, such as "other" credit institutions conducting deposit transactions pursuant to section 1 (1) sentence 2 number 5 of the German Banking Act.

10 See Deutsche Bundesbank, Statistics on banks and other financial intermediaries, guidelines, Special Statistical Publication No 1, January 2014, pp 281ff. For up-to-date figures, see Deutsche Bundesbank, Securities holdings statistics, December 2014, http://www.bundesbank.de.

Methodology for deriving transactions from flows in securities holdings on a security-by-security basis

The method which is applied for determining transactions in the securities holdings statistics and in the Securities Holdings Statistics Database is explained below. With this method, flows in securities holdings can be used to approximate the cumulative securities transactions during a given period (eg monthly). The concept is based on ESA 2010 in which the flows are first broken down into their components.

If these principles are applied to individual securities, a flow between two points in time may be the outcome of financial transactions, adjustments in prices and exchange rates, the compound effect or other volume-driven adjustments. The compound effect is a residual resulting from the simultaneous occurrence of adjustments in market prices and exchange rates and which cannot clearly be ascribed to one of the two causes of adjustment. Other volume-driven adjustments in holdings comprise flows due, say, to reclassifications. This includes changes in the characteristics of the securities (such as a change in the type of security, the currency of issuance or the maturity) as well as in the securities issuers and investors (sector or country of domicile, for example).

In line with this approach, a change in the holdings of an individual security comes about as follows:

$$S_t^{MV€} - S_{t-1}^{MV€} = T_t^{MV€} + O_t^{MV€} + P_t^{MV€} + X_t^{MV€} + comp_t^{MV€} - IN_t^{€},$$

where $S_t^{MV€}$ denotes the securities holdings[1], $T_t^{MV€}$ the financial transaction, $O_t^{MV€}$ the other volume-driven adjustment, $P_t^{MV€}$ the price adjustment $X_t^{MV€}$ the exchange rate adjustment, $comp_t^{MV€}$ the compound effect and $IN_t^{€}$ the interest income, all valued at market prices (MV) and denominated in euro at time t.

While the nominal change in holdings $(S_t^{NV} - S_{t-1}^{NV})$ reflects the nominal transaction $T_t^{NV€}$ plus the other nominal volume-

1 In the case of bonds with changes in nominal value over time, such as redemption bonds, a pool factor has also to be taken into account. To improve readability, we forgo the corresponding formal representation at this point.

Decomposition of flows with reference to ESA 2010



Source: Bundesbank chart based on ESA 2010.
Deutsche Bundesbank

driven adjustment, additional components for the price and exchange rate adjustments as well as the compound effect are needed for the analysis of a market-price-related flow in holdings. The securities holdings can be valued at market prices using either the clean price (p_t^c) or the dirty price (p_t^d). The difference between the two variables is explained by the differing treatment of the accrued interest ai_t during the period, where $p_t^d = p_t^c + ai_t$ applies.

The securities holdings are generally valued at the clean price. However, the financial transaction is calculated including interest accrued during the relevant period. Consequently, the sum of the individual flow components would be greater than the difference in the holdings based on market prices. In order to obtain correct results, the interest income relevant to fixed-income securities $IN_t^{€}$ (ie the accrued interest contained in the financial transaction) has to be subtracted as a further component.

As it is not known at what point in time a transaction has taken place or whether intra-period transactions were carried out, the net transaction is valued at average prices $\overline{p}_t$ and exchange rates $\overline{x}_t$.

The financial transaction valued at market prices $T_t^{MV€}$ can be calculated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} T_t^{MV€} &= T_t^{NV€} \cdot \overline{p}_t + IN_t^{€} \\ &= (S_t^{NV} - S_{t-1}^{NV} - O_t^{NV}) \cdot \overline{x}_t \cdot \overline{p}_t + IN_t^{€}, \end{aligned}$$

with $\overline{p}_t = \frac{p_{t-1}^c + p_t^c}{2}$ and $\overline{x}_t = \frac{x_{t-1} + x_t}{2}$ as the average price and exchange rate at time t.

The other volume-driven adjustment $O_t^{MV€}$ may be valued as follows:

$O_t^{MV€} = O_t^{NV} \cdot x_t \cdot p_t^c$ with x_t as the exchange rate at time t.

$P_t^{MV€}$ takes account of the impact which adjustments in the price of the security have on the final holdings based on market prices, with the exchange rate being kept constant:

$$P_t^{MV€} = S_{t-1}^{NV} \cdot p_{t-1}^c \cdot x_{t-1} \cdot \left(\frac{p_t^c}{p_{t-1}^c} - 1 \right) + T_t^{MV€} \cdot \left(\frac{p_t^c}{\overline{p}_t} - 1 \right).$$

The first summand measures the valuation adjustment that is to be ascribed to the original holdings S_{t-1}^{NV}. The second summand explains the share of the price change that is caused by the transaction. In other words, this represents the new valuation/deflation of the security between the purchase/sale price and the end of the period. To do this, the current market price is set in relation to the average market price at which the transaction is valued.

The impact of fluctuating exchange rates is captured by the adjustment in the exchange rate $X_t^{MV€}$, with the price being kept constant:

$$X_t^{MV€} = S_{t-1}^{NV} \cdot p_{t-1}^c \cdot x_{t-1} \cdot \left(\frac{x_t}{x_{t-1}} - 1 \right) + T_t^{MV€} \cdot \left(\frac{x_t}{\overline{x}_t} - 1 \right).$$

The first summand measures the valuation adjustment that is to be ascribed to the original holdings S_{t-1}^{NV}. The second summand explains the share of the exchange rate adjustment that is due to the transaction, ie the difference between the average exchange rate at which the transaction is valued and the exchange rate at the end of the period.

If the transaction component $T_t^{MV€}$ is subtracted from the difference in the holdings based on market prices, there remains a variable which comprises all non-

transaction-related flows and which is designated at this point as the adjustment component:

$$ADJ_t^{MV€} = \left(S_t^{MV€} - S_{t-1}^{MV€}\right) - T_t^{MV€}.$$

It should be noted that, owing to the compound effect, the price adjustment, the exchange rate adjustment and the other volume-driven adjustment do not add up to the adjustment component. The following relationship holds:

$$ADJ_t^{MV€} = P_t^{MV€} + X_t^{MV€} + O_t^{MV€} + comp_t^{MV€}.$$

The following thus results for the compound effect:

$$comp_t^{MV€} = S_{t-1}^{NV} \cdot (x_t - x_{t-1}) \cdot (p_t^c - p_{t-1}^c) + T_t^{MV€} \cdot \frac{(x_t - \overline{x}_t) \cdot (p_t^c - \overline{p}_t)}{\overline{x}_t \cdot \overline{p}_t}.$$

The compound effect is equal to zero only when either no exchange rate adjustment or no price adjustment takes place.

Together, the components calculated in this way give the flow in holdings between two points in time.

Developments in securities holdings at market value by security types

The sectoral data serve as a basis for a range of analyses on the scope and structure of securities holdings in Germany. In this way, annual developments in securities holdings at market values can, for example, be examined for the various types of securities over the past eight years, ie including since the outbreak of the global financial and sovereign debt crisis in the euro area.

High correlation between investment volumes of listed shares and market price movements

When the global crisis broke out, the market value of the total volume of listed share holdings initially plummeted (-41%) and then recovered only slowly up to the end of 2010 – without, however, returning to the original value – before hitting a further low in December 2011. Nevertheless, at the end of November 2014, holdings reached market values that were higher than shortly before the financial crisis.[11] The movements of all listed share holdings essentially reflect developments in the DAX during the same period.[12]

Sharp rise in the volume of investment fund shares

Viewed over time, however, investment fund shares held in Germany moved in parallel to but with a slight lag behind listed shares. The relevant volumes have been above those of listed shares since December 2008, thus representing the second largest item among the categories of securities analysed. While holdings of listed shares returned to their level of December 2007 in terms of their market value, the volumes of investment fund shares based on market values increased on a scale (48%) unmatched by any other category of securities.

11 For further details, see Deutsche Bundesbank, Ownership structure in the German equity market: general trends and changes in the financial crisis, Monthly Report September 2014, pp 19-32.

12 Developments in the market value of total holdings of listed shares reported in Germany (currently around 27,000 national and international securities, including participation certificates) indicate a high correlation with developments in the corresponding DAX 30 securities volume, with an average of 54% of listed share holdings being attributable to DAX 30 values between December 2007 and November 2014.

Holdings in Germany by categories of securities

Holdings at year-end at market value in € billion, log scale



Deutsche Bundesbank

Diverging developments in holdings of short and long-term bonds

Developments in the volumes of short and long-term debt securities produce a mixed picture. Based on market values, holdings of the largest type of security under consideration – long-term debt securities with a maturity of more than one year – are characterised by largely stable growth. With the exception of a marked decline in December 2011, the volume of holdings based on market values rose by around 21% between December 2007 and the end of November 2014, with annual average growth of just under 3%. By contrast, following an initial steady rise, holdings of short-term debt securities with a maturity of up to one year peaked at the end of 2009. Thereafter they declined significantly, with the maximum volume of holdings recorded in December 2009 having already halved in December 2011.

Breakdown of securities holdings by investor group

Holdings of securities in Germany can also be analysed according to various groups of investors. For this purpose, domestic investors are broken down below into non-financial corporations, monetary financial institutions (banks), institutional investors,[13] general government (comprising central, state and local government and social security funds) and households (including non-profit institutions serving households), while foreign investors are combined to form a single investor group.[14]

Foreign investors form largest investor group

The volume of securities holdings in Germany calculated on the basis of market prices as at November 2014 totalled €8,914 billion, almost two-thirds of which are held by domestic investors, with the remaining 37% (€3,277 billion) of total holdings being owned by foreign investors. Institutional investors, especially investment funds, are the main domestic holders of securities, with a share of 28% (€2,509 billion). Monetary financial institutions form the second-largest domestic investor group, with their own holdings accounting for just under one-fifth (€1,544 billion) of the total volume. The banking sector's share thus roughly corresponds to the combined share of the next two largest sectors: households (€944 billion) and non-financial corporations (€479 billion). The general government sector is the smallest investor group; their securities holdings amount to around 2% (€161 billion) of the total volume.

Distribution of securities volume by type of security and investor group

While listed shares play an important role in foreign investors', non-financial corporations', institutional investors' and households' holdings of securities in Germany, they are of less

13 In this context, institutional investors comprise insurance corporations and pension funds, investment and money market funds and other financial intermediaries.
14 Foreign investors are predominantly banks and central securities depositories which hold securities for foreign institutional investors at German financial institutions.

Securities holdings in Germany according to investor group

Holdings at market value, € billion, as at November 2014



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significance in the portfolios of monetary financial institutions and general government. For the latter sectors, long-term debt securities, in particular, predominate.[15] Investment fund shares are primarily held by institutional investors, followed by households as the second-largest group of investors. Viewed in absolute terms, given the current low-interest-rate environment, short-term debt securities and money market fund shares play a fairly minor role in the safe custody accounts of the investor groups as a whole. The comparatively high percentage of holdings of listed shares in the portfolios of non-financial corporations (61%) can mainly be explained by strategic investment, as they are often participating interests in affiliated enterprises within a group. Long-term debt securities account for just under 85% of the holdings of monetary financial institutions. These largely comprise domestic and foreign bank debt securities as well as government bonds, most of which were issued abroad.[16]

Decline in transactions currently being offset by price increases

The breakdown of securities holdings by investor group makes possible a variety of analyses. If financial transactions and other changes in the volume of assets are derived statistically from the flows in securities holdings (see the box on pages 99 to 101), it is possible to study the trading activities of individual investor groups, for example. Looking at the components of the flows based on market values between October and November 2014 across all securities categories, highlights the fact that, alongside financial transactions, the price effect is of major significance. While households, monetary financial institutions and general government top up their securities portfolios on the whole, sales of securities predominate in the case of non-financial corporations, institutional investors and foreign investors. Owing to the price effect, which reflects the positive market developments in late autumn, the securities holdings of all investor groups show an increase, however.

Selected research projects on investment behaviour

In recent years, the availability of data on a security-by-security basis has resulted in a range of research projects drawing on sectoral data from the Bundesbank's securities holdings statistics. In a recent paper, Buch, Koetter and Ohls, for example, examine the relationship between German banks' investment in government bonds and these institutions' risk profile. They furthermore examine to what extent

15 Further studies also show that foreign investors constitute the largest group of creditors of long-term debt securities.

16 In principle, in terms of their chronology all securities holdings can additionally be broken down by economic sector or country of origin of the respective issuer. A detailed presentation of this would go beyond the scope of this article.

Securities holdings according to category of investor and security

Holdings at market value, € billion, November 2014

Investor group	Short-term debt securities	Long-term debt securities	Listed shares	Money market fund shares	Investment fund shares	Total
Households	3.1	197.4	247.4	4.1	492.0	944.1
Non-financial corporations	6.7	45.5	290.2	1.3	135.4	479.0
Monetary financial institutions	21.6	1,303.3	61.1	0.2	157.5	1,543.6
Foreign investors	81.7	2,027.1	881.1	4.9	282.2	3,277.1
Institutional investors	8.4	1,088.8	333.5	2.2	1,075.7	2,508.7
General government	0.2	125.0	19.9	0.1	16.0	161.2
Total	121.7	4,787.1	1,833.2	12.8	2,158.8	8,913.7

Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Securities holdings statistics.
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these banks have adjusted their share of government bonds in the wake of the global financial crisis. The analysis shows that, between 2005 and 2010, numerous banks did not hold any government bonds, that institutions investing in them showed a fluctuating degree of diversification, and that, since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, banks have been increasingly taking macroeconomic factors into account when making investment decisions.[17]

Fecht, Hackethal and Karabulut examine the business policy of universal banks in retail banking. They find that the institutions systematically sell shares from their own trading portfolio to their customers, and that the returns on these securities that they have passed on are lower than those on the other shares in their own portfolio and also lower than the returns on other shares in their private customers' holdings.[18]

In another study, Kick, Onali, Ruprecht and Schaeck investigate to what extent households and non-financial corporations reshuffle their securities portfolios as a result of macroeconomic wealth shocks and microeconomic supply shocks. Their results show that, given losses in securities investments, it is households in particular which – having invested a large percentage of their funds in government bonds of crisis-hit European countries – change the composition of their portfolios. If there is a reduction in the supply of credit, both households and non-financial corporations decrease their portfolio concentration.[19]

Baltzer, Stolper and Walter study the geographical composition of households' holdings of shares. They find that the securities of local public limited companies account for a higher share in the portfolio of households than would be recommendable on the basis of an optimal diversification strategy. This phenomenon of local bias is observed by the authors across national borders.[20]

In a recently published study, Baltzer, Jank and Smajlbegovic analyse the trading behaviour of various investor groups on the German stock market. They focus on the momentum effect,

17 See C M Buch, M Koetter and J Ohls, Banks and Sovereign Risk: A Granular View, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, No 29/2013.
18 See F Fecht, A Hackethal and Y Karabulut, Is Proprietary Trading Detrimental to Retail Investors?, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, No 42/2013.
19 See T Kick, E Onali, B Ruprecht and K Schaeck, Wealth Shocks, Credit-Supply Shocks, and Asset Allocation: Evidence from Household and Firm Portfolios, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, No 07/2014.
20 See M Baltzer, O Stolper and A Walter, Is Local Bias a Cross-Border Phenomenon? Evidence from Individual Investors' International Asset Allocation, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, No 18/2013.

which states that shares that performed well in the past will continue to deliver above-average returns, whereas shares that have performed poorly hitherto will also underperform the market in the future. They show that it is mainly foreign institutional investors and domestic financial investors that pursue a momentum strategy, whereas domestic households act as a contrarian.[21]

Finally, Craig, Gorenflo, Kremer and Paterlini study the interconnectedness of the German banking sector using mutual equity participations. They show that the network structure between banks in Germany diverges from theory-based optimal networks. Future analyses will focus on the development of an early warning indicator for financial market stability as well as determining a robust network structure.[22]

Data collected across Europe for the Securities Holdings Statistics Database

Introduction of harmonised securities holdings data in the ESCB

The ESCB's Centralised Securities Database has been providing price and reference data since 2005, in particular for securities which are issued or held by residents of the European Union and for securities denominated in euro. Corresponding information on securities holdings was not collected initially. This led to an advisory group being set up in 2008 to examine the need for European microdata on securities holdings and the practicability of the requirements. The results of this initiative formed the basis for the design of the standardised reporting scheme used for the Securities Holdings Statistics Database.[23] In the field of sectoral data, this mainly comprises holdings of securities by euro-area investors and securities issued by residents and held by non-euro area investors.[24] The group data currently contain information on the global own holdings of the 25 largest banking groups in the euro area.

Changes in securities holdings according to investor group

Calculations at market values, € billion,
November 2014 compared with previous month

Investor group	Changes in holdings	Transactions	Price effects	Other effects[1]
Households	24.4	4.6	20.2	– 0.4
Non-financial corporations	9.7	– 6.2	16.1	– 0.2
Monetary financial institutions	18.9	11.0	9.2	– 1.3
Foreign investors	54.2	– 16.9	73.8	– 2.7
Institutional investors	56.3	– 40.3	98.6	– 2.0
General government	4.1	2.4	1.9	– 0.2

Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Securities holdings statistics. **1** Other effects comprise changes in holdings due to exchange rate and compound effects, other changes in volume and accrued interest.

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Quarterly data compilation and preparation of statistical results

Since the fourth reporting quarter of 2013, 25 European central banks have been submitting harmonised information on securities holdings to the Securities Holdings Statistics Database. This is a data production and analysis system for securities holdings operated jointly by the Bundesbank and the ECB on a quarterly basis. The Bundesbank receives information from across Europe, links the transmitted data to the harmonised price and reference data of the Centralised Securities Database, carries out a data quality control and performs calculations on a security-by-security basis, such as the calculation of flows, for example. The ECB then takes over the granular data in order to prepare standardised or individually processed European statistical results for the various tasks of the ESCB. Under certain conditions, data requirements which go beyond those of the

21 See M Baltzer, S Jank and E Smajlbegovic, Who Trades on Momentum?, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, No 42/2014.
22 See B Craig, M Gorenflo, P Kremer and S Paterlini, Understanding Banking Networks from Optimal Portfolio Choices, Extended Research Proposal Presented at Computational and Financial Econometrics/European Research Consortium for Informatics and Mathematics in Pisa, 8 December 2014.
23 See P Bull (2013), ECB, Statistics for Economic and Monetary Union, Enhancements and New Directions, pp 76-79.
24 In addition, most non-euro area EU countries provide national contributions to the sectoral data on a voluntary basis. See ECB, Who Holds What? New Information on Securities Holdings, ECB Economic Bulletin Issue 02/2015.

German contribution to European security holdings data broken down by investor group

Holdings at market value in € billion, 2014 Q2, securities holdings of investors domiciled in the euro area

Investor group	Total	German contribution for domestic investors
Financial sectors in the euro area	18,316	3,849
Monetary financial institutions	6,152	1,451
Institutional investors[1]	12,164	2,398
Non-financial sectors in the euro area	5,036	1,574
Non-financial corporations	1,434	473
General government	746	157
Households	2,856	944
Total	23,352	5,423

Sources: Securities Holdings Statistics Database (see ECB, Who Holds What? New information on Securities Holdings, ECB Economic Bulletin Issue 2/2015). **1** In this instance, institutional investors comprise insurance corporations and pension funds, investment funds excluding money market funds and other financial institutions.
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ESCB can be met, for example for the European Systemic Risk Board, European supervisory authorities, the European Commission and international organisations (such as the International Monetary Fund and the Bank for International Settlements).

Uniform rules for submission of national contributions

In order to guarantee complete and non-overlapping statistics on European securities holdings, the national central banks provide information in accordance with harmonised requirements. For example, information available in the individual countries cannot be readily merged, which poses a challenge for the sectoral data. Securities owned by French banks and held in safe custody at German institutions may be recorded both indirectly (in the securities holdings statistics) and directly at the investor (in the statistics of the Banque de France). To rule out double-counting and, at the same time, to provide a largely complete overview of the European securities holdings structures, data reported directly are first collected in the Securities Holdings Statistics Database and the remaining data gaps are then closed using information that has been collected indirectly. In the case of Germany, for example, banks and investment funds have so far submitted direct reports of their securities holdings; in all other sectors, such as insurance corporations and pension funds, non-financial corporations, general government and households, data are collected indirectly through custodian banks.

Share of securities holdings statistics in sectoral data across Europe

A study of European sectoral data for the second quarter of 2014[25] shows a market value of €23,352 billion for the total security holdings of investors resident in the euro area. The German contribution for domestic investors amounts to €5,423 billion.[26] A breakdown of securities holdings by investor group into financial and non-financial sectors reveals that the share of the financial sector clearly predominates at more than 78% at the European level and 71% in Germany.

Additional benefit of European securities holdings statistics

The standardisation of the reporting and submission schemes and the uniform compilation procedures of the Securities Holdings Statistics Database ensure a high degree of comparability in European statistics. In addition, data quality is improved by merging information at the European level, as enhanced checks can be carried out, which are not possible with purely na-

25 As this report went to press, the European sector data were available only up to the second quarter of 2014; this is therefore the observation period that has been examined here.
26 In comparison, the sectoral data of the securities holdings statistics record a total stock of securities held by both residents and non-residents of €8,681.1 billion for the second quarter of 2014.

tional datasets. The higher degree of coverage provided by European securities holdings statistics, in particular for indirectly collected sectoral data, is also of great significance. In this way, the collection of data by other central banks, for example in Belgium, Luxembourg or the Netherlands, can close data gaps for securities held by German non-financial corporations and households in other European countries.

The Securities Holdings Statistics Database allows a wide range of flexible analyses across Europe in strategically important and especially risky segments of the money and capital markets. For example, linking securities issued and held in the "who-to-whom" analyses provides detailed insights into the structure of securities holdings in the euro area and thus into relationships and dependencies in the European financial system. Symmetrical access by the entire Eurosystem to all European securities holdings data ultimately ensures a uniform information base for decision-making processes on the European committees.

Outlook for the development of granular securities holdings statistics

Planned enhancement of securities holdings statistics

The planned enhancement of securities holdings statistics in the ESCB is closely connected with the availability of other microdata. In future, corporate data will be provided through the Register of Institutions and Affiliates Database, for example, which allows additional analyses on issuers and investors; the Analytical Credit Dataset will create a European database system that provides a detailed picture of lending and borrowing.[27] Connecting the information on individual loans gained in this way with the granular securities data that become available will allow banking supervisors to identify debtors' overall risks, for example. In order to ensure that loan and individual securities holdings data can be analysed together in future, consideration is currently being given at the European level to expanding the reporting scheme for the group data of the securities holdings statistics and thus for securities holdings statistics for Germany.

Potential of ESCB microdata

With the ongoing broadening of the micro database, the collection and application of statistical data in the ESCB will continue to change. Granular information can be collected once, stored centrally and used for various purposes,[28] irrespective of the statistical results to be compiled, following standardised procedures across Europe. As a rule, it is possible to use information that is already available, which means that new requirements can be implemented flexibly and within a narrow time frame. For a large number of users, the introduction of harmonised microdata throughout Europe opens up the prospect of new analytical options and research perspectives.

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27 See P Bull (2013), ECB, Statistics for Economic and Monetary Union, Enhancements and New Directions, pp 183-190; and the ECB Decision on the organisation of preparatory measures for the collection of granular credit data by the European System of Central Banks (ECB/2014/6), http://eur-lex.europa.eu.

28 An ESCB statistics group is currently working together with the European Reporting Framework to develop conceptual preconditions for a more strongly integrated granular reporting procedure for the collection of statistical and prudential supervisory data.

Statistical Section

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V Minimum reserves

VI Interest rates

VII Insurance corporations and pension funds

VIII Capital market

IX Financial accounts

X Public finances in Germany

XI Economic conditions in Germany

XII External sector

I Key economic data for the euro area

1 Monetary developments and interest rates

	Money stock in various definitions [1,2]				Determinants of the money stock [1]			Interest rates		
			M 3 [3]							
	M1	M2		3-month moving average (centred)	MFI lending, total	MFI lending to enterprises and households	Monetary capital formation [4]	Eonia [5,7]	3-month Euribor [6,7]	Yield on European government bonds outstanding [8]
Period	Annual percentage change							% Annual percentage as a monthly average		
2013 May	8.3	4.6	2.8	2.8	0.2	– 0.6	– 1.0	0.08	0.20	2.6
June	7.5	4.3	2.4	2.5	0.1	– 0.6	– 1.0	0.09	0.21	3.0
July	7.1	4.1	2.1	2.3	– 0.4	– 1.1	– 1.0	0.09	0.22	3.0
Aug	6.7	4.0	2.2	2.1	– 0.3	– 0.9	– 1.2	0.08	0.23	3.0
Sep	6.6	3.8	2.0	1.9	– 0.7	– 1.0	– 1.3	0.08	0.22	3.1
Oct	6.5	3.2	1.4	1.6	– 0.9	– 1.3	– 0.9	0.09	0.23	2.9
Nov	6.5	3.0	1.5	1.3	– 1.1	– 1.3	– 0.9	0.10	0.22	2.8
Dec	5.7	2.5	1.0	1.2	– 1.8	– 2.0	– 1.2	0.17	0.27	2.9
2014 Jan	6.1	2.4	1.2	1.2	– 1.8	– 2.3	– 1.2	0.20	0.29	2.8
Feb	6.1	2.4	1.3	1.2	– 1.9	– 2.4	– 1.3	0.16	0.29	2.6
Mar	5.6	2.2	1.0	1.1	– 2.1	– 2.5	– 1.0	0.19	0.31	2.5
Apr	5.2	2.0	0.8	1.0	– 2.3	– 2.6	– 1.0	0.25	0.33	2.3
May	5.0	2.1	1.1	1.2	– 2.5	– 2.7	– 1.3	0.25	0.32	2.2
June	5.4	2.4	1.6	1.5	– 2.4	– 2.3	– 1.6	0.08	0.24	2.1
July	5.6	2.5	1.8	1.8	– 1.8	– 1.8	– 1.3	0.04	0.21	1.9
Aug	5.8	2.7	2.0	2.1	– 1.8	– 1.9	– 1.1	0.02	0.19	1.7
Sep	6.2	3.0	2.5	2.3	– 1.6	– 1.9	– 1.1	0.01	0.10	1.6
Oct	6.2	2.7	2.5	2.7	– 1.3	– 1.6	– 1.7	0.00	0.08	1.6
Nov	6.9	3.3	3.1	3.1	– 1.0	– 1.5	– 1.9	– 0.01	0.08	1.5
Dec	7.9	3.6	3.8	3.6	– 0.1	– 0.6	– 2.3	– 0.03	0.08	1.3
2015 Jan	9.0	4.0	4.1	...	0.3	– 0.2	– 2.6	– 0.05	0.06	1.1
Feb	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	– 0.04	0.05	1.0

1 Source: ECB. **2** Seasonally adjusted. **3** Excluding money market fund shares/units, money market paper and debt securities with a maturity of up to two years held by non-euro-area residents. **4** Longer-term liabilities to euro-area non-MFIs. **5** Euro OverNight Index Average. **6** Euro Interbank Offered Rate. **7** See also footnotes to Table VI.4, p 43• **8** GDP-weighted yield on ten-year government bonds. Countries include:DE,FR,NL,BE,AT,FI,IE,PT,ES,IT,GR,SK.

2 External transactions and positions *

	Selected items of the euro-area balance of payments								Euro exchange rates [1]		
	Current account		Financial account							Effective exchange rate [3]	
	Balance	*of which* Goods	Balance	Direct investment	Portfolio investment	Financial derivatives [2]	Other investment	Reserve assets	Dollar rate	Nominal	Real [4]
Period	€ million								1 EUR = ... USD	Q1 1999 = 100	
2013 May	+ 8,840	+ 20,519	+ 5,442	– 46,161	– 37,817	+ 7,785	+ 81,048	+ 586	1.2982	100.6	98.4
June	+ 24,996	+ 20,970	+ 131,331	– 11,310	+ 48,501	– 929	+ 94,397	+ 673	1.3189	101.6	99.3
July	+ 24,223	+ 22,032	+ 23,901	– 7,634	+ 21,254	+ 3,271	+ 7,230	– 220	1.3080	101.6	99.3
Aug	+ 11,317	+ 12,061	+ 37,889	+ 2,939	+ 346	– 4,673	+ 37,251	+ 2,025	1.3310	102.3	99.8
Sep	+ 16,679	+ 15,206	+ 33,738	+ 13,242	+ 8,551	+ 1,909	+ 8,894	+ 1,143	1.3348	102.1	99.4
Oct	+ 23,369	+ 21,258	+ 37,660	– 7,120	+ 182	+ 4,540	+ 40,864	– 807	1.3635	102.9	100.1
Nov	+ 26,478	+ 21,802	+ 31,364	+ 17,655	– 51,535	+ 4,413	+ 60,990	– 159	1.3493	102.7	99.8
Dec	+ 34,501	+ 16,080	+ 100,132	+ 16,722	+ 18,862	+ 3,087	+ 60,091	+ 1,371	1.3704	103.9	101.0
2014 Jan	+ 853	+ 3,875	– 25,110	– 3,875	– 43,314	– 336	+ 19,724	+ 2,692	1.3610	103.5	100.5
Feb	+ 10,675	+ 19,103	+ 7,040	+ 8,027	– 57,132	+ 2,859	+ 53,728	– 442	1.3659	103.6	100.7
Mar	+ 23,654	+ 21,706	+ 78,644	+ 16,890	+ 47,840	+ 2,978	+ 10,682	+ 253	1.3823	104.7	101.6
Apr	+ 15,884	+ 19,226	– 6,350	+ 13,960	+ 25,221	+ 4,731	– 50,657	+ 397	1.3813	104.6	101.3
May	+ 5,967	+ 20,838	+ 9,007	– 3,142	– 60,920	+ 6,510	+ 66,082	+ 476	1.3732	103.9	100.4
June	+ 20,760	+ 20,967	+ 77,080	– 11,924	– 7,361	+ 4,883	+ 91,932	– 451	1.3592	103.1	99.6
July	+ 27,646	+ 25,766	+ 18,507	+ 9,424	+ 14,225	+ 3,204	– 7,696	– 650	1.3539	102.7	99.1
Aug	+ 12,934	+ 11,241	– 920	– 2,479	+ 3,009	+ 3,479	– 6,169	+ 1,240	1.3316	102.0	98.5
Sep	+ 31,658	+ 25,229	+ 51,036	+ 20,704	+ 59,236	+ 9,467	– 36,443	– 1,928	1.2901	100.5	97.0
Oct	+ 29,815	+ 25,447	+ 36,032	+ 946	+ 47,367	+ 651	– 13,936	+ 1,004	1.2673	99.6	96.1
Nov	+ 26,488	+ 22,995	+ 79,480	+ 28,544	+ 11,359	+ 3,384	+ 35,401	+ 791	1.2472	99.6	96.1
Dec	+ 29,181	+ 25,176	+ 23,341	– 8,427	+ 75,637	+ 1,602	– 46,546	+ 1,076	1.2331	99.7	96.0
2015 Jan	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1.1621	95.9	p 92.2
Feb	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1.1350	94.0	p 90.2

***** Source: ECB, according to the international standards of the Balance of Payments Manual in the 6th edition of the International Monetary Fund. **1** See also Tables XII.10 and 12, pp 81–82• **2** Including employee stock options. **3** Vis-à-vis the currencies of The-EER-19 group. **4** By derogation from the standard, the real effective exchange rates of the euro based on consumer price indices are computed for the EMU without Lithuania. The deflator HICP (EMU-19) is not yet available. The Lithuanian litas is included in the basket of partner country currencies.

I Key economic data for the euro area

3 General economic indicators

Period	Euro area	Belgium	Germany	Estonia	Finland	France	Greece	Ireland	Italy	Latvia
Real gross domestic product [1,2,3]										
2012	– 0.8	0.1	0.4	4.7	– 1.4	0.3	– 6.6	– 0.3	– 2.8	4.8
2013	– 0.5	0.3	0.1	1.6	– 1.3	0.3	– 3.9	0.2	– 1.7	4.2
2014	0.9	...	1.6	2.1	– 0.1	0.4	0.8	...	– 0.4	2.4
2013 Q3	– 0.3	0.6	0.8	0.3	– 0.4	0.7	– 2.6	1.8	– 0.9	4.6
Q4	0.4	0.6	1.0	1.7	– 0.1	0.6	– 3.1	– 1.1	– 0.9	4.5
2014 Q1	1.1	1.2	2.6	0.5	0.1	0.7	– 0.5	4.0	– 0.1	2.8
Q2	0.8	1.0	1.0	2.3	– 0.4	0.1	0.4	7.3	– 0.5	2.3
Q3	0.8	1.0	1.2	2.4	0.0	0.3	2.0	3.5	– 0.4	2.4
Q4	0.9	1.0	1.6	3.0	– 0.1	0.4	1.2	...	– 0.6	2.1
Industrial production [1,4]										
2012	– 2.5	– 2.1	– 0.3	1.5	– 1.5	– 2.7	– 2.1	– 1.5	– 6.4	6.2
2013	– 0.7	0.9	0.2	4.2	– 3.4	– 0.6	– 3.2	– 2.2	– 3.1	– 0.4
2014	e 0.6	p 1.0	1.3	2.1	– 2.6	– 1.0	– 2.3	19.9	– 0.7	– 0.9
2013 Q3	– 1.1	0.7	– 0.2	4.2	– 2.5	– 1.6	– 5.4	– 1.6	– 3.6	0.2
Q4	1.5	4.0	3.0	2.1	– 1.5	0.6	– 4.8	– 1.3	– 0.2	– 0.6
2014 Q1	1.3	3.3	3.0	– 1.5	– 4.4	– 0.7	– 2.5	11.9	0.5	– 2.0
Q2	0.9	2.1	1.1	2.3	– 3.5	– 1.8	– 3.1	21.0	0.0	– 0.2
Q3	0.5	0.0	0.7	3.2	– 2.3	0.0	– 3.2	19.1	– 1.8	– 0.8
Q4	e – 0.1	p – 1.2	0.5	4.4	– 0.6	– 1.4	– 0.2	27.8	– 1.7	– 0.7
Capacity utilisation in industry [5]										
2012	78.8	77.7	83.5	70.2	78.8	82.2	64.9	–	70.1	70.8
2013	78.0	76.6	82.1	71.3	78.4	80.9	65.0	–	70.1	72.0
2014	79.9	79.3	83.9	73.0	79.0	81.9	67.7	–	72.2	72.2
2013 Q4	78.4	78.2	82.3	72.5	77.5	79.6	65.9	–	72.2	72.2
2014 Q1	80.1	79.5	83.3	72.3	79.1	81.8	65.9	–	72.5	72.1
Q2	79.5	79.0	83.9	72.6	79.9	81.3	67.7	–	71.7	72.0
Q3	79.9	79.2	84.0	74.0	78.9	82.5	70.4	–	72.5	71.5
Q4	80.0	79.4	84.4	73.2	77.9	82.0	66.7	–	72.0	73.3
2015 Q1	80.7	79.7	84.8	71.2	78.6	81.9	69.2	–	73.2	71.3
Standardised unemployment rate [6,7]										
2012	11.4	7.6	5.4	10.0	7.7	9.8	24.5	14.7	10.7	15.0
2013	12.0	8.4	5.2	8.6	8.2	10.3	27.5	13.1	12.1	11.9
2014	11.6	8.5	5.0	7.4	8.7	10.2	...	11.3	12.7	10.8
2014 Aug	11.5	8.6	5.1	7.9	8.7	10.3	26.2	11.2	12.7	10.6
Sep	11.5	8.6	5.1	7.6	8.8	10.3	26.1	10.9	12.9	10.6
Oct	11.5	8.6	5.0	6.9	8.9	10.2	25.8	10.7	13.0	10.6
Nov	11.4	8.6	5.1	6.5	8.9	10.3	25.8	10.4	13.2	10.6
Dec	11.3	8.5	4.7	6.4	8.8	10.3	...	10.2	12.7	10.6
2015 Jan	11.2	8.5	4.6	...	8.8	10.2	...	10.0	12.6	...
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices [1]										
2012	2.5	2.6	2.1	4.2	3.2	2.2	1.0	1.9	3.3	2.3
2013	1.4	1.2	1.6	3.2	2.2	1.0	– 0.9	0.5	1.3	0.0
2014	8 0.4	0.5	0.8	0.5	1.2	0.6	– 1.4	0.3	0.2	0.7
2014 Sep	0.3	0.2	0.8	0.2	1.5	0.4	– 1.1	0.5	– 0.1	1.2
Oct	0.4	0.3	0.7	0.5	1.2	0.5	– 1.8	0.4	0.2	0.7
Nov	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.0	1.1	0.4	– 1.2	0.2	0.3	0.9
Dec	– 0.2	– 0.4	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.1	– 2.5	– 0.3	– 0.1	0.3
2015 Jan	9 – 0.6	– 0.6	– 0.5	– 0.5	– 0.1	– 0.4	– 2.8	– 0.4	– 0.5	– 0.3
Feb	p – 0.3	– 0.4	– 0.1	– 0.2	– 0.1	– 0.3	– 1.9	– 0.4	0.1	0.0
General government financial balance [10]										
2011	– 4.1	– 3.9	– 0.9	1.0	– 1.0	– 5.1	– 10.1	– 12.6	– 3.5	– 3.4
2012	– 3.6	– 4.1	0.1	– 0.3	– 2.1	– 4.9	– 8.6	– 8.0	– 3.0	– 0.8
2013	– 2.9	– 2.9	0.1	– 0.5	– 2.4	– 4.1	– 12.2	– 5.7	– 2.8	– 0.9
General government debt [10]										
2011	85.5	102.1	77.6	6.0	48.5	85.0	171.3	111.1	116.4	42.7
2012	88.7	104.0	79.0	9.7	53.0	89.2	156.9	121.7	122.2	40.9
2013	90.7	104.5	76.9	10.1	56.0	92.2	174.9	123.3	127.9	38.2

Sources: National data, European Commission, Eurostat, European Central Bank. Latest data are partly based on press reports and are provisional. **1** Annual percentage change. **2** GDP of the euro area calculated from seasonally adjusted data. Euro-area aggregate (excluding Lithuania). **3** ESA 2010. **4** Manufacturing, mining and energy; adjusted for working-day variations; Euro-area aggregate (excluding Lithuania). **5** Manufacturing, in %; seasonally adjusted; data are collected in

I Key economic data for the euro area

Lithuania	Luxembourg	Malta	Netherlands	Austria	Portugal	Slovakia	Slovenia	Spain	Cyprus	Period
										Real gross domestic product [1,2,3]
3.8	– 0.2	2.5	– 1.6	0.9	– 3.3	1.6	– 2.6	– 2.1	– 2.4	2012
3.3	2.0	2.7	– 0.7	0.2	– 1.4	1.4	– 1.0	– 1.2	– 5.4	2013
2.9	...	3.5	0.8	0.3	0.9	2.4	2.6	1.4	– 2.3	2014
3.0	2.7	2.1	– 0.6	0.4	– 1.2	1.5	– 0.3	– 0.5	– 5.0	2013 Q3
3.3	1.0	2.5	1.0	0.9	0.9	2.0	2.1	– 0.1	– 4.9	Q4
3.3	2.5	3.2	0.0	0.5	0.7	2.3	2.1	0.7	– 3.4	2014 Q1
3.4	1.3	3.3	1.1	0.6	1.0	2.6	2.9	1.1	– 1.7	Q2
2.7	4.0	3.7	1.0	0.3	1.5	2.4	3.2	1.7	– 2.1	Q3
2.4	...	4.0	1.0	– 0.2	0.4	2.4	2.4	2.1	– 2.0	Q4
										Industrial production [1,4]
3.7	– 4.3	–	– 0.5	– 0.3	– 6.1	8.0	– 0.5	– 6.9	– 9.6	2012
3.3	– 3.3	–	0.5	0.8	0.5	5.2	– 1.4	– 1.7	– 12.7	2013
0.2	6.8	–	– 2.9	p 0.6	1.2	3.7	p 1.7	1.3	p – 0.9	2014
0.8	– 2.8	–	– 0.6	0.5	– 1.5	4.9	– 2.3	– 1.0	– 11.3	2013 Q3
– 2.4	5.1	–	0.8	0.6	3.8	11.0	1.3	1.0	– 10.2	Q4
– 6.4	7.5	–	– 6.9	2.1	2.3	6.8	– 0.1	1.6	– 1.9	2014 Q1
4.7	8.9	–	– 1.7	0.9	1.9	5.4	1.7	2.3	– 0.5	Q2
– 0.6	5.6	–	– 0.1	– 0.2	1.5	2.3	2.8	0.8	0.4	Q3
3.5	5.2	–	– 2.2	p – 0.1	– 0.7	0.6	p 2.4	0.5	p – 1.9	Q4
										Capacity utilisation in industry [5]
72.1	76.4	75.2	78.4	84.6	73.8	69.6	79.1	72.1	56.5	2012
73.2	64.5	77.0	76.7	83.6	73.5	60.6	78.3	73.3	49.3	2013
74.9	66.2	78.1	80.2	84.3	75.6	54.6	80.3	75.8	53.9	2014
74.0	65.8	78.4	77.4	82.6	73.2	54.0	78.6	73.5	50.8	2013 Q4
74.2	67.7	80.2	79.7	84.1	76.3	57.6	79.7	77.0	52.5	2014 Q1
75.1	64.8	76.8	81.0	85.1	74.8	46.8	79.5	74.1	54.1	Q2
75.1	65.4	77.2	79.6	84.2	75.6	56.5	80.8	75.3	54.5	Q3
75.1	66.9	78.1	80.3	83.7	75.5	57.3	81.2	76.9	54.5	Q4
74.4	66.4	80.5	80.6	84.1	78.0	75.0	85.1	78.1	54.9	2015 Q1
										Standardised unemployment rate [6,7]
13.4	5.1	6.3	5.8	4.3	15.8	14.0	8.9	24.8	11.9	2012
11.8	5.9	6.4	7.3	4.9	16.4	14.2	10.1	26.1	15.9	2013
10.7	6.0	5.9	7.4	...	14.1	13.2	9.8	24.5	16.1	2014
10.5	5.9	6.0	7.2	5.0	13.5	13.1	9.7	24.1	16.2	2014 Aug
10.3	6.0	5.9	7.1	5.1	13.4	12.9	9.7	24.0	16.2	Sep
10.3	5.9	5.9	7.1	5.1	13.5	12.8	9.7	23.9	16.3	Oct
10.1	5.9	5.9	7.1	4.9	13.5	12.6	9.7	23.7	16.6	Nov
10.0	5.9	5.8	7.2	4.9	13.6	12.5	9.7	23.6	16.4	Dec
9.8	5.9	6.0	7.2	4.8	13.3	12.5	9.7	23.4	16.1	2015 Jan
										Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices [1]
3.2	2.9	3.2	2.8	2.6	2.8	3.7	2.8	2.4	3.1	2012
1.2	1.7	1.0	2.6	2.1	0.4	1.5	1.9	1.5	0.4	2013
0.2	0.7	0.8	0.3	1.5	– 0.2	– 0.1	0.4	– 0.2	– 0.3	2014
0.0	0.3	0.6	0.2	1.4	0.0	– 0.1	– 0.1	– 0.3	0.0	2014 Sep
0.3	0.4	0.7	0.4	1.4	0.1	0.0	0.1	– 0.2	0.3	Oct
0.4	0.2	0.6	0.3	1.5	0.1	0.0	0.1	– 0.5	0.0	Nov
– 0.1	– 0.9	0.4	– 0.1	0.8	– 0.3	– 0.1	– 0.1	– 1.1	– 1.0	Dec
– 1.4	– 1.1	0.8	– 0.7	0.5	– 0.4	– 0.5	– 0.7	– 1.5	– 0.7	2015 Jan
– 1.5	– 0.3	0.6	– 0.5	p 0.5	– 0.1	– 0.6	– 0.5	– 1.2	– 0.8	Feb
										General government financial balance [10]
– 9.0	0.3	– 2.6	– 4.3	– 2.6	– 7.4	– 4.1	– 6.2	– 9.4	– 5.8	2011
– 3.2	0.1	– 3.7	– 4.0	– 2.3	– 5.5	– 4.2	– 3.7	– 10.3	– 5.8	2012
– 2.6	0.6	– 2.7	– 2.3	– 1.5	– 4.9	– 2.6	– 14.6	– 6.8	– 4.9	2013
										General government debt [10]
37.3	18.5	69.8	61.3	82.1	111.1	43.5	46.2	69.2	66.0	2011
39.9	21.4	67.9	66.5	81.7	124.8	52.1	53.4	84.4	79.5	2012
39.0	23.6	69.8	68.6	81.2	128.0	54.6	70.4	92.1	102.2	2013

January, April, July and October. **6** As a percentage of the civilian labour force; seasonally adjusted. **7** Standardised unemployment rate of Germany: calculation based on unadjusted data from the Federal Statistical Office. **8** Including Latvia from 2014 onwards. **9** Including Lithuania from 2015 onwards. **10** As a percentage of GDP (based on ESA 2010); Euro-area aggregate (excluding Lithuania): European Central Bank, member states (Maastricht Treaty definition): European Commission.

II Overall monetary survey in the euro area

1 The money stock and its counterparts *
(a) Euro area

€ billion

Period	I Lending to non-banks (non-MFIs) in the euro area					II Net claims on non-euro-area residents			III Monetary capital formation at monetary financial institutions (MFIs) in the euro area				
		Enterprises and households		General government									
	Total	Total	*of which* Securities	Total	*of which* Securities	Total	Claims on non-euro-area residents	Liabilities to non-euro-area residents	Total	Deposits with an agreed maturity of over 2 years	Deposits at agreed notice of over 3 months	Debt securities with maturities of over 2 years (net) **2**	Capital and reserves **3**
2013 June	– 7.3	– 35.8	– 24.8	28.5	36.5	36.0	– 56.6	– 92.5	13.7	– 0.6	– 1.3	– 22.4	37.9
July	– 120.7	– 83.5	– 12.1	– 37.2	– 39.5	– 1.8	– 27.9	– 26.1	– 35.0	– 4.2	– 1.2	– 25.8	– 3.8
Aug	– 53.7	– 35.9	– 6.0	– 17.8	– 2.8	34.3	– 15.8	– 50.1	– 8.8	– 6.3	– 0.8	– 13.7	12.0
Sep	3.2	19.3	– 0.6	– 16.1	– 16.3	23.8	– 31.6	– 55.4	– 8.6	– 4.2	– 1.3	– 2.0	– 1.0
Oct	– 43.1	– 61.4	– 26.5	18.2	5.8	34.1	65.3	31.3	8.4	2.0	– 0.5	15.3	– 8.4
Nov	– 18.9	7.6	– 2.5	– 26.5	– 7.8	51.6	5.6	– 46.0	– 2.2	1.7	– 0.3	– 2.3	– 1.4
Dec	– 182.0	–107.0	– 38.6	– 75.0	– 73.1	78.0	– 85.8	– 163.8	– 11.4	– 8.9	– 0.5	– 9.8	7.7
2014 Jan	43.5	– 18.9	9.5	62.4	42.6	9.0	125.0	116.0	– 1.1	– 2.7	0.1	– 12.4	13.9
Feb	– 5.1	– 9.2	– 16.4	4.1	12.3	32.5	16.1	– 16.4	– 11.9	– 5.9	0.1	– 11.3	5.2
Mar	7.7	6.1	– 3.2	1.6	3.9	12.6	– 23.6	– 36.3	10.4	– 8.6	– 0.2	– 0.1	19.4
Apr	– 6.1	– 6.2	– 17.1	0.1	– 0.1	– 9.4	64.8	74.2	– 24.9	– 31.1	– 0.3	– 0.9	7.4
May	– 25.7	– 36.4	23.8	10.7	9.1	51.6	37.0	– 14.6	– 21.0	– 14.9	– 0.4	3.3	– 9.0
June	9.3	23.6	– 12.9	– 14.3	– 6.4	69.3	– 34.0	– 103.4	– 15.4	– 10.6	– 1.4	– 22.3	18.8
July	– 25.9	– 15.7	6.4	– 10.2	– 17.8	27.2	61.1	34.0	– 6.8	– 12.4	0.6	– 10.3	15.2
Aug	– 45.7	– 51.0	– 15.6	5.3	15.9	– 1.3	– 5.8	– 4.5	0.2	– 5.0	1.3	– 5.9	9.8
Sep	34.8	26.2	– 14.5	8.6	9.2	– 25.0	– 17.7	7.3	– 6.0	– 16.5	0.3	– 12.0	22.1
Oct	5.0	– 24.0	– 9.0	29.0	23.1	10.4	– 4.0	– 14.4	– 37.0	– 13.9	– 0.2	– 26.5	3.6
Nov	33.7	25.6	5.5	8.1	5.2	60.2	76.5	16.3	– 13.3	1.1	– 0.4	– 13.1	– 0.9
Dec	– 33.3	9.2	7.0	– 42.5	– 50.4	– 5.8	– 115.2	– 109.3	– 43.0	– 1.0	2.3	– 41.3	– 3.0
2015 Jan	97.1	22.0	3.8	75.1	53.0	– 7.4	204.2	211.6	– 20.9	– 17.3	0.4	– 7.9	3.9

(b) German contribution

Period	I Lending to non-banks (non-MFIs) in the euro area					II Net claims on non-euro-area residents			III Monetary capital formation at monetary financial institutions (MFIs) in the euro area				
		Enterprises and households		General government									
	Total	Total	*of which* Securities	Total	*of which* Securities	Total	Claims on non-euro-area residents	Liabilities to non-euro-area residents	Total	Deposits with an agreed maturity of over 2 years	Deposits at agreed notice of over 3 months	Debt securities with maturities of over 2 years (net) **2**	Capital and reserves **3**
2013 June	0.2	3.6	– 6.1	– 3.4	– 0.4	– 0.3	– 8.3	– 8.0	– 2.4	– 1.0	– 0.9	– 8.7	8.2
July	– 3.0	– 12.8	0.8	9.8	4.8	– 3.8	– 9.7	– 5.9	– 14.0	– 4.9	– 1.0	– 7.6	– 0.5
Aug	– 13.5	– 9.5	– 2.0	– 4.1	1.9	1.2	– 13.4	– 14.6	– 10.1	– 4.3	– 0.9	– 5.1	0.2
Sep	– 3.7	2.4	1.3	– 6.1	– 5.1	22.3	– 17.6	– 39.9	– 1.1	– 3.9	– 0.8	3.3	0.2
Oct	9.4	– 0.6	0.3	10.1	2.3	22.3	25.8	3.5	– 4.2	– 3.4	– 0.1	– 0.6	– 0.1
Nov	5.0	7.9	1.7	– 2.9	1.8	14.6	16.1	1.5	– 1.5	– 0.7	– 0.0	– 1.3	0.5
Dec	– 17.0	– 8.3	– 6.3	– 8.7	– 2.2	40.7	– 25.6	– 66.3	– 6.5	– 1.5	– 0.2	– 5.7	0.9
2014 Jan	15.2	9.7	10.4	5.4	– 0.8	– 12.1	32.5	44.7	– 8.6	– 1.4	– 0.5	– 7.2	0.4
Feb	– 3.1	– 3.9	– 8.7	0.8	4.6	24.4	4.7	– 19.7	– 2.7	– 3.5	0.3	0.2	0.4
Mar	4.1	7.8	6.0	– 3.7	1.0	15.8	– 3.7	– 19.6	– 5.0	– 2.9	– 0.0	– 2.8	0.7
Apr	21.3	20.5	13.8	0.9	– 0.1	0.4	8.2	7.8	– 15.7	– 3.6	– 0.3	– 12.0	0.1
May	– 2.3	– 4.7	– 9.6	2.4	1.0	7.5	17.7	10.2	12.1	– 2.6	– 0.2	10.8	3.9
June	– 7.2	0.5	– 0.9	– 7.8	0.6	34.6	12.3	– 22.3	5.5	– 3.1	– 1.1	– 3.0	12.7
July	10.3	3.2	3.3	7.1	4.1	21.8	23.5	1.7	– 1.2	– 4.3	0.7	– 0.7	3.1
Aug	– 6.4	0.8	– 3.4	– 7.2	– 2.0	– 16.9	– 11.4	5.5	– 2.7	– 1.3	0.9	– 2.8	0.5
Sep	10.2	6.2	2.1	4.0	4.8	– 16.6	– 14.1	2.5	– 3.2	– 0.7	0.5	– 4.5	1.5
Oct	5.3	– 4.2	– 4.5	9.5	2.4	16.5	10.9	– 5.6	– 1.7	– 2.8	– 0.2	1.2	0.1
Nov	14.1	15.3	6.0	– 1.2	1.9	12.8	30.9	18.1	0.1	– 2.7	– 0.4	1.5	1.8
Dec	– 15.6	1.6	5.4	– 17.2	– 10.2	– 5.5	– 33.2	– 27.7	– 17.5	– 7.3	0.2	– 8.1	– 2.2
2015 Jan	26.4	11.3	6.8	15.1	6.6	– 57.8	52.3	110.1	– 0.8	– 3.0	0.0	1.3	0.9

***** The data in this table are based on the consolidated balance sheet of monetary financial institutions (MFIs) (Table II.2); statistical breaks have been eliminated from the flow figures (see also the "Notes on the figures" in the "Explanatory notes" in the Statistical Supplement to the Monthly Report 1, p 30•). **1** Source: ECB. **2** Excluding MFIs' portfolios. **3** After deduction of inter-MFI participations. **4** Including the counterparts of monetary liabilities of central governments. **5** Including the monetary liabilities of central governments (Post Office, Treasury). **6** In Germany, only savings deposits. **7** Paper held by residents outside the euro area has been eliminated.

II Overall monetary survey in the euro area

(a) Euro area

IV Deposits of central governments	V Other factors: Total [4]	V Other factors: *of which* Intra-Eurosystem liability/claim related to banknote issue	VI Money stock M3: Total	Money stock M2: Total	Money stock M1: Total	Money stock M1: Currency in circulation	Money stock M1: Overnight deposits [5]	Deposits with an agreed maturity of up to 2 years [5]	Deposits at agreed notice of up to 3 months [5,6]	Repo transactions	Money market fund shares (net) [2,7,8]	Debt securities with maturities of up to 2 years (incl money market paper) (net) [2,7]	Period
30.3	– 8.6	–	– 6.7	25.7	45.1	6.2	38.9	– 19.2	– 0.2	21.8	– 19.6	– 2.1	2013 June
– 26.1	– 55.1	–	– 6.4	– 7.0	– 8.3	6.9	– 15.2	– 2.2	3.5	– 48.9	– 1.1	– 6.7	July
– 55.7	12.4	–	32.8	27.4	25.4	1.4	24.0	0.5	1.5	4.4	9.5	1.1	Aug
11.2	58.1	–	– 33.8	– 1.3	23.6	– 0.2	23.8	– 19.2	– 5.6	– 8.0	– 26.4	6.5	Sep
– 28.0	– 5.3	–	15.7	22.0	38.5	3.9	34.6	– 9.4	– 7.1	– 5.5	1.3	– 12.4	Oct
18.4	– 11.9	–	28.4	33.9	47.1	5.4	41.7	– 15.1	1.9	3.7	– 1.1	– 4.0	Nov
– 49.3	– 26.3	–	– 17.0	15.2	13.7	17.9	– 4.2	– 0.2	1.7	– 15.5	– 12.8	– 12.9	Dec
20.4	37.7	–	– 4.5	– 39.7	– 36.5	– 13.6	– 23.0	– 15.6	12.5	– 6.9	25.3	– 0.9	2014 Jan
36.9	– 13.6	–	16.0	14.4	12.2	1.9	10.2	2.3	– 0.0	19.1	– 0.8	– 4.9	Feb
– 5.3	3.0	–	12.3	38.5	33.0	6.3	26.7	0.6	4.9	– 12.8	– 17.6	3.2	Mar
– 10.7	– 6.8	–	26.8	27.9	38.2	5.3	32.9	– 7.9	– 2.4	– 8.9	5.4	– 11.9	Apr
33.1	– 50.1	–	63.8	57.8	54.9	7.1	47.8	1.0	1.9	– 13.9	– 4.1	8.6	May
26.4	51.1	–	16.6	23.1	44.4	6.4	38.0	– 19.4	– 1.9	28.1	– 12.9	2.4	June
– 23.1	2.4	–	28.8	15.0	10.3	9.4	0.9	6.4	– 1.6	2.7	16.9	– 7.3	July
– 46.4	– 48.2	–	47.5	40.7	34.9	2.0	32.8	3.5	2.4	2.9	3.7	2.4	Aug
– 6.1	22.8	–	– 0.8	14.7	33.4	0.3	33.1	– 12.8	– 5.8	– 18.3	– 11.6	6.0	Sep
– 6.5	33.8	–	25.2	8.8	38.3	3.5	34.8	– 20.6	– 8.9	25.6	14.6	– 4.3	Oct
25.9	– 11.4	–	92.7	90.5	100.6	6.2	94.4	– 14.5	4.4	– 2.7	5.6	0.6	Nov
– 47.0	19.2	–	31.7	31.7	51.5	23.8	27.7	– 17.5	– 2.3	– 13.8	– 17.5	31.3	Dec
79.6	– 32.3	–	63.2	28.9	55.4	– 2.7	58.1	– 35.8	9.3	24.3	19.9	8.6	2015 Jan

(b) German contribution

IV Deposits of central governments	V Other factors: Total	V Other factors: *of which* Intra-Eurosystem liability/claim related to banknote issue [9,11]	V Other factors: *of which* Currency in circulation	VI Money stock M3 (balance I plus II less III less IV less V) [10]: Total	Components of the money stock: Overnight deposits	Deposits with an agreed maturity of up to 2 years	Deposits at agreed notice of up to 3 months [6]	Repo transactions	Money market fund shares (net) [7,8]	Debt securities with maturities of up to 2 years (incl money market paper)(net) [7]	Period
1.1	– 4.6	1.3	1.7	5.7	– 0.6	– 5.7	– 0.2	15.4	– 0.5	– 2.7	2013 June
– 1.8	23.1	3.3	1.4	– 14.1	9.1	– 3.0	– 0.6	– 23.5	– 0.0	3.9	July
– 8.9	3.4	3.4	– 0.4	3.2	13.0	2.4	0.2	– 9.4	0.0	– 3.0	Aug
1.1	14.2	3.2	0.2	4.5	12.9	– 6.5	– 0.3	0.7	– 0.5	– 1.8	Sep
– 3.3	7.0	2.2	0.6	32.2	27.1	– 0.7	0.0	4.0	– 0.3	2.1	Oct
0.5	18.8	1.5	1.4	1.9	10.4	– 1.9	– 0.0	– 3.5	– 0.1	– 3.0	Nov
2.6	31.0	2.5	3.7	– 3.3	– 13.6	7.1	4.1	2.9	– 0.0	– 3.9	Dec
– 3.1	16.2	10.4	– 13.0	– 1.3	5.1	– 4.9	– 0.6	1.2	0.1	– 2.2	2014 Jan
3.7	5.1	2.4	0.2	15.2	8.7	4.4	0.5	0.1	– 0.0	1.6	Feb
– 1.6	37.3	1.6	1.9	– 10.7	– 7.9	3.7	– 1.2	– 2.8	– 0.2	– 2.2	Mar
– 2.3	6.1	2.2	1.4	33.6	35.9	– 3.3	– 1.6	2.5	0.0	0.1	Apr
1.9	– 24.5	3.0	1.3	15.7	11.2	7.3	– 0.6	– 3.0	– 0.1	0.7	May
– 0.9	30.9	2.8	1.9	– 8.1	– 8.3	– 2.5	– 0.4	0.4	– 0.1	2.7	June
1.3	24.4	4.5	2.4	7.6	5.5	0.0	– 0.9	3.2	– 0.0	– 0.2	July
– 4.8	– 38.5	3.7	– 0.1	22.7	15.8	2.9	0.6	1.7	– 0.3	2.1	Aug
1.5	– 4.0	3.8	0.3	– 0.7	6.1	– 4.8	0.1	– 2.7	0.0	0.6	Sep
– 1.3	6.5	3.2	0.8	18.2	25.6	– 9.3	– 0.3	1.8	– 0.0	0.4	Oct
– 0.3	0.8	2.5	1.2	26.2	26.6	0.3	– 0.4	0.4	– 0.0	– 0.8	Nov
2.3	12.4	3.6	5.0	– 18.2	– 18.1	4.6	2.2	– 6.2	0.0	– 0.8	Dec
5.6	– 61.6	2.4	– 0.8	25.4	26.2	– 4.2	– 1.1	3.4	0.0	1.0	2015 Jan

8 Less German MFIs' holdings of paper issued by euro-area MFIs. **9** Including national banknotes still in circulation. **10** The German contributions to the Eurosystem's monetary aggregates should on no account be interpreted as national monetary aggregates and are therefore not comparable with the erstwhile German money stocks M1, M2 or M3. **11** The difference between the volume of euro banknotes actually issued by the Bundesbank and the amount disclosed in accordance with the accounting regime chosen by the Eurosystem (see also footnote 2 on banknote circulation in Table III.2).

II Overall monetary survey in the euro area

2 Consolidated balance sheet of monetary financial institutions (MFIs) *

End of year/month	Total assets or liabilities	Assets										
		Lending to non-banks (non-MFIs) in the euro area									Claims on non-euro-area residents	Other assets
		Total	Enterprises and households				General government					
			Total	Loans	Debt securities 2	Shares and other equities	Total	Loans	Debt securities 3			
	Euro area (€ billion) 1											
2012 Dec	26,251.1	16,610.8	13,245.1	11,044.3	1,433.8	767.0	3,365.7	1,170.3	2,195.4	4,845.6	4,794.7	
2013 Jan	26,397.8	16,646.9	13,249.6	11,053.1	1,415.9	780.7	3,397.3	1,174.2	2,223.1	4,799.6	4,951.2	
Feb	26,517.2	16,640.3	13,243.1	11,048.6	1,418.7	775.8	3,397.2	1,135.6	2,261.7	4,826.1	5,050.8	
Mar	26,567.8	16,698.5	13,262.6	11,044.6	1,433.3	784.7	3,435.9	1,141.2	2,294.8	4,844.2	5,025.1	
Apr	26,709.3	16,730.7	13,270.3	11,014.5	1,440.4	815.4	3,460.3	1,151.1	2,309.3	4,818.7	5,159.9	
May	26,371.6	16,728.1	13,249.1	10,992.1	1,446.8	810.2	3,479.0	1,125.4	2,353.7	4,798.6	4,844.9	
June	25,926.2	16,691.6	13,200.4	10,975.2	1,432.7	792.6	3,491.1	1,116.9	2,374.3	4,669.1	4,565.6	
July	25,675.6	16,573.2	13,113.1	10,895.5	1,432.0	785.7	3,460.0	1,120.3	2,339.8	4,636.9	4,465.6	
Aug	25,458.7	16,417.2	12,977.1	10,767.7	1,427.9	781.6	3,440.0	1,105.3	2,334.8	4,661.9	4,379.6	
Sep	25,420.6	16,423.1	12,996.1	10,781.6	1,421.9	792.7	3,426.9	1,105.5	2,321.4	4,587.6	4,409.9	
Oct	25,463.9	16,386.4	12,927.6	10,732.8	1,401.5	793.3	3,458.8	1,118.1	2,340.7	4,625.3	4,452.2	
Nov	25,426.6	16,364.8	12,929.5	10,736.1	1,398.2	795.2	3,435.3	1,099.5	2,335.8	4,616.6	4,445.2	
Dec	24,648.0	16,161.5	12,802.4	10,649.6	1,360.8	792.1	3,359.1	1,097.3	2,261.8	4,487.3	3,999.1	
2014 Jan	25,041.7	16,241.9	12,803.5	10,640.4	1,368.4	794.7	3,438.5	1,118.5	2,320.0	4,680.4	4,119.3	
Feb	24,985.6	16,222.0	12,771.6	10,635.6	1,343.7	792.3	3,450.4	1,110.2	2,340.1	4,671.5	4,092.2	
Mar	24,905.6	16,233.6	12,772.9	10,638.7	1,330.0	804.2	3,460.6	1,108.0	2,352.6	4,638.6	4,033.4	
Apr	25,042.7	16,233.3	12,767.4	10,647.1	1,294.8	825.6	3,465.9	1,107.7	2,358.2	4,697.2	4,112.3	
May	25,173.8	16,217.0	12,733.6	10,585.5	1,333.1	815.0	3,483.4	1,109.4	2,373.9	4,770.8	4,186.0	
June	25,131.3	16,209.3	12,730.5	10,606.7	1,318.3	805.5	3,478.8	1,100.9	2,377.9	4,751.1	4,170.9	
July	25,303.6	16,176.1	12,701.1	10,574.2	1,321.3	805.7	3,475.0	1,110.1	2,364.8	4,853.0	4,274.6	
Aug	25,538.7	16,141.2	12,650.4	10,537.6	1,310.1	802.7	3,490.8	1,099.5	2,391.3	4,877.2	4,520.3	
Sep	25,682.8	16,184.8	12,682.5	10,580.6	1,297.7	804.2	3,502.3	1,099.2	2,403.2	4,988.6	4,509.4	
Oct	25,677.5	16,174.0	12,646.8	10,556.0	1,290.2	800.5	3,527.2	1,106.5	2,420.7	4,969.1	4,534.4	
Nov	26,010.6	16,221.2	12,675.7	10,573.1	1,296.8	805.9	3,545.5	1,109.7	2,435.8	5,040.3	4,749.1	
Dec	25,891.4	16,241.6	12,691.8	10,635.8	1,287.6	768.4	3,549.8	1,131.0	2,418.8	4,991.1	4,658.6	
2015 Jan	26,956.6	16,408.5	12,770.3	10,700.3	1,292.7	777.3	3,638.2	1,159.2	2,479.0	5,425.1	5,123.0	
	German contribution (€ billion)											
2012 Dec	6,158.5	3,745.1	2,970.5	2,593.8	147.9	228.9	774.6	385.1	389.5	1,159.8	1,253.7	
2013 Jan	6,067.4	3,774.6	2,998.7	2,611.3	146.5	240.9	775.9	386.9	389.0	1,140.9	1,151.9	
Feb	6,062.6	3,765.7	2,998.6	2,614.6	148.2	235.8	767.1	382.0	385.1	1,143.4	1,153.5	
Mar	6,075.5	3,766.8	3,000.8	2,608.8	150.0	242.0	765.9	379.8	386.2	1,154.8	1,154.0	
Apr	6,087.6	3,792.2	3,014.9	2,605.5	148.6	260.7	777.3	390.5	386.9	1,139.0	1,156.4	
May	5,962.4	3,768.8	3,003.0	2,607.6	146.3	249.0	765.9	379.8	386.1	1,132.8	1,060.8	
June	5,846.2	3,766.9	3,005.4	2,616.6	148.4	240.3	761.6	376.7	384.9	1,103.7	975.6	
July	5,814.2	3,762.3	2,990.9	2,601.1	147.7	242.1	771.4	381.7	389.8	1,097.2	954.7	
Aug	5,642.3	3,656.3	2,889.1	2,501.7	145.7	241.7	767.2	375.7	391.5	1,100.0	886.0	
Sep	5,637.5	3,650.6	2,889.5	2,500.3	144.3	244.8	761.2	374.6	386.6	1,070.0	916.9	
Oct	5,668.2	3,659.4	2,887.3	2,497.3	145.4	244.6	772.1	382.6	389.5	1,090.1	918.8	
Nov	5,680.6	3,663.8	2,894.5	2,502.7	146.9	244.9	769.3	377.9	391.4	1,101.1	915.7	
Dec	5,571.3	3,644.0	2,884.1	2,498.8	145.3	240.0	759.9	371.4	388.5	1,065.2	862.1	
2014 Jan	5,651.4	3,659.6	2,893.1	2,498.5	144.8	249.8	766.6	377.8	388.8	1,111.0	880.7	
Feb	5,617.5	3,654.6	2,886.9	2,500.6	143.2	243.1	767.7	373.9	393.7	1,111.8	851.1	
Mar	5,600.4	3,658.2	2,894.0	2,501.7	144.3	247.9	764.3	369.2	395.0	1,105.8	836.3	
Apr	5,631.0	3,679.4	2,914.4	2,508.2	145.2	261.0	765.0	369.8	395.2	1,112.1	839.6	
May	5,688.2	3,679.0	2,910.7	2,513.9	146.5	250.4	768.2	371.2	397.0	1,136.0	873.2	
June	5,697.3	3,670.8	2,910.9	2,515.1	145.8	250.0	759.9	362.6	397.3	1,150.9	875.5	
July	5,765.7	3,681.2	2,914.0	2,515.6	143.9	254.6	767.2	365.7	401.5	1,183.5	900.9	
Aug	5,843.8	3,675.7	2,915.6	2,520.4	142.6	252.7	760.1	360.4	399.7	1,179.0	989.0	
Sep	5,843.6	3,688.5	2,924.1	2,526.7	144.0	253.5	764.4	359.8	404.6	1,182.8	972.4	
Oct	5,864.9	3,695.6	2,922.0	2,528.3	141.7	251.9	773.6	366.9	406.8	1,192.8	976.5	
Nov	5,960.0	3,711.2	2,938.5	2,537.3	145.5	255.7	772.6	363.9	408.7	1,225.3	1,023.5	
Dec	5,964.3	3,696.6	2,931.8	2,527.7	143.8	260.3	764.8	364.1	400.6	1,209.1	1,058.7	
2015 Jan	6,233.2	3,728.7	2,948.4	2,536.7	142.3	269.4	780.3	372.4	407.9	1,313.5	1,190.9	

* Monetary financial institutions (MFIs) comprise banks (including building and loan associations), money market funds, and the European Central Bank and national central banks (the Eurosystem). **1** Source: ECB. **2** Including money market paper of enterprises. **3** Including Treasury bills and other money market paper issued by general government. **4** Euro currency in circulation (see also footnote 8 on p 12•) Excluding MFIs' cash in hand (in euro). The German contribution includes the volume

II Overall monetary survey in the euro area

Liabilities											
	Deposits of non-banks (non-MFIs) in the euro area										
			Enterprises and households								
					With agreed maturities of			At agreed notice of [6]			
Currency in circulation [4]	Total	*of which* in euro [5]	Total	Overnight	up to 1 year	over 1 year and up to 2 years	over 2 years	up to 3 months	over 3 months	End of year/month
										Euro area (€ billion) [1]
876.8	10,809.5	10,247.1	10,269.7	4,061.3	1,392.7	312.8	2,359.7	2,042.8	100.5	2012 Dec
857.0	10,821.5	10,224.9	10,253.7	4,036.1	1,380.3	319.7	2,354.8	2,064.1	98.6	2013 Jan
855.8	10,836.5	10,221.3	10,262.6	4,047.8	1,367.3	330.8	2,347.7	2,072.3	96.7	Feb
867.5	10,915.5	10,288.3	10,326.1	4,090.3	1,357.1	339.8	2,365.2	2,078.3	95.3	Mar
874.7	10,895.0	10,325.1	10,354.6	4,147.6	1,320.3	350.5	2,358.7	2,084.1	93.5	Apr
879.7	10,966.5	10,332.1	10,351.2	4,160.2	1,285.3	363.8	2,363.4	2,087.1	91.5	May
885.9	11,010.7	10,339.5	10,356.6	4,191.4	1,256.1	371.3	2,360.2	2,087.3	90.4	June
892.8	10,958.0	10,321.2	10,341.5	4,181.5	1,243.0	383.2	2,354.4	2,090.2	89.3	July
894.2	10,922.7	10,336.4	10,362.1	4,208.3	1,241.3	385.9	2,346.9	2,091.3	88.4	Aug
894.0	10,924.4	10,323.2	10,348.0	4,227.6	1,212.3	392.3	2,343.0	2,085.6	87.2	Sep
898.0	10,915.2	10,342.4	10,372.6	4,264.1	1,193.0	405.6	2,344.3	2,078.9	86.8	Oct
903.4	10,961.8	10,369.7	10,389.6	4,295.5	1,162.4	419.6	2,345.1	2,080.3	86.7	Nov
921.2	10,900.4	10,351.8	10,401.3	4,310.6	1,153.6	431.3	2,334.9	2,084.5	86.4	Dec
908.3	10,919.1	10,348.6	10,399.4	4,304.6	1,132.1	442.6	2,337.6	2,096.5	86.0	2014 Jan
910.2	10,949.2	10,338.5	10,382.8	4,307.7	1,129.1	445.4	2,319.8	2,094.6	86.2	Feb
916.5	10,966.6	10,355.6	10,399.0	4,332.6	1,129.0	441.5	2,311.4	2,098.5	86.1	Mar
921.8	10,948.1	10,350.7	10,394.3	4,364.8	1,124.3	442.6	2,280.1	2,096.5	86.0	Apr
928.9	11,020.7	10,387.2	10,425.8	4,414.7	1,121.4	439.4	2,266.3	2,098.4	85.6	May
935.3	11,050.7	10,387.6	10,424.2	4,447.5	1,104.4	434.9	2,255.8	2,097.2	84.4	June
944.7	11,022.8	10,378.1	10,420.0	4,448.9	1,115.3	430.6	2,244.8	2,095.2	85.0	July
946.8	11,015.1	10,414.4	10,454.5	4,478.1	1,124.0	427.2	2,241.3	2,097.5	86.3	Aug
947.0	11,017.4	10,417.6	10,466.0	4,522.5	1,115.0	422.6	2,227.3	2,091.9	86.7	Sep
950.6	11,004.8	10,402.5	10,465.5	4,557.8	1,109.4	415.2	2,212.0	2,084.5	86.5	Oct
956.8	11,109.7	10,480.5	10,532.6	4,637.2	1,099.7	407.6	2,213.2	2,088.7	86.1	Nov
980.6	11,154.9	10,547.7	10,629.8	4,746.6	1,090.1	399.6	2,218.6	2,087.9	87.0	Dec
979.1	11,291.7	10,585.4	10,683.8	4,832.2	1,074.3	389.5	2,205.9	2,093.8	88.1	2015 Jan
										German contribution (€ billion)
216.3	3,131.3	3,060.2	2,930.4	1,307.2	222.8	40.0	742.2	528.6	89.6	2012 Dec
212.7	3,116.1	3,045.2	2,928.9	1,315.4	216.1	39.6	740.4	529.6	87.8	2013 Jan
212.1	3,103.6	3,034.1	2,921.3	1,320.1	209.7	38.4	736.0	530.9	86.2	Feb
214.7	3,093.1	3,026.7	2,905.9	1,311.8	207.3	37.1	734.8	529.5	85.4	Mar
217.1	3,112.2	3,047.8	2,928.5	1,340.3	208.8	36.1	730.7	528.9	83.8	Apr
217.9	3,120.7	3,051.1	2,925.7	1,343.8	205.7	35.4	730.0	529.0	81.8	May
219.6	3,113.0	3,041.2	2,911.2	1,340.2	198.5	34.3	728.4	528.8	81.0	June
221.0	3,110.3	3,040.5	2,916.4	1,353.3	198.9	33.3	722.9	528.2	79.9	July
220.7	3,111.9	3,051.4	2,924.9	1,365.3	200.3	32.8	719.1	528.4	79.0	Aug
220.9	3,115.2	3,051.4	2,926.9	1,378.4	193.3	32.5	716.4	528.1	78.2	Sep
221.5	3,134.5	3,075.3	2,955.7	1,408.4	195.1	32.9	713.0	528.1	78.1	Oct
222.9	3,142.9	3,081.9	2,956.1	1,415.6	188.8	33.3	712.2	528.1	78.1	Nov
226.6	3,140.9	3,075.9	2,955.8	1,403.8	197.6	33.6	710.9	532.2	77.8	Dec
213.5	3,136.4	3,074.8	2,960.6	1,414.2	195.0	32.8	709.6	531.7	77.3	2014 Jan
213.7	3,149.6	3,084.0	2,965.9	1,419.3	198.7	32.4	705.8	532.1	77.6	Feb
215.6	3,139.6	3,074.6	2,954.0	1,410.5	200.0	32.0	703.1	530.9	77.5	Mar
217.0	3,164.3	3,101.6	2,984.7	1,446.5	200.8	31.5	699.3	529.2	77.4	Apr
218.3	3,182.1	3,116.5	2,992.7	1,455.0	203.1	32.0	696.8	528.6	77.2	May
220.3	3,165.8	3,101.0	2,972.3	1,446.5	195.6	32.1	693.6	528.3	76.1	June
222.6	3,168.9	3,102.0	2,976.7	1,455.9	195.5	31.5	689.5	527.5	76.8	July
222.5	3,183.4	3,120.4	2,992.8	1,467.7	199.8	31.3	688.2	528.0	77.7	Aug
222.8	3,187.6	3,124.3	2,997.3	1,479.1	191.5	32.7	687.6	528.2	78.2	Sep
223.6	3,199.5	3,133.6	3,020.0	1,507.0	189.9	32.5	684.8	527.9	78.1	Oct
224.8	3,222.7	3,157.5	3,038.6	1,531.2	186.7	33.4	682.2	527.4	77.7	Nov
229.7	3,207.5	3,139.1	3,019.1	1,507.1	191.8	32.3	680.7	530.9	76.3	Dec
228.9	3,234.0	3,155.2	3,045.4	1,541.7	187.8	31.8	677.9	528.8	77.4	2015 Jan

of euro banknotes put into circulation by the Bundesbank in accordance with the accounting regime chosen by the Eurosystem (see also footnote 2 on banknote circulation in Table III.2). The volume of currency actually put into circulation by the Bundesbank can be calculated by adding to this total the item "Intra-Eurosystem liability/claim related to banknote issue" (see "Other liability items"). **5** Excluding central governments' deposits. **6** In Germany, only savings deposits.

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2 Consolidated balance sheet of monetary financial institutions (MFIs) (cont'd) *

End of year/month	Liabilities (cont'd)												
	Deposits of non-banks (non-MFIs) in the euro area (cont'd)								Repo transactions with non-banks in the euro area			Debt securities	
	General government												
		Other general government											
				With agreed maturities of			At agreed notice of 2						
	Central governments	Total	Overnight	up to 1 year	over 1 year and up to 2 years	over 2 years	up to 3 months	over 3 months	Total	*of which* Enterprises and households	Money market fund shares (net) 3	Total	*of which* denominated in euro
	Euro area (€ billion) 1												
2012 Dec	251.0	288.7	134.9	86.7	6.0	43.9	11.6	5.6	376.4	372.4	467.9	2,853.2	2,183.1
2013 Jan	284.9	282.9	129.2	83.5	6.0	43.4	14.4	6.4	390.1	386.2	459.7	2,807.6	2,172.3
Feb	290.5	283.3	129.3	83.6	6.0	43.5	14.6	6.3	417.3	412.0	465.9	2,806.9	2,151.4
Mar	301.2	288.2	126.0	91.0	6.6	44.0	14.4	6.2	440.3	434.2	459.6	2,775.5	2,122.0
Apr	250.7	289.7	130.1	87.7	6.9	43.7	15.1	6.1	431.3	423.8	459.1	2,747.3	2,102.0
May	313.2	302.1	137.1	91.8	7.3	44.6	15.3	6.0	444.5	437.7	455.7	2,721.4	2,076.4
June	343.5	310.6	142.5	95.5	7.6	44.3	14.9	5.9	466.2	459.7	436.0	2,695.8	2,061.8
July	317.4	299.1	131.9	94.1	7.2	45.1	14.9	5.8	417.1	411.3	434.8	2,656.5	2,031.2
Aug	261.7	299.0	130.7	95.3	7.5	44.5	15.1	5.8	339.1	332.9	444.4	2,646.2	2,012.9
Sep	272.9	303.5	133.8	96.8	7.5	44.8	15.0	5.8	331.1	325.3	417.9	2,642.7	2,003.7
Oct	245.2	297.3	132.3	91.8	7.9	45.0	14.7	5.6	313.9	308.0	419.1	2,638.0	2,006.1
Nov	263.6	308.6	140.0	94.8	8.2	45.3	14.7	5.6	310.6	303.4	417.9	2,631.1	1,999.9
Dec	214.8	284.4	121.3	92.0	8.5	45.1	12.2	5.2	294.5	287.7	404.8	2,586.5	1,978.6
2014 Jan	236.4	283.2	120.9	89.6	8.6	45.1	13.4	5.6	287.8	279.3	422.6	2,581.8	1,969.1
Feb	272.5	293.8	127.5	91.0	9.1	45.5	15.2	5.6	306.7	295.2	421.8	2,556.5	1,956.7
Mar	267.2	300.4	128.2	95.9	9.1	45.4	16.4	5.5	293.9	285.4	404.1	2,558.8	1,961.5
Apr	256.5	297.4	130.2	91.0	9.3	45.4	16.0	5.4	285.0	276.2	409.3	2,544.4	1,948.4
May	289.6	305.3	130.0	99.0	9.4	45.4	16.2	5.3	271.3	262.6	405.2	2,563.1	1,948.7
June	315.9	310.5	133.6	101.3	9.4	45.3	15.6	5.2	299.4	285.1	392.2	2,533.2	1,919.9
July	292.8	310.0	132.6	101.9	9.2	45.0	16.1	5.2	302.3	293.4	409.0	2,524.2	1,898.5
Aug	246.4	314.2	138.0	100.3	9.3	45.0	16.4	5.2	305.3	296.2	412.7	2,521.4	1,888.8
Sep	240.6	310.8	132.1	102.9	9.1	45.2	16.4	5.1	287.6	272.5	414.4	2,526.9	1,878.0
Oct	236.2	303.1	133.1	95.0	9.3	45.1	15.5	5.1	313.2	302.7	428.9	2,489.0	1,839.8
Nov	262.2	315.0	142.1	97.0	10.1	44.9	15.8	5.1	310.5	301.4	434.4	2,474.9	1,824.9
Dec	217.9	307.2	137.9	96.9	11.5	39.6	16.2	5.1	297.0	290.7	417.1	2,498.0	1,815.2
2015 Jan	299.7	308.2	134.7	97.8	11.3	39.9	19.1	5.4	322.0	311.9	438.6	2,535.1	1,800.5
	German contribution (€ billion)												
2012 Dec	29.2	171.7	58.5	67.5	4.4	38.2	2.5	0.5	80.4	80.1	4.3	627.0	350.3
2013 Jan	30.1	157.0	47.6	64.2	4.4	37.7	2.5	0.6	83.1	82.6	4.4	610.1	345.1
Feb	27.2	155.1	46.0	63.8	4.4	37.7	2.6	0.6	99.7	98.7	4.6	620.0	346.1
Mar	25.4	161.9	44.8	70.8	4.9	38.1	2.6	0.6	97.0	95.8	4.7	610.5	338.4
Apr	22.7	161.0	45.7	69.1	5.1	37.8	2.6	0.6	98.9	96.6	5.3	605.6	340.1
May	27.8	167.2	47.2	72.6	5.4	38.5	2.8	0.6	98.0	96.7	5.3	593.2	330.7
June	28.9	172.9	50.1	75.6	5.4	38.3	2.9	0.6	113.3	112.8	4.8	581.3	326.4
July	27.1	166.7	45.7	73.5	5.0	39.0	2.9	0.6	89.8	89.7	4.8	574.5	322.1
Aug	18.2	168.9	46.8	74.8	5.1	38.4	3.0	0.7	3.0	2.8	4.8	567.8	316.2
Sep	19.2	169.2	46.4	75.4	5.1	38.6	3.0	0.7	3.7	3.2	4.3	566.6	316.5
Oct	16.0	162.9	43.2	71.9	5.4	38.8	3.0	0.7	7.7	6.2	4.0	565.3	316.5
Nov	16.5	170.4	46.4	76.0	5.4	38.9	2.9	0.7	3.9	3.3	3.9	561.7	314.1
Dec	19.0	166.1	44.4	73.8	5.7	38.7	2.9	0.7	6.7	5.1	3.9	550.0	309.5
2014 Jan	15.9	159.9	39.7	72.3	5.7	38.7	2.8	0.7	7.9	7.1	4.1	545.0	304.4
Feb	18.7	165.0	42.7	73.7	6.1	38.9	2.9	0.7	8.0	6.5	4.0	543.2	303.5
Mar	17.1	168.5	43.6	76.5	6.1	38.7	2.8	0.7	5.2	4.5	3.8	538.2	305.3
Apr	14.9	164.7	43.4	72.8	6.2	38.8	2.8	0.7	7.7	7.1	3.8	525.9	293.7
May	16.8	172.6	46.7	77.5	6.1	38.8	2.8	0.7	4.8	4.8	3.7	540.8	296.7
June	15.9	177.6	46.8	82.4	6.1	38.9	2.8	0.7	5.2	5.2	3.7	540.3	294.3
July	17.3	174.9	43.6	83.2	5.9	38.7	2.8	0.7	8.4	7.7	3.7	543.2	291.5
Aug	12.4	178.2	47.8	82.1	6.0	38.8	2.8	0.6	10.1	9.0	3.4	541.2	289.6
Sep	13.9	176.4	43.8	84.6	5.8	38.8	2.7	0.6	7.4	5.8	3.4	546.0	285.7
Oct	12.6	166.8	41.6	77.1	5.8	38.9	2.8	0.6	9.1	8.4	3.4	549.3	287.7
Nov	12.4	171.7	44.0	79.2	6.4	38.7	2.8	0.6	9.6	9.0	3.4	550.5	285.7
Dec	14.9	173.5	50.7	78.7	7.6	32.8	3.0	0.7	3.4	3.1	3.4	547.1	280.7
2015 Jan	20.5	168.2	44.5	79.5	7.5	32.9	3.1	0.7	6.8	4.7	3.4	565.6	283.1

***** Monetary financial institutions (MFIs) comprise banks (including building and loan associations), money market funds, and the European Central Bank and national central banks (the Eurosystem). **1** Source: ECB. **2** In Germany, only savings deposits. **3** Excluding holdings of MFIs; for the German contribution, excluding German MFIs' portfolios of securities issued by MFIs in the euro area. **4** In Germany, bank debt securities with maturities of up to one year are classed as money market paper. **5** Excluding liabilities arising from securities issued. **6** After deduction of inter-MFI participations. **7** The German contributions to the Eurosystem's monetary aggregates should on no account be interpreted as national monetary aggregates and are therefore not comparable with the erstwhile German money stocks M1, M2 or M3. **8** including DM banknotes still in circulation (see also footnote 4 on p 10•) **9** For the German contribution, the difference between the volume of

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issued (net) [3]									*Memo item*					
						Other liability items			Monetary aggregates [7] (From 2002, German contribution excludes currency in circulation)					
With maturities of														
up to 1 year [4]	over 1 year and up to 2 years	over 2 years	Liabilities to non-euro-area residents [5]	Capital and reserves [6]	Excess of inter-MFI liabilities	Total [8]	*of which* Intra-Eurosystem-liability/ claim related to banknote issue [9]		M1 [10]	M2 [11]	M3 [12]	Monetary capital formation [13]	Monetary liabilities of central governments (Post Office, Treasury) [14]	End of year/month
Euro area (€ billion) [1]														
87.4	93.8	2,672.1	3,793.4	2,396.4	– 52.1	4,729.6		–	5,168.7	9,045.7	9,809.1	7,578.1	120.0	2012 Dec
70.1	92.3	2,645.3	3,774.6	2,387.7	– 32.6	4,932.3		–	5,109.7	9,002.2	9,749.0	7,536.2	112.0	2013 Jan
61.7	88.1	2,657.0	3,812.7	2,378.2	– 38.3	4,982.2		–	5,119.4	9,018.5	9,757.0	7,529.6	111.1	Feb
59.2	84.1	2,632.1	3,798.4	2,414.3	– 58.9	4,955.7		–	5,170.4	9,081.9	9,805.9	7,557.1	110.9	Mar
62.5	81.6	2,603.3	3,832.7	2,390.1	– 43.1	5,122.2		–	5,239.7	9,128.2	9,855.0	7,495.4	111.2	Apr
62.9	74.4	2,584.0	3,755.3	2,377.8	– 54.6	4,825.3		–	5,265.1	9,139.4	9,856.7	7,467.3	111.9	May
66.1	68.4	2,561.4	3,651.9	2,335.9	– 63.2	4,507.1		–	5,309.1	9,165.4	9,850.1	7,398.0	113.0	June
62.1	66.7	2,527.8	3,599.3	2,365.2	– 59.0	4,411.0		–	5,299.1	9,155.4	9,841.6	7,387.5	116.5	July
66.1	63.1	2,517.0	3,572.1	2,391.4	– 61.5	4,310.0		–	5,325.6	9,185.4	9,885.0	7,394.1	115.9	Aug
76.0	58.3	2,508.5	3,500.7	2,372.9	– 45.1	4,381.9		–	5,347.6	9,181.4	9,846.9	7,362.1	116.6	Sep
63.7	58.1	2,516.1	3,511.7	2,376.8	– 45.1	4,436.5		–	5,384.3	9,200.5	9,859.6	7,374.6	114.3	Oct
63.7	53.4	2,514.0	3,474.2	2,357.7	– 51.9	4,421.8		–	5,432.0	9,236.1	9,888.4	7,354.4	117.2	Nov
38.5	49.1	2,498.9	3,309.4	2,340.0	– 62.6	3,953.9		–	5,444.5	9,249.4	9,852.3	7,310.4	114.1	Dec
42.3	43.9	2,495.6	3,474.4	2,384.6	– 44.8	4,108.0		–	5,418.6	9,224.2	9,854.7	7,354.6	107.7	2014 Jan
42.1	39.1	2,475.3	3,428.5	2,405.2	– 31.4	4,039.0		–	5,427.9	9,235.1	9,866.7	7,337.6	105.3	Feb
49.1	35.4	2,474.4	3,392.4	2,422.0	– 30.0	3,981.3		–	5,461.0	9,273.8	9,879.1	7,344.7	106.1	Mar
37.8	32.6	2,474.0	3,463.5	2,433.5	– 23.1	4,060.2		–	5,498.8	9,301.1	9,903.1	7,324.3	104.5	Apr
43.7	35.1	2,484.3	3,477.3	2,426.9	– 35.6	4,116.1		–	5,556.5	9,362.8	9,970.8	7,313.8	105.4	May
44.4	35.9	2,452.8	3,375.2	2,456.9	– 50.4	4,138.9		–	5,600.8	9,386.0	9,986.6	7,300.5	106.7	June
37.6	35.2	2,451.4	3,438.4	2,469.0	– 46.1	4,239.4		–	5,611.4	9,402.4	10,016.6	7,300.4	107.8	July
41.0	34.2	2,446.2	3,451.1	2,493.6	– 59.1	4,451.8		–	5,648.2	9,445.8	10,067.0	7,317.6	108.3	Aug
38.7	33.1	2,455.2	3,577.8	2,508.5	– 67.6	4,470.9		–	5,688.1	9,468.9	10,079.0	7,327.9	109.4	Sep
30.8	36.9	2,421.3	3,563.2	2,491.2	– 83.4	4,520.1		–	5,726.9	9,478.2	10,104.8	7,261.3	107.8	Oct
29.7	38.8	2,406.4	3,573.4	2,504.1	– 68.5	4,715.3		–	5,827.3	9,568.3	10,197.2	7,259.8	113.3	Nov
86.1	42.9	2,369.1	3,559.8	2,467.7	– 45.9	4,562.1		–	5,956.7	9,679.7	10,338.1	7,187.0	112.3	Dec
91.3	42.4	2,401.4	3,905.9	2,560.1	– 84.6	5,008.8		–	6,038.4	9,745.2	10,436.4	7,300.9	113.4	2015 Jan
German contribution (€ billion)														
16.0	10.3	600.7	780.0	510.2	– 759.5	1,784.7		200.3	1,365.7	2,231.6	2,342.6	1,981.4	–	2012 Dec
13.5	8.9	587.7	783.8	507.3	– 715.8	1,678.5		199.4	1,363.0	2,219.5	2,329.4	1,961.3	–	2013 Jan
14.1	10.0	595.9	782.3	503.7	– 719.8	1,668.6		201.4	1,366.1	2,215.9	2,344.3	1,960.1	–	Feb
13.5	8.9	588.1	768.2	517.6	– 696.6	1,681.0		203.8	1,356.6	2,208.8	2,332.9	1,964.6	–	Mar
14.9	9.5	581.1	764.4	508.0	– 696.5	1,689.7		204.1	1,386.1	2,236.6	2,365.2	1,942.0	–	Apr
14.6	9.0	569.7	740.9	506.2	– 693.4	1,591.5		207.0	1,391.0	2,242.0	2,368.8	1,926.8	–	May
12.3	8.5	560.5	731.8	495.3	– 696.9	1,503.6		208.2	1,390.3	2,235.9	2,374.8	1,904.0	–	June
15.8	8.8	549.9	722.1	503.6	– 681.6	1,490.7		211.5	1,399.1	2,240.8	2,360.0	1,895.9	–	July
13.9	7.8	546.1	719.8	509.3	– 696.3	1,422.0		214.8	1,412.2	2,256.5	2,286.0	1,892.6	–	Aug
12.0	7.8	546.8	676.5	502.4	– 696.5	1,465.4		218.0	1,424.8	2,262.2	2,290.0	1,883.0	–	Sep
13.6	8.2	543.6	677.2	501.5	– 694.8	1,472.8		220.2	1,451.6	2,287.9	2,321.4	1,875.6	–	Oct
12.5	6.3	542.9	679.5	495.3	– 679.0	1,472.5		221.7	1,462.1	2,296.5	2,323.1	1,868.1	–	Nov
8.9	5.9	535.1	610.6	490.2	– 652.9	1,422.0		224.3	1,448.1	2,293.9	2,319.4	1,853.4	–	Dec
8.4	4.3	532.3	658.5	498.1	– 638.1	1,439.4		234.7	1,453.9	2,294.3	2,319.0	1,856.7	–	2014 Jan
9.1	5.1	528.9	634.6	502.7	– 633.8	1,409.2		237.1	1,462.0	2,307.9	2,334.2	1,854.6	–	Feb
8.0	4.0	526.2	615.1	501.1	– 601.5	1,398.8		238.7	1,454.1	2,302.5	2,323.5	1,847.3	–	Mar
7.5	4.6	513.8	622.3	500.8	– 594.4	1,400.7		240.8	1,489.9	2,333.2	2,356.9	1,830.8	–	Apr
7.3	5.7	527.8	636.4	504.7	– 618.1	1,433.7		243.8	1,501.7	2,351.8	2,373.3	1,846.1	–	May
9.1	6.6	524.6	613.8	521.8	– 591.5	1,438.1		246.7	1,493.3	2,340.6	2,365.2	1,855.7	–	June
9.2	6.4	527.7	619.9	526.1	– 570.3	1,465.8		251.2	1,499.4	2,345.9	2,373.5	1,859.5	–	July
10.3	7.4	523.5	628.4	531.3	– 607.0	1,553.1		254.8	1,515.6	2,365.6	2,396.8	1,860.1	–	Aug
11.3	7.4	527.4	641.5	532.3	– 621.5	1,546.9		258.7	1,522.9	2,368.4	2,397.9	1,865.0	–	Sep
11.3	7.8	530.2	636.4	529.7	– 620.1	1,557.6		261.8	1,548.6	2,384.5	2,416.2	1,862.2	–	Oct
10.4	7.9	532.2	654.2	532.9	– 621.3	1,608.0		264.4	1,575.2	2,411.1	2,442.4	1,864.4	–	Nov
10.1	7.6	529.4	633.2	535.7	– 614.6	1,648.6		267.9	1,557.8	2,402.1	2,426.7	1,855.6	–	Dec
11.1	8.1	546.3	763.4	553.3	– 673.8	1,780.4		270.3	1,586.2	2,424.7	2,454.2	1,888.5	–	2015 Jan

euro banknotes actually issued by the Bundesbank and the amount disclosed in accordance with the accounting regime chosen by the Eurosystem (see also footnote 2 on banknote circulation in Table III.2). **10** Overnight deposits (excluding central governments' deposits), and (for the euro area) currency in circulation, central governments' overnight monetary liabilities, which are not included in the consolidated balance sheet. **11** M1 plus deposits with agreed maturities of up to 2 years and at agreed notice of up to 3 months (excluding central governments' deposits) and (for the euro area) central governments' monetary liabilities with such maturities. **12** M2 plus repo transactions, money market fund shares, money market paper and debt securities up to 2 years. **13** Deposits with agreed maturities of over 2 years and at agreed notice of over 3 months, debt securities with maturities of over 2 years, capital and reserves. **14** Non-existent in Germany.

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3 Banking system's liquidity position * Stocks

€ billion; period averages of daily positions

Reserve maintenance period ending in 1	Liquidity-providing factors					Liquidity-absorbing factors						
		Monetary policy operations of the Eurosystem										
	Net assets in gold and foreign currency	Main refinancing operations	Longer-term refinancing operations	Marginal lending facility	Other liquidity-providing operations 3	Deposit facility	Other liquidity-absorbing operations 4	Banknotes in circulation 5	Central government deposits	Other factors (net) 6	Credit institutions' current account balances (including minimum reserves) 7	Base money 8
Eurosystem 2												
2012 Oct	681.5	117.6	1 062.8	1.1	279.6	305.4	209.0	892.7	101.4	96.0	538.1	1 736.2
Nov	708.5	84.4	1 053.8	1.0	278.9	256.1	209.3	890.0	95.7	146.4	529.2	1 675.3
Dec	708.0	74.0	1 044.1	1.6	277.3	231.8	208.5	889.3	121.1	144.5	509.9	1 631.0
2013 Jan	683.9	78.2	1 036.8	3.7	276.8	238.4	206.6	903.5	100.1	141.7	489.0	1 630.9
Feb	656.5	127.5	960.3	0.3	273.4	184.3	207.8	883.4	90.8	185.6	466.3	1 534.0
Mar	655.7	130.5	843.2	0.9	269.9	145.3	205.5	880.5	78.8	187.1	403.0	1 428.8
Apr	656.8	123.7	782.9	0.5	269.1	133.8	205.5	889.2	89.7	168.7	346.0	1 369.0
May	657.3	113.0	749.9	0.9	265.7	114.5	204.3	897.1	82.5	166.2	322.2	1 333.8
June	656.0	104.7	728.4	0.5	259.9	90.5	199.4	904.1	83.1	172.3	300.3	1 294.9
July	615.9	108.8	708.0	1.3	256.4	92.1	195.0	909.3	92.5	115.1	286.5	1 287.9
Aug	532.3	104.5	698.6	0.2	255.0	82.6	195.5	917.6	97.1	28.2	269.6	1 269.8
Sep	531.8	97.5	692.3	0.4	251.1	79.2	191.7	920.4	72.6	34.7	274.5	1 274.2
Oct	538.2	96.2	674.6	0.2	248.2	58.9	189.8	918.3	80.1	41.9	268.4	1 245.6
Nov	550.9	90.8	652.4	0.1	244.6	52.1	187.2	920.4	70.9	63.4	244.9	1 217.4
Dec	550.8	91.6	625.3	0.1	241.5	48.3	177.4	925.9	80.2	57.2	220.2	1 194.4
2014 Jan	532.7	129.3	592.1	0.3	236.8	60.1	149.3	947.9	61.2	24.7	248.1	1 256.0
Feb	510.3	105.4	576.4	0.3	232.5	42.1	164.4	931.8	83.4	– 12.9	216.0	1 190.0
Mar	510.4	91.8	570.4	0.3	229.5	29.5	175.5	932.1	81.8	– 17.6	201.1	1 162.8
Apr	518.9	105.4	534.6	0.7	227.5	29.2	175.5	938.4	73.8	– 25.0	195.2	1 162.8
May	536.4	128.1	519.6	0.2	222.6	29.7	152.4	947.9	87.7	– 2.1	191.2	1 168.8
June	536.8	148.1	507.8	0.1	215.9	28.3	126.0	951.0	111.6	– 0.5	192.3	1 171.6
July	540.0	111.7	460.1	0.1	209.0	23.9	27.2	958.1	110.0	– 12.5	214.3	1 196.3
Aug	547.6	106.6	414.7	0.3	202.2	24.6	0.0	967.6	92.4	– 23.6	210.2	1 202.5
Sep	547.8	114.7	387.4	0.2	196.3	25.2	0.0	971.8	66.2	– 27.0	210.1	1 207.1
Oct	552.0	98.9	398.2	0.2	194.7	24.3	0.0	971.3	78.4	– 22.6	192.6	1 188.2
Nov	562.0	95.2	412.5	0.3	193.3	31.0	0.0	973.6	76.1	– 5.7	188.3	1 192.8
Dec	564.3	103.3	396.1	0.2	202.0	27.3	0.0	979.8	71.7	1.8	185.4	1 192.5
2015 Jan	576.4	119.0	454.4	0.5	217.9	50.2	0.0	1 005.5	66.3	9.8	236.3	1 292.1
Feb	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Deutsche Bundesbank												
2012 Oct	181.8	1.7	74.5	0.2	68.7	108.2	124.0	223.4	6.8	– 325.3	189.9	521.4
Nov	190.7	1.9	72.9	0.1	68.2	76.7	126.2	222.4	7.1	– 291.0	192.5	491.5
Dec	190.8	1.8	70.5	0.2	67.5	61.3	124.6	222.0	8.9	– 277.5	191.5	474.8
2013 Jan	185.1	2.1	69.7	0.1	67.4	56.1	117.2	225.3	10.0	– 242.5	158.2	439.6
Feb	176.8	0.7	58.9	0.0	66.3	34.2	109.9	219.2	2.5	– 207.3	144.2	397.5
Mar	176.4	0.7	34.9	0.0	65.3	30.4	107.3	219.7	2.1	– 203.2	121.0	371.1
Apr	177.1	0.1	21.8	0.0	65.0	24.4	95.7	221.6	1.9	– 189.2	109.7	355.8
May	176.7	0.3	16.2	0.0	64.3	26.8	88.2	223.2	1.0	– 182.0	100.3	350.4
June	175.4	0.2	13.0	0.0	63.0	23.9	93.0	226.0	0.7	– 189.0	97.0	346.9
July	161.3	0.6	11.7	0.0	61.8	26.1	79.2	226.3	0.8	– 194.0	97.0	349.4
Aug	136.9	0.6	11.3	0.0	61.1	27.5	73.6	228.6	0.7	– 207.5	87.0	343.1
Sep	136.3	0.2	10.6	0.0	59.7	22.3	72.2	229.2	0.7	– 206.2	88.7	340.3
Oct	138.3	0.2	10.1	0.1	58.9	15.8	63.4	229.2	1.3	– 195.0	92.9	337.9
Nov	142.5	0.2	8.8	0.0	57.9	15.1	61.4	229.0	1.6	– 176.2	78.4	322.5
Dec	142.3	0.3	8.5	0.0	57.0	12.9	66.7	230.0	1.4	– 170.0	67.1	310.0
2014 Jan	136.4	18.3	13.2	0.1	56.0	11.0	60.2	231.1	1.9	– 155.2	75.1	317.1
Feb	128.8	13.5	10.7	0.0	54.7	9.5	58.7	219.4	1.3	– 145.3	64.1	293.0
Mar	128.5	4.5	11.0	0.1	53.8	9.1	52.5	221.0	1.4	– 147.1	61.0	291.1
Apr	130.9	5.5	11.6	0.1	53.2	8.2	49.0	222.6	1.4	– 138.4	58.6	289.4
May	136.2	19.3	13.8	0.1	52.0	7.9	46.8	225.0	1.4	– 115.6	55.8	288.7
June	136.2	28.4	18.1	0.0	50.7	7.7	41.9	226.0	1.4	– 99.0	55.5	289.2
July	136.9	10.0	16.1	0.1	48.9	8.4	9.0	228.1	1.6	– 99.6	64.6	301.0
Aug	138.8	6.2	11.3	0.0	47.4	6.8	0.0	230.5	0.9	– 96.7	62.3	299.5
Sep	138.7	4.1	10.0	0.1	45.9	8.7	0.0	231.1	1.0	– 103.5	61.5	301.2
Oct	139.4	5.6	12.2	0.0	45.5	9.0	0.0	231.7	1.2	– 102.2	63.1	303.8
Nov	141.0	8.0	14.9	0.1	45.5	9.0	0.0	231.4	0.9	– 89.5	57.6	298.0
Dec	140.8	6.6	16.6	0.0	47.3	9.3	0.0	232.4	0.9	– 86.7	55.5	297.2
2015 Jan	141.9	13.4	30.7	0.0	50.4	14.9	0.0	237.3	1.2	– 92.3	75.3	327.5
Feb	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

Discrepancies may arise from rounding. * The banking system's liquidity position is defined as the current account holdings in euro of euro-area credit institutions with the Eurosystem. Amounts are derived from the consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem and the financial statement of the Bundesbank. **1** Figures are daily averages for the reserve maintenance period ending in the month indicated. Following the changeover in the frequency of Governing Council monetary policy meetings to a six-week cycle, a reserve maintenance period no longer ends in every month. No figures are available in such cases. **2** Source: ECB. **3** Includes liquidity provided under the Eurosystem's covered bond purchase programme and the Eurosystem's securities markets programme. **4** From Aug. 2009, includes liquidity absorbed as a result of the Eurosystem's foreign exchange swap operations. **5** From 2002, euro banknotes and other banknotes which have been issued by the national central banks of the Eurosystem and which are still in circulation. In accordance with the accounting procedure chosen by the Eurosystem for the issue of euro banknotes, 8% of the total

II Overall monetary survey in the euro area

Flows

Liquidity-providing factors					Liquidity-absorbing factors							
	Monetary policy operations of the Eurosystem											
Net assets in gold and foreign currency	Main refinancing operations	Longer-term refinancing operations	Marginal lending facility	Other liquidity-providing operations 3	Deposit facility	Other liquidity-absorbing operations 4	Banknotes in circulation 5	Central government deposits	Other factors (net) 6	Credit institutions' current account balances (including minimum reserves) 7	Base money 8	Reserve maintenance period ending in 1
Eurosystem 2												
+ 4.7	– 13.0	– 14.0	+ 0.3	– 0.1	– 23.2	– 1.5	– 4.9	– 5.6	+ 15.0	– 1.9	– 30.0	2012 Oct
+ 27.0	– 33.2	– 9.0	– 0.1	– 0.7	– 49.3	+ 0.3	– 2.7	– 5.7	+ 50.4	– 8.9	– 60.9	Nov
– 0.5	– 10.4	– 9.7	+ 0.6	– 1.6	– 24.3	– 0.8	– 0.7	+ 25.4	– 1.9	– 19.3	– 44.3	Dec
– 24.1	+ 4.2	– 7.3	+ 2.1	– 0.5	+ 6.6	– 1.9	+ 14.2	– 21.0	– 2.8	– 20.9	– 0.1	2013 Jan
– 27.4	+ 49.3	– 76.5	– 3.4	– 3.4	– 54.1	+ 1.2	– 20.1	– 9.3	+ 43.9	– 22.7	– 96.9	Feb
– 0.8	+ 3.0	– 117.1	+ 0.6	– 3.5	– 39.0	– 2.3	– 2.9	– 12.0	+ 1.5	– 63.3	– 105.2	Mar
+ 1.1	– 6.8	– 60.3	– 0.4	– 0.8	– 11.5	± 0.0	+ 8.7	+ 10.9	– 18.4	– 57.0	– 59.8	Apr
+ 0.5	– 10.7	– 33.0	+ 0.4	– 3.4	– 19.3	– 1.2	+ 7.9	– 7.2	– 2.5	– 23.8	– 35.2	May
– 1.3	– 8.3	– 21.5	– 0.4	– 5.8	– 24.0	– 4.9	+ 7.0	+ 0.6	+ 6.1	– 21.9	– 38.9	June
– 40.1	+ 4.1	– 20.4	+ 0.8	– 3.5	+ 1.6	– 4.4	+ 5.2	+ 9.4	– 57.2	– 13.8	– 7.0	July
– 83.6	– 4.3	– 9.4	– 1.1	– 1.4	– 9.5	+ 0.5	+ 8.3	+ 4.6	– 86.9	– 16.9	– 18.1	Aug
– 0.5	– 7.0	– 6.3	+ 0.2	– 3.9	– 3.4	– 3.8	+ 2.8	– 24.5	+ 6.5	+ 4.9	+ 4.4	Sep
+ 6.4	– 1.3	– 17.7	– 0.2	– 2.9	– 20.3	– 1.9	– 2.1	+ 7.5	+ 7.2	– 6.1	– 28.6	Oct
+ 12.7	– 5.4	– 22.2	– 0.1	– 3.6	– 6.8	– 2.6	+ 2.1	– 9.2	+ 21.5	– 23.5	– 28.2	Nov
– 0.1	+ 0.8	– 27.1	+ 0.0	– 3.1	– 3.8	– 9.8	+ 5.5	+ 9.3	– 6.2	– 24.7	– 23.0	Dec
– 18.1	+ 37.7	– 33.2	+ 0.2	– 4.7	+ 11.8	– 28.1	+ 22.0	– 19.0	– 32.5	+ 27.9	+ 61.6	2014 Jan
– 22.4	– 23.9	– 15.7	+ 0.0	– 4.3	– 18.0	+ 15.1	– 16.1	+ 22.2	– 37.6	– 32.1	– 66.0	Feb
+ 0.1	– 13.6	– 6.0	+ 0.0	– 3.0	– 12.6	+ 11.1	+ 0.3	– 1.6	– 4.7	– 14.9	– 27.2	Mar
+ 8.5	+ 13.6	– 35.8	+ 0.4	– 2.0	– 0.3	± 0.0	+ 6.3	– 8.0	– 7.4	– 5.9	+ 0.0	Apr
+ 17.5	+ 22.7	– 15.0	– 0.5	– 4.9	+ 0.5	– 23.1	+ 9.5	+ 13.9	+ 22.9	– 4.0	+ 6.0	May
+ 0.4	+ 20.0	– 11.8	– 0.1	– 6.7	– 1.4	– 26.4	+ 3.1	+ 23.9	+ 1.6	+ 1.1	+ 2.8	June
+ 3.2	– 36.4	– 47.7	+ 0.0	– 6.9	– 4.4	– 98.8	+ 7.1	– 1.6	– 12.0	+ 22.0	+ 24.7	July
+ 7.6	– 5.1	– 45.4	+ 0.2	– 6.8	+ 0.7	– 27.2	+ 9.5	– 17.6	– 11.1	– 4.1	+ 6.2	Aug
+ 0.2	+ 8.1	– 27.3	– 0.1	– 5.9	+ 0.6	± 0.0	+ 4.2	– 26.2	– 3.4	– 0.1	+ 4.6	Sep
+ 4.2	– 15.8	+ 10.8	± 0.0	– 1.6	– 0.9	± 0.0	– 0.5	+ 12.2	+ 4.4	– 17.5	– 18.9	Oct
+ 10.0	– 3.7	+ 14.3	+ 0.1	– 1.4	+ 6.7	± 0.0	+ 2.3	– 2.3	+ 16.9	– 4.3	+ 4.6	Nov
+ 2.3	+ 8.1	– 16.4	– 0.1	+ 8.7	– 3.7	± 0.0	+ 6.2	– 4.4	+ 7.5	– 2.9	– 0.3	Dec
+ 12.1	+ 15.7	+ 58.3	+ 0.3	+ 15.9	+ 22.9	± 0.0	+ 25.7	– 5.4	+ 8.0	+ 50.9	+ 99.6	2015 Jan
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	Feb
Deutsche Bundesbank												
+ 4.1	+ 0.1	– 0.9	+ 0.1	+ 0.1	– 3.9	– 10.6	– 1.3	+ 0.8	+ 23.8	– 5.3	– 10.5	2012 Oct
+ 8.9	+ 0.2	– 1.6	– 0.1	– 0.5	– 31.5	+ 2.2	– 1.0	+ 0.3	+ 34.4	+ 2.6	– 29.9	Nov
+ 0.2	– 0.1	– 2.4	+ 0.1	– 0.7	– 15.3	– 1.6	– 0.4	+ 1.8	+ 13.5	– 1.0	– 16.7	Dec
– 5.8	+ 0.3	– 0.8	– 0.1	– 0.1	– 5.2	– 7.4	+ 3.3	+ 1.1	+ 35.0	– 33.3	– 35.2	2013 Jan
– 8.3	– 1.3	– 10.8	– 0.1	– 1.0	– 21.9	– 7.3	– 6.1	– 7.5	+ 35.3	– 14.0	– 42.1	Feb
– 0.3	– 0.1	– 23.9	– 0.0	– 1.0	– 3.8	– 2.6	+ 0.6	– 0.4	+ 4.1	– 23.2	– 26.4	Mar
+ 0.7	– 0.5	– 13.1	+ 0.0	– 0.3	– 6.0	– 11.6	+ 1.9	– 0.3	+ 14.0	– 11.2	– 15.4	Apr
– 0.4	+ 0.2	– 5.6	– 0.0	– 0.8	+ 2.5	– 7.6	+ 1.6	– 0.8	+ 7.2	– 9.4	– 5.4	May
– 1.3	– 0.2	– 3.2	+ 0.0	– 1.3	– 3.0	+ 4.8	+ 2.8	– 0.3	– 7.0	– 3.3	– 3.5	June
– 14.2	+ 0.4	– 1.3	– 0.0	– 1.1	+ 2.3	– 13.8	+ 0.3	+ 0.1	– 5.0	– 0.0	+ 2.5	July
– 24.4	+ 0.0	– 0.5	– 0.0	– 0.7	+ 1.4	– 5.6	+ 2.3	– 0.2	– 13.5	– 9.9	– 6.3	Aug
– 0.5	– 0.4	– 0.7	+ 0.0	– 1.4	– 5.2	– 1.4	+ 0.6	– 0.0	+ 1.3	+ 1.7	– 2.8	Sep
+ 2.0	+ 0.0	– 0.5	+ 0.0	– 0.8	– 6.6	– 8.8	– 0.0	+ 0.6	+ 11.2	+ 4.2	– 2.4	Oct
+ 4.2	– 0.0	– 1.3	– 0.0	– 1.0	– 0.7	– 2.0	– 0.2	+ 0.3	+ 18.8	– 14.5	– 15.3	Nov
– 0.2	+ 0.2	– 0.2	– 0.0	– 0.9	– 2.2	+ 5.3	+ 1.0	– 0.2	+ 6.2	– 11.2	– 12.5	Dec
– 5.9	+ 17.9	+ 4.7	+ 0.0	– 1.0	– 1.9	– 6.5	+ 1.1	+ 0.5	+ 14.8	+ 7.9	+ 7.1	2014 Jan
– 7.6	– 4.7	– 2.5	– 0.0	– 1.3	– 1.5	– 1.4	– 11.6	– 0.5	+ 9.9	– 11.0	– 24.1	Feb
– 0.3	– 9.1	+ 0.3	+ 0.0	– 0.9	– 0.4	– 6.3	+ 1.6	+ 0.0	– 1.8	– 3.1	– 1.9	Mar
+ 2.4	+ 1.1	+ 0.7	+ 0.0	– 0.6	– 0.9	– 3.5	+ 1.6	+ 0.1	+ 8.7	– 2.4	– 1.7	Apr
+ 5.3	+ 13.7	+ 2.2	– 0.0	– 1.2	– 0.3	– 2.2	+ 2.4	– 0.0	+ 22.8	– 2.8	– 0.7	May
+ 0.0	+ 9.1	+ 4.3	– 0.0	– 1.4	– 0.2	– 5.0	+ 1.0	– 0.0	+ 16.6	– 0.3	+ 0.5	June
+ 0.7	– 18.4	– 2.0	+ 0.1	– 1.7	+ 0.7	– 32.9	+ 2.1	+ 0.2	– 0.6	+ 9.1	+ 11.9	July
+ 1.9	– 3.8	– 4.8	– 0.1	– 1.5	– 1.6	– 9.0	+ 2.4	– 0.6	+ 2.9	– 2.3	– 1.5	Aug
– 0.2	– 2.0	– 1.3	+ 0.1	– 1.6	+ 1.9	± 0.0	+ 0.6	+ 0.1	– 6.8	– 0.7	+ 1.7	Sep
+ 0.8	+ 1.5	+ 2.2	– 0.0	– 0.4	+ 0.4	± 0.0	+ 0.6	+ 0.2	+ 1.3	+ 1.6	+ 2.5	Oct
+ 1.5	+ 2.4	+ 2.7	+ 0.1	– 0.1	+ 0.0	± 0.0	– 0.3	– 0.3	+ 12.7	– 5.5	– 5.8	Nov
– 0.1	– 1.4	+ 1.7	– 0.1	+ 1.8	+ 0.3	± 0.0	+ 1.0	– 0.0	+ 2.8	– 2.0	– 0.8	Dec
+ 1.1	+ 6.7	+ 14.1	– 0.0	+ 3.1	+ 5.6	± 0.0	+ 4.9	+ 0.3	– 5.7	+ 19.8	+ 30.4	2015 Jan
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	Feb

value of the euro banknotes in circulation are allocated on a monthly basis to the ECB. The counterpart of this adjustment is shown under "Other factors". The remaining 92% of the value of the euro banknotes in circulation is allocated, likewise on a monthly basis, to the NCBs, with each NCB showing in its balance sheet the percentage of the euro banknotes in circulation that corresponds to its paid-up share in the ECB's capital. The difference between the value of the euro banknotes allocated to an NCB and the value of the euro banknotes which that NCB has put into circulation is likewise shown under "Other factors". From 2003 euro banknotes only. **6** Remaining items in the consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem and the financial statement of the Bundesbank. **7** Equal to the difference between the sum of liquidity-providing factors and the sum of liquidity-absorbing factors. **8** Calculated as the sum of the "deposit facility", "banknotes in circulation" and "credit institutions' current account holdings".

III Consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem

1 Assets *

€ billion

On reporting date/ End of month [1]		Total assets	Gold and gold receivables	Claims on non-euro area residents denominated in foreign currency			Claims on euro area residents denominated in foreign currency	Claims on non-euro area residents denominated in euro		
				Total	Receivables from the IMF	Balances with banks, security investments, external loans and other external assets		Total	Balances with banks, security investments and loans	Claims arising from the credit facility under ERM II
Eurosystem [2]										
2014 July	4	2,070.3	334.4	249.6	81.7	167.9	23.3	18.2	18.2	–
	11	2,057.1	334.4	249.2	81.6	167.6	22.9	18.5	18.5	–
	18	2,062.5	334.4	248.2	81.6	166.5	24.5	19.5	19.5	–
	25	2,044.3	334.4	248.1	81.6	166.5	25.2	18.6	18.6	–
Aug	1	2,059.7	334.4	248.5	81.7	166.8	24.9	18.5	18.5	–
	8	2,025.3	334.4	249.4	81.1	168.3	24.5	18.9	18.9	–
	15	2,023.2	334.4	249.1	80.8	168.3	24.5	19.3	19.3	–
	22	2,013.0	334.4	249.3	80.8	168.5	24.3	19.9	19.9	–
	29	2,038.7	334.4	249.5	80.9	168.7	24.2	20.9	20.9	–
Sep	5	2,012.1	334.4	249.8	81.4	168.4	25.4	21.8	21.8	–
	12	2,003.8	334.4	250.1	81.4	168.7	25.7	21.1	21.1	–
	19	1,988.2	334.4	247.3	81.1	166.1	26.9	19.9	19.9	–
	26	2,038.2	334.4	248.4	81.2	167.2	26.5	20.5	20.5	–
Oct	3	2,053.7	334.5	263.1	84.5	178.6	27.8	20.6	20.6	–
	10	2,042.7	334.5	263.0	84.3	178.7	28.7	21.1	21.1	–
	17	2,029.7	334.5	262.4	84.3	178.1	27.2	20.7	20.7	–
	24	2,032.8	334.5	263.6	84.3	179.3	26.9	21.2	21.2	–
	31	2,052.1	334.5	262.9	84.3	178.6	27.9	22.3	22.3	–
Nov	7	2,029.7	334.5	261.4	83.9	177.5	28.1	22.1	22.1	–
	14	2,028.2	334.5	263.2	83.8	179.4	28.0	22.6	22.6	–
	21	2,033.2	334.5	264.4	83.6	180.8	28.1	19.7	19.7	–
	28	2,053.9	334.5	264.3	83.6	180.6	28.8	18.7	18.7	–
2014 Dec	5	2,038.1	334.5	267.5	83.7	183.8	27.5	18.2	18.2	–
	12	2,034.7	334.5	266.3	81.2	185.1	27.1	19.4	19.4	–
	19	2,134.8	334.5	265.9	80.3	185.6	27.8	19.3	19.3	–
	26	2,150.2	334.5	266.1	80.3	185.8	28.7	19.4	19.4	–
2015 Jan	2	2,216.0	343.8	273.5	81.5	192.0	28.7	19.7	19.7	–
	9	2,168.8	343.9	272.6	81.5	191.2	32.6	20.4	20.4	–
	16	2,158.2	343.9	273.0	81.3	191.7	33.2	19.5	19.5	–
	23	2,159.8	343.9	274.9	81.3	193.6	32.9	18.5	18.5	–
	30	2,182.0	343.9	273.7	81.3	192.5	35.5	18.6	18.6	–
Feb	6	2,150.2	343.9	273.1	79.9	193.2	34.2	19.8	19.8	–
	13	2,153.1	343.9	273.8	79.7	194.1	36.7	19.3	19.3	–
	20	2,167.8	343.9	275.7	79.7	195.9	35.4	20.7	20.7	–
	27	2,155.8	343.9	278.5	79.4	199.1	33.0	22.0	22.0	–
Mar	6	2,134.8	343.9	277.4	79.5	197.9	35.1	22.9	22.9	–
Deutsche Bundesbank										
2013 Apr		916.9	136.5	52.0	22.4	29.7	2.8	–	–	–
May		891.6	136.5	52.0	22.3	29.7	0.8	–	–	–
June		839.7	100.3	50.5	21.9	28.6	0.9	–	–	–
July		838.1	100.3	49.9	21.9	28.0	0.7	–	–	–
Aug		832.2	100.3	50.3	21.5	28.8	0.2	–	–	–
Sep		835.0	107.8	48.6	21.3	27.3	0.4	–	–	–
Oct		823.5	107.7	48.4	21.1	27.3	0.1	–	–	–
Nov		806.9	107.7	48.8	21.0	27.8	0.1	–	–	–
Dec		800.7	94.9	48.9	20.8	28.1	0.1	–	–	–
2014 Jan		768.1	94.9	48.5	20.8	27.7	0.1	–	–	–
Feb		752.9	94.9	47.6	20.6	27.1	0.1	–	–	–
Mar		737.8	102.2	48.4	20.6	27.9	0.1	–	–	–
Apr		770.6	102.2	48.6	21.0	27.6	0.1	–	–	–
May		764.9	102.1	48.0	20.9	27.0	0.1	–	–	–
June		725.5	104.6	48.4	20.8	27.6	0.1	–	–	–
July		697.1	104.6	48.8	20.9	27.9	0.1	–	–	–
Aug		712.0	104.6	49.0	20.8	28.2	0.1	–	–	–
Sep		738.3	104.6	51.7	21.9	29.9	–	–	–	–
Oct		736.9	104.6	51.9	21.7	30.2	–	–	–	–
Nov		734.0	104.6	52.0	21.6	30.3	–	–	–	–
Dec		771.0	107.5	51.3	20.6	30.6	–	–	–	–
2015 Jan		805.7	107.5	51.6	20.4	31.2	–	–	–	–
Feb		800.2	107.5	51.9	20.3	31.6	–	–	–	–

* The consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem comprises the financial statement of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the financial statements of the national central banks of the euro area member states (NCBs). The balance sheet items for foreign currency, securities, gold and financial instruments are valued at the

III Consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem

Lending to euro area credit institutions related to monetary policy operations denominated in euro							Other claims on euro area credit institutions denominated in euro	Securities of euro area residents in euro			General government debt denominated in euro	Other assets	On reporting date/ End of month [1]
Total	Main refinancing operations	Longer-term refinancing operations	Fine-tuning reverse operations	Structural reverse operations	Marginal lending facility	Credits related to margin calls		Total	Securities held for monetary policy purposes	Other securities			
Eurosystem [2]													
545.9	97.1	448.8	–	–	–	–	61.6	566.9	205.2	361.7	26.7	243.6	2014 July 4
529.2	94.2	434.8	–	–	0.2	–	60.9	568.8	204.8	364.0	26.7	246.5	11
531.7	99.9	431.1	–	–	0.7	0.0	68.3	565.8	204.1	361.7	26.7	243.4	18
507.8	97.9	409.6	–	–	0.4	–	74.2	566.3	203.5	362.8	26.7	242.8	25
533.5	133.3	400.2	–	–	0.0	0.0	74.2	556.8	199.0	357.8	26.7	242.1	Aug 1
504.9	107.9	397.0	–	–	0.0	–	66.1	559.1	199.0	360.1	26.7	241.1	8
501.0	108.2	392.8	–	–	0.0	–	66.8	560.9	199.0	361.9	26.7	240.5	15
497.6	107.6	390.0	–	–	0.0	0.1	61.9	557.7	195.4	362.3	26.7	241.1	22
517.6	131.8	384.9	–	–	0.9	–	62.6	559.9	195.4	364.4	26.7	242.9	29
492.7	111.2	381.4	–	–	0.1	0.0	62.4	560.7	195.4	365.3	26.7	238.1	Sep 5
483.1	110.7	372.3	–	–	0.2	–	63.5	561.6	195.1	366.5	26.7	237.5	12
472.3	105.7	366.3	–	–	0.3	–	63.3	561.4	194.5	366.9	26.7	236.0	19
520.2	90.3	429.6	–	–	0.3	0.0	66.3	561.8	194.5	367.3	26.7	233.3	26
513.9	89.1	424.7	–	–	0.1	–	67.0	561.9	194.6	367.2	26.7	238.1	Oct 3
506.8	84.2	422.4	–	–	0.1	–	65.7	561.1	194.0	367.0	26.7	235.1	10
499.2	82.5	416.6	–	–	0.1	–	65.6	559.1	191.2	367.9	26.7	234.3	17
503.9	92.9	410.8	–	–	0.2	0.0	60.8	561.2	192.4	368.8	26.7	234.0	24
527.6	118.2	408.5	–	–	1.0	–	59.8	557.1	192.9	364.2	26.7	233.1	31
502.8	98.2	404.6	–	–	0.0	–	57.7	560.5	195.6	365.0	26.7	235.8	Nov 7
496.7	98.4	398.2	–	–	0.1	–	56.0	563.0	198.0	365.0	26.7	237.3	14
499.0	102.6	396.2	–	–	0.0	0.1	61.0	563.4	199.0	364.5	26.7	236.3	21
513.8	114.3	398.8	–	–	0.7	–	58.1	570.2	204.2	366.1	26.7	238.8	28
491.1	98.0	392.9	–	–	0.1	–	58.2	574.8	207.5	367.2	26.7	239.7	2014 Dec 5
484.2	105.2	378.9	–	–	0.1	–	54.6	579.9	211.5	368.4	26.7	241.9	12
579.4	99.0	480.4	–	–	0.0	–	58.0	585.9	215.5	370.4	26.7	237.2	19
592.5	119.2	473.3	–	–	0.0	–	58.7	587.5	216.9	370.6	26.7	236.1	26
629.7	156.1	473.3	–	–	0.3	0.0	60.4	592.4	217.2	375.2	26.7	241.0	2015 Jan 2
585.6	112.3	473.3	–	–	0.0	0.0	58.4	593.2	218.9	374.3	26.7	235.4	9
573.8	114.0	459.1	–	–	0.7	–	59.0	594.6	220.7	373.9	26.7	234.5	16
572.1	125.3	445.3	–	–	1.6	–	58.7	599.6	224.7	374.9	26.7	232.5	23
579.6	163.8	415.6	–	–	0.2	–	62.1	603.4	227.1	376.3	26.7	238.4	30
557.1	151.8	404.8	–	–	0.5	0.0	64.6	601.0	226.6	374.4	26.7	229.9	Feb 6
500.2	104.5	395.4	–	–	0.2	–	116.3	606.5	229.4	377.1	26.7	229.8	13
502.5	122.1	379.2	–	–	1.2	0.0	121.9	610.1	231.5	378.6	26.7	231.0	20
488.7	165.4	323.0	–	–	0.3	0.0	124.9	611.6	234.2	377.4	26.7	226.6	27
470.9	147.9	323.0	–	–	0.0	0.0	121.4	613.9	237.1	376.7	26.7	222.8	Mar 6
Deutsche Bundesbank													
14.8	0.5	14.3	–	–	0.0	–	5.8	63.8	63.8	–	4.4	636.7	2013 Apr
12.3	0.1	12.1	–	–	0.0	–	4.9	62.9	62.9	–	4.4	617.8	May
12.8	0.9	11.8	–	–	0.0	–	4.8	61.9	61.9	–	4.4	604.1	June
12.2	1.0	11.2	–	–	0.0	–	4.5	61.1	61.1	–	4.4	605.0	July
10.8	0.2	10.6	–	–	0.0	–	4.6	59.5	59.5	–	4.4	602.1	Aug
10.8	0.2	9.9	–	–	0.7	–	4.9	58.6	58.6	–	4.4	599.5	Sep
9.3	0.2	8.7	–	–	0.4	–	5.0	57.6	57.6	–	4.4	591.0	Oct
9.2	0.7	8.4	–	–	0.1	–	5.1	57.0	57.0	–	4.4	574.5	Nov
52.1	38.2	13.8	–	–	0.1	–	4.7	55.8	55.8	–	4.4	539.8	Dec
31.3	20.3	11.0	–	–	–	–	5.1	54.2	54.2	–	4.4	529.5	2014 Jan
18.2	7.1	11.0	–	–	0.1	–	5.7	53.8	53.8	–	4.4	528.2	Feb
24.4	10.7	11.0	–	–	2.7	–	5.6	53.6	53.6	–	4.4	499.0	Mar
51.4	38.2	12.9	–	–	0.2	–	5.7	51.6	51.6	–	4.4	506.7	Apr
60.0	41.5	18.5	–	–	0.0	–	3.8	50.7	50.7	–	4.4	495.8	May
26.1	7.4	16.1	–	–	2.6	–	2.3	49.0	49.0	–	4.4	490.6	June
17.8	7.1	10.5	–	–	0.2	–	1.6	47.4	47.4	–	4.4	472.3	July
14.3	4.0	9.7	–	–	0.6	–	1.1	45.7	45.7	–	4.4	492.7	Aug
21.6	6.3	14.9	–	–	0.3	–	1.8	45.5	45.5	–	4.4	508.6	Sep
31.3	15.2	15.2	–	–	0.9	–	1.7	45.3	45.3	–	4.4	497.5	Oct
27.2	8.5	18.5	–	–	0.2	–	1.5	47.7	47.7	–	4.4	496.6	Nov
65.6	32.5	32.9	–	–	0.1	–	2.0	50.2	50.2	–	4.4	490.0	Dec
43.1	11.2	31.9	–	–	0.0	–	3.2	52.1	52.1	–	4.4	543.7	2015 Jan
37.3	8.6	28.7	–	–	0.0	–	4.6	52.9	52.9	–	4.4	541.5	Feb

end of the quarter. **1** For the Eurosystem: financial statements for specific weekly dates; for the Bundesbank: end of month financial statement. **2** Source: ECB.

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2 Liabilities *

€ billion

On reporting date/ End of month 1		Total liabilities	Banknotes in circulation 2	Liabilities to euro area credit institutions related to monetary policy operations denominated in euro						Other liabilities to euro-area credit institutions denominated in euro	Debt certificates issued	Liabilities to other euro area residents denominated in euro		
				Total	Current accounts (covering the minimum reserve system)	Deposit facility	Fixed-term deposits	Fine-tuning reverse operations	Deposits related to margin calls			Total	General government	Other liabilities
Eurosystem 4														
2014 July	4	2,070.3	963.9	241.5	214.2	27.3	–	–	0.0	3.7	–	141.1	100.3	40.9
	11	2,057.1	965.2	226.3	206.2	20.2	–	–	0.0	4.2	–	144.1	107.2	36.8
	18	2,062.5	965.6	233.9	211.1	22.7	–	–	0.1	5.0	–	140.9	103.2	37.7
	25	2,044.3	965.5	217.7	196.4	21.3	–	–	0.0	4.8	–	139.9	107.1	32.8
Aug	1	2,059.7	971.4	263.9	219.7	44.1	–	–	0.0	4.8	–	105.8	70.9	34.9
	8	2,025.3	973.4	235.9	214.5	21.1	–	–	0.3	5.0	–	96.7	66.6	30.2
	15	2,023.2	975.6	241.5	221.6	19.8	–	–	0.0	4.8	–	86.3	57.7	28.6
	22	2,013.0	970.3	230.9	205.2	25.6	–	–	0.0	4.8	–	95.1	66.4	28.7
	29	2,038.7	971.3	253.7	222.8	30.9	–	–	0.0	4.9	–	93.1	63.8	29.3
Sep	5	2,012.1	972.6	220.4	193.7	26.7	–	–	0.0	4.9	–	98.5	70.7	27.8
	12	2,003.8	971.9	200.3	179.2	21.1	–	–	0.0	4.8	–	111.4	80.0	31.4
	19	1,988.2	970.4	185.5	162.4	23.1	–	–	0.0	4.9	–	115.8	86.0	29.8
	26	2,038.2	970.0	234.1	209.4	24.7	–	–	0.0	4.8	–	116.6	87.1	29.5
Oct	3	2,053.7	975.1	237.1	206.8	30.4	–	–	0.0	4.8	–	100.0	69.5	30.5
	10	2,042.7	974.3	227.8	204.6	23.1	–	–	0.1	4.8	–	103.2	72.6	30.7
	17	2,029.7	972.9	213.9	184.8	29.0	–	–	0.0	4.7	–	108.5	75.6	32.9
	24	2,032.8	971.1	197.2	170.0	27.1	–	–	0.0	4.8	–	134.0	102.2	31.8
	31	2,052.1	975.2	250.0	211.6	38.4	–	–	0.0	4.8	–	93.1	56.8	36.2
Nov	7	2,029.7	977.2	225.2	183.1	42.0	–	–	0.0	4.4	–	93.7	58.2	35.5
	14	2,028.2	976.9	212.7	187.0	25.6	–	–	0.0	4.5	–	103.4	67.5	35.9
	21	2,033.2	975.1	197.6	175.5	22.0	–	–	0.0	4.8	–	120.8	84.7	36.1
	28	2,053.9	981.0	244.1	208.3	35.8	–	–	0.0	4.7	–	92.3	56.1	36.2
2014 Dec	5	2,038.1	988.9	205.8	177.8	28.0	–	–	0.0	4.8	–	107.7	71.0	36.8
	12	2,034.7	992.6	215.2	188.7	26.5	–	–	0.0	4.8	–	92.3	64.8	27.5
	19	2,134.8	1,003.8	284.0	245.1	38.9	–	–	–	4.9	–	106.8	80.6	26.3
	26	2,150.2	1,017.2	300.0	256.4	43.5	–	–	–	4.9	–	93.0	66.4	26.6
2015 Jan	2	2,216.0	1,017.1	364.5	302.8	61.7	–	–	0.0	6.2	–	71.9	43.9	28.0
	9	2,168.8	1,006.9	316.1	242.4	73.7	–	–	0.0	6.3	–	84.9	56.9	28.0
	16	2,158.2	1,001.4	288.9	223.3	65.6	–	–	0.0	6.9	–	94.7	64.9	29.8
	23	2,159.8	1,002.3	243.8	189.3	54.5	–	–	0.0	5.7	–	114.7	81.0	33.7
	30	2,182.0	1,004.2	264.5	227.4	36.6	–	–	0.6	5.6	–	111.4	76.3	35.2
Feb	6	2,150.2	1,004.7	269.5	233.7	35.8	–	–	0.0	5.4	–	88.4	55.2	33.2
	13	2,153.1	1,005.6	272.3	226.9	45.4	–	–	0.0	5.4	–	91.8	56.0	35.8
	20	2,167.8	1,005.0	271.4	229.3	42.0	–	–	0.0	5.3	–	110.2	70.5	39.7
	27	2,155.8	1,007.0	272.0	235.0	37.1	–	–	–	5.3	–	97.4	52.4	45.0
Mar	6	2,134.8	1,009.7	254.0	206.6	47.5	–	–	–	5.3	–	101.5	56.2	45.3
Deutsche Bundesbank														
2013 Apr		916.9	224.5	215.5	102.9	30.8	81.8	–	–	–	–	28.7	0.9	27.7
May		891.6	225.4	198.3	88.3	20.6	89.4	–	–	–	–	20.6	0.6	20.1
June		839.7	226.9	195.1	89.6	23.5	82.1	–	–	–	–	8.1	0.5	7.6
July		838.1	227.9	187.0	90.2	20.1	76.7	–	–	–	–	12.5	0.5	12.0
Aug		832.2	228.1	179.2	90.8	15.1	73.4	–	–	–	–	10.6	0.5	10.0
Sep		835.0	227.9	173.7	97.7	17.5	58.5	–	–	–	–	13.5	1.9	11.6
Oct		823.5	229.3	139.0	61.5	12.3	65.3	–	–	–	–	33.0	1.4	31.5
Nov		806.9	230.1	135.5	64.0	13.9	57.6	–	–	–	–	19.1	1.0	18.1
Dec		800.7	237.3	141.5	83.9	10.7	46.9	–	–	–	–	10.5	2.0	8.5
2014 Jan		768.1	220.6	123.2	64.1	10.7	48.4	–	–	–	–	9.5	1.0	8.5
Feb		752.9	220.9	115.0	53.0	9.1	53.0	–	–	–	–	11.8	1.2	10.7
Mar		737.8	222.2	103.3	50.2	4.7	48.5	–	–	–	–	8.4	1.1	7.3
Apr		770.6	224.5	112.6	68.4	7.8	36.4	–	–	–	–	26.6	1.4	25.2
May		764.9	225.7	103.4	62.2	7.2	34.0	–	–	–	–	24.7	0.9	23.9
June		725.5	227.0	65.5	60.0	5.5	–	–	–	–	–	18.9	1.2	17.7
July		697.1	229.4	56.5	49.9	6.6	–	–	–	–	–	14.2	0.8	13.4
Aug		712.0	229.8	68.8	59.9	9.0	–	–	–	–	–	12.8	0.7	12.1
Sep		738.3	229.8	85.1	81.1	4.0	–	–	–	–	–	15.1	1.1	13.9
Oct		736.9	230.7	72.3	62.5	9.7	–	–	–	–	–	21.8	0.8	21.0
Nov		734.0	232.1	63.1	54.1	9.0	–	–	0.0	–	–	24.7	0.7	23.9
Dec		771.0	240.5	90.2	81.2	9.0	–	–	–	–	–	9.9	1.9	7.9
2015 Jan		805.7	236.1	76.0	69.0	7.1	–	–	–	–	–	19.1	0.8	18.2
Feb		800.2	236.8	77.3	71.0	6.2	–	–	–	–	–	28.8	1.1	27.7

***** The consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem comprises the financial statement of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the financial statements of the national central banks of the euro area member states (NCBs). The balance sheet items for foreign currency, securities, gold and financial instruments are valued at market rates at the end of the quarter. **1** For Eurosystem: financial statements for specific weekly dates; for the Bundesbank: end-of-month financial statements. **2** According to the accounting regime chosen by the Eurosystem on the issue of euro banknotes, a share of 8% of the total value of the euro banknotes in circulation is allocated to the ECB on a monthly basis. The counterpart of this adjustment is disclosed as an "Intra-Eurosystem liability related to euro banknote issue". The

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Liabilities to non-euro area residents denominated in euro	Liabilities to euro area residents in foreign currency	Liabilities to non-euro area residents denominated in foreign currency			Counterpart of special drawing rights allocated by the IMF	Other liabilities [3]	Intra-Eurosystem liability related to euro banknote issue [2]	Revaluation accounts	Capital and reserves	On reporting date/ End of month [1]
		Total	Deposits, balances and other liabilities	Liabilities arising from the credit facility under ERM II						
Eurosystem [4]										
56.9	1.0	5.4	5.4	–	53.4	206.6	–	301.4	95.3	2014 July 4
53.2	1.1	4.8	4.8	–	53.4	208.1	–	301.4	95.3	11
52.2	1.3	5.0	5.0	–	53.4	208.5	–	301.4	95.3	18
48.5	1.1	5.6	5.6	–	53.4	211.1	–	301.4	95.3	25
44.2	1.3	5.4	5.4	–	53.4	212.8	–	301.4	95.3	Aug 1
43.8	1.0	6.3	6.3	–	53.4	213.1	–	301.4	95.3	8
43.8	1.0	6.1	6.1	–	53.4	213.9	–	301.4	95.3	15
42.0	1.1	5.9	5.9	–	53.4	213.0	–	301.4	95.3	22
41.6	1.1	6.1	6.1	–	53.4	217.1	–	301.4	95.3	29
43.2	0.9	7.0	7.0	–	53.4	214.7	–	301.4	95.3	Sep 5
40.6	0.9	7.6	7.6	–	53.4	216.2	–	301.4	95.3	12
40.9	1.0	6.2	6.2	–	53.4	213.4	–	301.4	95.3	19
40.3	0.8	7.0	7.0	–	53.4	214.5	–	301.4	95.3	26
41.0	0.9	7.3	7.3	–	55.5	221.1	–	315.5	95.3	Oct 3
39.1	1.2	7.5	7.5	–	55.5	218.4	–	315.5	95.3	10
36.8	1.1	5.7	5.7	–	55.5	219.7	–	315.5	95.3	17
36.2	1.1	6.4	6.4	–	55.5	215.7	–	315.5	95.3	24
39.1	1.3	6.3	6.3	–	55.5	215.9	–	315.5	95.3	31
40.5	1.3	5.3	5.3	–	55.5	215.8	–	315.5	95.3	Nov 7
39.7	1.1	6.7	6.7	–	55.5	216.9	–	315.5	95.3	14
41.1	1.1	6.9	6.9	–	55.5	219.5	–	315.5	95.3	21
39.9	1.1	6.3	6.3	–	55.5	219.5	–	315.5	94.0	28
39.7	1.5	6.1	6.1	–	55.5	218.5	–	315.5	94.0	2014 Dec 5
40.5	1.1	6.3	6.3	–	55.5	216.9	–	315.5	94.0	12
46.9	1.3	7.0	7.0	–	55.5	214.9	–	315.5	94.0	19
47.2	1.3	6.8	6.8	–	55.5	214.8	–	315.5	94.0	26
46.9	1.3	5.5	5.5	–	56.4	220.9	–	330.9	94.4	2015 Jan 2
50.8	2.4	5.0	5.0	–	56.4	214.5	–	330.9	94.7	9
60.3	1.7	6.5	6.5	–	56.4	215.9	–	330.9	94.7	16
86.7	1.6	6.4	6.4	–	56.4	216.0	–	330.9	95.2	23
84.4	1.5	7.3	7.3	–	56.4	220.4	–	330.9	95.2	30
75.9	1.5	5.7	5.7	–	56.4	216.4	–	330.9	95.5	Feb 6
71.5	2.0	7.6	7.6	–	56.4	214.2	–	330.9	95.5	13
65.4	1.9	7.0	7.0	–	56.4	218.9	–	330.9	95.5	20
62.5	2.2	6.6	6.6	–	56.4	220.1	–	330.9	95.5	27
57.5	2.1	6.4	6.4	–	56.4	215.6	–	330.9	95.5	Mar 6
Deutsche Bundesbank										
67.9	0.0	0.6	0.6	–	14.1	24.4	204.1	132.1	5.0	2013 Apr
63.5	0.0	0.6	0.6	–	14.1	25.0	207.0	132.1	5.0	May
61.5	0.0	0.7	0.7	–	13.9	25.3	208.2	95.0	5.0	June
59.7	0.0	0.1	0.1	–	13.9	25.5	211.5	95.0	5.0	July
58.9	0.0	0.7	0.7	–	13.9	26.0	214.8	95.0	5.0	Aug
54.7	0.0	0.2	0.2	–	13.7	26.6	218.0	101.6	5.0	Sep
54.6	0.0	0.1	0.1	–	13.7	27.0	220.2	101.6	5.0	Oct
52.1	0.0	0.7	0.7	–	13.7	27.4	221.7	101.6	5.0	Nov
52.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	–	13.5	26.8	224.3	88.1	5.0	Dec
45.3	0.4	0.8	0.8	–	13.5	27.2	234.7	88.1	5.0	2014 Jan
33.1	– 0.0	0.6	0.6	–	13.5	27.8	237.1	88.1	5.0	Feb
26.4	0.0	1.3	1.3	–	13.5	23.6	238.7	95.4	5.0	Mar
27.4	0.0	1.0	1.0	–	13.5	23.8	240.8	95.4	5.0	Apr
28.9	0.0	0.5	0.5	–	13.5	24.0	243.8	95.4	5.0	May
25.4	0.0	0.7	0.7	–	13.7	24.4	246.7	98.3	5.0	June
3.4	0.0	1.0	1.0	–	13.7	24.5	251.2	98.3	5.0	July
2.7	0.0	1.4	1.4	–	13.7	24.6	254.8	98.3	5.0	Aug
3.6	0.0	1.1	1.1	–	14.2	25.0	258.7	100.8	5.0	Sep
3.6	0.0	1.4	1.4	–	14.2	25.2	261.8	100.8	5.0	Oct
2.9	0.0	1.6	1.6	–	14.2	25.2	264.4	100.8	5.0	Nov
12.3	0.0	0.8	0.8	–	14.4	25.5	267.9	104.5	5.0	Dec
54.0	0.0	1.3	1.3	–	14.4	25.0	270.3	104.5	5.0	2015 Jan
33.9	0.0	1.9	1.9	–	14.4	25.2	272.4	104.5	5.0	Feb

remaining 92 % of the value of the euro banknote in circulation is also allocated to the NCBs on a monthly basis, and each NCB shows in its balance sheet the share of the euro banknotes issued which corresponds to its paid-up share in the ECB's capital. The difference between the value of the euro banknotes allocated to the NCB according to the aforementioned accounting regime and the value of euro banknotes put into circulation is also disclosed as an "Intra-Eurosystem claim/ liability related to banknote issue". **3** For the Deutsche Bundesbank: including DM banknotes still in circulation. **4** Source: ECB.

IV Banks

1 Assets and liabilities of monetary financial institutions (excluding the Bundesbank) in Germany *
Assets

€ billion

Period	Balance sheet total [1]	Cash in hand	Lending to banks (MFIs) in the euro area							Lending to non-banks (non-MFIs) in the			
				to banks in the home country			to banks in other member states				to non-banks in the home country		
												Enterprises and households	
			Total	Total	Loans	Securities issued by banks	Total	Loans	Securities issued by banks	Total	Total	Total	Loans
	End of year or month												
2006	7,154.4	16.4	2,314.4	1,718.6	1,138.6	580.0	595.8	376.8	219.0	3,462.1	3,085.5	2,536.1	2,241.9
2007	7,592.4	17.8	2,523.4	1,847.9	1,290.4	557.5	675.4	421.6	253.8	3,487.3	3,061.8	2,556.0	2,288.8
2008	7,892.7	17.8	2,681.8	1,990.2	1,404.3	585.8	691.6	452.9	238.8	3,638.2	3,163.0	2,686.9	2,357.3
2009	7,436.1	17.2	2,480.5	1,813.2	1,218.4	594.8	667.3	449.5	217.8	3,638.3	3,187.9	2,692.9	2,357.5
2010	8,304.8	16.5	2,361.6	1,787.8	1,276.9	510.9	573.9	372.8	201.0	3,724.5	3,303.0	2,669.2	2,354.7
2011	8,393.3	16.4	2,394.4	1,844.5	1,362.2	482.2	550.0	362.3	187.7	3,673.5	3,270.5	2,709.4	2,415.1
2012	8,226.6	19.2	2,309.0	1,813.2	1,363.8	449.4	495.9	322.2	173.7	3,688.6	3,289.4	2,695.5	2,435.7
2013	7,528.9	18.7	2,145.0	1,654.8	1,239.1	415.7	490.2	324.6	165.6	3,594.3	3,202.1	2,616.3	2,354.0
2014	7,803.6	19.2	2,033.4	1,541.2	1,157.8	383.3	492.3	333.9	158.4	3,654.5	3,239.4	2,661.4	2,384.8
2013 Apr	8,080.3	15.7	2,220.5	1,715.6	1,281.3	434.3	504.9	337.1	167.8	3,736.2	3,329.5	2,732.4	2,446.6
May	7,937.6	16.0	2,196.9	1,692.8	1,258.9	433.9	504.1	335.6	168.5	3,713.8	3,302.1	2,720.5	2,451.6
June	7,833.2	15.8	2,189.1	1,676.4	1,243.9	432.5	512.7	344.5	168.2	3,713.6	3,307.8	2,727.1	2,464.1
July	7,752.9	15.1	2,149.0	1,650.0	1,223.2	426.9	499.0	333.5	165.5	3,708.9	3,300.7	2,711.5	2,449.8
Aug	7,684.9	16.4	2,256.6	1,752.4	1,327.1	425.3	504.2	336.9	167.2	3,604.4	3,197.1	2,613.8	2,351.7
Sep	7,682.1	15.3	2,250.2	1,741.8	1,317.7	424.0	508.4	342.6	165.9	3,599.5	3,197.8	2,615.6	2,352.6
Oct	7,670.3	15.9	2,205.2	1,701.8	1,283.3	418.4	503.4	338.9	164.5	3,607.9	3,207.9	2,615.7	2,351.6
Nov	7,704.8	15.3	2,221.4	1,713.0	1,294.7	418.3	508.3	342.0	166.3	3,612.6	3,208.8	2,619.5	2,356.1
Dec	7,528.9	18.7	2,145.0	1,654.8	1,239.1	415.7	490.2	324.6	165.6	3,594.3	3,202.1	2,616.3	2,354.0
2014 Jan	7,610.4	14.9	2,156.0	1,653.3	1,240.7	412.6	502.7	336.9	165.8	3,610.2	3,210.8	2,620.3	2,351.3
Feb	7,563.0	15.1	2,145.2	1,653.5	1,244.9	408.6	491.7	328.2	163.5	3,604.7	3,204.2	2,616.6	2,354.6
Mar	7,512.4	14.6	2,110.7	1,625.0	1,219.7	405.3	485.7	322.1	163.6	3,608.1	3,206.8	2,623.6	2,356.3
Apr	7,543.0	15.5	2,107.4	1,616.2	1,212.2	404.1	491.1	325.6	165.6	3,630.9	3,228.6	2,644.2	2,359.8
May	7,619.9	15.4	2,126.3	1,632.2	1,229.5	402.7	494.1	329.1	165.0	3,630.4	3,225.2	2,637.6	2,364.9
June	7,589.2	14.9	2,089.4	1,595.1	1,196.2	398.9	494.2	330.2	164.0	3,623.8	3,219.0	2,637.4	2,367.1
July	7,657.0	15.0	2,089.5	1,580.6	1,184.2	396.4	508.9	345.9	163.0	3,635.3	3,227.8	2,639.9	2,366.6
Aug	7,750.2	15.5	2,103.8	1,596.1	1,201.4	394.8	507.7	345.2	162.5	3,631.4	3,226.7	2,643.3	2,372.4
Sep	7,746.4	15.3	2,100.2	1,593.1	1,198.5	394.5	507.1	344.3	162.9	3,644.2	3,237.5	2,653.9	2,380.5
Oct	7,755.6	15.4	2,084.1	1,579.2	1,188.8	390.4	505.0	344.4	160.6	3,653.0	3,241.6	2,649.8	2,378.9
Nov	7,840.0	15.6	2,074.1	1,563.1	1,174.4	388.8	510.9	351.4	159.6	3,668.7	3,251.5	2,662.4	2,389.2
Dec	7,803.6	19.2	2,033.4	1,541.2	1,157.8	383.3	492.3	333.9	158.4	3,654.5	3,239.4	2,661.4	2,384.8
2015 Jan	8,125.8	15.4	2,107.5	1,582.3	1,198.1	384.3	525.2	363.3	162.0	3,686.7	3,263.4	2,674.8	2,389.4
	Changes [3]												
2007	518.3	1.5	218.9	135.5	156.3	– 20.8	83.4	47.4	36.0	54.1	– 1.0	38.7	53.2
2008	313.3	– 0.1	183.6	164.3	127.5	36.9	19.3	33.7	– 14.4	140.4	102.6	130.9	65.5
2009	–454.5	– 0.5	–189.0	–166.4	–182.2	15.8	– 22.5	– 1.8	– 20.7	17.4	38.3	17.0	6.6
2010	–136.3	– 0.7	–111.6	– 15.6	58.5	– 74.1	– 95.9	– 80.9	– 15.1	96.4	126.0	– 13.7	0.7
2011	54.1	– 0.1	32.6	58.7	91.7	– 33.0	– 26.0	– 12.1	– 13.9	– 51.8	– 35.3	38.7	56.7
2012	–129.2	2.9	– 81.9	– 28.4	3.0	– 31.4	– 53.5	– 39.7	– 13.8	27.5	27.7	17.0	28.8
2013	–703.6	– 0.5	–257.1	–249.2	–216.5	– 32.7	– 7.9	1.6	– 9.5	13.6	16.6	23.6	21.6
2014	223.6	0.4	–113.2	–116.7	– 83.8	– 32.9	3.5	8.2	– 4.7	57.1	41.2	53.4	37.9
2013 May	–142.7	0.3	– 23.5	– 22.8	– 22.4	– 0.5	– 0.7	– 1.4	0.7	– 22.0	– 27.1	– 11.6	5.5
June	–102.1	– 0.2	– 7.2	– 16.1	– 14.9	– 1.1	8.8	9.1	– 0.3	1.1	6.6	7.3	12.9
July	– 72.5	– 0.6	– 38.9	– 25.6	– 20.3	– 5.4	– 13.2	– 10.5	– 2.8	– 2.8	– 6.0	– 14.6	– 13.1
Aug	– 87.5	1.2	7.7	5.7	7.3	– 1.6	2.0	0.3	1.7	– 12.1	– 11.6	– 5.9	– 6.4
Sep	– 14.6	– 1.0	– 5.4	– 10.1	– 8.9	– 1.2	4.7	6.1	– 1.4	– 2.7	2.3	3.4	2.8
Oct	– 5.5	0.6	– 44.2	– 39.4	– 34.0	– 5.4	– 4.8	– 3.2	– 1.6	9.9	11.2	1.2	0.5
Nov	32.6	– 0.6	15.3	11.0	11.2	– 0.2	4.2	2.3	1.9	5.6	1.3	4.0	4.8
Dec	–169.8	3.4	– 75.2	– 57.6	– 55.3	– 2.3	– 17.6	– 16.9	– 0.7	– 15.8	– 4.7	– 1.6	– 0.7
2014 Jan	71.1	– 3.8	9.8	– 2.1	1.0	– 3.1	11.9	11.4	0.5	16.3	9.5	4.9	– 2.4
Feb	– 37.7	0.2	– 9.3	1.0	4.7	– 3.7	– 10.3	– 8.0	– 2.3	– 3.1	– 4.9	– 2.0	5.1
Mar	– 50.8	– 0.6	– 34.5	– 28.5	– 25.2	– 3.3	– 6.0	– 6.1	0.1	4.1	3.4	7.9	2.4
Apr	32.0	1.0	– 3.1	– 8.6	– 7.4	– 1.2	5.5	3.6	2.0	23.2	22.1	20.6	3.6
May	67.8	– 0.1	17.3	15.2	16.8	– 1.6	2.1	2.8	– 0.7	– 1.8	– 4.0	– 7.1	4.7
June	– 30.3	– 0.5	– 36.5	– 36.7	– 33.2	– 3.5	0.2	1.1	– 0.9	– 6.0	– 5.6	0.2	2.4
July	57.7	0.1	– 1.6	– 15.4	– 12.6	– 2.7	13.8	14.9	– 1.1	11.5	8.9	2.8	– 0.7
Aug	86.5	0.5	13.5	15.3	17.1	– 1.8	– 1.8	– 1.2	– 0.6	– 4.7	– 1.4	3.0	5.3
Sep	– 27.7	– 0.2	– 7.5	– 5.0	– 4.1	– 0.9	– 2.4	– 2.7	0.2	10.2	9.6	9.6	7.1
Oct	8.0	0.1	– 12.3	– 13.9	– 9.8	– 4.0	1.6	2.6	– 1.0	6.5	5.3	– 3.0	– 0.6
Nov	84.4	0.2	– 8.8	– 16.0	– 14.5	– 1.5	7.2	7.2	0.0	14.4	9.7	12.5	10.8
Dec	– 37.3	3.6	– 40.3	– 22.1	– 16.6	– 5.5	– 18.3	– 17.3	– 0.9	– 13.6	– 11.6	4.0	0.3
2015 Jan	325.1	– 3.8	74.3	41.1	40.2	0.9	33.1	29.5	3.7	34.0	25.0	14.4	5.9

* This table serves to supplement the "Overall monetary survey" in section II. Unlike the other tables in section IV, this table includes – in addition to the figures reported by banks (including building and loan associations) – data from money market funds. **1** See footnote 1 in Table IV.2. **2** Including debt securities arising from the

IV Banks

euro area										Claims on non-euro-area residents			
				to non-banks in other member states									
	General government				Enterprises and households		General government						
Securities	Total	Loans	Securities [2]	Total	Total	*of which* Loans	Total	Loans	Securities	Total	*of which* Loans	Other assets [1]	Period
End of year or month													
294.1	549.5	390.2	159.2	376.6	228.1	85.2	148.5	26.1	122.4	1,172.7	936.2	188.8	2006
267.3	505.8	360.7	145.0	425.5	294.6	124.9	130.9	26.0	104.9	1,339.5	1,026.9	224.4	2007
329.6	476.1	342.8	133.4	475.1	348.1	172.1	127.0	27.6	99.4	1,279.2	1,008.6	275.7	2008
335.4	495.0	335.1	160.0	450.4	322.2	162.9	128.2	23.5	104.7	1,062.6	821.1	237.5	2009
314.5	633.8	418.4	215.3	421.6	289.2	164.2	132.4	24.8	107.6	1,021.0	792.7	1,181.1	2010
294.3	561.1	359.8	201.2	403.1	276.9	161.2	126.2	32.6	93.6	995.1	770.9	1,313.8	2011
259.8	594.0	350.3	243.7	399.2	275.1	158.1	124.1	30.4	93.7	970.3	745.0	1,239.4	2012
262.3	585.8	339.2	246.6	392.3	267.6	144.6	124.6	27.8	96.9	921.2	690.5	849.7	2013
276.6	578.0	327.9	250.2	415.1	270.2	142.7	144.9	31.9	113.0	1,050.0	805.0	1,046.5	2014
285.8	597.1	355.2	241.9	406.6	282.3	158.7	124.4	30.8	93.5	964.2	736.2	1,143.8	2013 Apr
268.9	581.6	344.6	237.0	411.8	282.3	155.8	129.5	30.7	98.8	962.8	733.7	1,048.1	May
262.9	580.8	342.3	238.5	405.7	278.1	152.3	127.6	29.9	97.7	951.9	723.2	962.7	June
261.7	589.2	347.3	241.9	408.2	279.2	151.0	129.0	29.9	99.1	937.8	706.4	942.0	July
262.1	583.3	340.6	242.8	407.2	275.1	149.8	132.1	30.7	101.5	934.2	703.9	873.3	Aug
263.0	582.2	340.0	242.2	401.7	273.6	147.5	128.0	30.2	97.8	912.8	681.8	904.2	Sep
264.1	592.2	347.2	245.0	400.0	271.3	145.5	128.6	30.9	97.7	935.2	704.6	906.1	Oct
263.4	589.3	342.6	246.7	403.8	274.8	146.4	129.0	30.8	98.1	952.7	721.5	902.8	Nov
262.3	585.8	339.2	246.6	392.3	267.6	144.6	124.6	27.8	96.9	921.2	690.5	849.7	Dec
268.9	590.5	345.4	245.0	399.4	272.6	146.9	126.9	27.9	99.0	960.8	729.9	868.4	2014 Jan
262.0	587.6	341.1	246.5	400.6	270.1	145.8	130.4	28.4	102.1	959.2	735.1	838.8	Feb
267.4	583.2	336.7	246.5	401.3	270.1	145.2	131.2	28.1	103.1	954.9	723.4	824.1	Mar
284.3	584.4	336.7	247.7	402.4	270.0	148.1	132.4	28.7	103.7	961.7	732.7	827.4	Apr
272.7	587.6	338.2	249.5	405.2	273.0	148.8	132.2	28.6	103.6	986.8	754.4	861.0	May
270.2	581.7	330.2	251.4	404.8	273.3	147.8	131.4	27.9	103.5	997.6	762.8	863.5	June
273.4	587.8	333.0	254.8	407.5	273.9	148.8	133.6	28.2	105.4	1,028.4	793.4	888.9	July
270.9	583.4	327.4	256.0	404.7	272.1	147.8	132.6	28.6	104.0	1,022.4	786.3	977.2	Aug
273.4	583.6	326.9	256.7	406.7	270.0	145.9	136.7	28.4	108.3	1,026.1	784.3	960.6	Sep
270.9	591.9	333.3	258.6	411.3	272.0	149.3	139.3	29.2	110.2	1,038.4	799.6	964.8	Oct
273.1	589.1	330.8	258.3	417.2	276.0	147.9	141.3	28.7	112.6	1,070.0	827.9	1,011.6	Nov
276.6	578.0	327.9	250.2	415.1	270.2	142.7	144.9	31.9	113.0	1,050.0	805.0	1,046.5	Dec
285.5	588.6	336.7	251.8	423.3	273.4	147.1	149.9	31.2	118.7	1,136.5	885.6	1,179.7	2015 Jan
Changes [3]													
– 14.6	– 39.6	– 29.3	– 10.3	55.1	73.6	41.5	– 18.6	0.0	– 18.6	222.7	136.5	21.1	2007
65.4	– 28.4	– 16.9	– 11.5	37.8	42.3	40.4	– 4.5	1.6	– 6.1	– 40.3	– 7.6	29.7	2008
10.5	21.3	– 5.1	26.4	– 20.9	– 20.9	– 7.1	0.0	– 3.9	3.9	–182.5	–162.3	– 99.8	2009
– 14.3	139.7	83.4	56.3	– 29.6	– 36.4	0.2	6.8	3.1	3.7	– 74.1	– 61.9	– 46.3	2010
– 18.0	– 74.0	– 59.1	– 14.9	– 16.6	– 13.8	– 5.5	– 2.7	8.0	– 10.7	– 39.5	– 34.9	112.9	2011
– 11.8	10.7	– 10.5	21.2	– 0.2	– 0.7	– 1.5	0.5	– 2.2	2.7	– 15.5	– 17.7	– 62.2	2012
2.0	– 7.0	– 10.9	3.9	– 3.0	– 3.4	– 9.3	0.5	– 2.6	3.1	– 38.8	– 47.2	–420.8	2013
15.5	– 12.2	– 15.1	2.9	15.9	1.3	– 3.2	14.6	0.9	13.7	94.6	82.2	184.8	2014
– 17.1	– 15.5	– 10.5	– 4.9	5.1	– 0.1	– 3.0	5.1	– 0.1	5.2	– 1.9	– 2.8	– 95.6	2013 May
– 5.6	– 0.7	– 2.3	1.6	– 5.6	– 3.8	– 3.3	– 1.8	– 0.7	– 1.1	– 8.4	– 8.8	– 87.3	June
– 1.4	8.5	5.1	3.5	3.3	1.8	– 0.5	1.5	– 0.0	1.5	– 9.2	– 11.8	– 21.0	July
0.5	– 5.7	– 6.7	1.0	– 0.5	– 3.5	– 1.1	3.1	0.8	2.3	– 14.4	– 13.3	– 69.9	Aug
0.5	– 1.1	– 0.6	– 0.5	– 5.0	– 0.9	– 1.7	– 4.1	– 0.5	– 3.6	– 16.8	– 17.6	11.4	Sep
0.7	10.0	7.1	2.8	– 1.2	– 1.9	– 1.5	0.6	0.7	– 0.1	26.1	26.6	2.1	Oct
– 0.8	– 2.7	– 4.6	1.9	4.3	3.9	1.5	0.3	– 0.1	0.4	15.8	15.5	– 3.4	Nov
– 0.9	– 3.1	– 3.4	0.3	– 11.0	– 6.7	– 1.3	– 4.4	– 3.1	– 1.3	– 27.1	– 26.8	– 55.2	Dec
7.4	4.6	6.2	– 1.6	6.8	4.8	1.8	2.0	0.1	2.0	33.4	33.3	15.3	2014 Jan
– 7.1	– 2.8	– 4.3	1.5	1.7	– 1.9	– 0.3	3.6	0.5	3.1	5.0	11.5	– 30.5	Feb
5.5	– 4.4	– 4.5	0.0	0.7	– 0.1	– 0.6	0.8	– 0.2	1.0	– 4.4	– 12.0	– 15.4	Mar
16.9	1.6	0.4	1.2	1.1	– 0.1	3.0	1.2	0.6	0.6	7.9	10.4	3.0	Apr
– 11.8	3.1	1.4	1.7	2.3	2.4	0.2	– 0.2	– 0.1	– 0.1	18.7	15.9	33.7	May
– 2.2	– 5.8	– 7.6	1.9	– 0.4	0.3	– 0.9	– 0.8	– 0.7	– 0.1	12.3	9.1	0.5	June
3.5	6.1	2.7	3.4	2.5	0.4	0.6	2.2	0.3	1.8	23.6	23.9	24.1	July
– 2.3	– 4.5	– 5.5	1.1	– 3.2	– 2.2	– 1.1	– 1.0	0.4	– 1.4	– 11.1	– 11.7	88.4	Aug
2.5	– 0.0	– 0.6	0.6	0.6	– 3.4	– 3.0	4.0	– 0.2	4.2	– 12.8	– 17.7	– 17.4	Sep
– 2.4	8.3	6.4	1.9	1.2	– 1.3	0.9	2.4	0.7	1.7	10.8	14.3	2.8	Oct
1.7	– 2.8	– 2.4	– 0.4	4.6	2.8	– 1.5	1.8	– 0.6	2.4	31.3	28.1	47.4	Nov
3.7	– 15.6	– 7.2	– 8.4	– 2.0	– 0.5	– 2.3	– 1.5	0.2	– 1.7	– 19.9	– 22.9	32.9	Dec
8.5	10.6	8.9	1.7	9.0	3.9	5.4	5.1	– 0.1	5.2	87.4	81.0	133.2	2015 Jan

exchange of equalisation claims. **3** Statistical breaks have been eliminated from the flow figures (see also footnote * in Table II.1).

IV Banks

1 Assets and liabilities of monetary financial institutions (excluding the Bundesbank) in Germany * Liabilities

€ billion

Period	Balance sheet total [1]	Deposits of banks (MFIs) in the euro area			Deposits of non-banks (non-MFIs) in the euro area								
						Deposits of non-banks in the home country						Deposits of non-banks	
			of banks					With agreed maturities		At agreed notice			
		Total	in the home country	in other member states	Total	Total	Over-night	Total	*of which* up to 2 years	Total	*of which* up to 3 months	Total	Over-night
												End of year or month	
2006	7,154.4	1,637.7	1,348.6	289.0	2,449.2	2,341.6	745.8	1,009.3	310.1	586.5	487.4	62.0	13.9
2007	7,592.4	1,778.6	1,479.0	299.6	2,633.6	2,518.3	769.6	1,193.3	477.9	555.4	446.0	75.1	19.6
2008	7,892.7	1,827.7	1,583.0	244.7	2,798.2	2,687.3	809.5	1,342.7	598.7	535.2	424.8	74.2	22.4
2009	7,436.1	1,589.7	1,355.6	234.0	2,818.0	2,731.3	997.8	1,139.1	356.4	594.4	474.4	63.9	17.7
2010	8,304.8	1,495.8	1,240.1	255.7	2,925.8	2,817.6	1,089.1	1,110.3	304.6	618.2	512.5	68.4	19.3
2011	8,393.3	1,444.8	1,210.3	234.5	3,033.4	2,915.1	1,143.3	1,155.8	362.6	616.1	515.3	78.8	25.9
2012	8,226.6	1,371.0	1,135.9	235.1	3,091.4	2,985.2	1,294.9	1,072.8	320.0	617.6	528.4	77.3	31.2
2013	7,528.9	1,345.4	1,140.3	205.1	3,130.5	3,031.5	1,405.3	1,016.2	293.7	610.1	532.4	81.3	33.8
2014	7,803.6	1,325.7	1,113.6	212.1	3,197.7	3,103.8	1,514.3	981.9	294.5	607.7	531.3	79.7	34.4
2013 Apr	8,080.3	1,348.6	1,089.7	258.9	3,083.6	2,984.0	1,322.3	1,049.5	305.9	612.3	528.7	77.0	35.4
May	7,937.6	1,320.9	1,071.5	249.4	3,100.0	2,998.0	1,337.7	1,049.6	306.6	610.7	529.1	74.3	32.7
June	7,833.2	1,301.2	1,060.2	241.1	3,104.9	2,997.9	1,345.3	1,043.0	302.4	609.6	528.9	78.2	37.1
July	7,752.9	1,292.8	1,050.1	242.7	3,097.8	2,994.5	1,351.7	1,034.7	298.3	608.1	528.3	76.3	34.9
Aug	7,684.9	1,388.6	1,148.9	239.7	3,101.4	3,006.8	1,367.7	1,031.7	298.5	607.4	528.6	76.5	34.0
Sep	7,682.1	1,387.4	1,147.4	240.0	3,101.7	3,005.5	1,375.9	1,023.3	293.7	606.3	528.2	78.5	36.9
Oct	7,670.3	1,375.2	1,141.5	233.7	3,101.5	3,011.3	1,387.4	1,017.6	291.1	606.3	528.3	75.1	32.0
Nov	7,704.8	1,391.9	1,161.9	230.0	3,123.8	3,030.2	1,409.9	1,014.1	289.9	606.3	528.3	77.8	33.8
Dec	7,528.9	1,345.4	1,140.3	205.1	3,130.5	3,031.5	1,405.3	1,016.2	293.7	610.1	532.4	81.3	33.8
2014 Jan	7,610.4	1,363.2	1,138.4	224.9	3,126.9	3,034.2	1,411.3	1,013.8	292.6	609.1	531.8	77.7	33.9
Feb	7,563.0	1,357.9	1,148.8	209.2	3,137.8	3,042.7	1,416.9	1,016.0	297.4	609.8	532.3	77.2	34.1
Mar	7,512.4	1,347.5	1,132.2	215.3	3,131.3	3,035.5	1,412.2	1,014.8	298.8	608.5	531.0	79.3	34.2
Apr	7,543.0	1,376.0	1,153.3	222.7	3,137.7	3,043.0	1,427.3	1,009.0	296.3	606.6	529.3	80.7	36.9
May	7,619.9	1,378.3	1,163.9	214.5	3,157.4	3,061.4	1,442.9	1,012.5	302.7	605.9	528.8	79.9	34.7
June	7,589.2	1,370.1	1,143.3	226.8	3,146.9	3,053.8	1,438.8	1,010.4	303.4	604.5	528.4	78.1	36.5
July	7,657.0	1,376.8	1,134.7	242.1	3,154.6	3,061.7	1,450.4	1,006.9	303.9	604.3	527.6	76.3	35.5
Aug	7,750.2	1,361.0	1,124.7	236.3	3,170.6	3,079.8	1,468.1	1,005.9	304.8	605.8	528.1	78.9	35.3
Sep	7,746.4	1,349.9	1,117.3	232.6	3,172.6	3,079.6	1,470.2	1,002.9	300.5	606.5	528.2	80.1	38.6
Oct	7,755.6	1,353.0	1,123.0	230.0	3,177.6	3,085.6	1,490.7	988.8	290.9	606.0	528.0	80.1	36.6
Nov	7,840.0	1,348.2	1,116.1	232.1	3,198.0	3,105.3	1,514.5	985.5	290.7	605.3	527.6	81.0	36.6
Dec	7,803.6	1,325.7	1,113.6	212.1	3,197.7	3,103.8	1,514.3	981.9	294.5	607.7	531.3	79.7	34.4
2015 Jan	8,125.8	1,383.5	1,138.1	245.4	3,214.9	3,112.7	1,530.5	975.6	291.1	606.6	529.1	82.4	37.2
												Changes [4]	
2007	518.3	148.4	134.8	13.6	185.1	177.3	24.5	183.9	167.8	– 31.1	– 41.4	13.6	5.6
2008	313.3	65.8	121.7	– 55.8	162.3	173.1	38.7	154.6	123.5	– 20.2	– 21.2	– 7.5	– 0.1
2009	–454.5	–235.4	–224.6	– 10.8	31.9	43.9	205.0	–220.4	–259.3	59.3	50.3	– 9.6	– 4.1
2010	–136.3	– 75.2	– 99.4	24.2	72.3	59.7	88.7	– 53.0	– 52.2	24.0	38.3	– 4.4	2.2
2011	54.1	– 48.4	– 28.8	– 19.6	102.1	97.4	52.4	47.6	58.8	– 2.6	1.3	4.8	6.5
2012	–129.2	– 68.7	– 70.0	1.3	57.8	67.1	156.1	– 90.4	– 50.2	1.5	14.1	– 1.4	5.4
2013	–703.6	–106.2	– 73.9	– 32.3	39.1	47.8	111.5	– 56.3	– 26.6	– 7.3	4.0	2.6	3.3
2014	223.6	– 25.3	– 30.1	4.8	63.7	68.8	106.7	– 35.5	– 0.4	– 2.4	– 2.4	– 2.3	0.1
2013 May	–142.7	– 27.7	– 18.1	– 9.6	16.0	14.0	15.5	0.1	0.7	– 1.6	0.4	– 3.1	– 2.2
June	–102.1	– 19.8	– 11.6	– 8.2	5.4	0.3	7.6	– 6.2	– 4.6	– 1.1	– 0.2	4.0	4.5
July	– 72.5	– 7.7	– 9.6	2.0	– 6.6	– 3.0	6.8	– 8.2	– 4.0	– 1.5	– 0.6	– 1.8	– 2.1
Aug	– 87.5	12.9	18.5	– 5.7	3.5	12.2	15.9	– 3.0	0.2	– 0.7	0.2	0.1	– 1.0
Sep	– 14.6	– 0.5	– 1.1	0.6	– 0.5	– 0.9	8.4	– 8.2	– 4.6	– 1.1	– 0.3	0.9	3.0
Oct	– 5.5	– 11.5	– 5.5	– 6.1	0.3	6.2	11.8	– 5.6	– 2.3	– 0.0	0.0	– 3.4	– 4.9
Nov	32.6	16.2	20.3	– 4.1	22.1	18.8	22.4	– 3.5	– 1.2	– 0.0	– 0.0	2.7	1.8
Dec	–169.8	– 45.9	– 21.3	– 24.6	7.1	1.7	– 4.3	2.1	3.8	3.9	4.1	3.6	0.1
2014 Jan	71.1	16.0	– 2.5	18.5	– 4.4	2.0	5.5	– 2.5	– 1.2	– 1.0	– 0.6	– 3.8	– 0.0
Feb	– 37.7	– 4.4	11.0	– 15.3	11.6	8.4	6.2	1.5	4.0	0.7	0.5	– 0.4	0.2
Mar	– 50.8	– 10.4	– 16.6	6.2	– 6.6	– 7.2	– 4.7	– 1.2	1.4	– 1.2	– 1.2	2.1	0.2
Apr	32.0	28.6	21.3	7.4	6.6	7.6	15.2	– 5.7	– 2.4	– 1.9	– 1.6	1.4	2.7
May	67.8	1.5	10.0	– 8.5	19.0	17.8	15.1	3.4	6.3	– 0.7	– 0.5	– 0.9	– 2.2
June	– 30.3	– 8.1	– 20.5	12.4	– 10.5	– 7.6	– 4.1	– 2.1	0.7	– 1.4	– 0.4	– 1.8	1.8
July	57.7	5.6	– 9.2	14.9	7.1	7.4	11.0	– 3.5	0.6	– 0.2	– 0.8	– 1.9	– 1.1
Aug	86.5	– 16.6	– 10.4	– 6.2	15.5	17.7	17.4	– 1.1	0.9	1.5	0.6	2.5	– 0.2
Sep	– 27.7	– 13.1	– 8.4	– 4.7	0.4	– 1.7	1.0	– 3.3	– 4.5	0.6	0.1	0.9	3.2
Oct	8.0	2.9	5.6	– 2.7	5.0	5.9	20.5	– 14.1	– 9.7	– 0.4	– 0.3	– 0.0	– 2.0
Nov	84.4	– 4.9	– 7.0	2.1	20.4	19.8	23.8	– 3.3	– 0.2	– 0.7	– 0.4	0.9	– 0.0
Dec	– 37.3	– 22.4	– 3.2	– 19.2	– 0.3	– 1.3	– 0.3	– 3.4	3.9	2.4	2.2	– 1.3	– 2.2
2015 Jan	325.1	57.7	24.5	33.2	17.2	8.9	16.3	– 6.3	– 3.4	– 1.1	– 1.1	2.7	2.8

***** This table serves to supplement the "Overall monetary survey" in section II. Unlike the other tables in section IV, this table includes – in addition to the figures reported by banks (including building and loan associations) – data from money market funds. **1** See footnote 1 in Table IV.2. **2** Excluding deposits of central

IV Banks

in other member states [2]				Deposits of central governments		Liabilities arising from repos with non-banks in the euro area	Money market fund shares issued [3]	Debt securities issued [3]		Liabilities to non-euro-area residents	Capital and reserves	Other Liabilities [1]	Period
With agreed maturities		At agreed notice											
Total	*of which* up to 2 years	Total	*of which* up to 3 months	Total	*of which* domestic central governments			Total	*of which* with maturities of up to 2 years [3]				
End of year or month													
45.9	9.3	2.3	1.9	45.5	41.9	17.1	32.0	1,636.7	136.4	638.5	389.6	353.7	2006
53.2	22.0	2.3	1.8	40.1	38.3	26.6	28.6	1,637.6	182.3	661.0	428.2	398.2	2007
49.5	24.9	2.4	1.8	36.6	34.8	61.1	16.4	1,609.9	233.3	666.3	461.7	451.5	2008
43.7	17.0	2.5	2.0	22.8	22.2	80.5	11.4	1,500.5	146.3	565.6	454.8	415.6	2009
46.4	16.1	2.8	2.2	39.8	38.7	86.7	9.8	1,407.8	82.3	636.0	452.6	1,290.2	2010
49.6	18.4	3.3	2.5	39.5	37.9	97.1	6.2	1,345.7	75.7	561.5	468.1	1,436.6	2011
42.3	14.7	3.8	2.8	28.9	25.9	80.4	7.3	1,233.1	56.9	611.4	487.3	1,344.7	2012
44.0	16.9	3.5	2.7	17.6	16.0	6.7	4.1	1,115.2	39.0	479.5	503.0	944.5	2013
42.0	15.9	3.3	2.7	14.2	14.1	3.4	3.6	1,077.3	39.3	534.9	535.5	1,125.5	2014
38.0	13.1	3.6	2.8	22.6	21.8	98.9	7.4	1,192.5	50.2	602.5	502.7	1,244.1	2013 Apr
38.0	12.5	3.6	2.8	27.7	22.5	98.0	7.3	1,177.8	48.5	585.4	506.6	1,141.6	May
37.5	11.5	3.6	2.8	28.8	21.9	113.3	5.7	1,166.0	45.5	574.3	517.2	1,050.5	June
37.8	12.4	3.6	2.8	27.0	23.5	89.8	5.7	1,149.8	49.5	565.9	518.3	1,032.7	July
39.0	14.5	3.5	2.8	18.1	16.7	3.0	5.7	1,142.8	46.2	560.2	522.6	960.6	Aug
38.1	12.7	3.5	2.8	17.6	15.4	3.7	5.3	1,139.7	43.9	523.1	521.3	999.8	Sep
39.5	14.2	3.5	2.7	15.2	13.9	7.7	4.7	1,131.1	44.0	525.3	520.5	1,004.2	Oct
40.5	13.6	3.5	2.7	15.8	14.3	3.9	4.6	1,129.7	42.4	535.2	515.2	1,000.6	Nov
44.0	16.9	3.5	2.7	17.6	16.0	6.7	4.1	1,115.2	39.0	479.5	503.0	944.5	Dec
40.3	13.2	3.5	2.7	15.1	11.7	7.9	4.3	1,107.6	35.8	518.9	517.5	964.1	2014 Jan
39.6	13.5	3.5	2.7	17.9	12.0	8.0	4.2	1,098.5	37.4	511.3	514.6	930.7	Feb
41.6	15.8	3.4	2.7	16.4	11.7	5.2	4.0	1,090.4	35.1	501.5	511.5	921.0	Mar
40.4	14.9	3.4	2.7	14.0	13.2	7.7	4.0	1,078.9	35.4	511.2	508.3	919.0	Apr
41.8	16.0	3.4	2.7	16.1	10.9	4.8	4.0	1,091.2	36.7	519.8	516.8	947.6	May
38.3	12.8	3.4	2.7	15.0	12.8	5.2	3.9	1,085.5	39.7	498.9	531.8	946.9	June
37.5	12.3	3.4	2.7	16.6	11.8	8.4	3.9	1,084.0	39.0	524.2	537.7	967.4	July
40.3	14.4	3.3	2.7	11.8	10.6	10.1	3.7	1,079.7	41.0	523.9	550.3	1,051.1	Aug
38.1	14.1	3.3	2.7	12.9	11.5	7.4	3.7	1,084.7	42.1	537.3	550.2	1,040.6	Sep
40.2	14.5	3.3	2.6	12.0	11.2	9.1	3.6	1,083.0	41.9	536.9	545.3	1,047.1	Oct
41.1	15.0	3.3	2.6	11.7	10.6	9.6	3.6	1,084.8	41.3	562.0	540.1	1,093.7	Nov
42.0	15.9	3.3	2.7	14.2	14.1	3.4	3.6	1,077.3	39.3	534.9	535.5	1,125.5	Dec
41.8	15.5	3.4	2.7	19.8	14.5	6.8	3.6	1,103.0	43.5	613.7	543.8	1,256.3	2015 Jan
Changes [4]													
8.0	12.9	0.0	– 0.1	– 5.8	– 4.3	8.1	– 3.4	20.9	49.3	48.7	42.3	68.3	2007
– 7.5	0.6	0.1	– 0.0	– 3.3	– 3.2	36.1	– 12.2	– 33.9	50.2	– 0.1	39.3	56.1	2008
– 5.7	– 7.7	0.1	0.2	– 2.4	– 0.8	19.4	– 5.0	–104.6	– 87.1	– 95.3	– 0.3	– 65.0	2009
– 6.8	– 5.8	0.3	0.3	17.0	16.5	6.2	– 1.6	–106.7	– 63.2	54.4	– 7.1	– 78.6	2010
– 2.2	1.7	0.5	0.3	– 0.1	– 0.7	10.0	– 3.7	– 76.9	– 6.6	– 80.5	13.7	137.8	2011
– 7.2	– 3.6	0.5	0.3	– 7.9	– 9.2	– 19.6	1.2	–107.0	– 18.6	54.2	21.0	– 68.5	2012
– 0.5	2.2	– 0.3	– 0.1	– 11.3	– 10.0	4.1	– 3.2	–104.9	– 17.6	–134.1	18.9	–417.1	2013
– 2.2	– 1.2	– 0.2	– 0.1	– 2.8	– 1.3	– 3.4	– 0.5	– 56.3	1.1	40.6	26.2	178.5	2014
– 0.9	– 0.6	– 0.0	0.0	5.1	0.7	– 0.9	– 0.1	– 14.7	– 1.7	– 17.6	4.0	–101.7	2013 May
– 0.5	– 1.0	– 0.0	– 0.0	1.1	– 0.6	15.4	– 1.6	– 10.8	– 3.0	– 10.1	10.8	– 91.2	June
0.3	0.9	– 0.0	– 0.0	– 1.8	1.5	– 23.5	– 0.0	– 12.7	4.0	– 5.7	2.0	– 18.3	July
1.2	2.2	– 0.0	– 0.0	– 8.9	– 6.8	– 9.4	0.0	– 8.4	– 3.4	– 17.6	3.6	– 72.1	Aug
– 2.2	– 1.8	– 0.0	– 0.0	– 0.5	– 1.3	0.7	– 0.5	– 0.2	– 2.2	– 34.5	– 0.5	21.4	Sep
1.5	1.6	– 0.0	– 0.0	– 2.5	– 1.5	4.0	– 0.5	– 5.9	0.1	4.2	– 0.1	4.2	Oct
1.0	– 0.7	– 0.0	– 0.0	0.6	0.4	– 3.5	– 0.1	– 2.1	– 1.6	9.3	– 5.5	– 3.8	Nov
3.5	3.3	– 0.0	0.0	1.8	1.7	2.9	– 0.5	– 11.7	– 3.3	– 53.7	– 11.5	– 56.5	Dec
– 3.8	– 3.7	– 0.0	– 0.0	– 2.5	– 4.2	1.2	0.1	– 12.2	– 3.3	37.2	13.5	19.8	2014 Jan
– 0.6	0.3	– 0.0	0.0	3.6	1.1	0.1	– 0.0	– 5.1	1.7	– 4.5	– 2.2	– 33.2	Feb
2.0	2.3	– 0.0	– 0.0	– 1.5	– 0.3	– 2.8	– 0.2	– 8.1	– 2.3	– 9.9	– 3.1	– 9.7	Mar
– 1.2	– 0.9	– 0.0	– 0.0	– 2.4	1.5	2.5	0.0	– 11.0	0.3	10.2	– 3.0	– 1.9	Apr
1.3	1.0	– 0.0	– 0.0	2.2	– 2.3	– 3.0	– 0.0	8.6	1.2	5.7	7.6	28.4	May
– 3.5	– 3.2	– 0.0	– 0.0	– 1.1	1.9	0.4	– 0.1	– 5.6	3.0	– 20.7	15.1	– 0.8	June
– 0.8	– 0.5	– 0.0	– 0.0	1.6	– 1.0	3.2	– 0.0	– 5.5	– 0.8	22.1	5.0	20.3	July
2.8	2.1	– 0.0	– 0.0	– 4.8	– 1.1	1.7	– 0.2	– 6.8	1.9	– 2.5	12.1	83.4	Aug
– 2.2	– 0.3	– 0.0	– 0.0	1.1	0.8	– 2.7	0.0	– 4.4	0.8	5.7	– 2.6	– 10.9	Sep
2.0	0.4	– 0.0	– 0.0	– 0.9	– 0.3	1.8	– 0.1	– 2.1	– 0.2	– 0.9	– 4.9	6.3	Oct
0.9	0.5	– 0.0	– 0.0	– 0.3	– 0.6	0.4	– 0.0	2.2	– 0.6	25.3	– 5.1	46.1	Nov
0.9	0.9	0.0	0.0	2.2	3.3	– 6.2	0.0	– 6.1	– 0.6	– 27.1	– 6.0	30.8	Dec
– 0.2	– 0.3	0.1	0.0	5.7	0.4	3.4	0.1	29.5	8.0	79.0	4.4	133.7	2015 Jan

governments. **3** In Germany, debt securities with maturities of up to one year are classed as money market paper; up to the January 2002 Monthly Report they were published together with money market fund shares. **4** Statistical breaks have been eliminated from the flow figures (see also footnote * in Table II.1).

IV Banks

2 Principal assets and liabilities of banks (MFIs) in Germany, by category of banks*

€ billion

End of month	Number of reporting institutions	Balance sheet total [1]	Cash in hand and credit balances with central banks	Lending to banks (MFIs)			Lending to non-banks (non-MFIs)					Participating interests	Other assets [1]
				Total	of which		Total	of which					
					Balances and loans	Securities issued by banks		Loans		Bills	Securities issued by non-banks		
								for up to and including 1 year	for more than 1 year				
All categories of banks													
2014 Aug	1,831	7,801.6	90.5	2,616.1	2,003.5	601.4	3,888.8	376.8	2,752.9	0.5	748.0	132.1	1,074.1
Sep	1,822	7,797.7	113.5	2,587.4	1,973.0	603.3	3,906.0	380.2	2,756.6	0.5	760.4	132.8	1,058.0
Oct	1,812	7,807.4	91.3	2,613.3	2,004.9	597.3	3,907.4	374.2	2,767.3	0.5	756.5	133.0	1,062.5
Nov	1,807	7,891.9	82.5	2,637.8	2,029.0	597.8	3,928.8	377.9	2,775.5	0.5	765.7	132.7	1,110.1
Dec	1,807	7,853.4	113.7	2,551.2	1,950.5	590.6	3,902.4	350.5	2,776.6	0.6	767.5	130.1	1,155.9
2015 Jan	1,805	8,176.5	99.9	2,704.7	2,095.2	595.8	3,962.2	383.7	2,786.9	0.6	782.8	129.1	1,280.7
Commercial banks [6]													
2014 Dec	276	3,043.5	59.2	992.3	897.6	91.3	1,092.6	178.9	680.9	0.3	229.5	65.2	834.3
2015 Jan	274	3,282.9	48.2	1,085.8	989.9	92.6	1,132.0	201.6	683.9	0.3	241.4	64.8	952.0
Big banks [7]													
2014 Dec	4	1,944.9	9.7	619.9	569.3	47.7	459.5	90.0	253.0	0.2	114.1	57.0	798.8
2015 Jan	4	2,158.2	8.8	691.0	639.5	48.7	490.2	105.7	255.1	0.2	126.0	56.5	911.7
Regional banks and other commercial banks													
2014 Dec	163	846.4	23.2	219.7	177.6	41.6	567.4	68.3	392.5	0.1	106.1	6.6	29.5
2015 Jan	162	868.7	21.0	235.1	192.9	41.8	572.4	73.6	393.3	0.1	105.1	6.7	33.5
Branches of foreign banks													
2014 Dec	109	252.2	26.3	152.6	150.7	2.0	65.7	20.6	35.4	0.0	9.3	1.6	6.1
2015 Jan	108	256.0	18.4	159.7	157.6	2.1	69.3	22.3	35.5	0.0	10.3	1.6	6.9
Landesbanken													
2014 Dec	9	1,060.2	6.7	340.3	235.2	102.5	547.4	59.2	379.3	0.1	106.3	12.4	153.5
2015 Jan	9	1,086.4	2.2	367.6	260.8	104.3	554.5	62.8	381.8	0.1	108.0	11.6	150.5
Savings banks													
2014 Dec	416	1,126.7	19.4	216.2	85.4	130.4	858.3	53.2	667.4	0.1	137.5	15.2	17.7
2015 Jan	416	1,120.2	15.0	212.5	81.7	130.5	860.9	54.1	668.1	0.1	138.4	15.2	16.6
Regional institutions of credit cooperatives													
2014 Dec	2	281.2	0.6	155.0	122.0	32.8	62.8	9.7	22.2	0.0	30.5	14.4	48.5
2015 Jan	2	298.0	0.7	164.9	131.0	33.9	65.0	11.9	22.5	0.0	30.5	14.4	53.0
Credit cooperatives													
2014 Dec	1,047	786.6	12.4	170.8	54.2	116.4	569.4	32.4	449.1	0.1	87.8	14.4	19.6
2015 Jan	1,047	784.1	10.9	169.3	53.4	115.7	570.3	32.4	449.7	0.1	88.1	14.4	19.1
Mortgage banks													
2014 Dec	17	398.5	0.4	93.8	59.0	31.9	288.2	4.8	212.5	–	70.9	0.6	15.5
2015 Jan	17	401.2	0.3	97.4	63.1	31.3	288.4	4.8	212.2	–	71.4	0.6	14.5
Building and loan associations													
2014 Dec	21	211.7	0.1	62.1	45.5	16.6	143.8	1.6	121.6	.	20.6	0.3	5.4
2015 Jan	21	212.9	0.1	62.8	45.5	17.3	144.2	1.5	121.7	.	21.0	0.3	5.5
Special purpose banks													
2014 Dec	19	944.9	15.0	520.7	451.7	68.7	340.1	10.8	243.6	–	84.4	7.7	61.4
2015 Jan	19	991.0	22.6	544.2	469.9	70.3	347.0	14.6	247.1	–	84.1	7.8	69.4
Memo item: **Foreign banks [8]**													
2014 Dec	145	903.7	42.8	313.4	270.3	40.1	427.1	67.4	242.7	0.2	114.7	5.5	114.9
2015 Jan	144	936.4	33.2	347.0	303.5	40.6	432.8	73.2	241.6	0.2	114.7	5.6	117.7
of which: **Banks majority-owned by foreign banks [9]**													
2014 Dec	36	651.5	16.5	160.7	119.6	38.1	361.4	46.8	207.4	0.1	105.4	4.0	108.9
2015 Jan	36	680.4	14.8	187.3	145.9	38.5	363.4	50.9	206.2	0.1	104.4	4.0	110.9

***** Assets and liabilities of monetary financial institutions (MFIs) in Germany. The assets and liabilities of foreign branches, of money market funds (which are also classified as MFIs) and of the Bundesbank are not included. For the definitions of the respective items, see the footnotes to Table IV.3. **1** Owing to the Act Modernising Accounting Law (Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Bilanzrechts) of 25 May 2009, derivative financial instruments in the trading portfolio (trading portfolio derivatives) within the meaning of section 340e (3) sentence 1 of the German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch) read in conjunction with section 35 (1) No 1a of the Credit Institution Accounting Regulation (Verordnung über die Rechnungslegung der Kreditinstitute) are classified under "Other assets and liabilities" as of the December 2010 reporting date. Trading portfolio derivatives are listed separately in the Statistical Supplement to the Monthly Report 1, Banking statistics, in Tables I.1 to I.3. **2** For building and

IV Banks

Deposits of banks (MFIs)			Deposits of non-banks (non-MFIs)										
	of which			*of which*									
					Time deposits [2]			Savings deposits [4]					
Total	Sight deposits	Time deposits	Total	Sight deposits	for up to and including 1 year	for more than 1 year [2]	*Memo item* Liabilities arising from repos [3]	Total	*of which* At three months' notice	Bank savings bonds	Bearer debt securities out-standing [5]	Capital including published reserves, partici-pation rights capital, funds for general banking risks	Other liabi-lities [1]	End of month
All categories of banks														
1,716.7	418.4	1,298.3	3,349.9	1,599.8	328.5	724.3	85.8	615.3	535.7	82.0	1,164.6	463.8	1,106.5	2014 Aug
1,715.5	448.3	1,267.1	3,352.8	1,609.9	319.4	724.5	80.6	615.8	535.7	83.2	1,168.4	464.9	1,096.2	Sep
1,720.2	438.0	1,282.2	3,357.3	1,632.0	307.2	720.3	83.1	615.3	535.4	82.4	1,162.0	465.0	1,102.9	Oct
1,743.6	457.1	1,286.5	3,375.0	1,650.0	308.8	721.4	76.4	614.6	535.1	80.2	1,157.0	466.6	1,149.7	Nov
1,721.1	404.9	1,316.1	3,339.1	1,630.8	297.3	714.3	43.3	617.0	538.7	79.8	1,147.9	464.6	1,180.6	Dec
1,829.3	513.6	1,315.7	3,389.5	1,679.2	304.7	711.8	74.2	615.9	536.6	77.9	1,182.1	464.4	1,311.2	2015 Jan
Commercial banks [6]														
722.6	259.6	463.0	1,218.1	717.3	156.9	203.5	29.7	114.8	99.4	25.7	143.1	158.2	801.4	2014 Dec
783.7	323.0	460.7	1,268.4	757.8	168.6	202.2	56.1	114.5	98.9	25.2	145.4	158.5	926.8	2015 Jan
Big banks [7]														
484.8	189.2	295.6	513.3	284.9	74.5	73.6	29.3	71.0	68.4	9.4	104.5	95.2	747.1	2014 Dec
541.9	247.4	294.5	548.0	308.4	87.4	73.1	55.8	70.4	67.8	8.8	105.2	95.3	867.7	2015 Jan
Regional banks and other commercial banks														
136.7	36.2	100.5	569.4	347.5	60.3	103.0	0.4	43.5	30.8	15.1	38.0	54.5	47.8	2014 Dec
142.2	43.2	99.0	580.6	360.1	59.7	101.8	0.3	43.8	30.9	15.2	39.6	54.6	51.7	2015 Jan
Branches of foreign banks														
101.2	34.3	66.9	135.4	84.9	22.1	26.9	–	0.3	0.2	1.2	0.6	8.5	6.5	2014 Dec
99.6	32.4	67.2	139.7	89.3	21.6	27.4	–	0.3	0.2	1.2	0.6	8.6	7.4	2015 Jan
Landesbanken														
301.7	42.8	258.9	294.9	111.3	55.3	113.8	11.8	14.5	10.9	0.1	249.0	58.4	156.1	2014 Dec
318.2	63.9	254.3	300.8	117.8	54.8	113.7	16.1	14.5	10.9	0.1	250.4	57.7	159.3	2015 Jan
Savings banks														
148.0	12.2	135.8	829.5	450.0	26.5	15.0	–	298.3	257.8	39.7	14.5	90.0	44.7	2014 Dec
148.6	13.7	134.9	823.1	446.8	24.9	14.8	–	298.0	257.8	38.6	14.4	90.0	44.0	2015 Jan
Regional institutions of credit cooperatives														
135.6	36.2	99.4	30.2	8.3	9.5	10.1	1.0	–	–	2.2	53.4	15.6	46.5	2014 Dec
142.8	35.9	106.9	30.7	8.9	9.6	10.0	1.3	–	–	2.2	56.4	15.6	52.6	2015 Jan
Credit cooperatives														
102.8	5.3	97.6	581.9	325.1	36.3	20.6	–	188.9	170.1	11.0	9.2	60.1	32.6	2014 Dec
101.8	4.4	97.4	580.3	325.9	35.0	20.3	–	188.4	168.4	10.7	9.0	60.1	32.8	2015 Jan
Mortgage banks														
98.4	7.6	90.8	147.4	8.3	7.6	131.2	0.0	0.2	0.2	.	116.5	16.3	19.9	2014 Dec
99.9	8.9	91.0	146.7	8.4	7.6	130.5	–	0.1	0.1	.	118.4	16.3	19.8	2015 Jan
Building and loan associations														
23.2	1.6	21.6	162.1	0.6	0.6	159.6	–	0.4	0.4	1.0	2.8	9.2	14.5	2014 Dec
24.0	2.5	21.5	162.5	0.5	0.6	160.1	–	0.3	0.3	1.0	2.8	9.4	14.3	2015 Jan
Special purpose banks														
188.7	39.6	149.1	75.0	10.0	4.5	60.6	0.8	–	–	.	559.4	56.8	64.9	2014 Dec
210.4	61.5	148.9	76.9	13.1	3.6	60.2	0.6	–	–	.	585.2	56.9	61.5	2015 Jan
***Memo item:* Foreign banks [8]**														
225.2	78.0	147.2	484.9	315.9	59.9	76.8	8.2	21.7	21.3	10.6	25.1	48.4	120.0	2014 Dec
243.0	88.6	154.3	498.7	330.5	59.1	76.9	10.9	21.7	21.3	10.5	25.0	48.5	121.1	2015 Jan
***of which:* Banks majority-owned by foreign banks [9]**														
124.0	43.7	80.3	349.5	230.9	37.8	50.0	8.2	21.5	21.1	9.4	24.5	39.9	113.5	2014 Dec
143.4	56.3	87.1	359.0	241.2	37.5	49.6	10.9	21.4	21.1	9.3	24.4	39.9	113.7	2015 Jan

loan associations: Including deposits under savings and loan contracts (see Table IV.12). **3** Included in time deposits. **4** Excluding deposits under savings and loan contracts (see also footnote 2). **5** Including subordinated negotiable bearer debt securities; excluding non-negotiable bearer debt securities. **6** Commercial banks comprise the sub-groups "Big banks", "Regional banks and other commercial banks" and "Branches of foreign banks". **7** Deutsche Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG (up to Nov. 2009), Commerzbank AG, UniCredit Bank AG (formerly Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG) and Deutsche Postbank AG. **8** Sum of the banks majority-owned by foreign banks and included in other categories of banks and the category "Branches (with dependent legal status) of foreign banks". **9** Separate presentation of the banks majority-owned by foreign banks included in other banking categories.

IV Banks

3 Assets and liabilities of banks (MFIs) in Germany vis-à-vis residents *

€ billion

Period	Cash in hand (euro-area banknotes and coins)	Credit balances with the Bundesbank	Lending to domestic banks (MFIs)						Lending to domestic non-banks (non-MFIs)				
			Total	Credit balances and loans	Bills	Negotiable money market paper issued by banks	Securities issued by banks	*Memo item* Fiduciary loans	Total	Loans	Bills	Treasury bills and negotiable money market paper issued by non-banks	Securities issued by non-banks [1]
													End of year or month *
2005	15.1	47.9	1,684.5	1,096.8	0.0	6.7	580.9	2.1	2,995.1	2,632.7	2.4	2.4	357.6
2006	16.0	49.4	1,637.8	1,086.3	–	9.3	542.2	1.9	3,000.7	2,630.3	1.9	2.0	366.5
2007	17.5	64.6	1,751.8	1,222.5	0.0	25.3	504.0	2.3	2,975.7	2,647.9	1.6	1.5	324.7
2008	17.4	102.6	1,861.7	1,298.1	0.0	55.7	507.8	2.0	3,071.1	2,698.9	1.2	3.1	367.9
2009	16.9	78.9	1,711.5	1,138.0	–	31.6	541.9	2.2	3,100.1	2,691.8	0.8	4.0	403.5
2010	16.0	79.6	1,686.3	1,195.4	–	7.5	483.5	1.8	3,220.9	2,770.4	0.8	27.9	421.8
2011	15.8	93.8	1,725.6	1,267.9	–	7.1	450.7	2.1	3,197.8	2,774.6	0.8	6.4	415.9
2012	18.5	134.3	1,655.0	1,229.1	–	2.4	423.5	2.4	3,220.4	2,785.5	0.6	2.2	432.1
2013	18.5	85.6	1,545.6	1,153.1	0.0	1.7	390.8	2.2	3,131.6	2,692.6	0.5	1.2	437.2
2014	18.9	81.3	1,425.9	1,065.6	0.0	2.1	358.2	1.7	3,167.3	2,712.1	0.4	0.7	454.0
2013 Aug	15.1	91.5	1,637.1	1,235.3	–	1.9	399.9	2.3	3,127.2	2,691.9	0.4	1.9	433.1
Sep	14.7	97.8	1,620.4	1,219.6	–	1.7	399.0	2.2	3,127.5	2,691.9	0.4	2.1	433.1
Oct	15.6	60.7	1,617.5	1,222.3	–	1.5	393.6	2.2	3,138.2	2,698.4	0.4	1.6	437.7
Nov	15.0	62.5	1,627.0	1,231.9	0.0	1.4	393.8	2.2	3,139.2	2,698.3	0.4	1.8	438.6
Dec	18.5	85.6	1,545.6	1,153.1	0.0	1.7	390.8	2.2	3,131.6	2,692.6	0.5	1.2	437.2
2014 Jan	14.7	63.3	1,566.3	1,177.0	0.0	1.7	387.6	2.2	3,140.7	2,696.3	0.4	1.2	442.7
Feb	14.9	51.6	1,578.3	1,192.8	0.0	1.7	383.8	1.6	3,134.5	2,695.3	0.4	1.4	437.4
Mar	14.4	50.5	1,551.1	1,168.8	0.0	1.5	380.8	1.6	3,136.4	2,692.5	0.4	1.4	442.1
Apr	15.3	65.2	1,527.8	1,146.6	0.0	1.3	379.8	1.6	3,158.0	2,696.1	0.4	1.7	459.8
May	15.2	58.4	1,550.5	1,170.8	0.0	1.2	378.5	1.6	3,154.3	2,702.7	0.4	1.4	449.9
June	14.7	59.9	1,511.7	1,136.0	0.0	2.6	373.0	1.6	3,147.3	2,697.0	0.3	1.8	448.1
July	14.7	48.6	1,508.3	1,135.2	0.0	2.4	370.8	1.6	3,155.7	2,699.2	0.3	1.9	454.3
Aug	15.3	60.2	1,512.3	1,140.9	0.0	2.3	369.1	1.6	3,155.0	2,699.5	0.3	1.4	453.8
Sep	15.0	80.8	1,488.5	1,117.3	0.0	2.2	369.0	1.6	3,165.0	2,707.1	0.3	0.9	456.7
Oct	15.2	61.8	1,493.6	1,126.5	0.0	2.3	364.8	1.6	3,169.0	2,711.8	0.3	1.2	455.7
Nov	15.4	52.8	1,486.8	1,121.2	0.0	2.3	363.3	1.6	3,178.9	2,719.7	0.3	0.9	458.1
Dec	18.9	81.3	1,425.9	1,065.6	0.0	2.1	358.2	1.7	3,167.3	2,712.1	0.4	0.7	454.0
2015 Jan	15.2	69.3	1,490.7	1,128.6	0.0	2.7	359.4	1.6	3,191.5	2,725.6	0.4	1.1	464.5
													Changes *
2006	+ 0.9	+ 1.5	– 3.6	+ 24.5	– 0.0	+ 2.6	– 30.6	– 0.2	– 12.4	– 20.3	– 0.5	– 0.4	+ 8.8
2007	+ 1.5	+ 15.2	+ 114.8	+ 137.6	+ 0.0	+ 17.0	– 39.8	+ 0.4	– 15.9	+ 12.1	– 0.3	– 0.5	– 27.2
2008	– 0.1	+ 39.4	+ 125.9	+ 90.1	± 0.0	+ 30.6	+ 5.2	– 0.8	+ 92.0	+ 47.3	– 0.4	+ 1.8	+ 43.3
2009	– 0.5	– 23.6	– 147.2	– 157.3	– 0.0	– 24.1	+ 34.3	+ 0.2	+ 25.7	– 11.2	– 0.4	+ 1.4	+ 35.9
2010	– 0.9	+ 0.6	– 19.3	+ 61.5	± 0.0	– 24.0	– 56.8	– 0.3	+ 130.5	+ 78.7	+ 0.0	+ 23.8	+ 28.0
2011	– 0.2	+ 14.2	+ 47.3	+ 80.5	–	– 0.4	– 32.8	– 0.1	– 30.6	– 3.2	+ 0.0	– 21.5	– 5.9
2012	+ 2.7	+ 40.5	– 68.6	– 37.5	–	– 4.6	– 26.5	+ 0.1	+ 21.0	+ 9.8	– 0.2	– 4.3	+ 15.7
2013	+ 0.0	– 48.8	– 204.1	– 170.6	+ 0.0	– 0.7	– 32.7	– 0.2	+ 4.4	+ 0.3	– 0.1	– 0.6	+ 4.8
2014	+ 0.4	– 4.3	– 119.3	– 87.1	+ 0.0	+ 0.4	– 32.6	+ 0.1	+ 36.7	+ 20.5	– 0.1	– 0.6	+ 16.9
2013 Aug	+ 0.6	+ 1.4	+ 3.4	+ 5.0	– 0.0	– 0.1	– 1.4	+ 0.0	– 10.7	– 12.0	– 0.0	– 0.2	+ 1.4
Sep	– 0.4	+ 6.3	– 16.7	– 15.6	–	– 0.2	– 0.9	– 0.1	+ 0.3	+ 0.1	– 0.0	+ 0.2	+ 0.0
Oct	+ 0.9	– 37.0	– 2.9	+ 2.7	–	– 0.2	– 5.4	– 0.0	+ 10.8	+ 6.6	+ 0.0	– 0.5	+ 4.6
Nov	– 0.6	+ 1.8	+ 9.5	+ 9.5	+ 0.0	– 0.2	+ 0.1	– 0.0	+ 1.0	– 0.1	+ 0.0	+ 0.2	+ 0.8
Dec	+ 3.5	+ 23.1	– 81.4	– 78.8	+ 0.0	+ 0.4	– 3.0	+ 0.0	– 7.5	– 5.6	+ 0.1	– 0.6	– 1.3
2014 Jan	– 3.8	– 22.3	+ 20.8	+ 23.9	– 0.0	– 0.0	– 3.2	– 0.0	+ 9.1	+ 3.7	– 0.1	– 0.1	+ 5.6
Feb	+ 0.2	– 11.7	+ 12.0	+ 15.9	–	– 0.1	– 3.8	– 0.0	– 6.2	– 1.0	– 0.0	+ 0.2	– 5.3
Mar	– 0.6	– 1.0	– 27.2	– 24.0	–	– 0.1	– 3.0	– 0.0	+ 2.1	– 2.7	– 0.0	+ 0.0	+ 4.7
Apr	+ 0.9	+ 14.7	– 23.3	– 22.2	–	– 0.2	– 0.9	– 0.0	+ 21.5	+ 3.6	+ 0.0	+ 0.3	+ 17.7
May	– 0.1	– 6.8	+ 22.7	+ 24.1	–	– 0.1	– 1.3	– 0.0	– 3.7	+ 6.6	– 0.0	– 0.3	– 9.9
June	– 0.6	+ 1.5	– 38.9	– 34.8	+ 0.0	+ 1.4	– 5.5	+ 0.1	– 6.0	– 4.7	– 0.0	+ 0.5	– 1.7
July	+ 0.1	– 11.3	– 3.4	– 0.9	–	– 0.3	– 2.2	– 0.1	+ 8.4	+ 2.2	– 0.0	+ 0.0	+ 6.1
Aug	+ 0.5	+ 11.6	+ 4.3	+ 6.0	–	– 0.1	– 1.7	– 0.0	– 0.8	+ 0.2	– 0.0	– 0.5	– 0.5
Sep	– 0.2	+ 20.6	– 23.7	– 23.5	–	– 0.1	– 0.1	+ 0.0	+ 10.0	+ 7.7	– 0.0	– 0.5	+ 2.9
Oct	+ 0.1	– 19.0	+ 5.1	+ 9.2	–	+ 0.1	– 4.2	+ 0.0	+ 4.1	+ 4.7	– 0.0	+ 0.4	– 1.0
Nov	+ 0.2	– 9.0	– 6.9	– 5.3	+ 0.0	– 0.0	– 1.6	– 0.0	+ 9.9	+ 7.9	+ 0.0	– 0.4	+ 2.4
Dec	+ 3.6	+ 28.5	– 60.8	– 55.6	+ 0.0	– 0.1	– 5.1	+ 0.1	– 11.7	– 7.6	+ 0.1	– 0.1	– 4.1
2015 Jan	– 3.8	– 12.0	+ 63.9	+ 62.0	– 0.0	+ 0.6	+ 1.3	– 0.1	+ 25.1	+ 14.3	– 0.1	+ 0.4	+ 10.4

***** See Table IV.2, footnote*; statistical breaks have been eliminated from the changes. The figures for the latest date are always to be regarded as provisional. Subsequent revisions which appear in the following Monthly Report, are not specially marked. **1** Excluding debt securities arising from the exchange of equalisation claims (see also footnote 2). **2** Including debt securities arising from the exchange of equalisation claims. **3** Including liabilities arising from registered debt securities, registered money market paper and non-negotiable bearer debt securities; including subordinated liabilities. **4** Including liabilities arising from monetary policy operations

IV Banks

Equalisation claims [2]	*Memo item* Fiduciary loans	Participating interests in domestic banks and enterprises	Deposits of domestic banks (MFIs) [3] Total	Sight deposits [4]	Time deposits [4]	Redis-counted bills [5]	*Memo item* Fiduciary loans	Deposits of domestic non-banks (non-MFIs) Total	Sight deposits	Time deposits [6]	Savings deposits [7]	Bank savings bonds [8]	*Memo item* Fiduciary loans	Period
End of year or month *														
–	56.6	108.5	1,300.0	120.5	1,179.4	0.1	26.5	2,276.6	717.0	864.4	603.4	91.9	42.4	2005
–	53.0	106.3	1,348.2	125.4	1,222.7	0.0	22.3	2,394.6	747.7	962.8	586.5	97.5	37.8	2006
–	51.1	109.4	1,478.6	122.1	1,356.5	0.0	20.0	2,579.1	779.9	1,125.4	555.4	118.4	36.4	2007
–	47.2	111.2	1,582.5	138.5	1,444.0	0.0	41.6	2,781.4	834.6	1,276.1	535.2	135.4	32.3	2008
–	43.9	106.1	1,355.1	128.9	1,226.2	0.0	35.7	2,829.7	1,029.5	1,102.6	594.5	103.2	43.4	2009
–	33.7	96.8	1,238.3	135.3	1,102.6	0.0	13.8	2,935.2	1,104.4	1,117.1	618.2	95.4	37.5	2010
–	36.3	94.6	1,210.5	114.8	1,095.3	0.0	36.1	3,045.5	1,168.3	1,156.2	616.1	104.8	36.5	2011
–	34.8	90.0	1,135.5	132.9	1,002.6	0.0	36.3	3,090.2	1,306.5	1,072.5	617.6	93.6	34.9	2012
–	31.6	92.3	1,140.3	125.6	1,014.7	0.0	33.2	3,048.7	1,409.9	952.0	610.1	76.6	32.9	2013
–	26.5	94.3	1,111.9	127.8	984.1	0.0	11.7	3,118.2	1,517.8	926.7	607.7	66.0	30.9	2014
–	32.6	91.0	1,148.5	140.4	1,008.2	0.0	34.0	3,023.6	1,372.9	964.4	607.5	78.8	34.4	2013 Aug
–	31.9	91.1	1,147.2	146.3	1,000.9	0.0	33.9	3,020.6	1,379.4	956.9	606.4	78.0	33.5	Sep
–	31.6	91.1	1,141.4	150.1	991.2	0.0	33.4	3,027.2	1,392.9	950.6	606.4	77.3	33.4	Oct
–	31.6	91.0	1,161.7	162.1	999.7	0.0	33.7	3,044.4	1,413.4	947.8	606.3	76.9	33.3	Nov
–	31.6	92.3	1,140.3	125.6	1,014.7	0.0	33.2	3,048.7	1,409.9	952.0	610.1	76.6	32.9	Dec
–	31.2	92.0	1,138.1	143.5	994.6	0.0	33.1	3,047.2	1,416.0	946.7	609.1	75.4	32.9	2014 Jan
–	28.0	91.6	1,148.8	153.5	995.3	0.0	12.1	3,056.6	1,422.6	949.8	609.8	74.4	32.7	Feb
–	27.8	92.3	1,131.6	149.1	982.5	0.0	12.0	3,048.0	1,416.9	948.8	608.6	73.7	32.5	Mar
–	27.6	92.5	1,153.3	148.1	1,005.2	0.0	11.8	3,057.2	1,431.5	947.0	606.7	72.0	32.4	Apr
–	27.6	92.9	1,163.8	152.4	1,011.4	0.0	11.9	3,072.1	1,446.2	949.0	606.0	70.9	31.9	May
–	27.5	94.0	1,144.5	166.2	978.3	0.0	12.0	3,066.2	1,442.8	948.4	604.5	70.5	31.4	June
–	27.1	94.5	1,134.6	167.5	967.1	0.0	11.8	3,073.9	1,455.0	945.4	604.4	69.2	31.3	July
–	27.1	94.4	1,124.5	144.1	980.4	0.0	11.8	3,091.6	1,472.1	945.3	605.9	68.4	31.3	Aug
–	26.9	95.2	1,117.2	155.7	961.5	0.0	11.8	3,092.6	1,474.8	941.9	606.5	69.4	31.2	Sep
–	26.5	95.2	1,122.7	149.1	973.6	0.0	11.5	3,097.3	1,494.5	928.1	606.1	68.6	31.1	Oct
–	26.5	95.1	1,116.1	155.8	960.2	0.0	11.5	3,116.4	1,517.9	926.7	605.3	66.5	31.1	Nov
–	26.5	94.3	1,111.9	127.8	984.1	0.0	11.7	3,118.2	1,517.8	926.7	607.7	66.0	30.9	Dec
–	26.1	93.1	1,138.0	174.9	963.1	0.0	11.3	3,128.6	1,537.9	919.5	606.6	64.7	30.8	2015 Jan
Changes *														
–	– 3.7	– 2.2	+ 79.0	+ 8.6	+ 70.5	– 0.1	– 4.5	+ 118.0	+ 30.0	+ 97.7	– 16.8	+ 7.2	– 4.1	2006
–	– 2.3	+ 3.1	+ 132.0	– 3.3	+ 135.3	– 0.0	– 2.3	+ 181.1	+ 31.6	+ 160.5	– 31.1	+ 20.1	– 2.0	2007
–	– 5.4	+ 7.8	+ 124.3	+ 23.0	+ 101.3	– 0.0	– 3.6	+ 207.6	+ 54.3	+ 156.6	– 20.2	+ 17.0	– 1.3	2008
–	– 4.2	+ 0.7	– 225.4	– 9.7	– 215.7	– 0.0	– 5.7	+ 59.7	+ 211.4	– 179.3	+ 59.3	– 31.6	– 0.9	2009
–	– 2.1	– 9.2	– 96.5	+ 22.3	– 119.1	– 0.0	– 0.2	+ 77.8	+ 76.0	– 18.9	+ 24.0	– 3.3	– 1.7	2010
–	– 1.1	– 2.2	– 25.0	– 20.0	– 5.1	– 0.0	+ 0.1	+ 111.2	+ 63.7	+ 40.9	– 2.6	+ 9.3	– 1.1	2011
–	– 1.3	– 4.1	– 70.8	+ 21.5	– 91.9	– 0.0	+ 0.2	+ 42.2	+ 138.7	– 86.7	+ 1.5	– 11.2	– 1.6	2012
–	– 3.3	+ 2.4	– 79.4	– 24.1	– 55.3	+ 0.0	– 3.4	+ 40.2	+ 118.4	– 53.9	– 7.4	– 17.0	– 1.7	2013
–	– 1.9	+ 2.0	– 29.0	+ 2.2	– 31.2	– 0.0	– 0.6	+ 69.6	+ 107.9	– 25.3	– 2.4	– 10.6	– 2.0	2014
–	– 0.2	+ 0.1	+ 15.0	+ 2.8	+ 12.2	–	– 0.1	+ 0.1	+ 13.3	– 11.8	– 0.7	– 0.7	+ 0.0	2013 Aug
–	– 0.7	+ 0.1	– 1.3	+ 5.9	– 7.3	+ 0.0	– 0.5	– 3.0	+ 6.4	– 7.5	– 1.1	– 0.9	– 0.5	Sep
–	– 0.4	– 0.0	– 5.8	+ 3.9	– 9.7	– 0.0	– 0.5	+ 6.6	+ 13.5	– 6.3	– 0.0	– 0.6	– 0.1	Oct
–	+ 0.0	– 0.1	+ 20.3	+ 11.9	+ 8.4	+ 0.0	+ 0.3	+ 17.3	+ 20.6	– 2.8	– 0.0	– 0.5	– 0.0	Nov
–	– 0.0	+ 1.3	– 21.5	– 36.5	+ 15.0	+ 0.0	– 0.4	+ 4.3	– 3.5	+ 4.1	+ 3.9	– 0.2	– 0.4	Dec
–	– 0.3	– 0.3	– 2.2	+ 17.9	– 20.1	+ 0.0	– 0.1	– 1.5	+ 6.1	– 5.4	– 1.0	– 1.2	– 0.1	2014 Jan
–	– 0.1	– 0.3	+ 10.7	+ 10.0	+ 0.7	+ 0.0	– 0.1	+ 9.5	+ 6.7	+ 3.1	+ 0.7	– 1.0	– 0.1	Feb
–	– 0.2	+ 0.7	– 17.1	– 4.4	– 12.8	– 0.0	– 0.1	– 8.7	– 5.8	– 0.9	– 1.2	– 0.7	– 0.2	Mar
–	– 0.2	+ 0.2	+ 21.7	– 1.0	+ 22.7	– 0.0	– 0.2	+ 9.2	+ 14.6	– 1.8	– 1.9	– 1.7	– 0.1	Apr
–	+ 0.0	+ 0.4	+ 10.4	+ 4.3	+ 6.2	– 0.0	+ 0.1	+ 15.0	+ 14.7	+ 2.0	– 0.7	– 1.1	– 0.6	May
–	– 0.1	+ 1.1	– 19.2	+ 13.8	– 33.1	– 0.0	+ 0.1	– 5.9	– 3.4	– 0.6	– 1.4	– 0.4	– 0.5	June
–	– 0.4	+ 0.5	– 10.0	+ 1.2	– 11.2	–	– 0.2	+ 7.8	+ 12.2	– 2.9	– 0.2	– 1.3	– 0.0	July
–	– 0.1	– 0.1	– 10.0	– 23.4	+ 13.3	–	+ 0.0	+ 17.7	+ 17.1	– 0.1	+ 1.5	– 0.8	– 0.0	Aug
–	– 0.2	+ 0.7	– 7.1	+ 11.6	– 18.7	–	– 0.1	+ 0.9	+ 2.7	– 3.4	+ 0.6	+ 1.0	– 0.1	Sep
–	– 0.4	+ 0.0	+ 5.5	– 6.7	+ 12.1	–	– 0.3	+ 4.7	+ 19.7	– 13.8	– 0.4	– 0.7	– 0.1	Oct
–	– 0.1	– 0.1	– 6.6	+ 6.8	– 13.4	–	– 0.0	+ 19.2	+ 23.4	– 1.4	– 0.7	– 2.1	+ 0.0	Nov
–	+ 0.1	– 0.8	– 5.0	– 28.0	+ 23.0	–	+ 0.3	+ 1.7	– 0.1	– 0.0	+ 2.4	– 0.5	– 0.2	Dec
–	– 0.4	– 1.2	+ 26.1	+ 47.1	– 21.0	– 0.0	– 0.4	+ 10.5	+ 20.1	– 7.2	– 1.1	– 1.3	– 0.1	2015 Jan

with the Bundesbank. **5** Own acceptances and promissory notes outstanding. **6** Since the inclusion of building and loan associations in January 1999, including deposits under savings and loan contracts (see Table IV.12). **7** Excluding deposits under savings and loan contracts (see also footnote 8). **8** Including liabilities arising from non-negotiable bearer debt securities.

IV Banks

4 Assets and liabilities of banks (MFIs) in Germany vis-à-vis non-residents *

€ billion

Period	Cash in hand (non-euro-area banknotes and coins)	Lending to foreign banks (MFIs)							Lending to foreign non-banks (non-MFIs)					
		Total	Credit balances and loans, bills			Negotiable money market paper issued by banks	Securities issued by banks	*Memo item* Fiduciary loans	Total	Loans and bills			Treasury bills and negotiable money market paper issued by non-banks	Securities issued by non-banks
			Total	Short-term	Medium and long-term					Total	Short-term	Medium and long-term		
	End of year or month *													
2005	0.2	1,038.8	860.0	648.5	211.5	5.8	173.0	1.5	712.0	387.9	132.8	255.1	9.3	314.8
2006	0.4	1,266.9	1,003.2	744.5	258.7	13.3	250.4	0.8	777.0	421.0	156.0	264.9	7.2	348.9
2007	0.3	1,433.5	1,105.9	803.6	302.4	13.4	314.2	0.5	908.3	492.9	197.5	295.4	27.5	387.9
2008	0.3	1,446.6	1,131.6	767.2	364.3	15.6	299.5	1.9	908.4	528.9	151.4	377.5	12.9	366.6
2009	0.3	1,277.4	986.1	643.5	342.6	6.2	285.0	2.9	815.7	469.6	116.9	352.7	9.8	336.3
2010	0.5	1,154.1	892.7	607.7	285.1	2.1	259.3	1.8	773.8	461.4	112.6	348.8	10.1	302.3
2011	0.6	1,117.6	871.0	566.3	304.8	4.6	241.9	2.6	744.4	455.8	102.0	353.8	8.5	280.1
2012	0.8	1,046.0	813.5	545.5	268.1	5.4	227.0	2.6	729.0	442.2	105.1	337.1	9.0	277.8
2013	0.2	1,019.7	782.4	546.6	235.8	7.2	230.1	2.5	701.0	404.9	100.3	304.6	8.2	287.8
2014	0.2	1,125.3	884.9	618.8	266.1	7.9	232.5	1.1	735.1	415.2	94.4	320.8	6.5	313.5
2013 Aug	1.3	1,032.2	796.0	548.1	247.9	5.2	230.9	2.5	723.6	425.0	108.6	316.4	12.7	285.9
Sep	0.6	1,021.7	786.8	542.1	244.7	5.8	229.0	2.5	712.2	415.1	102.2	312.8	9.4	287.8
Oct	0.4	1,040.7	806.7	564.2	242.5	5.6	228.5	2.5	709.1	413.0	102.8	310.2	10.6	285.5
Nov	0.3	1,060.2	822.5	579.9	242.6	6.8	230.8	2.5	718.5	418.1	109.1	309.0	10.0	290.4
Dec	0.2	1,019.7	782.4	546.6	235.8	7.2	230.1	2.5	701.0	404.9	100.3	304.6	8.2	287.8
2014 Jan	0.2	1,051.7	813.1	577.8	235.3	6.9	231.7	2.5	715.2	417.7	110.5	307.2	8.0	289.6
Feb	0.2	1,043.7	805.9	572.5	233.5	7.2	230.6	1.7	711.1	418.1	113.4	304.7	8.4	284.6
Mar	0.2	1,030.9	792.4	554.2	238.2	7.4	231.1	1.7	715.6	413.9	108.9	305.1	9.9	291.8
Apr	0.2	1,037.1	796.9	560.9	235.9	8.2	232.0	1.7	719.9	423.0	118.6	304.4	10.7	286.2
May	0.2	1,064.1	823.0	580.9	242.1	8.4	232.6	1.2	723.0	422.8	116.3	306.5	9.9	290.3
June	0.2	1,072.0	830.7	595.3	235.4	8.4	232.8	1.1	726.9	422.7	116.9	305.9	9.9	294.3
July	0.2	1,109.1	868.6	634.1	234.5	8.1	232.3	1.1	737.9	432.1	122.7	309.4	9.5	296.4
Aug	0.2	1,103.8	862.7	624.0	238.6	8.9	232.2	1.1	733.8	430.4	118.2	312.3	9.1	294.2
Sep	0.2	1,098.9	855.7	607.3	248.4	8.9	234.3	1.1	741.0	429.9	111.3	318.6	7.4	303.7
Oct	0.2	1,119.6	878.5	628.7	249.8	8.6	232.5	1.1	738.3	429.8	110.3	319.5	7.7	300.8
Nov	0.2	1,151.0	907.8	658.2	249.7	8.7	234.5	1.1	749.8	433.9	113.5	320.4	8.3	307.6
Dec	0.2	1,125.3	884.9	618.8	266.1	7.9	232.5	1.1	735.1	415.2	94.4	320.8	6.5	313.5
2015 Jan	0.2	1,214.0	966.7	684.3	282.4	10.9	236.4	1.1	770.7	445.3	117.5	327.8	7.0	318.4
	Changes *													
2006	+ 0.1	+ 238.3	+ 153.5	+ 109.7	+ 43.8	+ 7.5	+ 77.2	– 0.7	+ 81.4	+ 51.6	+ 25.9	+ 25.8	– 1.8	+ 31.5
2007	– 0.0	+ 190.3	+ 123.7	+ 72.9	+ 50.8	+ 7.5	+ 59.1	– 0.4	+ 167.7	+ 94.3	+ 50.1	+ 44.2	+ 20.1	+ 53.3
2008	+ 0.0	+ 8.5	+ 20.2	– 43.0	+ 63.2	+ 2.1	– 13.7	– 0.0	+ 4.3	+ 45.1	– 31.9	+ 77.0	– 14.5	– 26.3
2009	– 0.0	– 170.0	– 141.3	– 122.5	– 18.8	– 10.3	– 18.4	– 0.2	– 72.8	– 43.8	– 31.7	– 12.1	– 3.3	– 25.7
2010	+ 0.1	– 141.5	– 116.2	– 47.3	– 68.9	– 4.8	– 20.4	– 0.2	– 62.0	– 24.5	– 12.6	– 11.9	+ 0.4	– 38.0
2011	+ 0.1	– 48.4	– 32.6	– 45.3	+ 12.7	+ 2.5	– 18.4	+ 0.0	– 38.9	– 13.6	– 12.8	– 0.9	– 1.6	– 23.6
2012	+ 0.1	– 70.1	– 56.8	– 23.1	– 33.7	+ 0.9	– 14.1	– 0.1	– 9.4	– 7.5	+ 8.3	– 15.9	+ 0.6	– 2.5
2013	– 0.5	– 22.7	– 26.9	– 1.3	– 25.6	+ 1.8	+ 2.4	– 0.0	– 21.2	– 33.1	– 5.8	– 27.2	– 0.7	+ 12.6
2014	– 0.0	+ 86.1	+ 80.1	+ 63.2	+ 16.8	+ 0.7	+ 5.3	– 0.6	+ 5.7	– 10.2	– 12.8	+ 2.7	– 1.8	+ 17.7
2013 Aug	+ 0.6	– 5.5	– 8.2	– 6.1	– 2.1	– 0.2	+ 2.8	+ 0.0	– 8.0	– 5.0	– 0.6	– 4.4	+ 2.6	– 5.6
Sep	– 0.6	– 7.2	– 6.0	– 4.2	– 1.8	+ 0.6	– 1.8	+ 0.0	– 9.0	– 8.1	– 6.2	– 2.0	– 3.3	+ 2.4
Oct	– 0.2	+ 23.5	+ 24.4	+ 25.3	– 1.0	– 0.3	– 0.6	– 0.0	– 2.4	– 2.0	– 0.8	– 1.2	+ 1.2	– 1.6
Nov	– 0.1	+ 19.4	+ 15.9	+ 15.6	+ 0.3	+ 1.2	+ 2.3	+ 0.0	+ 7.8	+ 3.7	+ 6.1	– 2.5	– 0.6	+ 4.8
Dec	– 0.1	– 37.5	– 37.3	– 31.7	– 5.6	+ 0.4	– 0.6	+ 0.0	– 15.3	– 11.5	– 8.5	– 3.0	– 1.8	– 2.0
2014 Jan	– 0.0	+ 35.5	+ 34.4	+ 36.9	– 2.4	– 0.4	+ 1.5	– 0.0	+ 10.7	+ 10.0	+ 9.7	+ 0.4	– 0.2	+ 0.9
Feb	– 0.0	– 3.2	– 2.6	– 2.5	– 0.0	+ 0.4	– 1.0	–	– 0.8	+ 3.1	+ 3.5	– 0.3	+ 0.4	– 4.3
Mar	– 0.0	– 13.0	– 14.0	– 18.4	+ 4.4	+ 0.2	+ 0.7	– 0.1	+ 4.4	– 4.0	– 4.6	+ 0.6	+ 1.5	+ 6.9
Apr	+ 0.0	+ 7.7	+ 5.3	+ 7.2	– 2.0	+ 0.8	+ 1.6	+ 0.0	+ 4.1	+ 9.5	+ 9.8	– 0.3	+ 0.8	– 6.2
May	– 0.0	+ 22.7	+ 22.0	+ 17.5	+ 4.5	+ 0.2	+ 0.5	– 0.5	+ 0.0	– 2.7	– 2.9	+ 0.2	– 0.8	+ 3.5
June	+ 0.0	+ 8.1	+ 8.0	+ 14.6	– 6.6	– 0.0	+ 0.2	– 0.1	+ 4.0	+ 0.1	+ 0.6	– 0.5	– 0.0	+ 4.0
July	– 0.0	+ 32.1	+ 33.0	+ 35.7	– 2.8	– 0.3	– 0.6	– 0.0	+ 7.7	+ 6.6	+ 5.2	+ 1.5	– 0.4	+ 1.4
Aug	– 0.0	– 9.3	– 9.9	– 12.6	+ 2.8	+ 0.8	– 0.2	+ 0.0	– 6.4	– 3.5	– 4.9	+ 1.4	– 0.3	– 2.6
Sep	+ 0.0	– 17.7	– 19.4	– 24.7	+ 5.3	+ 0.0	+ 1.8	+ 0.0	– 0.8	– 7.1	– 8.4	+ 1.3	– 1.8	+ 8.0
Oct	– 0.0	+ 23.9	+ 24.7	+ 23.5	+ 1.2	– 0.2	– 0.6	+ 0.0	– 6.8	– 2.9	– 3.4	+ 0.5	+ 0.3	– 4.2
Nov	+ 0.0	+ 32.4	+ 29.3	+ 30.4	– 1.1	+ 0.0	+ 3.0	+ 0.0	+ 10.4	+ 3.8	+ 3.0	+ 0.8	+ 0.6	+ 6.0
Dec	– 0.0	– 33.1	– 30.7	– 44.4	+ 13.6	– 0.8	– 1.6	– 0.0	– 20.8	– 23.1	– 20.2	– 2.9	– 1.9	+ 4.1
2015 Jan	+ 0.0	+ 63.1	+ 57.8	+ 50.3	+ 7.5	+ 3.0	+ 2.3	– 0.0	+ 21.4	+ 18.3	+ 20.6	– 2.3	+ 0.6	+ 2.5

* See Table IV.2, footnote*; statistical breaks have been eliminated from the changes. The figures for the latest date are always to be regarded as provisional. Subsequent revisions, which appear in the following Monthly Report, are not specially marked.

IV Banks

Memo item Fiduciary loans	Participating interests in foreign banks and enterprises	Deposits of foreign banks (MFIs)						Deposits of foreign non-banks (non-MFIs)						Period
		Total	Sight deposits	Time deposits (including bank savings bonds)			*Memo item* Fiduciary loans	Total	Sight deposits	Time deposits (including savings deposits and bank savings bonds)			*Memo item* Fiduciary loans	
				Total	Short-term	Medium and long-term				Total	Short-term	Medium and long-term		
End of year or month *														
10.6	37.2	651.7	102.9	548.8	420.4	128.4	0.6	316.4	62.0	254.4	119.4	135.0	1.2	2005
5.8	50.4	689.7	168.1	521.6	397.3	124.3	0.4	310.1	82.1	228.0	111.5	116.5	1.5	2006
5.7	48.3	738.9	164.7	574.1	461.2	113.0	0.2	303.1	76.0	227.1	122.3	104.8	3.1	2007
25.5	45.1	703.3	218.1	485.1	362.3	122.9	0.3	286.1	92.2	193.9	95.1	98.8	2.5	2008
32.1	45.4	652.6	213.6	439.0	307.4	131.6	0.2	216.3	78.1	138.2	73.7	64.5	1.9	2009
15.6	48.8	741.7	258.7	483.0	349.3	133.6	0.1	227.6	84.8	142.7	76.7	66.0	1.5	2010
32.9	45.0	655.7	242.6	413.1	289.4	123.7	0.1	225.9	92.3	133.6	66.9	66.6	1.3	2011
32.6	46.4	691.1	289.4	401.7	284.6	117.0	0.1	237.6	107.2	130.3	69.1	61.2	1.2	2012
30.8	39.0	515.7	222.6	293.2	196.0	97.2	0.1	257.8	118.1	139.7	76.8	62.9	1.0	2013
14.0	35.6	609.2	277.1	332.1	242.7	89.4	0.1	221.0	113.0	107.9	47.8	60.1	0.7	2014
32.0	46.3	627.6	254.2	373.3	269.3	104.0	0.1	253.6	129.3	124.3	65.0	59.3	1.1	2013 Aug
31.7	46.1	601.4	273.2	328.2	225.5	102.7	0.1	246.8	123.1	123.7	63.6	60.0	1.1	Sep
31.5	46.1	594.9	258.7	336.2	235.7	100.5	0.1	246.8	124.2	122.6	62.3	60.3	1.1	Oct
31.8	44.1	591.4	274.9	316.4	216.2	100.2	0.1	257.7	126.6	131.1	68.7	62.4	1.1	Nov
30.8	39.0	515.7	222.6	293.2	196.0	97.2	0.1	257.8	118.1	139.7	76.8	62.9	1.0	Dec
31.0	41.6	574.8	274.6	300.2	206.7	93.5	0.1	257.4	127.1	130.3	67.1	63.2	1.0	2014 Jan
14.4	40.0	554.1	256.2	297.9	205.6	92.3	0.1	256.1	128.6	127.5	66.2	61.3	1.0	Feb
14.4	39.7	554.2	257.3	297.0	200.1	96.9	0.1	251.9	129.4	122.5	62.8	59.7	1.0	Mar
14.4	39.7	567.4	254.6	312.8	215.7	97.0	0.1	255.4	134.1	121.3	61.6	59.7	1.0	Apr
14.4	39.7	564.4	256.4	308.0	212.7	95.3	0.1	260.8	140.6	120.2	59.7	60.6	1.0	May
14.2	38.6	556.0	272.6	283.5	190.5	92.9	0.1	256.5	144.2	112.2	53.0	59.3	1.1	June
14.3	37.7	587.4	287.2	300.2	209.6	90.5	0.1	269.1	147.3	121.8	62.8	59.0	0.9	July
14.7	37.7	592.2	274.2	317.9	230.3	87.6	0.1	258.3	127.7	130.5	70.5	60.1	1.3	Aug
14.7	37.7	598.2	292.6	305.6	216.9	88.8	0.1	260.2	135.1	125.2	64.9	60.2	1.3	Sep
14.6	37.8	597.5	289.0	308.5	220.4	88.2	0.1	260.0	137.5	122.5	62.6	59.9	1.3	Oct
14.7	37.6	627.5	301.3	326.3	238.4	87.8	0.1	258.6	132.1	126.5	65.7	60.8	1.3	Nov
14.0	35.6	609.2	277.1	332.1	242.7	89.4	0.1	221.0	113.0	107.9	47.8	60.1	0.7	Dec
14.0	35.7	691.4	338.7	352.6	260.2	92.5	0.1	260.9	141.4	119.5	59.2	60.3	0.7	2015 Jan
Changes *														
– 5.1	+ 13.8	+ 56.2	+ 68.3	– 12.1	– 13.7	+ 1.6	– 0.2	– 0.8	+ 21.2	– 22.0	– 5.1	– 17.0	– 0.2	2006
– 0.1	– 0.8	+ 67.3	+ 1.5	+ 65.8	+ 74.0	– 8.3	– 0.1	+ 4.6	– 5.5	+ 10.2	+ 16.6	– 6.4	+ 1.6	2007
+ 0.7	– 3.1	– 50.1	+ 52.2	– 102.3	– 120.7	+ 18.5	+ 0.1	– 12.4	+ 16.1	– 28.5	– 19.4	– 9.1	– 0.6	2008
– 3.2	+ 0.1	– 81.4	– 2.1	– 79.3	– 57.5	– 21.7	– 0.2	– 33.5	– 13.3	– 20.1	– 17.0	– 3.1	– 0.6	2009
+ 0.2	+ 1.4	+ 895.4	+ 42.0	+ 542.4	+ 38.1	+ 136.8	– 0.1	– 1.6	+ 6.0	– 7.6	– 3.3	– 4.4	– 0.4	2010
– 0.1	– 3.9	– 88.8	– 13.8	– 75.0	– 61.8	– 13.1	– 0.0	– 9.3	+ 6.4	– 15.7	– 10.4	– 5.3	– 0.2	2011
– 0.3	+ 1.5	+ 38.2	+ 51.7	– 13.5	– 7.5	– 6.0	– 0.0	+ 12.6	+ 15.2	– 2.6	+ 2.5	– 5.1	– 0.1	2012
– 1.8	– 7.2	– 174.0	– 75.6	– 98.4	– 83.1	– 15.4	– 0.0	+ 13.5	+ 9.6	+ 3.9	+ 6.9	– 3.0	– 0.2	2013
+ 0.1	– 3.8	+ 76.3	+ 47.8	+ 28.5	+ 39.0	– 10.5	– 0.0	– 43.6	– 8.3	– 35.3	– 30.7	– 4.6	+ 0.2	2014
– 0.0	+ 0.0	– 24.9	– 34.0	+ 9.1	+ 8.8	+ 0.3	–	– 0.5	– 0.4	– 0.1	+ 1.2	– 1.3	– 0.0	2013 Aug
– 0.3	– 0.2	– 23.9	+ 19.5	– 43.5	– 42.4	– 1.1	– 0.0	– 7.3	– 5.9	– 1.4	– 1.1	– 0.3	– 0.0	Sep
– 0.2	+ 0.0	– 4.8	– 13.7	+ 8.9	+ 10.8	– 1.9	–	+ 0.6	+ 1.3	– 0.7	– 1.2	+ 0.5	+ 0.0	Oct
+ 0.2	– 1.9	– 2.8	+ 15.7	– 18.5	– 18.1	– 0.4	–	+ 9.5	+ 2.6	+ 6.9	+ 4.8	+ 2.0	– 0.0	Nov
– 0.9	– 5.1	– 73.9	– 51.7	– 22.2	– 19.5	– 2.7	– 0.0	+ 0.9	– 8.2	+ 9.1	+ 8.3	+ 0.8	– 0.1	Dec
+ 0.2	+ 2.5	+ 56.6	+ 51.1	+ 5.5	+ 9.7	– 4.2	–	– 1.5	+ 8.6	– 10.1	– 10.0	– 0.1	– 0.1	2014 Jan
– 0.1	– 1.6	– 18.0	– 17.2	– 0.9	– 0.1	– 0.8	–	– 0.3	+ 1.9	– 2.2	– 0.6	– 1.6	– 0.0	Feb
+ 0.0	– 0.2	+ 0.0	+ 0.9	– 0.9	– 5.5	+ 4.6	– 0.0	– 4.3	+ 0.7	– 5.0	– 3.4	– 1.5	+ 0.0	Mar
– 0.1	– 0.0	+ 13.6	– 2.4	+ 16.0	+ 15.8	+ 0.2	–	+ 3.7	+ 4.9	– 1.2	– 1.2	+ 0.0	+ 0.0	Apr
+ 0.0	– 0.1	– 5.4	+ 0.9	– 6.3	– 4.1	– 2.2	–	+ 4.4	+ 6.0	– 1.6	– 2.1	+ 0.6	+ 0.0	May
– 0.2	– 1.0	– 8.2	+ 16.2	– 24.4	– 22.1	– 2.3	– 0.0	– 4.3	+ 3.7	– 8.0	– 6.7	– 1.3	+ 0.0	June
+ 0.1	– 1.0	+ 28.6	+ 13.5	+ 15.1	+ 18.0	– 2.8	–	+ 11.6	+ 2.6	+ 9.0	+ 9.6	– 0.5	– 0.1	July
+ 0.4	– 0.0	+ 2.7	– 14.0	+ 16.7	+ 19.8	– 3.1	–	– 11.5	– 20.0	+ 8.4	+ 7.6	+ 0.8	+ 0.3	Aug
+ 0.1	– 0.1	– 0.6	+ 16.1	– 16.7	– 16.9	+ 0.2	– 0.0	– 0.4	+ 6.2	– 6.6	– 6.1	– 0.5	+ 0.1	Sep
– 0.1	+ 0.1	– 1.1	– 3.7	+ 2.7	+ 3.3	– 0.7	–	– 0.3	+ 2.4	– 2.7	– 2.3	– 0.4	– 0.0	Oct
+ 0.0	– 0.2	+ 30.0	+ 12.2	+ 17.8	+ 18.1	– 0.3	–	– 1.4	– 5.4	+ 4.1	+ 3.2	+ 0.9	– 0.1	Nov
– 0.2	– 2.1	– 22.0	– 25.9	+ 3.9	+ 3.0	+ 0.9	– 0.0	– 39.3	– 19.8	– 19.5	– 18.4	– 1.1	– 0.1	Dec
+ 0.0	– 0.1	+ 68.7	+ 56.0	+ 12.8	+ 11.5	+ 1.3	–	+ 35.9	+ 26.3	+ 9.6	+ 10.6	– 1.0	– 0.0	2015 Jan

IV Banks

5 Lending by banks (MFIs) in Germany to domestic non-banks (non-MFIs) *

€ billion

Period	Lending to domestic non-banks, total		Short-term lending							Medium and long-term	
				to enterprises and households			to general government				to enter-
	including negotiable money market paper, securities, equalisation claims	excluding negotiable money market paper, securities, equalisation claims	Total	Total	Loans and bills	Negotiable money market paper	Total	Loans	Treasury bills	Total	Total
	End of year or month *										
2005	2,995.1	2,635.1	309.7	273.5	272.9	0.6	36.2	34.4	1.8	2,685.4	2,141.3
2006	3,000.7	2,632.2	303.1	269.8	269.3	0.6	33.3	31.9	1.4	2,697.6	2,181.8
2007	2,975.7	2,649.5	331.2	301.8	301.5	0.3	29.4	28.2	1.2	2,644.6	2,168.3
2008	3,071.1	2,700.1	373.0	337.5	335.3	2.2	35.5	34.5	1.0	2,698.1	2,257.8
2009	3,100.1	2,692.6	347.3	306.3	306.2	0.1	41.0	37.1	3.9	2,752.8	2,299.7
2010	3,220.9	2,771.3	428.0	283.0	282.8	0.2	145.0	117.2	27.7	2,793.0	2,305.6
2011	3,197.8	2,775.4	383.3	316.5	316.1	0.4	66.8	60.7	6.0	2,814.5	2,321.9
2012	3,220.4	2,786.1	376.1	316.8	316.3	0.5	59.3	57.6	1.7	2,844.3	2,310.9
2013	3,131.6	2,693.2	269.1	217.7	217.0	0.6	51.4	50.8	0.6	2,862.6	2,328.6
2014	3,167.3	2,712.6	257.5	212.7	212.0	0.6	44.8	44.7	0.1	2,909.8	2,376.9
2013 Aug	3,127.2	2,692.3	269.9	220.6	220.1	0.6	49.3	48.0	1.3	2,857.3	2,324.5
Sep	3,127.5	2,692.3	276.7	226.0	225.3	0.8	50.7	49.4	1.3	2,850.8	2,320.5
Oct	3,138.2	2,698.8	279.4	220.9	220.3	0.6	58.5	57.5	1.0	2,858.7	2,326.0
Nov	3,139.2	2,698.7	270.3	216.8	216.2	0.6	53.5	52.3	1.2	2,868.8	2,334.0
Dec	3,131.6	2,693.2	269.1	217.7	217.0	0.6	51.4	50.8	0.6	2,862.6	2,328.6
2014 Jan	3,140.7	2,696.8	272.9	214.7	213.9	0.8	58.2	57.8	0.4	2,867.8	2,335.9
Feb	3,134.5	2,695.7	271.7	216.6	215.9	0.7	55.1	54.5	0.6	2,862.7	2,330.7
Mar	3,136.4	2,692.9	271.7	220.6	219.8	0.7	51.2	50.5	0.7	2,864.7	2,333.1
Apr	3,158.0	2,696.5	269.9	217.2	216.6	0.7	52.6	51.6	1.0	2,888.1	2,356.7
May	3,154.3	2,703.1	271.1	216.5	215.7	0.9	54.5	54.0	0.5	2,883.2	2,350.5
June	3,147.3	2,697.3	273.3	223.4	222.6	0.8	49.9	48.8	1.0	2,874.1	2,342.6
July	3,155.7	2,699.5	268.1	215.3	214.6	0.7	52.8	51.6	1.2	2,887.6	2,352.9
Aug	3,155.0	2,699.8	260.5	212.2	211.6	0.5	48.4	47.5	0.9	2,894.4	2,359.6
Sep	3,165.0	2,707.4	270.3	220.9	220.3	0.6	49.4	49.1	0.3	2,894.7	2,360.7
Oct	3,169.0	2,712.1	265.6	212.6	211.8	0.8	53.0	52.5	0.5	2,903.4	2,364.9
Nov	3,178.9	2,720.0	265.7	214.6	214.1	0.4	51.1	50.7	0.4	2,913.3	2,375.5
Dec	3,167.3	2,712.6	257.5	212.7	212.0	0.6	44.8	44.7	0.1	2,909.8	2,376.9
2015 Jan	3,191.5	2,725.9	267.9	214.7	214.0	0.7	53.2	52.8	0.4	2,923.6	2,388.4
	Changes *										
2006	– 12.4	– 20.8	– 7.1	– 4.5	– 4.4	– 0.0	– 2.7	– 2.3	– 0.4	– 5.2	+ 23.6
2007	– 15.9	+ 11.8	+ 27.6	+ 31.5	+ 31.7	– 0.2	– 3.9	– 3.7	– 0.3	– 43.5	– 7.1
2008	+ 92.0	+ 46.9	+ 43.1	+ 36.8	+ 34.9	+ 1.8	+ 6.3	+ 6.3	– 0.0	+ 48.9	+ 83.4
2009	+ 25.7	– 11.6	– 26.1	– 31.5	– 30.0	– 1.5	+ 5.5	+ 2.5	+ 2.9	+ 51.8	+ 36.6
2010	+ 130.5	+ 78.7	+ 80.4	– 23.4	– 23.5	+ 0.1	+ 103.8	+ 80.1	+ 23.7	+ 50.1	+ 14.9
2011	– 30.6	– 3.2	– 45.2	+ 33.6	+ 33.3	+ 0.2	– 78.7	– 57.0	– 21.7	+ 14.6	+ 9.4
2012	+ 21.0	+ 9.6	– 9.7	– 1.6	– 1.7	+ 0.1	– 8.2	– 3.8	– 4.3	+ 30.7	+ 10.9
2013	+ 4.4	+ 0.1	– 13.8	– 5.8	– 6.3	+ 0.5	– 8.0	– 7.0	– 1.1	+ 18.2	+ 17.6
2014	+ 36.7	+ 20.5	– 11.6	– 4.5	– 4.5	– 0.0	– 7.1	– 6.5	– 0.6	+ 48.3	+ 52.5
2013 Aug	– 10.7	– 12.0	– 16.4	– 9.6	– 9.5	– 0.1	– 6.8	– 6.7	– 0.1	+ 5.6	+ 4.7
Sep	+ 0.3	+ 0.1	+ 6.9	+ 5.6	+ 5.4	+ 0.2	+ 1.3	+ 1.4	– 0.0	– 6.6	– 4.1
Oct	+ 10.8	+ 6.7	+ 2.9	– 4.8	– 4.6	– 0.2	+ 7.7	+ 8.0	– 0.3	+ 7.9	+ 5.5
Nov	+ 1.0	– 0.1	– 7.3	– 2.4	– 2.3	– 0.0	– 4.9	– 5.2	+ 0.3	+ 8.3	+ 6.2
Dec	– 7.5	– 5.5	– 1.3	+ 0.9	+ 0.9	+ 0.0	– 2.2	– 1.5	– 0.6	– 6.2	– 5.4
2014 Jan	+ 9.1	+ 3.6	+ 3.5	– 3.3	– 3.4	+ 0.2	+ 6.8	+ 7.1	– 0.3	+ 5.6	+ 7.7
Feb	– 6.2	– 1.1	– 1.2	+ 1.9	+ 2.0	– 0.1	– 3.1	– 3.4	+ 0.3	– 5.0	– 5.3
Mar	+ 2.1	– 2.7	+ 0.1	+ 4.0	+ 4.1	– 0.0	– 3.9	– 4.0	+ 0.1	+ 2.0	+ 2.5
Apr	+ 21.5	+ 3.6	– 1.9	– 3.3	– 3.3	– 0.0	+ 1.4	+ 1.1	+ 0.3	+ 23.4	+ 23.2
May	– 3.7	+ 6.6	+ 1.2	– 0.7	– 0.9	+ 0.2	+ 1.9	+ 2.4	– 0.5	– 4.9	– 6.2
June	– 6.0	– 4.7	+ 2.2	+ 6.8	+ 6.9	– 0.1	– 4.6	– 5.2	+ 0.5	– 8.2	– 7.1
July	+ 8.4	+ 2.2	– 5.2	– 8.1	– 8.0	– 0.1	+ 2.9	+ 2.8	+ 0.1	+ 13.5	+ 10.2
Aug	– 0.8	+ 0.2	– 7.4	– 3.0	– 2.8	– 0.2	– 4.4	– 4.1	– 0.3	+ 6.6	+ 6.4
Sep	+ 10.0	+ 7.7	+ 9.7	+ 8.7	+ 8.6	+ 0.1	+ 1.0	+ 1.6	– 0.6	+ 0.3	+ 1.3
Oct	+ 4.1	+ 4.7	– 4.7	– 8.3	– 8.5	+ 0.2	+ 3.6	+ 3.4	+ 0.2	+ 8.7	+ 4.1
Nov	+ 9.9	+ 7.9	+ 0.1	+ 2.0	+ 2.3	– 0.3	– 1.9	– 1.8	– 0.1	+ 9.8	+ 10.7
Dec	– 11.7	– 7.5	– 8.1	– 1.4	– 1.5	+ 0.2	– 6.8	– 6.5	– 0.3	– 3.6	+ 5.1
2015 Jan	+ 25.1	+ 14.3	+ 10.8	+ 2.4	+ 2.3	+ 0.1	+ 8.3	+ 8.0	+ 0.3	+ 14.4	+ 12.1

***** See Table IV.2, footnote*; statistical breaks have been eliminated from the changes. The figures for the latest date are always to be regarded as provisional. Subsequent revisions, which appear in the following Monthly Report, are not specially marked. **1** Excluding debt securities arising from the exchange of equalisation claims (see also footnote 2). **2** Including debt securities arising from the exchange of equalisation claims.

IV Banks

lending												
prises and households					to general government							
Loans						Loans						
Total	Medium-term	Long-term	Securities	*Memo item* Fiduciary loans	Total	Total	Medium-term	Long-term	Securities [1]	Equalisation claims [2]	*Memo item* Fiduciary loans	Period
End of year or month *												
1,953.4	194.7	1,758.8	187.9	52.1	544.1	374.4	32.9	341.4	169.7	–	4.5	2005
1,972.7	194.5	1,778.1	209.1	48.2	515.8	358.4	31.7	326.6	157.4	–	4.8	2006
1,987.3	207.7	1,779.6	181.1	46.5	476.2	332.5	31.9	300.6	143.7	–	4.7	2007
2,022.0	222.0	1,800.0	235.8	42.8	440.3	308.2	29.7	278.5	132.1	–	4.5	2008
2,051.3	242.7	1,808.6	248.4	39.6	453.1	298.0	32.2	265.8	155.1	–	4.3	2009
2,070.0	238.1	1,831.8	235.7	30.7	487.3	301.2	36.1	265.1	186.1	–	3.1	2010
2,099.5	247.9	1,851.7	222.4	32.7	492.6	299.1	41.1	258.0	193.5	–	3.6	2011
2,119.5	249.7	1,869.8	191.4	31.4	533.4	292.7	39.4	253.3	240.7	–	3.5	2012
2,136.9	248.0	1,888.9	191.7	28.9	534.0	288.4	38.8	249.7	245.6	–	2.7	2013
2,172.7	251.7	1,921.0	204.2	24.4	532.9	283.1	33.5	249.6	249.8	–	2.1	2014
2,131.7	249.5	1,882.2	192.8	29.5	532.8	292.6	41.2	251.3	240.3	–	3.1	2013 Aug
2,127.1	247.6	1,879.4	193.4	29.3	530.3	290.6	40.7	249.9	239.7	–	2.7	Sep
2,131.3	248.0	1,883.4	194.7	29.0	532.8	289.7	39.3	250.4	243.1	–	2.6	Oct
2,139.9	249.5	1,890.5	194.1	29.0	534.8	290.3	39.1	251.3	244.5	–	2.6	Nov
2,136.9	248.0	1,888.9	191.7	28.9	534.0	288.4	38.8	249.7	245.6	–	2.7	Dec
2,137.4	248.6	1,888.8	198.5	28.6	531.8	287.6	38.4	249.2	244.2	–	2.7	2014 Jan
2,138.7	248.5	1,890.2	192.0	25.8	532.1	286.6	38.0	248.6	245.4	–	2.3	Feb
2,136.4	249.1	1,887.3	196.7	25.5	531.6	286.2	37.4	248.8	245.4	–	2.3	Mar
2,143.2	251.0	1,892.3	213.4	25.4	531.4	285.1	36.7	248.4	246.3	–	2.2	Apr
2,149.2	250.1	1,899.1	201.3	25.4	532.8	284.2	36.8	247.4	248.6	–	2.2	May
2,144.5	248.9	1,895.6	198.1	25.3	531.5	281.4	36.1	245.4	250.0	–	2.2	June
2,151.9	249.5	1,902.4	200.9	25.0	534.7	281.4	36.0	245.4	253.4	–	2.1	July
2,160.8	250.6	1,910.2	198.8	24.9	534.8	279.9	32.9	247.0	255.0	–	2.1	Aug
2,160.3	250.3	1,910.0	200.5	24.8	534.0	277.8	32.3	245.5	256.2	–	2.1	Sep
2,167.0	251.8	1,915.3	197.8	24.4	538.6	280.7	34.5	246.3	257.9	–	2.1	Oct
2,175.1	252.6	1,922.5	200.5	24.3	537.7	280.1	33.8	246.3	257.6	–	2.1	Nov
2,172.7	251.7	1,921.0	204.2	24.4	532.9	283.1	33.5	249.6	249.8	–	2.1	Dec
2,175.2	252.5	1,922.7	213.3	24.0	535.2	284.0	32.7	251.3	251.2	–	2.1	2015 Jan
Changes *												
+ 2.3	+ 0.2	+ 2.2	+ 21.2	– 3.9	– 28.8	– 16.4	– 1.4	– 15.0	– 12.4	–	+ 0.3	2006
+ 9.6	+ 10.1	– 0.6	– 16.7	– 2.2	– 36.3	– 25.8	+ 0.1	– 26.0	– 10.5	–	– 0.1	2007
+ 28.8	+ 12.0	+ 16.8	+ 54.7	– 5.3	– 34.5	– 23.2	– 2.3	– 20.8	– 11.4	–	– 0.1	2008
+ 23.5	+ 17.3	+ 6.3	+ 13.1	– 3.9	+ 15.2	– 7.6	+ 2.5	– 10.2	+ 22.8	–	– 0.2	2009
+ 18.6	– 4.0	+ 22.6	– 3.8	– 1.7	+ 35.2	+ 3.5	+ 3.5	– 0.0	+ 31.7	–	– 0.3	2010
+ 22.6	+ 2.2	+ 20.4	– 13.2	– 1.0	+ 5.2	– 2.1	+ 4.9	– 7.0	+ 7.3	–	– 0.2	2011
+ 21.6	+ 1.5	+ 20.1	– 10.7	– 1.1	+ 19.8	– 6.6	– 1.9	– 4.7	+ 26.4	–	– 0.2	2012
+ 17.7	– 0.1	+ 17.8	– 0.1	– 2.5	+ 0.6	– 4.3	– 0.7	– 3.6	+ 4.9	–	– 0.8	2013
+ 39.9	+ 5.6	+ 34.3	+ 12.6	– 1.8	– 4.1	– 8.5	– 5.1	– 3.4	+ 4.3	–	– 0.2	2014
+ 4.3	+ 0.6	+ 3.7	+ 0.4	– 0.1	+ 1.0	– 0.1	+ 0.0	– 0.1	+ 1.0	–	– 0.0	2013 Aug
– 4.7	– 2.0	– 2.7	+ 0.6	– 0.2	– 2.5	– 2.0	– 0.5	– 1.4	– 0.6	–	– 0.5	Sep
+ 4.2	+ 0.4	+ 3.7	+ 1.3	– 0.3	+ 2.5	– 0.9	– 1.4	+ 0.6	+ 3.4	–	– 0.0	Oct
+ 6.8	+ 1.2	+ 5.7	– 0.6	+ 0.0	+ 2.1	+ 0.6	– 0.2	+ 0.8	+ 1.4	–	+ 0.0	Nov
– 3.0	– 1.5	– 1.5	– 2.4	– 0.1	– 0.8	– 1.9	– 0.3	– 1.6	+ 1.1	–	+ 0.1	Dec
+ 0.8	+ 0.8	– 0.0	+ 6.9	– 0.3	– 2.1	– 0.8	– 0.4	– 0.5	– 1.3	–	– 0.0	2014 Jan
+ 1.3	– 0.1	+ 1.4	– 6.5	– 0.1	+ 0.2	– 1.0	– 0.4	– 0.6	+ 1.2	–	– 0.0	Feb
– 2.3	+ 0.6	– 2.9	+ 4.7	– 0.2	– 0.5	– 0.5	– 0.7	+ 0.2	+ 0.0	–	– 0.0	Mar
+ 6.4	+ 3.4	+ 3.1	+ 16.7	– 0.1	+ 0.2	– 0.7	– 0.6	– 0.1	+ 0.9	–	– 0.0	Apr
+ 6.0	– 0.9	+ 6.9	– 12.2	+ 0.0	+ 1.3	– 0.9	+ 0.1	– 1.0	+ 2.3	–	– 0.0	May
– 4.0	– 1.2	– 2.8	– 3.1	– 0.1	– 1.0	– 2.5	– 0.7	– 1.7	+ 1.4	–	– 0.0	June
+ 7.4	+ 0.6	+ 6.8	+ 2.8	– 0.4	+ 3.3	– 0.0	– 0.1	+ 0.0	+ 3.3	–	– 0.0	July
+ 8.5	+ 1.0	+ 7.5	– 2.1	– 0.1	+ 0.3	– 1.3	– 0.7	– 0.7	+ 1.6	–	– 0.0	Aug
– 0.4	– 0.3	– 0.1	+ 1.7	– 0.2	– 0.9	– 2.2	– 0.5	– 1.6	+ 1.2	–	– 0.0	Sep
+ 6.8	+ 1.5	+ 5.3	– 2.7	– 0.4	+ 4.6	+ 2.9	– 0.0	+ 3.0	+ 1.7	–	– 0.0	Oct
+ 8.1	+ 0.8	+ 7.2	+ 2.6	– 0.1	– 0.9	– 0.6	– 0.7	+ 0.1	– 0.2	–	+ 0.0	Nov
+ 1.4	– 0.7	+ 2.1	+ 3.8	+ 0.1	– 8.7	– 0.9	– 0.4	– 0.5	– 7.8	–	– 0.0	Dec
+ 3.1	+ 1.4	+ 1.7	+ 9.1	– 0.4	+ 2.2	+ 0.9	– 0.9	+ 1.7	+ 1.4	–	–	2015 Jan

IV Banks

6 Lending by banks (MFIs) in Germany to domestic enterprises and households, housing loans, sectors of economic activity *

€ billion

Period	Lending to domestic enterprises and households (excluding holdings of negotiable money market paper and excluding securities portfolios) [1]													
		of which				Lending to enterprises and self-employed persons								
			Housing loans											
	Total	Mortgage loans, total	Total	Mortgage loans secured by residential real estate	Other housing loans	Total	*of which* Housing loans	Manufacturing	Electricity, gas and water supply; refuse disposal, mining and quarrying	Construction	Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	Agriculture, forestry, fishing and aquaculture	Transportation and storage; post and telecommunications	Financial intermediation (excluding MFIs) and insurance companies
	Lending, total													**End of year or quarter ***
2012	2,435.9	1,170.6	1,135.0	922.4	212.6	1,377.6	311.2	131.1	92.7	59.6	126.1	44.5	76.7	195.4
2013 Dec	2,354.0	1,179.5	1,159.3	935.4	223.9	1,281.1	319.2	127.7	97.3	58.9	124.2	45.7	70.0	104.9
2014 Mar	2,356.3	1,179.3	1,160.3	936.4	223.8	1,283.4	320.0	129.1	97.0	59.5	124.2	46.0	68.9	107.1
June	2,367.1	1,181.3	1,166.6	940.0	226.7	1,288.3	320.9	129.1	98.1	59.9	124.3	47.0	68.7	104.7
Sep	2,380.6	1,187.9	1,177.1	945.6	231.5	1,293.2	322.9	127.1	98.7	60.3	125.9	47.8	69.4	110.2
Dec	2,384.8	1,225.7	1,188.7	984.3	204.4	1,291.6	328.3	122.9	100.1	59.8	123.7	47.8	68.4	124.8
	Short-term lending													
2012	316.4	–	7.9	–	7.9	277.7	3.8	34.8	6.9	12.0	43.0	3.3	6.8	112.8
2013 Dec	217.1	–	8.3	–	8.3	180.2	4.1	33.9	6.4	12.0	40.9	3.4	6.4	22.8
2014 Mar	219.9	–	8.6	–	8.6	183.5	4.4	35.4	5.9	12.7	41.5	3.6	6.4	23.8
June	222.6	–	8.6	–	8.6	186.1	4.3	36.3	6.2	12.8	41.5	4.0	6.6	22.3
Sep	220.3	–	8.5	–	8.5	184.2	4.3	34.5	5.6	12.7	42.9	4.0	6.3	25.6
Dec	212.1	–	7.6	–	7.6	177.2	3.9	32.5	6.0	11.8	41.2	3.6	5.9	23.2
	Medium-term lending													
2012	249.7	–	35.3	–	35.3	176.7	11.8	25.6	7.0	9.3	16.5	4.0	11.0	35.9
2013 Dec	248.0	–	35.6	–	35.6	173.6	12.5	24.7	6.0	9.4	16.9	3.9	11.5	35.3
2014 Mar	249.1	–	35.0	–	35.0	175.0	12.3	25.3	5.9	9.3	16.5	4.0	11.4	35.8
June	248.9	–	35.3	–	35.3	176.2	12.8	24.7	5.4	9.3	16.9	4.1	11.5	35.5
Sep	250.3	–	35.3	–	35.3	176.7	12.7	24.5	5.6	9.7	16.9	4.2	11.7	35.9
Dec	251.7	–	35.8	–	35.8	178.4	13.4	23.5	5.4	9.9	16.6	4.2	11.4	39.2
	Long-term lending													
2012	1,869.8	1,170.6	1,091.8	922.4	169.4	923.2	295.6	70.7	78.8	38.3	66.6	37.2	58.9	46.7
2013 Dec	1,888.9	1,179.5	1,115.4	935.4	180.0	927.2	302.5	69.1	84.9	37.5	66.3	38.4	52.1	46.8
2014 Mar	1,887.3	1,179.3	1,116.7	936.4	180.3	924.9	303.3	68.4	85.2	37.5	66.1	38.5	51.1	47.5
June	1,895.6	1,181.3	1,122.8	940.0	182.9	926.1	303.8	68.1	86.5	37.8	66.0	38.9	50.7	46.9
Sep	1,910.0	1,187.9	1,133.4	945.6	187.8	932.4	305.8	68.2	87.5	38.0	66.0	39.6	51.4	48.8
Dec	1,921.0	1,225.7	1,145.2	984.3	160.9	936.1	310.9	66.9	88.8	38.1	65.8	39.9	51.2	62.3
	Lending, total													**Change during quarter ***
2013 Q4	+ 2.0	+ 2.3	+ 6.2	+ 2.6	+ 3.5	– 1.5	+ 2.1	– 2.4	+ 1.5	– 1.2	– 1.0	– 0.5	– 1.3	+ 0.6
2014 Q1	+ 2.3	– 0.2	+ 0.9	+ 1.0	– 0.1	+ 2.2	+ 0.6	+ 1.2	– 0.2	+ 0.6	+ 0.2	+ 0.3	– 1.1	+ 2.3
Q2	+ 11.2	+ 1.3	+ 6.3	+ 2.5	+ 3.8	+ 5.7	+ 1.0	+ 0.0	+ 0.5	+ 0.3	+ 0.2	+ 1.0	– 0.2	– 1.4
Q3	+ 13.3	+ 6.6	+ 9.9	+ 5.6	+ 4.3	+ 4.6	+ 2.0	– 2.0	+ 0.6	+ 0.4	+ 1.6	+ 0.8	+ 0.6	+ 3.7
Q4	+ 8.6	+ 8.5	+ 10.0	+ 8.3	+ 1.7	+ 4.0	+ 3.4	– 4.3	+ 1.4	– 0.4	– 2.2	– 0.1	– 1.0	+ 2.0
	Short-term lending													
2013 Q4	– 6.0	–	+ 0.2	–	+ 0.2	– 5.9	+ 0.2	– 1.8	– 0.2	– 1.0	– 1.3	– 0.7	+ 0.2	– 0.9
2014 Q1	+ 2.6	–	+ 0.3	–	+ 0.3	+ 3.0	+ 0.2	+ 1.5	– 0.4	+ 0.7	+ 0.6	+ 0.2	– 0.0	+ 1.1
Q2	+ 2.7	–	– 0.0	–	– 0.0	+ 2.6	– 0.1	+ 0.8	+ 0.3	+ 0.1	– 0.1	+ 0.4	+ 0.2	– 1.6
Q3	– 2.2	–	– 0.1	–	– 0.1	– 1.8	+ 0.0	– 1.8	– 0.6	– 0.1	+ 1.5	+ 0.0	– 0.1	+ 3.3
Q4	– 7.6	–	– 0.3	–	– 0.3	– 6.4	– 0.4	– 2.0	+ 0.3	– 0.9	– 1.7	– 0.4	– 0.4	– 2.6
	Medium-term lending													
2013 Q4	+ 0.1	–	– 0.1	–	– 0.1	+ 0.2	+ 0.2	– 0.2	– 0.6	– 0.0	+ 0.4	– 0.0	+ 0.2	+ 0.8
2014 Q1	+ 1.3	–	– 0.7	–	– 0.7	+ 1.7	– 0.2	+ 0.5	– 0.1	– 0.0	– 0.1	+ 0.0	– 0.1	+ 0.5
Q2	+ 1.3	–	+ 0.3	–	+ 0.3	+ 1.6	+ 0.4	– 0.6	– 0.5	+ 0.0	+ 0.4	+ 0.1	+ 0.1	– 0.3
Q3	+ 1.3	–	+ 0.1	–	+ 0.1	+ 0.4	+ 0.1	– 0.2	+ 0.1	+ 0.4	+ 0.1	+ 0.2	+ 0.2	– 0.3
Q4	+ 1.6	–	+ 0.4	–	+ 0.4	+ 1.8	+ 0.5	– 0.9	– 0.2	+ 0.2	– 0.3	– 0.0	– 0.3	+ 2.0
	Long-term lending													
2013 Q4	+ 7.9	+ 2.3	+ 6.0	+ 2.6	+ 3.4	+ 4.2	+ 1.7	– 0.4	+ 2.3	– 0.2	– 0.1	+ 0.2	– 1.7	+ 0.7
2014 Q1	– 1.6	– 0.2	+ 1.3	+ 1.0	+ 0.3	– 2.5	+ 0.6	– 0.8	+ 0.3	– 0.1	– 0.2	+ 0.1	– 1.0	+ 0.7
Q2	+ 7.1	+ 1.3	+ 6.0	+ 2.5	+ 3.6	+ 1.5	+ 0.6	– 0.2	+ 0.7	+ 0.3	– 0.1	+ 0.4	– 0.4	+ 0.4
Q3	+ 14.2	+ 6.6	+ 9.9	+ 5.6	+ 4.3	+ 5.9	+ 2.0	+ 0.1	+ 1.0	+ 0.1	+ 0.0	+ 0.7	+ 0.6	+ 0.7
Q4	+ 14.5	+ 8.5	+ 9.9	+ 8.3	+ 1.6	+ 8.6	+ 3.3	– 1.3	+ 1.3	+ 0.2	– 0.1	+ 0.4	– 0.2	+ 2.6

* Excluding lending by foreign branches. Breakdown of lending by building and loan associations by areas and sectors estimated. Statistical alterations have been eliminated from the changes. The figures for the latest date are always to be regarded as provisional; subsequent alterations, which will appear in the following Monthly Report,

IV Banks

Services sector (including the professions)				Memo items		Lending to employees and other individuals					Lending to non-profit institutions		Period
	of which							Other lending					
									of which				
Total	Housing enterprises	Holding companies	Other real estate activities	Lending to self-employed persons [2]	Lending to craft enterprises	Total	Housing loans	Total	Instalment loans [3]	Debit balances on wage, salary and pension accounts	Total	of which Housing loans	
End of year or quarter *												**Lending, total**	
651.6	184.6	39.0	178.5	388.4	51.0	1,044.9	820.3	224.6	147.2	13.0	13.4	3.5	2012
652.4	191.4	37.3	175.2	388.0	49.7	1,059.4	836.6	222.8	147.3	11.9	13.6	3.5	2013 Dec
651.5	192.1	37.1	175.9	387.5	49.4	1,059.4	836.8	222.6	148.0	12.0	13.5	3.5	2014 Mar
656.5	192.8	39.1	176.4	388.0	49.6	1,065.5	842.3	223.2	148.7	11.8	13.3	3.5	June
653.8	192.3	38.0	175.4	389.3	49.1	1,074.2	850.7	223.5	149.3	11.9	13.2	3.5	Sep
644.1	188.1	33.9	173.8	389.8	47.9	1,078.6	856.6	222.0	150.0	10.7	14.5	3.8	Dec
											Short-term lending		
58.0	9.3	7.9	12.9	30.0	7.2	37.7	4.0	33.7	2.1	13.0	1.1	0.0	2012
54.5	9.3	6.8	12.1	28.1	6.8	35.8	4.2	31.6	1.8	11.9	1.1	0.0	2013 Dec
54.0	8.9	6.6	12.4	27.8	7.0	35.4	4.2	31.2	1.8	12.0	1.0	0.0	2014 Mar
56.5	8.8	7.8	12.6	28.0	7.2	35.7	4.2	31.5	1.7	11.8	0.9	0.0	June
52.6	8.5	6.3	12.2	27.3	6.9	35.3	4.1	31.2	1.6	11.9	0.8	0.0	Sep
52.9	8.5	6.1	11.8	26.6	6.2	34.2	3.7	30.5	1.9	10.7	0.7	0.0	Dec
											Medium-term lending		
67.5	8.9	7.9	20.2	32.2	3.5	72.5	23.5	49.0	44.1	–	0.5	0.0	2012
65.8	9.6	6.8	18.9	32.2	3.6	73.9	23.1	50.8	45.6	–	0.5	0.0	2013 Dec
66.8	9.9	6.7	20.1	32.1	3.5	73.6	22.6	51.0	45.8	–	0.4	0.0	2014 Mar
68.8	10.4	7.2	20.5	31.7	3.6	72.2	22.5	49.7	44.6	–	0.5	0.0	June
68.2	9.9	7.2	20.0	32.0	3.6	73.1	22.5	50.6	45.4	–	0.5	0.0	Sep
68.2	9.4	7.0	19.8	32.0	3.5	72.8	22.4	50.4	45.2	–	0.5	0.0	Dec
											Long-term lending		
526.1	166.4	23.2	145.5	326.2	40.3	934.7	792.8	142.0	100.9	–	11.8	3.5	2012
532.0	172.4	23.7	144.3	327.7	39.3	949.7	809.4	140.3	99.9	–	12.0	3.5	2013 Dec
530.6	173.3	23.9	143.4	327.6	38.9	950.4	810.0	140.4	100.4	–	12.0	3.5	2014 Mar
531.2	173.6	24.2	143.3	328.3	38.8	957.6	815.6	142.0	102.3	–	12.0	3.5	June
533.0	173.8	24.5	143.2	330.0	38.6	965.8	824.1	141.7	102.2	–	11.8	3.5	Sep
523.0	170.2	20.9	142.2	331.2	38.2	971.6	830.5	141.1	102.8	–	13.4	3.7	Dec
Change during quarter *												**Lending, total**	
+ 2.7	+ 3.6	– 0.0	– 0.5	– 0.7	– 1.0	+ 3.3	+ 4.0	– 0.7	+ 0.2	– 0.7	+ 0.2	+ 0.0	2013 Q4
– 1.1	+ 0.6	– 0.1	+ 0.7	– 0.7	– 0.2	+ 0.2	+ 0.3	– 0.1	+ 0.7	+ 0.1	– 0.1	+ 0.0	2014 Q1
+ 5.2	+ 0.6	+ 2.0	+ 0.6	+ 0.9	+ 0.2	+ 5.6	+ 5.3	+ 0.3	+ 0.8	– 0.1	– 0.1	– 0.0	Q2
– 1.3	+ 0.9	– 1.1	– 0.9	+ 1.2	– 0.4	+ 8.8	+ 7.9	+ 0.9	+ 1.3	+ 0.0	– 0.0	–	Q3
+ 8.4	+ 2.5	+ 1.0	+ 1.3	+ 0.4	– 1.2	+ 4.2	+ 6.4	– 2.1	– 0.3	– 1.1	+ 0.4	+ 0.2	Q4
											Short-term lending		
– 0.3	+ 0.5	– 0.3	– 0.0	– 0.5	– 0.7	– 0.2	+ 0.1	– 0.3	+ 0.2	– 0.7	+ 0.1	– 0.0	2013 Q4
– 0.5	– 0.4	– 0.2	+ 0.4	– 0.3	+ 0.2	– 0.4	+ 0.0	– 0.4	– 0.0	+ 0.1	– 0.1	– 0.0	2014 Q1
+ 2.5	– 0.1	+ 1.2	+ 0.2	+ 0.2	+ 0.2	+ 0.3	+ 0.0	+ 0.2	– 0.1	– 0.1	– 0.1	– 0.0	Q2
– 4.0	– 0.3	– 1.5	– 0.4	– 0.7	– 0.3	– 0.4	– 0.1	– 0.3	– 0.1	+ 0.0	– 0.0	– 0.0	Q3
+ 1.4	+ 0.2	+ 0.1	– 0.2	– 0.7	– 0.7	– 1.3	+ 0.1	– 1.4	+ 0.4	– 1.1	+ 0.1	+ 0.0	Q4
											Medium-term lending		
– 0.4	+ 0.4	– 0.2	– 0.6	– 0.0	– 0.0	– 0.1	– 0.3	+ 0.2	+ 0.3	–	–	– 0.0	2013 Q4
+ 1.0	+ 0.3	– 0.1	+ 1.2	– 0.1	– 0.1	– 0.3	– 0.4	+ 0.2	+ 0.2	–	– 0.1	+ 0.0	2014 Q1
+ 2.3	+ 0.5	+ 0.5	+ 0.4	– 0.1	+ 0.0	– 0.3	– 0.1	– 0.2	– 0.1	–	+ 0.1	+ 0.0	Q2
+ 0.0	+ 0.1	– 0.0	– 0.4	+ 0.3	– 0.0	+ 0.9	+ 0.0	+ 0.9	+ 0.8	–	+ 0.0	+ 0.0	Q3
+ 1.4	– 0.3	– 0.0	+ 0.6	+ 0.0	– 0.1	– 0.2	– 0.1	– 0.1	– 0.1	–	+ 0.0	– 0.0	Q4
											Long-term lending		
+ 3.4	+ 2.6	+ 0.5	+ 0.2	– 0.2	– 0.3	+ 3.6	+ 4.3	– 0.6	– 0.3	–	+ 0.0	+ 0.0	2013 Q4
– 1.6	+ 0.8	+ 0.2	– 0.9	– 0.3	– 0.4	+ 0.8	+ 0.7	+ 0.1	+ 0.5	–	+ 0.1	+ 0.0	2014 Q1
+ 0.5	+ 0.3	+ 0.3	– 0.0	+ 0.8	– 0.1	+ 5.7	+ 5.4	+ 0.3	+ 0.9	–	– 0.1	– 0.0	Q2
+ 2.7	+ 1.1	+ 0.4	– 0.0	+ 1.6	– 0.2	+ 8.3	+ 7.9	+ 0.4	+ 0.6	–	– 0.0	– 0.0	Q3
+ 5.7	+ 2.6	+ 0.9	+ 1.0	+ 1.1	– 0.4	+ 5.7	+ 6.4	– 0.7	– 0.6	–	+ 0.3	+ 0.3	Q4

are not specially marked. **1** Excluding fiduciary loans. **2** Including sole proprietors.
3 Excluding mortgage loans and housing loans, even in the form of instalment credit.

IV Banks

7 Deposits of domestic non-banks (non-MFIs) at banks (MFIs) in Germany*

€ billion

Period	Deposits, total	Sight deposits	Time deposits [1,2]				Savings deposits [3]	Bank savings bonds [4]	*Memo item*		
			Total	for up to and including 1 year	for more than 1 year [2]				Fiduciary loans	Subordinated liabilities (excluding negotiable debt securities)	Liabilities arising from repos
					Total	for up to and including 2 years	for more than 2 years				
	Domestic non-banks, total										**End of year or month***
2012	3,090.2	1,306.5	1,072.5	341.3	731.2	32.0	699.2	617.6	93.6	34.9	31.7	82.9
2013	3,048.7	1,409.9	952.0	254.8	697.2	29.7	667.5	610.1	76.6	32.9	29.0	5.4
2014	3,118.2	1,517.8	926.7	257.0	669.7	29.4	640.3	607.7	66.0	30.9	26.2	1.7
2014 Feb	3,056.6	1,422.6	949.8	255.8	694.0	29.1	664.9	609.8	74.4	32.7	29.0	3.1
Mar	3,048.0	1,416.9	948.8	257.3	691.5	28.8	662.7	608.6	73.7	32.5	28.8	1.9
Apr	3,057.2	1,431.5	947.0	258.2	688.8	28.4	660.4	606.7	72.0	32.4	28.7	4.3
May	3,072.1	1,446.2	949.0	262.0	687.0	28.4	658.6	606.0	70.9	31.9	28.6	0.9
June	3,066.2	1,442.8	948.4	263.7	684.7	28.4	656.3	604.5	70.5	31.4	28.2	1.7
July	3,073.9	1,455.0	945.4	264.3	681.1	28.0	653.1	604.4	69.2	31.3	27.9	2.7
Aug	3,091.6	1,472.1	945.3	265.6	679.7	28.2	651.5	605.9	68.4	31.3	27.6	2.3
Sep	3,092.6	1,474.8	941.9	262.0	679.9	28.2	651.7	606.5	69.4	31.2	27.4	2.8
Oct	3,097.3	1,494.5	928.1	252.2	676.0	28.1	647.8	606.1	68.6	31.1	27.2	1.9
Nov	3,116.4	1,517.9	926.7	250.6	676.1	29.2	646.9	605.3	66.5	31.1	26.6	1.7
Dec	3,118.2	1,517.8	926.7	257.0	669.7	29.4	640.3	607.7	66.0	30.9	26.2	1.7
2015 Jan	3,128.6	1,537.9	919.5	253.1	666.4	28.6	637.8	606.6	64.7	30.8	25.8	3.2
												Changes*
2013	+ 40.2	+ 118.4	– 53.9	– 22.8	– 31.1	– 0.2	– 30.8	– 7.4	– 17.0	– 1.7	– 2.7	+ 3.6
2014	+ 69.6	+ 107.9	– 25.3	+ 2.5	– 27.8	– 0.5	– 27.3	– 2.4	– 10.6	– 2.0	– 2.8	– 3.7
2014 Feb	+ 9.5	+ 6.7	+ 3.1	+ 5.0	– 1.9	+ 0.1	– 2.0	+ 0.7	– 1.0	– 0.1	– 0.2	+ 0.6
Mar	– 8.7	– 5.8	– 0.9	+ 1.5	– 2.4	– 0.3	– 2.1	– 1.2	– 0.7	– 0.2	– 0.1	– 1.2
Apr	+ 9.2	+ 14.6	– 1.8	+ 0.9	– 2.7	– 0.4	– 2.3	– 1.9	– 1.7	– 0.1	– 0.2	+ 2.4
May	+ 15.0	+ 14.7	+ 2.0	+ 3.8	– 1.8	+ 0.0	– 1.8	– 0.7	– 1.1	– 0.6	– 0.1	– 3.4
June	– 5.9	– 3.4	– 0.6	+ 1.7	– 2.3	– 0.0	– 2.3	– 1.4	– 0.4	– 0.5	– 0.4	+ 0.8
July	+ 7.8	+ 12.2	– 2.9	+ 0.6	– 3.5	– 0.3	– 3.2	– 0.2	– 1.3	– 0.0	– 0.3	+ 1.0
Aug	+ 17.7	+ 17.1	– 0.1	+ 1.3	– 1.4	+ 0.2	– 1.6	+ 1.5	– 0.8	– 0.0	– 0.3	– 0.4
Sep	+ 0.9	+ 2.7	– 3.4	– 3.6	+ 0.2	– 0.0	+ 0.2	+ 0.6	+ 1.0	– 0.1	– 0.3	+ 0.4
Oct	+ 4.7	+ 19.7	– 13.8	– 9.8	– 3.9	– 0.1	– 3.9	– 0.4	– 0.7	– 0.1	– 0.2	– 0.8
Nov	+ 19.2	+ 23.4	– 1.4	– 1.6	+ 0.1	+ 1.1	– 1.0	– 0.7	– 2.1	+ 0.0	– 0.6	– 0.2
Dec	+ 1.7	– 0.1	– 0.0	+ 6.7	– 6.7	– 0.1	– 6.6	+ 2.4	– 0.5	– 0.2	– 0.4	– 0.1
2015 Jan	+ 10.5	+ 20.1	– 7.2	– 3.9	– 3.3	– 0.7	– 2.5	– 1.1	– 1.3	– 0.1	– 0.4	+ 1.6
	Domestic government											**End of year or month***
2012	186.2	50.8	130.7	73.0	57.7	4.5	53.1	3.1	1.6	32.7	5.9	3.1
2013	183.0	48.2	129.6	81.1	48.5	5.7	42.8	3.6	1.6	30.7	4.8	4.7
2014	186.7	52.4	128.2	84.5	43.7	7.5	36.2	3.8	2.3	29.1	4.8	0.5
2014 Feb	178.1	47.1	125.9	76.9	49.0	6.1	43.0	3.6	1.5	30.6	4.8	1.5
Mar	180.5	47.3	128.2	79.4	48.8	6.1	42.7	3.5	1.5	30.5	4.7	0.7
Apr	178.1	46.4	126.7	78.1	48.6	6.1	42.5	3.5	1.5	30.4	4.7	2.9
May	183.4	49.2	129.0	80.5	48.4	6.1	42.4	3.6	1.6	29.9	4.7	0.0
June	190.1	50.0	135.0	86.6	48.4	6.0	42.4	3.5	1.6	29.5	4.7	0.9
July	187.1	47.4	134.6	86.5	48.0	5.9	42.2	3.5	1.7	29.5	4.7	1.7
Aug	189.7	51.1	133.4	85.3	48.1	5.9	42.1	3.4	1.8	29.5	4.7	1.1
Sep	189.2	47.8	136.1	88.3	47.8	5.7	42.1	3.4	1.9	29.4	4.6	1.6
Oct	178.4	44.6	128.4	80.6	47.9	5.8	42.1	3.4	1.9	29.3	4.6	0.8
Nov	182.6	46.6	130.7	82.3	48.3	6.4	42.0	3.5	1.9	29.3	4.6	0.5
Dec	186.7	52.4	128.2	84.5	43.7	7.5	36.2	3.8	2.3	29.1	4.8	0.5
2015 Jan	184.5	50.7	127.6	84.0	43.6	7.4	36.2	3.8	2.4	29.1	4.8	2.2
												Changes*
2013	– 3.8	– 2.9	– 1.4	+ 7.6	– 9.0	+ 0.8	– 9.8	+ 0.5	+ 0.1	– 1.6	– 1.1	+ 1.6
2014	– 1.2	+ 1.9	– 3.9	+ 2.5	– 6.4	+ 1.0	– 7.4	+ 0.1	+ 0.7	– 1.6	– 0.1	– 4.2
2014 Feb	+ 5.5	+ 3.2	+ 2.1	+ 1.5	+ 0.6	+ 0.4	+ 0.2	+ 0.1	+ 0.1	– 0.0	–	+ 0.7
Mar	+ 2.4	+ 0.1	+ 2.3	+ 2.5	– 0.2	– 0.0	– 0.2	– 0.1	+ 0.0	– 0.1	– 0.1	– 0.8
Apr	– 2.6	– 0.9	– 1.7	– 1.4	– 0.4	+ 0.1	– 0.5	– 0.0	+ 0.0	– 0.1	+ 0.0	+ 2.2
May	+ 5.3	+ 2.8	+ 2.3	+ 2.5	– 0.2	– 0.1	– 0.1	+ 0.0	+ 0.1	– 0.5	– 0.0	– 2.9
June	+ 7.0	+ 0.8	+ 6.3	+ 6.2	+ 0.1	– 0.0	+ 0.1	– 0.1	+ 0.0	– 0.4	– 0.0	+ 0.9
July	– 2.8	– 2.6	– 0.3	– 0.0	– 0.3	– 0.1	– 0.2	– 0.0	+ 0.1	– 0.0	– 0.0	+ 0.8
Aug	+ 2.6	+ 3.7	– 1.2	– 1.2	+ 0.0	+ 0.1	– 0.0	– 0.0	+ 0.1	– 0.0	– 0.0	– 0.6
Sep	– 0.6	– 3.4	+ 2.7	+ 2.9	– 0.2	– 0.2	– 0.0	– 0.0	+ 0.1	– 0.1	– 0.0	+ 0.5
Oct	– 10.7	– 3.1	– 7.7	– 7.7	+ 0.0	+ 0.1	– 0.0	+ 0.0	+ 0.1	– 0.1	– 0.0	– 0.8
Nov	+ 4.1	+ 2.0	+ 2.2	+ 1.7	+ 0.4	+ 0.6	– 0.1	+ 0.1	– 0.0	+ 0.0	– 0.0	– 0.3
Dec	– 0.3	+ 4.1	– 5.1	+ 1.2	– 6.3	+ 0.3	– 6.5	+ 0.3	+ 0.4	– 0.2	+ 0.1	– 0.0
2015 Jan	– 2.2	– 1.7	– 0.6	– 0.4	– 0.2	– 0.1	– 0.1	+ 0.0	+ 0.1	– 0.0	– 0.0	+ 1.7

***** See Table IV.2, footnote *; statistical breaks have been eliminated from the changes. The figures for the latest date are always to be regarded as provisional. Subsequent revisions, which appear in the following Monthly Report, are not specially marked. **1** Including subordinated liabilities and liabilities arising from registered debt securities. **2** Including deposits under savings and loan contracts (see

IV Banks

7 Deposits of domestic non-banks (non-MFIs) at banks (MFIs) in Germany * (cont'd)

€ billion

Period	Deposits, total	Sight deposits	Time deposits [1,2]					Savings deposits [3]	Bank savings bonds [4]	*Memo item*		
			Total	for up to and including 1 year	for more than 1 year [2]					Fiduciary loans	Subordinated liabilities (excluding negotiable debt securities)	Liabilities arising from repos
					Total	for up to and including 2 years	for more than 2 years					
	Domestic enterprises and households											**End of year or month***
2012	2,904.0	1,255.7	941.7	268.3	673.5	27.5	646.0	614.5	92.0	2.2	25.8	79.8
2013	2,865.7	1,361.7	822.4	173.7	648.7	24.0	624.7	606.5	75.0	2.2	24.2	0.7
2014	2,931.5	1,465.4	798.5	172.5	625.9	21.8	604.1	604.0	63.7	1.8	21.5	1.2
2014 Feb	2,878.5	1,375.5	823.9	178.9	644.9	23.0	621.9	606.2	72.9	2.1	24.2	1.6
Mar	2,867.4	1,369.6	820.6	177.9	642.7	22.7	620.0	605.0	72.2	2.1	24.1	1.2
Apr	2,879.1	1,385.1	820.3	180.1	640.2	22.2	618.0	603.2	70.5	2.0	24.0	1.4
May	2,888.8	1,397.0	820.0	181.5	638.6	22.4	616.2	602.4	69.3	2.0	23.8	0.9
June	2,876.1	1,392.8	813.4	177.1	636.2	22.4	613.9	601.1	68.9	1.9	23.5	0.8
July	2,886.8	1,407.6	810.9	177.8	633.1	22.1	610.9	600.9	67.5	1.9	23.2	1.0
Aug	2,901.9	1,421.0	811.9	180.3	631.6	22.3	609.4	602.4	66.6	1.8	22.9	1.3
Sep	2,903.4	1,427.1	805.8	173.7	632.1	22.4	609.6	603.1	67.5	1.8	22.7	1.2
Oct	2,918.9	1,449.9	799.7	171.6	628.1	22.3	605.8	602.6	66.7	1.8	22.6	1.1
Nov	2,933.8	1,471.3	796.0	168.3	627.7	22.8	604.9	601.8	64.6	1.8	22.0	1.2
Dec	2,931.5	1,465.4	798.5	172.5	625.9	21.8	604.1	604.0	63.7	1.8	21.5	1.2
2015 Jan	2,944.1	1,487.2	791.9	169.0	622.8	21.2	601.6	602.8	62.3	1.8	21.0	1.1
												Changes*
2013	+ 43.9	+ 121.3	– 52.5	– 30.4	– 22.1	– 1.1	– 21.0	– 7.9	– 17.1	– 0.1	– 1.6	+ 2.0
2014	+ 70.8	+ 106.0	– 21.4	– 0.0	– 21.4	– 1.5	– 19.9	– 2.6	– 11.2	– 0.4	– 2.7	+ 0.5
2014 Feb	+ 4.0	+ 3.5	+ 1.0	+ 3.5	– 2.5	– 0.3	– 2.2	+ 0.6	– 1.1	– 0.1	– 0.2	– 0.1
Mar	– 11.1	– 5.9	– 3.3	– 1.0	– 2.2	– 0.3	– 1.9	– 1.2	– 0.7	– 0.1	– 0.1	– 0.4
Apr	+ 11.8	+ 15.5	– 0.1	+ 2.2	– 2.3	– 0.5	– 1.8	– 1.9	– 1.7	– 0.0	– 0.2	+ 0.2
May	+ 9.7	+ 11.9	– 0.3	+ 1.3	– 1.6	+ 0.1	– 1.7	– 0.7	– 1.1	– 0.1	– 0.1	– 0.5
June	– 12.9	– 4.1	– 6.9	– 4.5	– 2.4	+ 0.0	– 2.4	– 1.4	– 0.5	– 0.1	– 0.4	– 0.1
July	+ 10.6	+ 14.8	– 2.6	+ 0.7	– 3.2	– 0.2	– 3.0	– 0.2	– 1.4	– 0.0	– 0.3	+ 0.2
Aug	+ 15.1	+ 13.4	+ 1.0	+ 2.5	– 1.5	+ 0.1	– 1.6	+ 1.5	– 0.9	– 0.0	– 0.2	+ 0.3
Sep	+ 1.6	+ 6.1	– 6.1	– 6.6	+ 0.4	+ 0.2	+ 0.2	+ 0.7	+ 0.9	– 0.0	– 0.2	– 0.1
Oct	+ 15.5	+ 22.8	– 6.1	– 2.1	– 4.0	– 0.1	– 3.9	– 0.5	– 0.8	– 0.0	– 0.1	– 0.1
Nov	+ 15.0	+ 21.5	– 3.6	– 3.3	– 0.3	+ 0.5	– 0.8	– 0.8	– 2.1	– 0.0	– 0.6	+ 0.1
Dec	+ 2.0	– 4.3	+ 5.0	+ 5.5	– 0.5	– 0.4	– 0.1	+ 2.1	– 0.9	+ 0.0	– 0.5	– 0.0
2015 Jan	+ 12.6	+ 21.8	– 6.6	– 3.5	– 3.1	– 0.6	– 2.5	– 1.2	– 1.4	– 0.0	– 0.4	– 0.1
	***of which:* Domestic enterprises**											**End of year or month***
2012	1,105.3	414.2	668.5	185.9	482.5	10.4	472.2	6.5	16.1	2.2	18.2	79.8
2013	1,011.3	429.1	559.7	105.6	454.0	10.1	444.0	7.2	15.3	2.2	17.2	0.7
2014	1,007.9	457.1	529.1	104.1	425.0	10.4	414.6	6.9	14.9	1.8	16.5	1.2
2014 Feb	1,011.5	429.4	559.6	110.8	448.8	9.7	439.1	7.4	15.0	2.1	17.4	1.6
Mar	1,004.6	426.1	555.9	109.7	446.2	9.6	436.6	7.5	15.1	2.0	17.5	1.2
Apr	1,008.4	430.5	555.8	112.1	443.6	9.4	434.3	7.5	14.7	2.0	17.5	1.4
May	1,008.7	432.0	554.7	113.3	441.3	9.6	431.7	7.4	14.6	2.0	17.5	0.9
June	996.5	427.9	546.4	108.1	438.3	9.5	428.9	7.5	14.7	1.8	17.2	0.8
July	1,000.1	434.5	543.7	108.7	435.0	9.3	425.6	7.5	14.5	1.8	17.2	1.0
Aug	1,004.8	438.0	544.5	111.5	433.0	9.5	423.5	7.5	14.8	1.8	17.1	1.3
Sep	1,011.6	449.5	538.4	105.8	432.6	9.3	423.3	7.5	16.2	1.8	17.1	1.2
Oct	1,014.9	458.3	532.8	104.2	428.6	9.5	419.1	7.6	16.2	1.8	17.1	1.1
Nov	1,008.1	456.6	529.2	100.9	428.2	10.6	417.7	7.4	14.9	1.8	16.7	1.2
Dec	1,007.9	457.1	529.1	104.1	425.0	10.4	414.6	6.9	14.9	1.8	16.5	1.2
2015 Jan	1,013.7	467.2	524.8	102.7	422.1	10.3	411.9	6.8	14.8	1.8	16.2	1.1
												Changes*
2013	– 12.0	+ 30.3	– 42.3	– 16.4	– 25.9	+ 1.9	– 27.8	+ 0.8	– 0.8	– 0.1	– 1.0	+ 2.0
2014	– 1.4	+ 28.8	– 29.5	– 1.0	– 28.5	+ 0.4	– 28.9	– 0.4	– 0.3	– 0.4	– 0.8	+ 0.5
2014 Feb	– 4.7	– 4.7	+ 0.0	+ 3.3	– 3.3	– 0.1	– 3.1	+ 0.1	– 0.2	– 0.0	– 0.1	– 0.1
Mar	– 6.9	– 3.3	– 3.7	– 1.1	– 2.6	– 0.1	– 2.5	+ 0.0	+ 0.0	– 0.1	+ 0.1	– 0.4
Apr	+ 4.2	+ 4.4	+ 0.2	+ 2.4	– 2.2	– 0.2	– 2.0	+ 0.0	– 0.4	– 0.0	– 0.0	+ 0.2
May	+ 0.3	+ 1.5	– 1.1	+ 1.2	– 2.3	+ 0.3	– 2.6	– 0.0	– 0.1	– 0.0	+ 0.0	– 0.5
June	– 12.5	– 4.0	– 8.6	– 5.4	– 3.2	– 0.1	– 3.0	+ 0.0	+ 0.1	– 0.1	– 0.3	– 0.1
July	+ 3.6	+ 6.5	– 2.8	+ 0.6	– 3.4	– 0.1	– 3.3	– 0.0	– 0.2	– 0.0	– 0.1	+ 0.2
Aug	+ 4.7	+ 3.5	+ 0.9	+ 2.8	– 1.9	+ 0.1	– 2.1	+ 0.0	+ 0.3	– 0.0	– 0.1	+ 0.3
Sep	+ 6.8	+ 11.5	– 6.1	– 5.7	– 0.4	– 0.2	– 0.2	+ 0.0	+ 1.4	– 0.0	– 0.0	– 0.1
Oct	+ 3.3	+ 8.9	– 5.6	– 1.6	– 4.0	+ 0.2	– 4.1	+ 0.1	– 0.0	– 0.0	+ 0.1	– 0.1
Nov	– 6.8	– 1.7	– 3.7	– 3.3	– 0.3	+ 1.1	– 1.4	– 0.1	– 1.3	+ 0.0	– 0.4	+ 0.1
Dec	+ 1.3	+ 0.8	+ 1.0	+ 3.9	– 2.8	– 0.1	– 2.8	– 0.6	+ 0.0	+ 0.0	– 0.3	– 0.0
2015 Jan	+ 5.7	+ 10.1	– 4.3	– 1.5	– 2.9	– 0.2	– 2.7	– 0.0	– 0.0	– 0.1	– 0.2	– 0.1

Table IV.12). **3** Excluding deposits under savings and loan contracts (see also footnote 2). **4** Including liabilities arising from non-negotiable bearer debt securities.

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8 Deposits of domestic households and non-profit institutions at banks (MFIs) in Germany*

€ billion

Period	Deposits of domestic households and non-profit institutions, total	Sight deposits						Time deposits [1,2]					
		Total	by creditor group					Total	by creditor group				
			Domestic households				Domestic non-profit institutions		Domestic households				
			Total	Self-employed persons	Employees	Other individuals			Total	Self-employed persons	Employees	Other individuals	
	End of year or month*												
2012	1,798.7	841.5	816.5	147.1	548.6	120.8	25.0	273.3	256.6	18.8	219.3	18.6	
2013	1,854.4	932.5	906.3	161.3	613.0	132.0	26.2	262.8	247.2	16.5	215.1	15.6	
2014	1,923.6	1,008.3	980.1	173.3	673.0	133.8	28.2	269.3	254.7	27.8	185.1	41.8	
2014 Aug	1,897.1	983.0	952.2	170.6	648.9	132.8	30.7	267.4	251.1	17.1	219.2	14.9	
Sep	1,891.9	977.6	946.5	166.7	647.4	132.4	31.1	267.4	251.4	17.0	219.6	14.7	
Oct	1,904.0	991.5	958.8	172.9	652.7	133.2	32.8	266.9	251.1	17.0	219.5	14.7	
Nov	1,925.8	1,014.8	983.0	174.0	673.1	135.9	31.8	266.9	251.1	16.8	219.5	14.8	
Dec	1,923.6	1,008.3	980.1	173.3	673.0	133.8	28.2	269.3	254.7	27.8	185.1	41.8	
2015 Jan	1,930.4	1,020.0	990.3	176.0	678.7	135.6	29.7	267.1	252.9	26.4	184.6	41.9	
	Changes*												
2013	+ 56.0	+ 91.0	+ 89.7	+ 14.2	+ 62.1	+ 13.5	+ 1.3	– 10.1	– 9.4	– 2.4	– 4.5	– 2.6	
2014	+ 72.2	+ 77.2	+ 74.0	+ 11.7	+ 57.1	+ 5.3	+ 3.2	+ 8.1	+ 7.6	+ 1.9	+ 6.4	– 0.6	
2014 Aug	+ 10.4	+ 9.9	+ 9.5	+ 2.6	+ 6.6	+ 0.4	+ 0.4	+ 0.2	+ 0.0	– 0.1	+ 0.2	– 0.1	
Sep	– 5.3	– 5.4	– 5.8	– 3.8	– 1.5	– 0.4	+ 0.4	– 0.1	+ 0.2	– 0.0	+ 0.4	– 0.1	
Oct	+ 12.1	+ 14.0	+ 12.3	+ 5.9	+ 5.4	+ 1.0	+ 1.6	– 0.5	– 0.2	– 0.1	– 0.1	– 0.0	
Nov	+ 21.8	+ 23.2	+ 24.2	+ 1.0	+ 20.4	+ 2.8	– 1.0	+ 0.1	– 0.0	– 0.1	+ 0.0	+ 0.1	
Dec	+ 0.7	– 5.1	– 2.8	– 1.1	– 1.7	– 0.1	– 2.3	+ 4.0	+ 3.6	+ 1.6	+ 2.2	– 0.2	
2015 Jan	+ 6.9	+ 11.7	+ 10.2	+ 2.6	+ 5.7	+ 1.9	+ 1.5	– 2.3	– 1.8	– 1.4	– 0.5	+ 0.1	

* See Table IV.2, footnote*; statistical breaks have been eliminated from the changes. The figures for the latest date are always to be regarded as provisional. Subsequent revisions, which appear in the following Monthly Report, are not specially marked. 1 Including subordinated liabilities and liabilities arising from registered debt

9 Deposits of domestic government at banks (MFIs) in Germany, by creditor group*

€ billion

Period	Deposits												
	Domestic government, total	Federal Government and its special funds [1]						State governments					
		Total	Sight deposits	Time deposits		Savings deposits and bank savings bonds [2]	*Memo item* Fiduciary loans	Total	Sight deposits	Time deposits		Savings deposits and bank savings bonds [2]	*Memo item* Fiduciary loans
				for up to and including 1 year	for more than 1 year					for up to and including 1 year	for more than 1 year		
	End of year or month*												
2012	186.2	25.9	3.7	6.0	16.2	0.1	16.4	47.2	9.1	13.7	24.2	0.2	15.9
2013	183.0	16.0	2.9	7.7	5.3	0.1	15.7	43.6	10.2	10.1	23.0	0.2	14.6
2014	186.7	14.1	2.6	6.0	5.5	0.1	14.6	40.2	13.4	10.4	15.8	0.7	14.1
2014 Aug	189.7	10.6	2.3	3.4	4.9	0.1	14.9	49.9	12.2	14.9	22.7	0.2	14.2
Sep	189.2	11.5	2.7	3.8	4.9	0.1	14.9	54.3	11.6	20.0	22.6	0.2	14.2
Oct	178.4	11.2	2.6	3.6	4.9	0.1	14.8	48.7	11.2	14.8	22.5	0.2	14.1
Nov	182.6	10.6	2.3	3.3	5.0	0.1	14.8	44.0	10.8	10.3	22.7	0.2	14.1
Dec	186.7	14.1	2.6	6.0	5.5	0.1	14.6	40.2	13.4	10.4	15.8	0.7	14.1
2015 Jan	184.5	14.7	4.1	5.1	5.5	0.1	14.6	42.4	13.0	12.9	15.8	0.7	14.0
	Changes*												
2013	– 3.8	– 9.8	– 0.8	+ 1.8	– 10.8	– 0.0	– 0.7	– 4.2	+ 0.8	– 3.8	– 1.1	+ 0.0	– 0.9
2014	– 1.2	– 1.3	– 0.3	– 0.9	– 0.1	+ 0.0	– 1.0	– 3.7	+ 2.8	+ 0.4	– 7.2	+ 0.4	– 0.5
2014 Aug	+ 2.6	– 1.1	– 1.0	– 0.1	– 0.0	+ 0.0	+ 0.0	– 1.2	– 1.0	– 0.1	– 0.0	– 0.0	– 0.0
Sep	– 0.6	+ 0.8	+ 0.4	+ 0.5	+ 0.0	– 0.0	– 0.0	+ 4.4	– 0.6	+ 5.1	– 0.1	+ 0.0	– 0.1
Oct	– 10.7	– 0.3	– 0.1	– 0.2	+ 0.0	+ 0.0	– 0.1	– 5.7	– 0.5	– 5.2	– 0.0	+ 0.0	– 0.0
Nov	+ 4.1	– 0.6	– 0.3	– 0.3	+ 0.0	+ 0.0	+ 0.0	– 4.7	– 0.4	– 4.5	+ 0.1	+ 0.0	+ 0.0
Dec	– 0.3	+ 3.3	+ 0.3	+ 2.7	+ 0.3	– 0.0	– 0.2	– 4.1	+ 2.3	+ 0.0	– 6.8	+ 0.4	– 0.0
2015 Jan	– 2.2	+ 0.7	+ 1.5	– 0.9	+ 0.0	+ 0.0	+ 0.0	+ 2.2	– 0.4	+ 2.6	– 0.1	– 0.0	– 0.1

* See Table IV.2, footnote *; excluding deposits of the Treuhand agency and its successor organisations, of the Federal Railways, east German Railways and Federal Post Office, and, from 1995, of Deutsche Bahn AG, Deutsche Post AG and Deutsche Telekom AG, and of publicly owned enterprises, which are included in "Enterprises". Statistical breaks have been eliminated from the changes. The figures for the latest date are always to be regarded as provisional. Subsequent revisions, which appear in

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Domestic non-profit institutions	by maturity: up to and including 1 year	more than 1 year [2]: Total	more than 1 year [2]: of which: up to and including 2 years	more than 1 year [2]: of which: more than 2 years	Savings deposits [3]: Total	Savings deposits [3]: Domestic households	Savings deposits [3]: Domestic non-profit institutions	Bank savings bonds [4]	*Memo item*: Fiduciary loans	*Memo item*: Subordinated liabilities (excluding negotiable debt securities) [5]	*Memo item*: Liabilities arising from repos	Period
End of year or month*												
16.7	82.3	190.9	17.1	173.8	608.0	597.8	10.2	76.0	0.0	7.6	–	2012
15.6	68.1	194.7	14.0	180.7	599.3	589.6	9.7	59.8	0.0	7.0	–	2013
14.6	68.4	200.9	11.4	189.5	597.1	587.7	9.4	48.8	0.0	5.0	–	2014
16.3	68.8	198.6	12.8	185.9	594.9	585.5	9.5	51.8	0.0	5.9	–	2014 Aug
16.0	67.9	199.5	13.1	186.4	595.6	586.1	9.5	51.3	0.0	5.7	–	Sep
15.7	67.4	199.5	12.8	186.6	595.0	585.6	9.5	50.5	0.0	5.4	–	Oct
15.8	67.4	199.5	12.3	187.2	594.4	585.1	9.3	49.7	0.0	5.3	–	Nov
14.6	68.4	200.9	11.4	189.5	597.1	587.7	9.4	48.8	0.0	5.0	–	Dec
14.2	66.4	200.7	11.0	189.7	596.0	586.5	9.5	47.4	0.0	4.8	–	2015 Jan
Changes*												
– 0.7	– 14.0	+ 3.9	– 3.0	+ 6.8	– 8.7	– 8.3	– 0.4	– 16.2	– 0.0	– 0.6	–	2013
+ 0.5	+ 1.0	+ 7.1	– 2.0	+ 9.0	– 2.2	– 1.9	– 0.3	– 10.9	+ 0.0	– 1.9	–	2014
+ 0.1	– 0.3	+ 0.5	– 0.0	+ 0.5	+ 1.5	+ 1.5	– 0.0	– 1.1	– 0.0	– 0.1	–	2014 Aug
– 0.3	– 0.9	+ 0.8	+ 0.4	+ 0.5	+ 0.6	+ 0.6	– 0.0	– 0.5	– 0.0	– 0.2	–	Sep
– 0.3	– 0.5	– 0.0	– 0.3	+ 0.3	– 0.5	– 0.6	+ 0.0	– 0.8	–	– 0.2	–	Oct
+ 0.1	+ 0.0	+ 0.1	– 0.5	+ 0.6	– 0.6	– 0.4	– 0.2	– 0.8	– 0.0	– 0.2	–	Nov
+ 0.4	+ 1.6	+ 2.4	– 0.3	+ 2.7	+ 2.7	+ 2.5	+ 0.2	– 0.9	– 0.0	– 0.2	–	Dec
– 0.4	– 2.0	– 0.2	– 0.5	+ 0.2	– 1.1	– 1.2	+ 0.0	– 1.4	+ 0.0	– 0.2	–	2015 Jan

securities. **2** Including deposits under savings and loan contracts (see Table IV.12). **3** Excluding deposits under savings and loan contracts (see also foot-note 2). **4** Including liabilities arising from non-negotiable bearer debt securities. **5** Included in time deposits.

Local government and local government associations (including municipal special-purpose associations): Total	Sight deposits	Time deposits [3]: for up to and including 1 year	Time deposits [3]: for more than 1 year	Savings deposits and bank savings bonds [2,4]	*Memo item* Fiduciary loans	Social security funds: Total	Sight deposits	Time deposits: for up to and including 1 year	Time deposits: for more than 1 year	Savings deposits and bank savings bonds [2]	*Memo item* Fiduciary loans	Period
End of year or month*												
43.8	23.0	11.3	5.9	3.6	0.4	69.3	15.0	42.0	11.4	0.8	0.0	2012
44.9	23.5	10.7	6.6	4.1	0.4	78.7	11.6	52.7	13.5	0.9	0.0	2013
48.0	25.3	11.2	7.0	4.5	0.4	84.4	11.1	57.0	15.4	0.9	–	2014
46.2	22.9	12.4	6.6	4.3	0.4	83.0	13.7	54.8	13.9	0.7	0.0	2014 Aug
43.5	20.7	11.9	6.6	4.3	0.4	79.8	12.7	52.6	13.8	0.8	0.0	Sep
41.9	19.7	11.2	6.7	4.3	0.4	76.7	11.1	51.0	13.7	0.8	0.0	Oct
44.2	21.8	11.4	6.7	4.3	0.4	83.8	11.7	57.2	14.1	0.8	–	Nov
48.0	25.3	11.2	7.0	4.5	0.4	84.4	11.1	57.0	15.4	0.9	–	Dec
41.6	20.1	10.1	6.9	4.6	0.4	85.8	13.4	55.9	15.5	0.9	–	2015 Jan
Changes*												
+ 1.1	+ 0.5	– 0.6	+ 0.7	+ 0.5	– 0.0	+ 9.1	– 3.4	+ 10.1	+ 2.3	+ 0.1	– 0.0	2013
+ 2.9	+ 1.8	+ 0.4	+ 0.3	+ 0.4	– 0.0	+ 0.8	– 2.4	+ 2.6	+ 0.6	– 0.0	– 0.0	2014
+ 5.7	+ 4.4	+ 1.0	+ 0.1	+ 0.1	– 0.0	– 0.8	+ 1.3	– 2.0	– 0.0	– 0.0	–	2014 Aug
– 2.7	– 2.1	– 0.5	– 0.1	+ 0.0	–	– 3.2	– 1.0	– 2.1	– 0.1	+ 0.0	–	Sep
– 1.6	– 1.0	– 0.7	+ 0.1	+ 0.0	–	– 3.1	– 1.5	– 1.6	– 0.0	+ 0.1	–	Oct
+ 2.4	+ 2.1	+ 0.3	– 0.0	– 0.0	–	+ 7.0	+ 0.5	+ 6.2	+ 0.3	+ 0.0	– 0.0	Nov
+ 3.5	+ 3.5	– 0.4	+ 0.2	+ 0.2	–	– 2.9	– 1.9	– 1.1	+ 0.0	+ 0.0	–	Dec
– 6.4	– 5.3	– 1.1	– 0.1	+ 0.1	+ 0.0	+ 1.4	+ 2.4	– 1.1	+ 0.0	+ 0.1	–	2015 Jan

the following Monthly Report, are not specially marked. **1** Federal Railways Fund, Indemnification Fund, Redemption Fund for Inherited Liabilities, ERP Special Fund, German Unity Fund, Equalisation of Burdens Fund. **2** Including liabilities arising from non-negotiable bearer debt securities. **3** Including deposits under savings and loan contracts. **4** Excluding deposits under savings and loan contracts (see also footnote 3).

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10 Savings deposits and bank savings bonds of banks (MFIs) in Germany sold to non-banks (non-MFIs)*

€ billion

Period	Savings deposits [1]								Memo item Interest credited on savings deposits	Bank savings bonds [3], sold to			
		of residents					of non-residents				domestic non-banks		
			at three months' notice		at more than three months' notice								
	Total	Total	Total	of which Special savings facilities [2]	Total	of which Special savings facilities [2]	Total	of which At three months' notice		non-banks, total	Total	of which With maturities of more than 2 years	foreign non-banks
End of year or month*													
2012	628.2	617.6	528.4	418.1	89.2	77.7	10.6	8.1	9.8	110.5	93.6	68.6	16.9
2013	620.0	610.1	532.4	413.5	77.8	65.2	9.9	7.9	7.5	92.2	76.6	59.3	15.6
2014	617.0	607.7	531.3	401.4	76.4	63.3	9.2	7.4	6.1	79.8	66.0	51.4	13.8
2014 Sep	615.8	606.5	528.3	402.3	78.2	65.2	9.3	7.5	0.2	83.2	69.4	54.6	13.8
Oct	615.3	606.1	528.0	400.6	78.0	65.0	9.3	7.4	0.3	82.4	68.6	53.9	13.7
Nov	614.6	605.3	527.7	399.6	77.7	64.5	9.2	7.4	0.3	80.2	66.5	51.8	13.7
Dec	617.0	607.7	531.3	401.4	76.4	63.3	9.2	7.4	3.4	79.8	66.0	51.4	13.8
2015 Jan	615.9	606.6	529.1	397.3	77.5	64.3	9.3	7.4	0.3	77.9	64.7	50.6	13.2
Changes*													
2013	– 8.0	– 7.4	+ 4.0	– 4.4	– 11.3	– 12.4	– 0.7	– 0.2	.	– 18.4	– 17.0	– 9.3	– 1.4
2014	– 3.1	– 2.4	– 2.5	– 13.0	+ 0.0	– 1.0	– 0.6	– 0.5	.	– 12.3	– 10.6	– 7.8	– 1.8
2014 Sep	+ 0.6	+ 0.6	+ 0.1	– 0.4	+ 0.5	+ 0.4	– 0.0	– 0.0	.	+ 1.1	+ 1.0	+ 1.1	+ 0.1
Oct	– 0.5	– 0.4	– 0.3	– 1.7	– 0.2	– 0.2	– 0.1	– 0.0	.	– 0.8	– 0.7	– 0.6	– 0.1
Nov	– 0.8	– 0.7	– 0.4	– 1.0	– 0.4	– 0.5	– 0.0	– 0.0	.	– 2.1	– 2.1	– 2.1	– 0.0
Dec	+ 2.4	+ 2.4	+ 2.2	+ 0.8	+ 0.2	– 0.2	– 0.0	+ 0.0	.	– 0.4	– 0.5	– 0.5	+ 0.1
2015 Jan	– 1.1	– 1.1	– 1.1	– 3.1	– 0.0	– 0.1	+ 0.0	+ 0.0	.	– 1.9	– 1.3	– 0.8	– 0.6

***** See Table IV.2, footnote*; statistical breaks have been eliminated from the changes. The figures for the latest date are always to be regarded as provisional. Subsequent revisions, which appear in the following Monthly Report, are not specially marked. **1** Excluding deposits under savings and loan contracts, which are classified as time deposits. **2** Savings deposits bearing interest at a rate which exceeds the minimum or basic rate of interest. **3** Including liabilities arising from non-negotiable bearer debt securities.

11 Debt securities and money market paper outstanding of banks (MFIs) in Germany*

€ billion

Period	Negotiable bearer debt securities and money market paper									Non-negotiable bearer debt securities and money market paper [6]		Subordinated	
		of which				with maturities of							
						up to and including 1 year		more than 1 year up to and including 2 years					
	Total	Floating rate bonds [1]	Zero coupon bonds [1,2]	Foreign currency bonds [3,4]	Certificates of deposit	Total	of which without a nominal guarantee [5]	Total	of which without a nominal guarantee [5]	more than 2 years	Total	of which with maturities of more than 2 years	negotiable debt securities	non-negotiable debt securities
End of year or month*														
2012	1,265.1	346.8	31.6	362.3	58.9	76.4	3.0	51.3	4.4	1,137.4	0.3	0.3	38.6	1.1
2013	1,142.7	315.9	26.3	321.2	54.8	69.0	2.5	34.7	4.4	1,039.0	0.6	0.2	37.0	1.1
2014	1,114.2	286.4	26.3	354.0	69.2	83.6	1.8	26.3	5.0	1,004.3	1.0	0.2	33.7	1.2
2014 Sep	1,135.5	299.4	29.0	362.3	78.7	96.2	2.5	29.7	5.2	1,009.5	1.3	0.2	32.9	1.1
Oct	1,129.1	292.8	28.0	358.6	77.4	92.1	2.5	28.9	5.2	1,008.0	1.1	0.2	33.0	1.1
Nov	1,123.8	290.1	25.9	355.2	73.3	86.5	2.3	27.1	5.2	1,010.2	1.1	0.2	33.2	1.1
Dec	1,114.2	286.4	26.3	354.0	69.2	83.6	1.8	26.3	5.0	1,004.3	1.0	0.2	33.7	1.2
2015 Jan	1,147.9	286.0	26.4	381.2	80.6	95.0	1.9	27.5	5.2	1,025.4	0.8	0.2	34.2	1.2
Changes*														
2013	– 122.4	– 30.9	– 5.3	– 41.2	– 4.1	– 7.4	– 0.4	– 16.6	+ 0.1	– 98.4	+ 0.3	– 0.0	– 1.6	– 0.0
2014	– 28.7	– 29.5	+ 0.0	+ 32.7	+ 14.4	+ 14.6	– 0.7	– 8.4	+ 0.6	– 35.0	+ 0.4	– 0.0	+ 0.2	+ 0.2
2014 Sep	+ 5.3	– 2.9	+ 0.4	+ 8.5	– 1.5	– 0.6	– 0.1	+ 0.4	– 0.1	+ 5.5	+ 0.0	+ 0.0	– 1.7	–
Oct	– 6.4	– 6.7	– 1.0	– 3.7	– 1.3	– 4.1	+ 0.0	– 0.8	+ 0.1	– 1.5	– 0.2	– 0.0	+ 0.0	+ 0.1
Nov	– 5.2	– 2.7	– 2.1	– 3.4	– 4.1	– 5.6	– 0.2	– 1.8	+ 0.0	+ 2.2	+ 0.0	+ 0.0	+ 0.2	– 0.0
Dec	– 9.6	– 3.7	+ 0.4	– 1.2	– 4.1	– 3.0	– 0.5	– 0.8	– 0.2	– 5.9	– 0.0	– 0.0	+ 0.6	+ 0.1
2015 Jan	+ 33.7	– 0.4	+ 0.1	+ 27.2	+ 11.4	+ 11.5	+ 0.1	+ 1.1	+ 0.2	+ 21.1	– 0.2	+ 0.0	+ 0.4	–

***** See Table IV.2, footnote*; statistical breaks have been eliminated from the changes. The figures for the latest date are always to be regarded as provisional. Subsequent revisions, which appear in the following Monthly Report, are not specially marked. **1** Including debt securities denominated in foreign currencies. **2** Issue value when floated. **3** Including floating rate notes and zero coupon bonds denominated in foreign currencies. **4** Bonds denominated in non-euro-area currencies. **5** Negotiable bearer debt securities respectively money market paper with a nominal guarantee of less than 100%. **6** Non-negotiable bearer debt securities are classified among bank savings bonds (see also Table IV.10, footnote 2).

IV Banks

12 Building and loan associations (MFIs) in Germany *)
Interim statements

€ billion

End of year/month	Number of associations	Balance sheet total 13	Lending to banks (MFIs)			Lending to non-banks (non-MFIs)				Deposits of banks (MFIs) 5		Deposits of non-banks (non-MFIs)		Bearer debt securities outstanding	Capital (including published reserves) 7	*Memo item* New contracts entered into in year or month 8
			Credit balances and loans (excluding building loans) 1	Building loans 2	Bank debt securities 3	Building loans			Securities (including Treasury bills and Treasury discount paper) 4	Deposits under savings and loan contracts	Sight and time deposits	Deposits under savings and loan contracts	Sight and time deposits 6			
						Loans under savings and loan contracts	Interim and bridging loans	Other building loans								
All building and loan associations																
2013	22	205.2	43.6	0.0	16.9	21.0	82.5	17.0	17.6	1.6	21.1	149.0	5.7	4.0	9.0	105.4
2014	21	211.6	45.6	0.0	16.6	18.7	87.2	17.3	20.6	1.9	21.3	156.8	5.2	2.8	9.2	94.6
2014 Nov	21	210.8	45.2	0.0	16.5	19.1	86.6	17.2	20.5	1.8	21.7	154.1	5.1	2.9	9.1	7.8
Dec	21	211.6	45.6	0.0	16.6	18.7	87.2	17.3	20.6	1.9	21.3	156.8	5.2	2.8	9.2	9.3
2015 Jan	21	212.9	45.6	0.0	17.3	18.5	87.5	17.2	21.0	1.9	22.1	157.5	5.0	2.8	9.4	7.4
Private building and loan associations																
2014 Nov	12	146.9	27.8	–	9.5	13.5	67.8	14.7	8.9	1.2	17.9	101.6	4.9	2.9	6.1	4.9
Dec	12	147.5	28.2	–	9.5	13.3	68.3	14.7	8.9	1.2	17.7	103.4	4.9	2.8	6.1	6.0
2015 Jan	12	148.6	28.2	–	10.1	13.2	68.5	14.7	9.1	1.3	18.6	103.7	4.8	2.8	6.4	4.7
Public building and loan associations																
2014 Nov	9	63.8	17.4	0.0	7.1	5.6	18.7	2.5	11.6	0.6	3.9	52.5	0.1	–	3.0	2.8
Dec	9	64.2	17.4	0.0	7.1	5.5	18.9	2.5	11.7	0.6	3.6	53.4	0.3	–	3.0	3.4
2015 Jan	9	64.4	17.3	0.0	7.2	5.4	19.0	2.6	11.9	0.6	3.5	53.8	0.2	–	3.0	2.6

Trends in building and loan association business

€ billion

Period	Changes in deposits under savings and loan contracts			Capital promised		Capital disbursed						Disbursement commitments outstanding at end of period		Interest and repayments received on building loans 10		
							Allocations									
							Deposits under savings and loan contracts		Loans under savings and loan contracts 9							
	Amounts paid into savings and loan accounts 9	Interest credited on deposits under savings and loan contracts	Repayments of deposits under cancelled savings and loan contracts	Total	*of which* Net allocations 11	Total	Total	*of which* Applied to settlement of interim and bridging loans	Total	*of which* Applied to settlement of interim and bridging loans	Newly granted interim and bridging loans and other building loans	Total	*of which* Under allocated contracts	Total	*of which* Repayments during quarter	*Memo item* Housing bonuses received 12
All building and loan associations																
2013	29.7	2.6	6.7	47.9	30.3	41.3	18.0	4.3	6.5	3.7	16.8	13.9	8.0	11.6	9.4	0.4
2014	29.5	2.5	6.5	45.7	27.9	39.9	16.7	4.2	6.1	3.6	17.1	14.5	8.0	10.1	8.3	0.4
2014 Nov	2.3	0.0	0.5	3.6	2.2	3.1	1.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	1.4	14.9	8.2	0.8		0.0
Dec	2.5	2.2	0.6	3.5	2.1	3.4	1.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	1.6	14.5	8.0	0.9	2.0	0.0
2015 Jan	2.6	0.0	0.5	3.8	2.4	3.2	1.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	1.4	14.7	8.1	0.8		0.0
Private building and loan associations																
2014 Nov	1.5	0.0	0.2	2.6	1.4	2.4	1.0	0.3	0.3	0.2	1.1	10.3	4.8	0.6		0.0
Dec	1.7	1.5	0.3	2.5	1.5	2.5	1.0	0.2	0.3	0.2	1.2	10.2	4.8	0.7	1.5	0.0
2015 Jan	1.6	0.0	0.3	2.7	1.7	2.4	1.0	0.3	0.3	0.2	1.1	10.3	4.9	0.6		0.0
Public building and loan associations																
2014 Nov	0.8	0.0	0.3	1.0	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	4.5	3.4	0.2		0.0
Dec	0.9	0.8	0.3	1.0	0.7	0.9	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	4.3	3.2	0.3	0.5	0.0
2015 Jan	1.0	0.0	0.2	1.0	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	4.3	3.3	0.2		0.0

***** Excluding assets and liabilities and/or transactions of foreign branches. The figures for the latest date are always to be regarded as provisional. Subsequent revisions, which appear in the following Monthly Report, are not specially marked. **1** Including claims on building and loan associations, claims arising from registered debt securities and central bank credit balances. **2** Loans under savings and loan contracts and interim and bridging loans. **3** Including money market paper and small amounts of other securities issued by banks. **4** Including equalisation claims. **5** Including liabilities to building and loan associations. **6** Including small amounts of savings deposits. **7** Including participation rights capital and fund for general banking risks. **8** Total amount covered by the contracts; only contracts newly entered into, for which the contract fee has been fully paid. Increases in the sum contracted count as new contracts. **9** For disbursements of deposits under savings and loan contracts arising from the allocation of contracts see "Capital disbursed". **10** Including housing bonuses credited. **11** Only allocations accepted by the beneficiaries; including allocations applied to settlement of interim and bridging loans. **12** The amounts already credited to the accounts of savers or borrowers are also included in "Amounts paid into savings and loan accounts" and "Interest and repayments received on building loans". **13** See Table IV.2, footnote 1.

IV Banks

13 Assets and liabilities of the foreign branches and foreign subsidiaries of German banks (MFIs) *

€ billion

Period	Number of: German banks (MFIs) *with* foreign branches and/or foreign subsidiaries	Number of: foreign branches [1] and/or foreign subsidiaries	Balance sheet total [7]	Lending to banks (MFIs): Total	Lending to banks (MFIs): Credit balances and loans: Total	Lending to banks (MFIs): Credit balances and loans: German banks	Lending to banks (MFIs): Credit balances and loans: Foreign banks	Lending to banks (MFIs): Money market paper, securities [2,3]	Lending to non-banks (non-MFIs): Total	Lending to non-banks (non-MFIs): Loans: Total	Loans: to German non-banks	Loans: to foreign non-banks	Lending to non-banks (non-MFIs): Money market paper, securities [2]	Other assets [7]: Total	Other assets [7]: *of which* Derivative financial instruments in the trading portfolio
Foreign branches															**End of year or month** *
2012	55	210	2,042.7	552.1	537.9	179.5	358.4	14.2	550.2	427.1	16.9	410.2	123.1	940.4	671.8
2013	56	209	1,726.4	435.6	421.9	141.6	280.3	13.7	519.6	411.3	11.0	400.3	108.3	771.1	485.6
2014	56	205	1,926.2	548.8	532.2	201.2	331.0	16.5	593.5	473.1	14.0	459.1	120.5	783.8	551.9
2014 Mar	56	209	1,695.7	469.6	455.3	159.0	296.3	14.3	558.2	450.2	9.6	440.6	108.1	667.9	425.2
Apr	56	209	1,731.7	473.1	459.1	157.4	301.7	14.0	569.0	458.2	9.7	448.5	110.8	689.5	431.7
May	56	207	1,766.9	478.5	465.8	154.9	310.9	12.7	570.9	454.3	9.3	445.0	116.6	717.6	443.0
June	56	206	1,741.9	483.2	469.0	148.3	320.7	14.3	584.6	469.5	9.0	460.5	115.1	674.1	430.4
July	56	206	1,828.9	511.1	496.3	137.7	358.6	14.8	603.0	484.9	13.0	471.9	118.1	714.8	428.6
Aug	56	206	1,876.9	539.9	525.2	170.6	354.5	14.7	564.0	454.2	14.1	440.1	109.8	773.0	468.6
Sep	56	206	1,826.4	503.6	488.5	154.1	334.4	15.2	615.9	500.5	13.7	486.8	115.4	706.9	487.0
Oct	56	205	1,910.0	525.1	509.5	154.7	354.9	15.6	609.9	494.0	13.5	480.5	115.9	775.0	509.7
Nov	56	205	1,982.6	540.6	525.7	173.6	352.1	14.9	616.5	499.1	14.0	485.1	117.3	825.5	549.8
Dec	56	205	1,926.2	548.8	532.2	201.2	331.0	16.5	593.5	473.1	14.0	459.1	120.5	783.8	551.9
															Changes *
2013	+ 1	– 1	– 279.1	– 98.0	– 97.7	– 37.9	– 59.8	– 0.3	– 13.7	– 2.1	– 5.9	+ 3.8	– 11.7	– 167.4	– 186.2
2014	–	– 4	+ 119.6	+ 74.4	+ 72.2	+ 59.6	+ 12.6	+ 2.2	+ 38.0	+ 31.4	+ 3.0	+ 28.4	+ 6.6	+ 7.5	+ 66.4
2014 Apr	–	–	+ 37.7	+ 4.7	+ 5.0	– 1.6	+ 6.5	– 0.3	+ 11.4	+ 8.5	+ 0.1	+ 8.4	+ 2.9	+ 21.7	+ 6.5
May	–	– 2	+ 23.7	+ 0.2	+ 1.6	– 2.5	+ 4.1	– 1.4	– 3.7	– 8.5	– 0.4	– 8.1	+ 4.8	+ 27.3	+ 11.3
June	–	– 1	– 24.4	+ 5.5	+ 3.9	– 6.6	+ 10.5	+ 1.6	+ 13.5	+ 15.0	– 0.3	+ 15.3	– 1.5	– 43.4	– 12.6
July	–	–	+ 74.4	+ 21.9	+ 21.5	– 10.6	+ 32.0	+ 0.4	+ 12.5	+ 10.3	+ 4.0	+ 6.4	+ 2.1	+ 40.1	– 1.8
Aug	–	–	+ 38.9	+ 23.9	+ 24.0	+ 32.9	– 8.9	– 0.1	– 42.7	– 33.7	+ 1.1	– 34.8	– 8.9	+ 57.6	+ 40.0
Sep	–	–	– 80.5	– 51.9	– 52.1	– 16.5	– 35.5	+ 0.2	+ 39.6	+ 35.9	– 0.4	+ 36.2	+ 3.7	– 68.2	+ 18.4
Oct	–	– 1	+ 82.2	+ 20.6	+ 20.1	+ 0.6	+ 19.6	+ 0.4	– 6.3	– 6.7	– 0.2	– 6.6	+ 0.4	+ 67.9	+ 22.7
Nov	–	–	+ 73.4	+ 15.4	+ 16.0	+ 19.0	– 3.0	– 0.6	+ 7.6	+ 5.9	+ 0.5	+ 5.4	+ 1.7	+ 50.5	+ 40.1
Dec	–	–	– 75.7	– 0.6	– 2.0	+ 27.6	– 29.6	+ 1.4	– 32.1	– 33.9	– 0.1	– 33.8	+ 1.8	– 42.8	+ 2.2
Foreign subsidiaries															**End of year or month** *
2012	35	83	458.7	199.5	166.3	94.5	71.8	33.2	204.7	162.1	30.6	131.5	42.5	54.6	–
2013	33	75	425.2	187.9	158.7	91.4	67.3	29.2	185.4	148.3	26.1	122.3	37.1	52.0	–
2014	28	63	389.4	154.5	137.9	83.4	54.5	16.7	172.7	141.2	21.6	119.5	31.5	62.2	–
2014 Mar	32	73	407.3	171.3	145.7	80.0	65.7	25.5	181.5	146.4	25.0	121.4	35.1	54.6	–
Apr	32	73	401.4	168.3	143.3	79.1	64.1	25.1	178.1	143.0	25.1	117.9	35.2	54.9	–
May	32	72	404.9	166.4	141.9	77.5	64.4	24.5	177.2	140.9	24.7	116.1	36.3	61.3	–
June	32	71	410.4	169.0	145.5	84.8	60.7	23.5	181.7	145.9	24.7	121.2	35.8	59.7	–
July	31	70	403.1	167.3	146.0	86.6	59.4	21.2	172.2	137.5	21.4	116.1	34.7	63.7	–
Aug	31	70	407.3	169.4	148.8	89.7	59.1	20.5	170.8	136.6	21.5	115.1	34.2	67.1	–
Sep	30	66	399.3	166.3	146.7	90.3	56.4	19.6	169.1	136.1	21.5	114.6	33.1	63.9	–
Oct	29	64	393.2	160.0	143.0	88.7	54.3	17.0	173.6	139.5	21.5	118.0	34.0	59.6	–
Nov	29	64	395.0	155.5	138.1	84.7	53.4	17.4	174.5	140.1	21.4	118.7	34.3	65.1	–
Dec	28	63	389.4	154.5	137.9	83.4	54.5	16.7	172.7	141.2	21.6	119.5	31.5	62.2	–
															Changes *
2013	– 2	– 8	– 28.7	– 9.0	– 5.7	– 3.1	– 2.7	– 3.3	– 17.2	– 11.5	– 4.6	– 7.0	– 5.7	– 2.5	–
2014	– 5	– 12	– 46.7	– 39.9	– 26.3	– 8.0	– 18.2	– 13.6	– 17.0	– 11.4	– 4.4	– 7.0	– 5.6	+ 10.1	–
2014 Apr	–	–	– 5.6	– 2.7	– 2.3	– 0.8	– 1.4	– 0.4	– 3.2	– 3.3	+ 0.1	– 3.4	+ 0.1	+ 0.3	–
May	–	– 1	+ 2.0	– 2.9	– 2.1	– 1.6	– 0.5	– 0.7	– 1.5	– 2.7	– 0.4	– 2.3	+ 1.2	+ 6.3	–
June	–	– 1	+ 5.7	+ 2.7	+ 3.7	+ 7.3	– 3.7	– 1.0	+ 4.5	+ 5.0	– 0.0	+ 5.0	– 0.5	– 1.5	–
July	– 1	– 1	– 9.1	– 2.8	– 0.4	+ 1.8	– 2.2	– 2.4	– 10.2	– 9.1	– 3.3	– 5.8	– 1.1	+ 3.9	–
Aug	–	–	+ 2.9	+ 1.4	+ 2.1	+ 3.1	– 1.0	– 0.8	– 1.8	– 1.3	+ 0.1	– 1.4	– 0.5	+ 3.4	–
Sep	– 1	– 4	– 11.8	– 5.5	– 4.2	+ 0.6	– 4.8	– 1.3	– 3.0	– 1.9	+ 0.0	– 1.9	– 1.2	– 3.2	–
Oct	– 1	– 2	– 6.4	– 6.5	– 3.8	– 1.6	– 2.2	– 2.7	+ 4.3	+ 3.3	+ 0.0	+ 3.3	+ 1.0	– 4.3	–
Nov	–	–	+ 1.8	– 4.6	– 5.0	– 4.0	– 0.9	+ 0.4	+ 0.9	+ 0.6	– 0.1	+ 0.7	+ 0.3	+ 5.4	–
Dec	– 1	– 1	– 8.2	– 2.3	– 1.4	– 1.3	– 0.1	– 1.0	– 2.9	– 0.1	+ 0.2	– 0.3	– 2.8	– 2.9	–

***** In this table "foreign" also includes the country of domicile of the foreign branches and foreign subsidiaries. Statistical revisions have been eliminated from the changes. (Breaks owing to changes in the reporting population have not been eliminated from the flow figures for the foreign subsidiaries.) The figures for the latest date are always to be regarded as provisional; subsequent revisions, which appear in the following Monthly Report, are not specially marked. **1** Several branches in a given

IV Banks

Deposits									Money *market* paper and debt securities out-stand-ing [5]	Working capital and own funds	Other liabilities [6,7]		Period
	of banks (MFIs)			of non-banks (non-MFIs)									
					German non-banks [4]								
Total	Total	German banks	Foreign banks	Total	Total	Short-term	Medium and long-term	Foreign non-banks			Total	*of which* Derivative financial instruments in the trading portfolio	
End of year or month *												**Foreign branches**	
1,054.8	727.7	371.2	356.5	327.1	34.7	26.9	7.8	292.4	127.0	39.9	821.1	670.8	2012
890.9	596.4	327.0	269.4	294.5	24.2	19.1	5.1	270.3	125.4	41.2	668.9	484.1	2013
1,046.7	739.9	416.2	323.7	306.8	20.6	16.1	4.4	286.2	128.4	45.2	705.8	557.5	2014
964.2	625.5	340.9	284.6	338.7	29.0	24.0	5.0	309.7	125.3	40.5	565.7	435.1	2014 Mar
1,001.9	653.8	341.1	312.7	348.1	27.4	22.4	4.9	320.7	127.1	40.4	562.4	436.0	Apr
1,011.4	663.0	349.1	313.9	348.4	25.8	20.9	4.9	322.6	134.1	40.3	581.2	452.3	May
1,003.6	668.2	351.1	317.1	335.4	23.1	18.7	4.5	312.3	134.3	41.0	563.1	436.7	June
1,103.3	732.0	371.2	360.8	371.4	22.8	18.3	4.5	348.6	133.6	41.6	550.4	434.8	July
1,093.1	727.8	370.2	357.6	365.3	23.7	19.3	4.4	341.6	139.0	41.7	603.0	473.2	Aug
1,027.4	691.8	364.7	327.1	335.6	22.5	18.1	4.4	313.1	139.3	42.1	617.7	493.4	Sep
1,077.6	733.8	390.9	342.8	343.9	22.1	17.7	4.5	321.7	133.3	41.9	657.2	517.3	Oct
1,099.5	753.2	411.7	341.5	346.3	21.8	17.3	4.4	324.5	132.7	42.9	707.6	555.5	Nov
1,046.7	739.9	416.2	323.7	306.8	20.6	16.1	4.4	286.2	128.4	45.2	705.8	557.5	Dec
Changes *													
– 142.1	–118.2	– 44.3	– 74.0	– 23.9	– 10.4	– 7.7	– 2.7	– 13.4	– 1.5	+ 1.2	– 136.7	– 186.7	2013
+ 101.5	+112.9	+ 89.2	+ 23.6	– 11.4	– 3.7	– 3.0	– 0.7	– 7.7	+ 3.0	+ 4.0	+ 11.1	+ 73.4	2014
+ 38.8	+ 29.0	+ 0.2	+ 28.7	+ 9.9	– 1.6	– 1.6	– 0.0	+ 11.5	+ 1.8	– 0.1	– 2.8	+ 0.9	2014 Apr
+ 1.9	+ 5.2	+ 8.0	– 2.8	– 3.3	– 1.5	– 1.5	– 0.0	– 1.8	+ 7.0	– 0.1	+ 14.9	+ 16.3	May
– 7.3	+ 5.6	+ 2.0	+ 3.6	– 12.9	– 2.7	– 2.2	– 0.5	– 10.2	+ 0.3	+ 0.7	– 18.1	– 15.6	June
+ 91.5	+ 59.2	+ 20.1	+ 39.0	+ 32.4	– 0.4	– 0.4	+ 0.0	+ 32.8	– 0.8	+ 0.7	– 17.0	– 1.9	July
– 16.4	– 7.7	– 1.0	– 6.7	– 8.7	+ 0.9	+ 1.0	– 0.0	– 9.6	+ 5.5	+ 0.1	+ 49.7	+ 38.4	Aug
– 87.0	– 48.1	– 5.6	– 42.5	– 39.0	– 1.2	– 1.2	+ 0.0	– 37.8	+ 0.2	+ 0.5	+ 5.9	+ 20.2	Sep
+ 49.4	+ 41.4	+ 26.2	+ 15.1	+ 8.0	– 0.4	– 0.4	+ 0.0	+ 8.4	– 5.9	– 0.3	+ 39.0	+ 23.9	Oct
+ 22.2	+ 19.3	+ 20.8	– 1.4	+ 2.9	– 0.4	– 0.3	– 0.0	+ 3.2	– 0.7	+ 1.0	+ 50.9	+ 38.2	Nov
– 65.6	– 20.5	+ 4.6	– 25.1	– 45.1	– 1.2	– 1.2	– 0.0	– 43.9	– 4.2	+ 2.4	– 8.2	+ 2.0	Dec
End of year or month *												**Foreign subsidiaries**	
356.8	207.7	120.4	87.2	149.2	22.0	17.8	4.2	127.1	24.9	32.1	44.9	–	2012
334.2	201.1	113.4	87.7	133.0	18.5	16.4	2.0	114.6	21.3	30.0	39.8	–	2013
297.1	173.6	101.1	72.5	123.5	20.3	14.5	5.8	103.2	18.4	25.9	48.0	–	2014
319.5	186.3	95.0	91.3	133.2	19.6	17.6	2.0	113.6	20.3	29.1	38.4	–	2014 Mar
312.7	181.1	94.5	86.6	131.5	19.2	17.2	2.0	112.3	20.9	29.2	38.7	–	Apr
316.4	186.7	95.6	91.1	129.7	18.8	16.7	2.1	110.9	20.5	28.5	39.4	–	May
322.8	189.7	106.4	83.2	133.1	18.6	15.2	3.4	114.5	20.4	27.3	39.9	–	June
315.1	184.0	97.8	86.3	131.1	20.4	15.4	5.0	110.7	20.4	26.8	40.9	–	July
311.3	178.6	98.5	80.1	132.7	19.9	14.8	5.1	112.8	20.3	28.2	47.5	–	Aug
304.5	173.6	99.1	74.6	130.9	20.5	15.2	5.3	110.4	19.4	27.6	47.8	–	Sep
302.4	175.5	99.4	76.1	126.9	19.7	14.3	5.5	107.2	16.1	26.4	48.2	–	Oct
304.2	179.1	100.6	78.5	125.2	20.6	14.5	6.1	104.6	16.1	26.3	48.4	–	Nov
297.1	173.6	101.1	72.5	123.5	20.3	14.5	5.8	103.2	18.4	25.9	48.0	–	Dec
Changes *													
– 18.9	– 4.6	– 7.0	+ 2.4	– 14.3	– 3.6	– 1.4	– 2.2	– 10.7	– 3.6	– 2.1	– 4.1	–	2013
– 45.5	– 32.4	– 12.3	– 20.1	– 13.1	+ 1.8	– 1.9	+ 3.8	– 14.9	– 3.0	– 4.0	+ 5.8	–	2014
– 6.6	– 5.0	– 0.5	– 4.5	– 1.6	– 0.4	– 0.4	– 0.0	– 1.2	+ 0.5	+ 0.1	+ 0.3	–	2014 Apr
+ 2.6	+ 4.8	+ 1.1	+ 3.7	– 2.2	– 0.4	– 0.5	+ 0.1	– 1.8	– 0.4	– 0.7	+ 0.4	–	May
+ 6.5	+ 3.1	+ 10.8	– 7.7	+ 3.4	– 0.2	– 1.5	+ 1.3	+ 3.6	– 0.1	– 1.2	+ 0.5	–	June
– 9.1	– 6.5	– 8.7	+ 2.2	– 2.6	+ 1.8	+ 0.2	+ 1.6	– 4.4	– 0.0	– 0.6	+ 0.6	–	July
– 4.8	– 6.0	+ 0.7	– 6.7	+ 1.2	– 0.5	– 0.6	+ 0.1	+ 1.7	– 0.1	+ 1.4	+ 6.4	–	Aug
– 9.7	– 6.7	+ 0.6	– 7.3	– 3.1	+ 0.5	+ 0.3	+ 0.2	– 3.6	– 0.9	– 0.6	– 0.5	–	Sep
– 2.3	+ 1.7	+ 0.3	+ 1.4	– 4.0	– 0.7	– 0.9	+ 0.2	– 3.3	– 3.3	– 1.2	+ 0.4	–	Oct
+ 1.7	+ 3.5	+ 1.2	+ 2.3	– 1.8	+ 0.8	+ 0.2	+ 0.6	– 2.6	+ 0.0	– 0.1	+ 0.2	–	Nov
– 9.1	– 6.7	+ 0.5	– 7.2	– 2.4	– 0.3	+ 0.0	– 0.3	– 2.2	+ 2.3	– 0.3	– 1.0	–	Dec

country of domicile are regarded as a single branch. **2** Treasury bills, Treasury discount paper and other money market paper, debt securities. **3** Including own debt securities. **4** Excluding subordinated liabilities and non-negotiable debt securities. **5** Issues of negotiable and non-negotiable debt securities and money market paper. **6** Including subordinated liabilities. **7** See also Table IV.2, footnote 1.

V Minimum reserves

1 Reserve maintenance in the euro area

€ billion

Maintenance period beginning in [1]	Reserve base [2]	Required reserves before deduction of lump-sum allowance [3]	Required reserves after deduction of lump-sum allowance [4]	Current accounts [5]	Excess reserves [6]	Deficiencies [7]
2009	10,530.2	210.6	210.1	211.3	1.2	0.0
2010	10,559.5	211.2	210.7	212.4	1.7	0.0
2011	10,376.3	207.5	207.0	212.3	5.3	0.0
2012 [8]	10,648.6	106.5	106.0	489.0	383.0	0.0
2013	10,385.9	103.9	103.4	248.1	144.8	0.0
2014 [9]	10,677.3	106.8	106.3	236.3	130.1	0.0
2014 Dec [9]	10,677.3	106.8	106.3	236.3	130.1	0.0
2015 Jan [p]	10,800.5	108.0	107.5	225.3	117.8	...
Feb	.	.	.	.	.	.
Mar [p]	...	...	110.5	...	...	...

2 Reserve maintenance in Germany

€ million

Maintenance period beginning in [1]	Reserve base [2]	German share of euro-area reserve base in per cent	Required reserves before deduction of lump-sum allowance [3]	Required reserves after deduction of lump-sum allowance [4]	Current accounts [5]	Excess reserves [6]	Deficiencies [7]
2009	2,507,906	23.8	50,158	49,971	50,297	326	0
2010	2,530,997	24.0	50,620	50,435	51,336	901	0
2011	2,666,422	25.7	53,328	53,145	54,460	1,315	1
2012 [8]	2,874,716	27.0	28,747	28,567	158,174	129,607	1
2013	2,743,933	26.4	27,439	27,262	75,062	47,800	2
2014	2,876,931	26.9	28,769	28,595	75,339	46,744	4
2014 Dec	2,876,931	26.9	28,769	28,595	75,339	46,744	4
2015 Jan	2,921,579	27.1	29,216	29,041	74,678	45,637	1
Feb	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Mar [p]	3,012,093	...	30,121	29,947	...	...	...

(a) Required reserves of individual categories of banks

€ million

Maintenance period beginning in [1]	Big banks	Regional banks and other commercial banks	Branches of foreign banks	Landesbanken and savings banks	Regional institutions of credit cooperatives and credit cooperatives	Mortgage banks	Special purpose banks and building and loan associations
2009	11,165	7,885	1,461	18,040	9,400	652	1,368
2010	10,633	7,949	1,845	18,128	9,914	556	1,409
2011	10,459	8,992	3,078	18,253	10,230	601	1,531
2012 [8]	5,388	4,696	2,477	9,626	5,262	248	871
2013	5,189	4,705	1,437	9,306	5,479	239	906
2014	5,593	4,966	1,507	9,626	5,753	216	934
2014 Dec	5,593	4,966	1,507	9,626	5,753	216	934
2015 Jan	5,907	4,940	1,519	9,741	5,819	212	905
Feb	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Mar [p]	6,128	5,095	1,622	9,891	5,922	212	1,076

(b) Reserve base by subcategories of liabilities

€ million

Maintenance period beginning in [1]	Liabilities (excluding savings deposits, deposits with building and loan associations and repos) to non-MFIs with agreed maturities of up to 2 years	Liabilities (excluding repos and deposits with building and loan associations) with agreed maturities of up to 2 years to MFIs that are resident in euro-area countries but not subject to minimum reserve requirements	Liabilities (excluding repos and deposits with building and loan associations) with agreed maturities of up to 2 years to banks in non-euro-area countries	Savings deposits with agreed periods of notice of up to 2 years	Liabilities arising from bearer debt securities issued with agreed maturities of up to 2 years and bearer money market paper after deduction of a standard amount for bearer debt certificates or deduction of such paper held by the reporting institution
2009	1,473,296	6,814	309,908	572,127	145,759
2010	1,484,334	2,376	344,440	594,119	105,728
2011	1,609,904	3,298	354,235	596,833	102,153
2012 [8]	1,734,716	2,451	440,306	602,834	94,453
2013	1,795,844	2,213	255,006	600,702	90,159
2014	1,904,200	1,795	282,843	601,390	86,740
2014 Dec	1,904,200	1,795	282,843	601,390	86,740
2015 Jan	1,932,264	1,264	305,908	600,771	81,428
Feb	.	.	.	.	.
Mar [p]	1,958,611	1,719	361,779	602,551	87,427

1 The reserve maintenance period starts on the settlement day of the main refinancing operation immediately following the meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB for which the discussion on the monetary policy stance is scheduled. **2** Article 3 of the Regulation of the European Central Bank on the application of minimum reserves (excluding liabilities to which a reserve ratio of 0% applies, pursuant to Article 4 (1)). **3** Amount after applying the reserve ratio to the reserve base. The reserve ratio for liabilities with agreed maturities of up to two years is 1%. **4** Article 5 (2) of the Regulation of the European Central Bank on the application of minimum reserves. **5** Average credit balances of credit institutions at national central banks. **6** Average credit balances less required reserves after deduction of the lump-sum allowance. **7** Required reserves after deduction of the lump-sum allowance. **8** The reserve ratio for liabilities with agreed maturities of up to two years was 2% between 1 January 1999 and 17 January 2012. Since 18 January 2012, it has stood at 1%. **9** Required reserves after deduction of the lump-sum allowance, including required reserves of Lithuania (€ 0.154 billion). Required reserves of the euro area up to 31 December 2014 amounted to € 106.2 billion.

VI Interest rates

1 ECB interest rates

% per annum

Applicable from	Deposit facility	Main refinancing operations: Fixed rate	Main refinancing operations: Minimum bid rate	Marginal lending facility	Applicable from	Deposit facility	Main refinancing operations: Fixed rate	Main refinancing operations: Minimum bid rate	Marginal lending facility
2005 Dec 6	1.25	–	2.25	3.25	2011 Apr 13	0.50	1.25	–	2.00
					July 13	0.75	1.50	–	2.25
2006 Mar 8	1.50	–	2.50	3.50	Nov 9	0.50	1.25	–	2.00
June 15	1.75	–	2.75	3.75	Dez 14	0.25	1.00	–	1.75
Aug 9	2.00	–	3.00	4.00					
Oct 11	2.25	–	3.25	4.25	2012 July 11	0.00	0.75	–	1.50
Dec 13	2.50	–	3.50	4.50					
					2013 May 8	0.00	0.50	–	1.00
2007 Mar 14	2.75	–	3.75	4.75	Nov 13	0.00	0.25	–	0.75
June 13	3.00	–	4.00	5.00					
					2014 June 11	–0.10	0.15	–	0.40
2008 July 9	3.25	–	4.25	5.25	Sep 10	–0.20	0.05	–	0.30
Oct 8	2.75	–	3.75	4.75					
Oct 9	3.25	3.75	–	4.25					
Nov 12	2.75	3.25	–	3.75					
Dec 10	2.00	2.50	–	3.00					
2009 Jan 21	1.00	2.00	–	3.00					
Mar 11	0.50	1.50	–	2.50					
Apr 8	0.25	1.25	–	2.25					
May 13	0.25	1.00	–	1.75					

1 Pursuant to section 247 of the Civil Code.

2 Base rates

% per annum

Applicable from	Base rate as per Civil Code **1**	Applicable from	Base rate as per Civil Code **1**
2002 Jan 1	2.57	2009 Jan 1	1.62
July 1	2.47	July 1	0.12
2003 Jan 1	1.97	2011 July 1	0.37
July 1	1.22		
		2012 Jan 1	0.12
2004 Jan 1	1.14		
July 1	1.13	2013 Jan 1	–0.13
		July 1	–0.38
2005 Jan 1	1.21		
July 1	1.17	2014 Jan 1	–0.63
		July 1	–0.73
2006 Jan 1	1.37		
July 1	1.95	2015 Jan 1	–0.83
2007 Jan 1	2.70		
July 1	3.19		
2008 Jan 1	3.32		
July 1	3.19		

3 Eurosystem monetary policy operations allotted through tenders *

Date of settlement	Bid amount	Allotment amount	Fixed rate tenders: Fixed rate	Variable rate tenders: Minimum bid rate	Variable rate tenders: Marginal rate **1**	Variable rate tenders: Weighted average rate	Running for ... days
	€ million		% per annum				
Main refinancing operations							
2015 Feb 11	104,539	104,539	0.05	–	–	–	7
Feb 18	122,114	122,114	0.05	–	–	–	7
Feb 25	165,352	165,352	0.05	–	–	–	7
Mar 4	147,853	147,853	0.05	–	–	–	7
Mar 11	141,839	141,839	0.05	–	–	–	7
Mar 18	142,402	142,402	0.05	–	–	–	7
Long-term refinancing operations							
2014 Dec 17	129,840	129,840	0.15	–	–	–	1,379
Dec 18	22,349	22,349	**2** ...	–	–	–	98
2015 Jan 29	34,132	34,132	**2** ...	–	–	–	91
Feb 26	54,037	54,037	**2** ...	–	–	–	91

***** Source: ECB. **1** Lowest or highest interest rate at which funds were allotted or collected. **2** Interest payment on the maturity date; the rate will be fixed at the average minimum bid rate of the main refinancing operations over the life of this operation.

4 Money market rates, by month *

% per annum

Monthly average	EONIA **1**	EURIBOR **2**: One-week funds	One-month funds	Three-month funds	Six-month funds	Nine-month funds	Twelve-month funds
2014 Aug	0.02	0.04	0.09	0.19	0.29	0.38	0.47
Sep	0.01	– 0.01	0.02	0.10	0.20	0.27	0.36
Oct	0.00	– 0.01	0.01	0.08	0.18	0.26	0.34
Nov	– 0.01	– 0.01	0.01	0.08	0.18	0.26	0.33
Dec	– 0.03	– 0.01	0.02	0.08	0.18	0.25	0.33
2015 Jan	– 0.05	– 0.04	0.01	0.06	0.15	0.22	0.30
Feb	– 0.04	– 0.03	0.00	0.05	0.13	0.19	0.26

***** Averages are Bundesbank calculations. Neither the Deutsche Bundesbank nor anyone else can be held liable for any irregularity or inaccuracy of the EONIA rate and the EURIBOR rate. **1** Euro OverNight Index Average: weighted average overnight rate for interbank operations calculated by the European Central Bank since 4 January 1999 on the basis of real turnover according to the act/360 method and published via Reuters. **2** Euro Interbank Offered Rate: unweighted average rate calculated by Reuters since 30 December 1998 according to the act/360 method.

VI Interest rates

5 Interest rates and volumes for outstanding amounts and new business of German banks (MFIs) *
(a) Outstanding amounts o

End of month	Households' deposits				Non-financial corporations' deposits			
	with an agreed maturity of							
	up to 2 years		over 2 years		up to 2 years		over 2 years	
	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million
2014 Jan	1.01	95,966	1.95	227,207	0.48	83,425	3.04	20,595
Feb	0.99	95,572	1.94	227,617	0.44	86,581	3.02	20,561
Mar	0.97	95,257	1.92	227,604	0.45	85,751	3.01	20,226
Apr	0.95	94,627	1.91	226,848	0.45	86,699	2.98	19,598
May	0.92	94,570	1.89	226,619	0.46	87,856	2.95	19,903
June	0.91	95,671	1.87	226,527	0.44	84,165	2.92	19,989
July	0.87	95,197	1.85	225,989	0.41	85,704	2.87	19,674
Aug	0.84	94,384	1.84	225,881	0.39	86,373	2.83	19,536
Sep	0.81	93,703	1.82	225,992	0.39	83,870	2.81	19,601
Oct	0.79	92,778	1.81	225,657	0.37	83,587	2.78	19,663
Nov	0.76	92,016	1.80	225,585	0.37	83,312	2.73	19,554
Dec	0.70	92,021	1.77	227,145	0.36	81,096	2.74	19,152
2015 Jan	0.69	89,436	1.75	226,468	0.34	79,607	2.67	18,930

End of month	Housing loans to households 3						Loans for consumption and other purposes to households 4, 5					
	with a maturity of											
	up to 1 year 6		over 1 year and up to 5 years		over 5 years		up to 1 year 6		over 1 year and up to 5 years		over 5 years	
	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million
2014 Jan	3.16	5,704	3.10	28,563	3.96	977,215	7.66	57,235	4.99	77,651	5.00	308,100
Feb	3.20	5,602	3.08	28,337	3.94	979,347	7.61	56,749	4.97	77,550	4.98	308,406
Mar	3.22	5,707	3.06	28,267	3.92	980,208	7.75	58,723	4.97	77,679	4.97	307,181
Apr	3.17	5,744	3.03	28,198	3.90	981,947	7.53	57,688	4.91	76,672	4.99	309,107
May	3.17	5,764	3.01	28,197	3.88	984,889	7.51	56,479	4.94	75,911	4.98	309,887
June	3.17	5,762	2.99	28,112	3.86	986,700	7.59	59,098	4.92	76,099	4.96	308,827
July	3.08	5,812	2.96	28,148	3.83	989,997	7.51	56,579	4.89	76,766	4.94	309,761
Aug	3.09	5,667	2.94	28,220	3.82	994,510	7.36	55,731	4.86	77,128	4.91	309,772
Sep	3.09	5,630	2.91	28,295	3.80	997,116	7.54	58,107	4.83	77,166	4.89	308,303
Oct	3.05	5,766	2.87	28,278	3.77	1,000,934	7.36	56,716	4.79	77,707	4.87	308,423
Nov	2.98	5,631	2.84	28,396	3.75	1,004,378	7.25	54,676	4.77	77,140	4.84	308,879
Dec	3.04	5,175	2.82	28,209	3.72	1,010,155	7.14	56,678	4.78	76,938	4.84	304,381
2015 Jan	3.02	5,257	2.79	28,086	3.69	1,008,805	7.21	55,845	4.75	76,653	4.79	303,662

End of month	Loans to non-financial corporations with a maturity of					
	up to 1 year 6		over 1 year and up to 5 years		over 5 years	
	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million
2014 Jan	3.10	129,373	2.86	124,931	3.24	585,957
Feb	3.11	131,524	2.84	125,835	3.23	586,261
Mar	3.23	133,290	2.84	126,844	3.22	582,771
Apr	3.17	132,664	2.83	130,113	3.21	583,996
May	3.14	133,191	2.81	130,069	3.20	586,337
June	3.11	138,116	2.76	129,524	3.18	582,780
July	2.97	133,446	2.72	129,959	3.15	583,339
Aug	2.96	131,893	2.71	130,271	3.14	585,897
Sep	2.98	132,902	2.65	129,887	3.11	584,473
Oct	2.90	130,017	2.60	131,515	3.07	586,281
Nov	2.88	132,058	2.57	131,532	3.05	588,938
Dec	2.80	128,984	2.52	128,693	3.02	574,766
2015 Jan	2.78	129,967	2.51	129,374	2.98	575,480

***** The MFI interest rate statistics are based on the interest rates applied by MFIs and the related volumes of euro-denominated deposits and loans to households and non-financial corporations domiciled in the euro area. The household sector comprises individuals (including sole proprietors) and non-profit institutions serving households. Non-financial corporations include all enterprises other than insurance companies, banks and other financial institutions. The interest rate statistics gathered on a harmonised basis in the euro area from January 2003 are collected in Germany on a sample basis. The most recent figures are in all cases to be regarded as provisional. Subsequent revisions appearing in the following Monthly Report are not specially marked. Further information on the MFI interest rate statistics can be found on the Bundesbank's website (Statistics / Reporting system / Banking statistics / MFI interest rate statistics). **o** The statistics on outstanding amounts are collected at the end of the month. **1** The effective interest rates are calculated either as annualised agreed interest rates or as narrowly defined effective rates. Both calculation methods cover all interest payments on deposits and loans but not any other related charges which may occur for enquiries, administration, preparation of the documents, guarantees and credit insurance. **2** Data based on monthly balance sheet statistics. **3** Secured and unsecured loans for home purchase, including building and home improvements; including loans granted by building and loan associations and interim credits as well as transmitted loans granted by the reporting agents in their own name and for their own account. **4** Loans for consumption are defined as loans granted for the purpose of personal use in the consumption of goods and services. **5** For the purpose of these statistics, other loans are loans granted for other purposes such as business, debt consolidation, education etc. **6** Including overdrafts (see also footnotes 13 to 15 p 47•).

VI Interest rates

5 Interest rates and volumes for outstanding amounts and new business of German banks (MFIs) * (cont'd)
(b) New business +

Reporting period	Households' deposits											
	Overnight		with an agreed maturity of						redeemable at notice of 8			
			up to 1 year		over 1 year and up to 2 years		over 2 years		up to 3 months		over 3 months	
	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million
2014 Jan	0.38	937,354	0.75	8,957	1.10	837	1.58	1,785	0.77	531,516	0.96	77,239
Feb	0.38	945,510	0.78	7,933	0.99	810	1.34	1,514	0.80	531,906	0.94	77,471
Mar	0.37	942,554	0.69	7,426	0.98	583	1.33	1,496	0.72	530,731	0.92	77,451
Apr	0.36	953,725	0.68	8,300	1.03	808	1.29	1,523	0.73	529,024	0.91	77,285
May	0.36	964,096	0.66	7,869	0.92	690	1.33	1,895	0.72	528,416	0.88	77,128
June	0.35	963,948	0.65	7,904	1.02	595	1.36	1,420	0.70	528,104	0.84	76,049
July	0.30	972,397	0.53	8,497	0.87	691	1.26	1,493	0.66	527,278	0.82	76,712
Aug	0.30	982,182	0.54	6,962	0.96	600	1.11	1,293	0.61	527,851	0.83	77,648
Sep	0.29	976,579	0.52	7,217	0.87	611	1.16	1,224	0.60	527,990	0.81	78,170
Oct	0.27	990,310	0.51	7,406	0.98	560	1.04	1,104	0.56	527,680	0.79	77,990
Nov	0.26	1,013,535	0.52	7,410	0.90	616	1.18	1,098	0.54	527,234	0.77	77,625
Dec	0.26	1,007,245	0.35	8,589	0.81	570	1.14	1,168	0.52	530,301	0.75	76,202
2015 Jan	0.25	1,017,775	0.56	7,241	0.87	817	1.09	1,129	0.51	528,559	0.73	77,361

Reporting period	Non-financial corporations' deposits							
	Overnight		with an agreed maturity of					
			up to 1 year		over 1 year and up to 2 years		over 2 years	
	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million
2014 Jan	0.15	320,229	0.24	25,407	0.66	391	1.36	417
Feb	0.15	315,847	0.23	22,970	0.65	371	2.07	265
Mar	0.17	313,232	0.22	22,601	0.67	525	1.03	389
Apr	0.17	315,372	0.26	26,114	0.68	576	1.04	345
May	0.16	318,469	0.25	27,178	0.60	432	0.91	390
June	0.14	314,270	0.18	24,006	0.54	313	1.02	615
July	0.12	320,536	0.18	17,300	0.53	335	1.06	436
Aug	0.12	326,545	0.16	15,252	0.48	188	0.82	186
Sep	0.11	336,903	0.16	12,441	0.34	279	1.13	281
Oct	0.10	345,504	0.17	13,388	0.48	608	0.74	292
Nov	0.09	343,396	0.14	12,311	0.52	1,448	0.52	486
Dec	0.09	344,691	0.16	14,634	0.47	731	1.55	725
2015 Jan	0.09	337,478	0.16	12,054	0.42	391	0.56	349

Reporting period	Loans to households											
	Loans for other purposes to households with an initial rate fxation of 5											
	floating rate or up to 1 year 9		over 1 year and up to 5 years		over 5 years		*of which* loans to sole proprietors 10					
							floating rate or up to 1 year 9		over 1 year and up to 5 years		over 5 years	
	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million
2014 Jan	1.98	5,139	3.38	1,102	2.91	2,188	2.31	2,887	3.49	806	2.83	1,438
Feb	1.89	3,836	3.32	902	2.94	2,153	2.21	2,252	3.63	622	2.85	1,223
Mar	2.06	4,627	3.50	1,162	2.89	2,841	2.32	2,832	3.68	694	2.86	1,427
Apr	2.02	4,931	3.47	1,092	2.91	2,814	2.23	2,924	3.64	778	2.88	1,368
May	1.96	4,047	3.52	1,023	2.84	2,136	2.26	2,277	3.74	789	2.75	1,213
June	2.04	4,245	3.46	947	2.77	2,325	2.29	2,615	3.62	712	2.72	1,346
July	1.88	4,952	3.33	1,196	2.71	2,713	2.15	3,073	3.50	888	2.66	1,470
Aug	2.14	3,449	3.51	799	2.59	1,996	2.24	2,089	3.66	622	2.57	1,314
Sep	1.93	4,709	3.48	859	2.51	2,586	2.02	2,858	3.61	632	2.42	1,400
Oct	1.80	4,726	3.26	972	2.58	2,521	1.94	2,869	3.50	694	2.47	1,437
Nov	1.98	3,301	3.21	847	2.46	2,215	1.99	2,175	3.42	619	2.35	1,221
Dec	1.68	5,108	2.95	1,178	2.36	3,050	1.87	3,235	3.11	870	2.34	1,696
2015 Jan	1.89	4,298	3.08	1,053	2.45	2,383	2.07	2,758	3.28	778	2.32	1,329

For footnotes * and 1 to 6, see p 44•. **+** In the case of deposits with an agreed maturity and all loans excluding revolving loans and overdrafts, credit card debt, new business covers all new agreements between households or non-financial corporations and the bank. The interest rates are calculated as volume-weighted average rates of all new agreements concluded during the reporting month. In the case of overnight deposits, deposits redeemable at notice, revolving loans and overdrafts, credit card debt, new business is collected in the same way as outstanding amounts for the sake of simplicity. This means that all outstanding deposit and lending business at the end of the month has to be incorporated in the calculation of average rates of interest. **7** Estimated. The volume of new business is extrapolated to form the underlying total using the Horvitz-Thompson estimator. **8** Including non-financial corporations' deposits; including fidelity and growth premia. **9** Excluding overdrafts. **10** Collected from June 2010.

VI Interest rates

5 Interest rates and volumes for outstanding amounts and new business of German banks (MFIs) * (cont'd)
(b) New business +

Reporting period	Loans to households (cont'd)								
	Loans for consumption with an initial rate fixation of **4**								
	Total (including charges)	Total		floating rate or up to 1 year **9**		over 1 year and up to 5 years		over 5 years	
	Annual percentage rate of charge **11** % pa	Effective interest rate **1** % pa	Volume **7** € million	Effective interest rate **1** % pa	Volume **7** € million	Effective interest rate **1** % pa	Volume **7** € million	Effective interest rate **1** % pa	Volume **7** € million
	Total loans								
2014 Jan	6.56	6.47	5,445	5.73	538	5.20	2,478	7.93	2,429
Feb	6.40	6.32	5,076	5.87	591	5.09	2,300	7.73	2,185
Mar	6.19	6.12	5,954	5.72	832	4.99	2,702	7.51	2,420
Apr	6.26	6.20	5,613	5.44	395	4.92	2,606	7.59	2,612
May	6.34	6.25	5,665	5.33	497	5.02	2,520	7.59	2,648
June	6.26	6.24	5,571	5.17	406	5.00	2,438	7.51	2,727
July	6.31	6.23	5,983	5.28	414	4.96	2,704	7.57	2,865
Aug	6.21	6.14	6,277	5.21	486	4.86	2,782	7.47	3,009
Sep	6.08	5.98	6,207	5.02	543	4.77	2,836	7.37	2,828
Oct	6.07	6.03	6,460	5.03	392	4.71	2,962	7.41	3,106
Nov	5.97	5.88	5,730	5.02	472	4.71	2,657	7.23	2,601
Dec	5.67	5.62	4,969	4.49	515	4.67	2,328	6.94	2,126
2015 Jan	6.11	6.05	5,776	5.19	375	4.71	2,536	7.36	2,865
	of which: collateralised loans **12**								
2014 Jan	.	4.04	245	2.65	61	4.73	122	4.06	62
Feb	.	4.35	217	3.11	33	4.84	119	4.10	65
Mar	.	4.23	261	3.41	53	4.75	138	3.84	70
Apr	.	3.99	248	2.15	52	4.63	133	4.14	63
May	.	4.32	220	3.57	22	4.64	129	3.97	69
June	.	4.21	215	3.43	28	4.64	121	3.76	66
July	.	3.85	299	2.68	102	4.79	128	3.82	69
Aug	.	4.42	193	3.33	20	4.74	120	4.11	53
Sep	.	4.12	203	2.79	27	4.66	116	3.65	60
Oct	.	3.96	1,018	2.72	86	4.52	454	3.66	478
Nov	.	4.07	791	3.23	26	4.57	381	3.62	384
Dec	.	3.83	635	3.13	25	4.52	302	3.20	308
2015 Jan	.	3.75	682	2.77	102	4.37	276	3.51	304

Reporting period	Loans to households (cont'd)										
	Housing loans with an initial rate fixation of **3**										
	Total (including charges)	Total		floating rate or up to 1 year **9**		over 1 year and up to 5 years		over 5 years and up to 10 years		over 10 years	
	Annual percentage rate of charge **11** % pa	Effective interest rate **1** % pa	Volume **7** € million	Effective interest rate **1** % pa	Volume **7** € million	Effective interest rate **1** % pa	Volume **7** € million	Effective interest rate **1** % pa	Volume **7** € million	Effective interest rate **1** % pa	Volume **7** € million
	Total loans										
2014 Jan	2.94	2.84	16,675	2.70	3,082	2.54	2,460	2.86	6,752	3.07	4,381
Feb	2.90	2.83	15,089	2.85	2,762	2.43	2,061	2.81	5,540	3.02	4,726
Mar	2.82	2.75	16,442	2.75	2,449	2.36	2,266	2.73	6,455	2.94	5,272
Apr	2.85	2.75	17,947	2.69	2,754	2.40	2,574	2.71	7,202	3.02	5,417
May	2.73	2.66	16,015	2.70	2,259	2.33	2,229	2.63	6,506	2.84	5,021
June	2.65	2.58	15,767	2.49	2,436	2.31	2,091	2.55	6,359	2.79	4,881
July	2.55	2.50	19,296	2.50	2,866	2.21	2,638	2.48	7,957	2.65	5,835
Aug	2.52	2.45	16,207	2.59	2,398	2.17	2,018	2.40	6,422	2.55	5,369
Sep	2.39	2.34	16,831	2.44	2,127	2.08	2,063	2.31	6,907	2.44	5,734
Oct	2.34	2.29	18,118	2.38	2,543	2.07	2,197	2.22	7,383	2.40	5,995
Nov	2.29	2.23	16,479	2.42	2,176	1.99	2,185	2.15	6,376	2.33	5,742
Dec	2.22	2.17	18,743	2.26	2,640	1.98	2,095	2.12	7,778	2.24	6,230
2015 Jan	2.22	1.96	19,920	2.29	2,561	1.95	2,076	2.05	7,114	1.78	8,169
	of which: collateralised loans **12**										
2014 Jan	.	2.79	7,816	2.68	1,079	2.48	1,271	2.80	3,255	3.01	2,211
Feb	.	2.80	7,211	2.87	1,276	2.37	1,011	2.76	2,664	2.99	2,260
Mar	.	2.69	7,808	2.69	954	2.31	1,152	2.66	3,125	2.90	2,577
Apr	.	2.73	8,786	2.61	1,159	2.35	1,336	2.65	3,499	3.07	2,792
May	.	2.60	7,592	2.61	923	2.24	1,110	2.58	3,109	2.80	2,450
June	.	2.53	7,151	2.41	901	2.20	1,017	2.50	2,955	2.76	2,278
July	.	2.44	9,007	2.45	1,163	2.14	1,371	2.42	3,718	2.61	2,755
Aug	.	2.39	7,432	2.54	900	2.08	992	2.33	3,015	2.52	2,525
Sep	.	2.28	7,574	2.44	810	1.97	1,014	2.21	3,065	2.41	2,685
Oct	.	2.23	8,249	2.41	987	1.95	1,107	2.15	3,358	2.38	2,797
Nov	.	2.13	7,782	2.32	889	1.81	1,310	2.06	2,959	2.29	2,624
Dec	.	2.10	8,525	2.28	998	1.82	1,059	2.04	3,493	2.21	2,975
2015 Jan	.	1.78	10,252	2.23	1,005	1.81	1,080	1.97	3,527	1.54	4,640

For footnotes * and 1 to 6, see p 44•. For footnotes +, 7 to 10, see p 45•. For footnote 12, see p 47•. **11** Annual percentage rate of charge, which contains other related charges which may occur for enquiries, administration, preparation of the documents, guarantees and credit insurance.

VI Interest rates

5 Interest rates and volumes for outstanding amounts and new business of German banks (MFIs) * (cont'd)
(b) New business +

Reporting period	Loans to households (cont'd)						Loans to non-financial corporations			
	Revolving loans 13 and overdrafts 14 credit card debt 15		of which: Revolving loans 13 and overdrafts 14		of which: Extended credit card debt		Revolving loans 13 and overdrafts 14 credit card debt 15		of which: Revolving loans 13 and overdrafts 14	
	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 16 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 16 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 2 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 16 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 16 € million
2014 Jan	9.36	43,888	9.38	37,050	14.51	4,288	4.27	65,336	4.29	65,106
Feb	9.31	43,418	9.29	36,571	14.55	4,259	4.28	66,556	4.31	66,281
Mar	9.33	45,617	9.34	38,706	14.58	4,313	4.39	68,638	4.41	68,379
Apr	9.20	43,618	9.27	37,048	15.35	3,587	4.38	66,730	4.39	66,493
May	9.21	42,626	9.22	36,563	15.42	3,566	4.39	66,148	4.41	65,901
June	9.26	44,696	9.30	38,374	15.43	3,657	4.35	69,615	4.37	69,358
July	9.20	42,604	9.21	36,390	15.36	3,630	4.17	65,960	4.19	65,707
Aug	9.08	41,864	9.14	35,283	15.34	3,721	4.13	65,743	4.14	65,562
Sep	9.16	44,311	9.23	37,656	15.31	3,783	4.17	66,516	4.18	66,287
Oct	9.06	42,611	9.09	36,051	15.32	3,770	4.14	62,839	4.16	62,600
Nov	9.00	40,795	8.92	34,390	15.32	3,788	4.03	64,435	4.05	64,185
Dec	8.98	42,863	9.01	36,198	15.30	3,816	3.95	63,192	3.97	62,988
2015 Jan	9.01	41,798	8.95	35,383	15.32	3,800	3.93	63,698	3.94	63,500

Reporting period	Loans to non-financial corporations (cont'd)											
	Loans up to €1 million with an initial rate fixation of 17						Loans over €1 million with an initial rate fixation of 17					
	floating rate or up to 1 year 9		over 1 year and up to 5 years		over 5 years		floating rate or up to 1 year 9		over 1 year and up to 5 years		over 5 years	
	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million	Effective interest rate 1 % pa	Volume 7 € million
	Total loans											
2014 Jan	2.92	7,777	3.50	995	2.93	1,164	1.85	40,304	2.41	1,534	2.82	4,479
Feb	2.97	6,822	3.67	726	2.87	1,009	1.71	32,393	2.14	1,285	2.91	3,721
Mar	3.01	8,295	3.54	1,018	2.80	1,121	1.91	37,918	2.53	1,289	2.77	4,529
Apr	2.95	8,017	3.54	1,087	2.73	1,156	1.83	44,756	2.34	1,752	2.87	4,473
May	3.06	7,005	3.64	919	2.63	1,102	1.74	36,580	2.19	1,457	2.66	3,829
June	2.97	7,708	3.62	897	2.59	1,098	1.65	43,000	2.31	2,259	2.42	5,386
July	2.82	8,292	3.36	1,336	2.55	1,355	1.61	48,992	2.56	2,124	2.58	5,078
Aug	2.77	6,172	3.26	1,080	2.47	1,156	1.46	36,472	2.22	1,864	2.40	4,379
Sep	2.77	7,503	3.24	1,178	2.35	1,248	1.57	44,139	2.37	1,608	2.22	5,639
Oct	2.70	8,199	3.21	1,286	2.29	1,260	1.53	45,100	2.59	2,975	2.18	6,336
Nov	2.82	7,996	3.14	1,057	2.16	1,117	1.52	33,405	2.42	1,520	2.02	5,095
Dec	2.78	7,949	2.97	1,584	2.12	1,709	1.61	48,843	1.99	2,990	2.01	10,718
2015 Jan	2.64	7,604	3.10	1,203	1.39	3,038	1.41	45,388	1.87	2,212	1.82	7,077
	of which: collateralised loans 12											
2014 Jan	2.71	1,122	2.69	161	2.85	324	2.16	8,627	2.65	519	2.87	1,224
Feb	2.86	772	2.72	105	2.66	316	2.16	4,281	2.39	300	2.73	796
Mar	2.81	1,000	2.72	145	2.70	320	2.27	5,618	2.74	408	2.66	994
Apr	2.66	1,161	2.73	152	2.60	340	2.09	9,522	2.31	658	2.98	1,495
May	2.86	862	2.71	118	2.48	358	2.23	5,063	2.60	477	2.64	984
June	2.87	952	2.67	109	2.46	344	2.07	4,950	2.33	1,055	2.22	1,518
July	2.61	1,318	2.55	196	2.44	461	2.05	8,769	2.64	786	2.85	1,477
Aug	2.79	776	2.46	127	2.32	326	1.90	4,212	2.61	854	2.41	815
Sep	2.68	920	2.52	129	2.23	361	1.97	6,190	3.13	488	2.09	1,535
Oct	2.52	1,188	2.42	139	2.22	369	1.81	9,300	3.58	803	2.38	1,697
Nov	2.64	794	2.36	93	2.00	341	1.69	4,649	2.24	618	2.12	1,049
Dec	2.55	1,050	2.17	196	1.96	493	1.72	8,019	1.93	1,194	1.85	3,329
2015 Jan	2.42	1,154	2.37	147	1.13	2,235	1.71	8,846	1.76	764	1.45	2,758

For footnotes * and 1 to 6, see p 44•. For footnotes + and 7 to 10, see p 45•. For footnote 11, see p 46•. **12** Collected from June 2010. For the purposes of the interest rate statistis, a loan is considered to be secured if collateral (among others financial collateral, real estate collateral, debt securities) in at leat the same value as the loan amount has been posted, pledged or assigned. **13** From June 2010 including revolving loans which have all the following features: (a) the borrower may use or withdraw the funds to a pre-approved credit limit without giving prior notice to the lender; (b) the amount of available credit can increase and decrease as funds are borrowed and repaid; (c) the loan may be used repeatedly; (d) there is no obligation of regular repayment of funds. **14** Overdrafts are defined as debit balances on current accounts. They include all bank overdrafts regardless of whether they are within or beyond the limits agreed between customers and the bank. **15** From June 2010 including convenience and extended credit card debt. Convenience credit is defined as the credit granted at an interest rate of 0% in the period between payment transactions effectuated with the card during one billing cycle and the date at which the debt balances from this specific billing cycle become due. **16** From January 2003 up to May 2010 estimated. The volume of outstanding amounts reported was extrapolated to form the underlying total using the Horvitz-Thompson estimator. From June 2010 the data are based on monthly balance sheet statistics. **17** The amount refers to the single loan transaction considered as new business.

VII Insurance corporations and pension funds

1 Assets *

€ billion

End of year/quarter	Assets									
	Total	Financial assets								Non-financial assets
		Total	Cash and deposits with banks (MFIs) 1	Debt securities (including financial derivatives)	Loans granted 2	Shares and other equity 3	Investment fund shares/units	Ceded share of insurance technical reserves	Other financial assets	
Insurance corporations and pension funds 4										
2005	1,696.0	1,633.7	486.8	153.0	240.8	240.3	356.4	79.6	76.9	62.4
2006	1,771.5	1,709.2	524.1	149.9	244.8	261.5	385.6	74.5	68.7	62.3
2007	1,838.3	1,779.8	558.3	155.1	248.2	275.3	409.6	70.2	63.1	58.5
2008	1,770.6	1,714.8	574.5	159.4	243.3	228.9	379.7	65.8	63.4	55.8
2009	1,836.8	1,779.6	588.9	173.9	259.8	210.5	426.9	58.6	61.2	57.1
2010	1,961.9	1,900.5	570.9	210.4	267.2	223.5	501.4	59.9	67.2	61.4
2011	2,011.2	1,947.8	576.3	226.2	271.9	221.9	522.1	62.2	67.1	63.4
2012	2,162.8	2,095.7	560.1	287.2	277.9	223.8	619.5	63.1	64.2	67.1
2013	2,236.3	2,164.2	540.7	318.4	283.8	224.6	670.4	63.6	62.7	72.1
2012 Q3	2,128.8	2,062.6	566.0	275.5	276.6	223.5	594.0	62.9	64.1	66.2
Q4	2,162.8	2,095.7	560.1	287.2	277.9	223.8	619.5	63.1	64.2	67.1
2013 Q1	2,196.6	2,128.7	560.3	300.2	279.4	225.3	637.3	61.7	64.4	67.9
Q2	2,195.8	2,127.1	554.5	302.8	279.8	224.8	638.8	62.1	64.2	68.7
Q3	2,214.6	2,144.2	547.3	308.4	283.1	224.5	654.7	62.8	63.4	70.4
Q4	2,236.3	2,164.2	540.7	318.4	283.8	224.6	670.4	63.6	62.7	72.1
2014 Q1	2,296.8	2,223.5	542.3	336.3	286.8	226.0	703.1	65.5	63.4	73.3
Q2	2,340.9	2,267.0	538.6	353.5	288.1	226.9	731.3	65.5	63.3	73.9
Q3	2,370.9	2,295.8	530.5	372.9	288.2	228.7	745.8	65.4	64.3	75.1
Insurance corporations										
2005	1,436.7	1,391.4	384.7	130.4	221.3	234.2	272.0	78.6	70.2	45.3
2006	1,489.2	1,444.6	410.4	127.6	224.7	254.2	292.7	73.1	62.0	44.6
2007	1,526.2	1,485.5	432.5	130.7	226.4	267.1	304.0	68.2	56.6	40.7
2008	1,454.7	1,416.5	436.7	133.7	221.7	221.4	284.3	63.4	55.2	38.2
2009	1,490.3	1,452.2	440.4	146.2	236.4	202.7	317.6	55.6	53.2	38.1
2010	1,553.3	1,513.1	420.0	170.9	243.2	210.7	356.5	56.5	55.4	40.3
2011	1,584.6	1,542.9	419.8	191.3	246.0	210.4	361.4	58.4	55.5	41.7
2012	1,694.4	1,651.1	405.1	246.2	251.7	211.4	425.1	59.0	52.7	43.3
2013	1,741.0	1,694.6	382.9	271.4	256.9	211.1	462.4	59.2	50.9	46.4
2012 Q3	1,671.2	1,628.1	410.4	235.7	250.6	211.3	408.6	58.8	52.7	43.0
Q4	1,694.4	1,651.1	405.1	246.2	251.7	211.4	425.1	59.0	52.7	43.3
2013 Q1	1,720.0	1,676.4	403.5	259.1	253.2	212.5	437.7	57.5	52.9	43.6
Q2	1,716.4	1,672.3	397.9	259.9	253.6	211.9	438.5	57.9	52.7	44.1
Q3	1,727.7	1,682.3	390.1	264.3	256.2	211.3	450.1	58.5	51.7	45.4
Q4	1,741.0	1,694.6	382.9	271.4	256.9	211.1	462.4	59.2	50.9	46.4
2014 Q1	1,790.4	1,743.4	382.0	288.8	259.6	212.2	488.3	61.1	51.4	47.0
Q2	1,823.4	1,776.1	378.0	303.1	260.9	212.9	509.0	61.0	51.2	47.4
Q3	1,849.6	1,801.2	371.8	316.4	261.1	213.3	526.0	60.8	51.7	48.4
Pension funds 4										
2005	259.3	242.3	102.0	22.6	19.5	6.1	84.4	1.0	6.6	17.0
2006	282.3	264.6	113.8	22.4	20.1	7.3	92.8	1.5	6.7	17.7
2007	312.1	294.3	125.8	24.4	21.9	8.2	105.6	1.9	6.6	17.8
2008	315.9	298.3	137.8	25.6	21.6	7.4	95.3	2.4	8.2	17.5
2009	346.5	327.4	148.4	27.7	23.3	7.7	109.3	3.0	8.0	19.1
2010	408.5	387.4	150.9	39.5	24.0	12.8	144.9	3.5	11.8	21.1
2011	426.6	404.9	156.5	34.9	25.9	11.5	160.8	3.8	11.6	21.7
2012	468.4	444.6	155.1	40.9	26.2	12.4	194.4	4.1	11.5	23.8
2013	495.3	469.5	157.8	47.0	27.0	13.5	208.1	4.4	11.8	25.7
2012 Q3	457.7	434.5	155.6	39.9	26.0	12.2	185.4	4.0	11.4	23.2
Q4	468.4	444.6	155.1	40.9	26.2	12.4	194.4	4.1	11.5	23.8
2013 Q1	476.6	452.3	156.9	41.1	26.2	12.8	199.6	4.2	11.6	24.3
Q2	479.4	454.8	156.6	43.0	26.2	13.0	200.2	4.2	11.6	24.6
Q3	486.9	461.9	157.2	44.1	26.8	13.2	204.6	4.3	11.7	25.0
Q4	495.3	469.5	157.8	47.0	27.0	13.5	208.1	4.4	11.8	25.7
2014 Q1	506.4	480.1	160.3	47.5	27.2	13.8	214.8	4.5	12.0	26.3
Q2	517.5	491.0	160.6	50.4	27.2	14.0	222.3	4.5	12.1	26.5
Q3	521.3	494.6	158.7	56.4	27.1	15.4	219.9	4.5	12.6	26.7

Source: Bundesbank calculations based on supervisory data of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). * Valuation of securities based on current market values; valuation of other items based on book values. Figures as from 2013 have been revised. 1 Including registered bonds, borrower's note loans and Pfandbriefe of monetary financial institutions. 2 Including deposits retained on assumed reinsurance. 3 Including participation certificates ("Genuss-Scheine"). 4 The term "pension funds" refers to the institutional sector "insurance corporations and pension funds" of the European System of Accounts. Pension funds thus comprise company pension schemes ("Pensionskassen", pension funds supervised by BaFin, Contractual Trust Arrangements (CTAs; included as from 2010) and public, church and municipal supplementary pension funds) and occupational pension schemes for the self-employed. Social security funds are not included.

VII Insurance corporations and pension funds

2 Liabilities *

€ billion

End of year/quarter	Liabilities								
					Insurance technical reserves				
	Total	Debt securities (including financial derivatives)	Loans received 1	Shares and other equity 2	Total	Net equity of households in life insurance and pension fund reserves 3	Unearned premiums and reserves for outstanding claims	Other liabilities	Net worth 4
Insurance corporations and pension funds 5									
2005	1,696.0	6.7	89.8	186.0	1,263.8	989.0	274.8	83.9	65.8
2006	1,771.5	8.4	91.6	210.0	1,318.8	1,049.1	269.6	81.3	61.5
2007	1,838.3	11.7	88.9	214.8	1,377.9	1,119.2	258.7	78.2	66.9
2008	1,770.6	14.7	77.0	136.0	1,396.3	1,141.5	254.8	74.7	71.8
2009	1,836.8	16.2	71.6	136.2	1,460.5	1,211.6	249.0	73.1	79.2
2010	1,961.9	17.8	72.3	137.6	1,573.3	1,318.9	254.4	71.5	89.3
2011	2,011.2	17.0	72.1	111.8	1,625.0	1,360.3	264.7	71.5	113.8
2012	2,162.8	22.4	77.1	158.9	1,708.3	1,437.1	271.2	71.3	124.8
2013	2,236.3	16.9	81.7	197.7	1,792.9	1,516.1	276.8	70.5	76.6
2012 Q3	2,128.8	19.3	77.2	141.1	1,688.1	1,418.0	270.0	71.5	131.8
Q4	2,162.8	22.4	77.1	158.9	1,708.3	1,437.1	271.2	71.3	124.8
2013 Q1	2,196.6	21.4	77.1	169.7	1,740.7	1,463.3	277.4	71.8	115.9
Q2	2,195.8	17.8	80.3	172.1	1,757.4	1,480.6	276.8	71.3	96.8
Q3	2,214.6	16.5	81.7	177.0	1,771.9	1,495.8	276.1	70.8	96.7
Q4	2,236.3	16.9	81.7	197.7	1,792.9	1,516.1	276.8	70.5	76.6
2014 Q1	2,296.8	16.3	83.3	191.3	1,826.3	1,540.1	286.2	72.0	107.5
Q2	2,340.9	16.2	83.8	184.1	1,843.6	1,557.5	286.1	72.3	141.0
Q3	2,370.9	17.6	83.6	188.0	1,853.6	1,569.6	284.0	72.3	155.9
Insurance corporations									
2005	1,436.7	6.7	88.4	178.9	1,025.7	751.3	274.4	81.9	55.1
2006	1,489.2	8.4	89.8	202.0	1,061.3	792.0	269.2	79.1	48.6
2007	1,526.2	11.7	86.4	206.7	1,090.1	831.7	258.3	75.7	55.6
2008	1,454.7	14.7	74.2	130.6	1,095.7	841.3	254.4	72.3	67.2
2009	1,490.3	16.2	68.3	130.8	1,136.4	887.8	248.5	71.1	67.5
2010	1,553.3	17.8	68.7	131.8	1,191.3	937.3	254.0	69.4	74.4
2011	1,584.6	17.0	68.3	107.0	1,224.3	960.1	264.2	69.6	98.3
2012	1,694.4	22.4	73.1	152.0	1,280.0	1,009.2	270.8	69.5	97.4
2013	1,741.0	16.9	77.5	188.7	1,337.8	1,061.4	276.4	68.7	51.3
2012 Q3	1,671.2	19.3	73.2	135.0	1,268.5	998.9	269.6	69.6	105.6
Q4	1,694.4	22.4	73.1	152.0	1,280.0	1,009.2	270.8	69.5	97.4
2013 Q1	1,720.0	21.4	73.0	162.3	1,305.9	1,029.0	276.9	70.0	87.3
Q2	1,716.4	17.8	76.2	164.5	1,317.4	1,041.0	276.4	69.5	70.9
Q3	1,727.7	16.5	77.6	169.1	1,326.3	1,050.6	275.7	69.0	69.1
Q4	1,741.0	16.9	77.5	188.7	1,337.8	1,061.4	276.4	68.7	51.3
2014 Q1	1,790.4	16.3	79.0	182.8	1,365.2	1,079.4	285.8	70.2	76.9
Q2	1,823.4	16.2	79.5	175.8	1,376.7	1,091.1	285.6	70.4	104.8
Q3	1,849.6	17.6	79.1	179.5	1,383.5	1,099.9	283.5	70.3	119.6
Pension funds 5									
2005	259.3	–	1.3	7.2	238.1	237.7	0.4	2.0	10.7
2006	282.3	–	1.8	8.0	257.5	257.1	0.4	2.1	12.9
2007	312.1	–	2.4	8.1	287.8	287.5	0.3	2.5	11.2
2008	315.9	–	2.8	5.4	300.6	300.2	0.4	2.4	4.7
2009	346.5	–	3.2	5.4	324.2	323.7	0.4	1.9	11.7
2010	408.5	–	3.6	5.8	382.1	381.7	0.4	2.1	15.0
2011	426.6	–	3.8	4.8	400.6	400.2	0.5	1.9	15.5
2012	468.4	–	4.1	6.9	428.3	427.9	0.4	1.8	27.3
2013	495.3	–	4.2	8.9	455.1	454.6	0.5	1.8	25.3
2012 Q3	457.7	–	4.0	6.1	419.5	419.1	0.4	1.9	26.2
Q4	468.4	–	4.1	6.9	428.3	427.9	0.4	1.8	27.3
2013 Q1	476.6	–	4.0	7.4	434.8	434.3	0.4	1.8	28.6
Q2	479.4	–	4.1	7.6	440.1	439.6	0.4	1.8	25.9
Q3	486.9	–	4.1	7.9	445.6	445.1	0.4	1.8	27.5
Q4	495.3	–	4.2	8.9	455.1	454.6	0.5	1.8	25.3
2014 Q1	506.4	–	4.2	8.5	461.1	460.6	0.5	1.9	30.6
Q2	517.5	–	4.3	8.3	466.9	466.4	0.5	1.9	36.2
Q3	521.3	–	4.4	8.5	470.1	469.6	0.5	1.9	36.3

Source: Bundesbank calculations based on supervisory data of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). * Valuation of securities based on current market values; valuation of other items based on book values. Quarterly data and data as from 2013 are partially estimated. Figures as from 2013 have been revised. **1** Including deposits retained on ceded business. **2** Including participation certificates ("Genuss-Scheine"). **3** Including ageing provisions of health insurance schemes and premium reserves of accident insurance schemes with guaranteed premium refund. **4** As defined in the European System of Accounts (ESA 1995), net worth is the difference between total assets and the remaining liability items. Own funds are the sum of net worth and "shares and other equity". **5** The term "pension funds" refers to the institutional sector "insurance corporations and pension funds" of the ESA. Pension funds thus comprise company pension schemes ("Pensionskassen", pension funds supervised by BaFin, Contractual Trust Arrangements (CTAs; included as from 2010) and public, church and municipal supplementary pension funds) and occupational pension schemes for the self-employed. Social security funds are not included.

VIII Capital market

1 Sales and purchases of debt securities and shares in Germany

€ million

Period	Debt securities											
		Sales					Purchases					
		Domestic debt securities 1					Residents					
	Sales = total purchases	Total	Bank debt securities	Corporate bonds (non-MFIs) 2	Public debt securities 3	Foreign debt securities 4	Total 5	Credit institutions including building and loan associations 6	Deutsche Bundesbank	Other sectors 7	Non-residents 8
2003	184,679	134,455	31,404	30,262	72,788	50,224	105,557	35,748	.	69,809	79,122
2004	233,890	133,711	64,231	10,778	58,703	100,179	108,119	121,841	.	– 13,723	125,772
2005	252,658	110,542	39,898	2,682	67,965	142,116	94,718	61,740	.	32,978	157,940
2006	242,006	102,379	40,995	8,943	52,446	139,627	125,423	68,893	.	56,530	116,583
2007	217,798	90,270	42,034	20,123	28,111	127,528	– 26,762	96,476	.	– 123,238	244,560
2008	76,490	66,139	– 45,712	86,527	25,322	10,351	18,236	68,049	.	– 49,813	58,254
2009	70,208	– 538	– 114,902	22,709	91,655	70,747	90,154	12,973	8,645	77,181	– 19,945
2010	146,620	– 1,212	– 7,621	24,044	– 17,635	147,831	92,682	– 103,271	22,967	172,986	53,938
2011	33,649	13,575	– 46,796	850	59,521	20,075	– 23,876	– 94,793	36,805	34,112	57,525
2012	54,952	– 21,419	– 98,820	– 8,701	86,103	76,370	– 1,139	– 42,017	– 3,573	44,450	56,092
2013	– 9,340	– 101,616	– 117,187	153	15,415	92,275	23,033	– 25,778	– 12,708	61,521	– 32,374
2014	68,533	– 31,962	– 47,404	– 1,330	16,776	100,493	49,539	– 12,128	– 11,951	73,618	18,994
2014 Mar	5,392	– 14,577	– 12,262	– 1,890	– 425	19,970	13,250	641	– 203	12,812	– 7,857
Apr	– 6,730	– 23,586	– 12,132	635	– 12,088	16,856	7,978	1,680	– 1,786	8,084	– 14,708
May	32,168	28,566	11,336	– 1,127	18,357	3,602	2,591	1,764	– 966	1,793	29,576
June	1,652	– 5,765	– 9,400	– 4,686	8,321	7,417	2,811	– 2,240	– 1,632	6,683	– 1,159
July	3,087	– 2,955	– 2,229	5,062	– 5,788	6,042	9,896	32	– 1,640	11,504	– 6,809
Aug	10,406	14,890	4,695	– 1,327	11,523	– 4,485	– 5,222	– 2,744	– 1,666	– 812	15,628
Sep	7,891	– 7,661	– 4,017	– 218	– 3,426	15,551	15,169	7,579	– 373	7,963	– 7,279
Oct	5,342	– 2,321	– 6,304	– 1,626	5,609	7,663	6,756	– 5,699	– 981	13,436	– 1,414
Nov	20,323	2,177	– 4,561	– 305	7,044	18,145	10,445	8,392	– 660	2,713	9,877
Dec	– 23,629	– 23,897	– 7,257	227	– 16,867	268	– 4,942	– 15,489	27	10,520	– 18,687
2015 Jan	23,294	12,020	9,062	2,258	700	11,274	3,174	11,538	– 736	– 7,628	20,121

€ million

Period	Shares						
		Sales		Purchases			
				Residents			
	Sales = total purchases	Domestic shares 9	Foreign shares 10	Total 11	Credit institutions 6	Other sectors 12	Non-residents 13
2003	11,896	16,838	– 4,946	– 15,121	7,056	– 22,177	27,016
2004	– 3,317	10,157	– 13,474	7,432	5,045	2,387	– 10,748
2005	32,364	13,766	18,597	1,036	10,208	– 9,172	31,329
2006	26,276	9,061	17,214	7,528	11,323	– 3,795	18,748
2007	– 5,009	10,053	– 15,062	– 62,308	– 6,702	– 55,606	57,299
2008	– 29,452	11,326	– 40,778	2,743	– 23,079	25,822	– 32,194
2009	35,980	23,962	12,018	30,496	– 8,335	38,831	5,484
2010	37,767	20,049	17,719	36,406	7,340	29,066	1,361
2011	25,833	21,713	4,120	40,804	670	40,134	– 14,971
2012	17,426	5,120	12,306	16,126	10,259	5,867	1,300
2013	29,243	10,106	19,137	24,322	11,991	12,331	4,921
2014	45,491	18,778	26,713	33,307	17,078	16,229	12,184
2014 Mar	5,041	111	4,930	9,533	10,246	– 713	– 4,492
Apr	2,118	136	1,982	12,028	9,932	2,096	– 9,910
May	11,714	868	10,846	4,994	– 7,328	12,322	6,720
June	11,563	9,015	2,548	430	168	262	11,133
July	3,399	1,770	1,629	6,776	3,182	3,594	– 3,377
Aug	– 1,413	291	– 1,704	– 2,860	– 2,003	– 857	1,447
Sep	4,140	4,218	– 78	– 3,667	1,111	– 4,778	7,807
Oct	– 1,951	1,221	– 3,172	– 8,030	– 4,565	– 3,465	6,079
Nov	– 270	245	– 515	2,412	2,047	365	– 2,682
Dec	11,881	189	11,692	12,527	7,310	5,217	– 646
2015 Jan	805	78	727	6,671	7,110	– 439	– 5,866

1 Net sales at market values plus/minus changes in issuers' portfolios of their own debt securities. **2** Including cross-border financing within groups from January 2011. **3** Including Federal Railways Fund, Federal Post Office and Treuhand agency. **4** Net purchases or net sales (–) of foreign debt securities by residents; transaction values. **5** Domestic and foreign debt securities. **6** Book values; statistically adjusted. **7** Residual; also including purchases of domestic and foreign securities by domestic mutual funds. Up to end-2008, data comprise Deutsche Bundesbank. **8** Net purchases or net sales (–) of domestic debt securities by non-residents; transaction values. **9** Excluding shares of public limited investment companies; at issue prices. **10** Net purchases or net sales (–) of foreign shares (including direct investment) by residents; transaction values. **11** Domestic and foreign shares. **12** Residual; also including purchases of domestic and foreign securities by domestic mutual funds. **13** Net purchases or net sales (–) of domestic shares (including direct investment) by non-residents; transaction values. — The figures for the most recent date are provisional; revisions are not specially marked. Some of the data from 2011 until 2014 have been revised by changes in the balance of payment statistics.

VIII Capital market

2 Sales of debt securities issued by residents *

€ million nominal value

Period	Total	Bank debt securities [1]					Corporate bonds (non-MFIs) [2]	Public debt securities [3]	*Memo item* Foreign DM/euro bonds issued by German-managed syndicates
		Total	Mortgage Pfandbriefe	Public Pfandbriefe	Debt securities issued by special purpose credit institutions	Other bank debt securities			
	Gross sales [4]								
2003	958,917	668,002	47,828	107,918	140,398	371,858	22,510	268,406	2,850
2004	990,399	688,844	33,774	90,815	162,353	401,904	31,517	270,040	12,344
2005	988,911	692,182	28,217	103,984	160,010	399,969	24,352	272,380	600
2006	925,863	622,055	24,483	99,628	139,193	358,750	29,975	273,834	69
2007	1,021,533	743,616	19,211	82,720	195,722	445,963	15,043	262,872	–
2008	1,337,337	961,271	51,259	70,520	382,814	456,676	95,093	280,974	–
2009	1,533,616	1,058,815	40,421	37,615	331,566	649,215	76,379	398,423	–
2010	1,375,138	757,754	36,226	33,539	363,828	324,160	53,654	563,731	–
2011	1,337,772	658,781	31,431	24,295	376,876	226,180	86,615	592,376	–
2012	1,340,568	702,781	36,593	11,413	446,153	208,623	63,259	574,529	–
2013	1,433,628	908,107	25,775	12,963	692,611	176,758	66,630	458,891	–
2014	1,362,056	829,864	24,202	13,016	620,409	172,236	79,873	452,321	–
2014 June	97,623	59,724	2,532	816	42,949	13,427	3,509	34,390	–
July	116,843	61,883	2,752	1,431	43,306	14,394	9,710	45,250	–
Aug	109,326	75,365	932	940	54,900	18,594	2,172	31,789	–
Sep	101,795	60,749	4,805	1,218	37,935	16,792	8,843	32,204	–
Oct	123,390	69,634	2,072	1,771	54,826	10,965	6,850	46,907	–
Nov	105,190	67,032	2,191	315	50,578	13,948	6,956	31,202	–
Dec	98,708	66,890	731	928	50,249	14,981	6,515	25,303	–
2015 Jan	139,925	90,524	3,485	795	63,247	22,996	6,550	42,851	–
	***of which:* Debt securities with maturities of more than four years [5]**								
2003	369,336	220,103	23,210	55,165	49,518	92,209	10,977	138,256	2,850
2004	424,769	275,808	20,060	48,249	54,075	153,423	20,286	128,676	4,320
2005	425,523	277,686	20,862	63,851	49,842	143,129	16,360	131,479	400
2006	337,969	190,836	17,267	47,814	47,000	78,756	14,422	132,711	69
2007	315,418	183,660	10,183	31,331	50,563	91,586	13,100	118,659	–
2008	387,516	190,698	13,186	31,393	54,834	91,289	84,410	112,407	–
2009	361,999	185,575	20,235	20,490	59,809	85,043	55,240	121,185	–
2010	381,687	169,174	15,469	15,139	72,796	65,769	34,649	177,863	–
2011	368,039	153,309	13,142	8,500	72,985	58,684	41,299	173,431	–
2012	421,018	177,086	23,374	6,482	74,386	72,845	44,042	199,888	–
2013	372,805	151,797	16,482	10,007	60,662	64,646	45,244	175,765	–
2014	420,006	157,720	17,678	8,904	61,674	69,462	56,249	206,037	–
2014 June	34,521	11,498	2,122	632	5,037	3,707	2,280	20,743	–
July	39,896	13,217	2,585	1,280	4,513	4,839	7,835	18,845	–
Aug	21,235	8,481	717	410	1,715	5,639	463	12,291	–
Sep	39,315	16,184	2,937	952	3,856	8,439	7,704	15,427	–
Oct	35,987	9,295	1,419	609	4,042	3,225	4,826	21,865	–
Nov	32,395	15,177	1,117	212	8,119	5,728	3,878	13,340	–
Dec	27,575	11,748	731	858	2,963	7,195	3,729	12,098	–
2015 Jan	44,986	19,854	3,185	400	9,064	7,205	2,400	22,733	–
	Net sales [6]								
2003	124,556	40,873	2,700	– 42,521	44,173	36,519	18,431	65,253	– 54,990
2004	167,233	81,860	1,039	– 52,615	50,142	83,293	18,768	66,605	– 22,124
2005	141,715	65,798	– 2,151	– 34,255	37,242	64,962	10,099	65,819	– 35,963
2006	129,423	58,336	– 12,811	– 20,150	44,890	46,410	15,605	55,482	– 19,208
2007	86,579	58,168	– 10,896	– 46,629	42,567	73,127	– 3,683	32,093	– 29,750
2008	119,472	8,517	15,052	– 65,773	25,165	34,074	82,653	28,302	– 31,607
2009	76,441	– 75,554	858	– 80,646	25,579	– 21,345	48,508	103,482	– 21,037
2010	21,566	– 87,646	– 3,754	– 63,368	28,296	– 48,822	23,748	85,464	– 10,904
2011	22,518	– 54,582	1,657	– 44,290	32,904	– 44,852	– 3,189	80,289	– 5,989
2012	– 85,298	– 100,198	– 4,177	– 41,660	– 3,259	– 51,099	– 6,401	21,298	– 2,605
2013	– 140,017	– 125,932	– 17,364	– 37,778	– 4,027	– 66,760	1,394	– 15,479	– 3,057
2014	– 34,020	– 56,899	– 6,313	– 23,856	– 862	– 25,869	10,497	12,383	– 2,626
2014 June	– 5,487	– 5,439	– 544	– 5,692	6,003	– 5,206	– 3,862	3,813	–
July	– 7,850	– 7,611	– 1,612	– 992	– 3,445	– 1,562	5,283	– 5,522	–
Aug	16,022	4,579	– 1,287	437	595	4,834	– 1,109	12,552	–
Sep	– 3,467	– 2,745	493	– 1,208	– 1,082	– 949	1,166	– 1,888	–
Oct	– 4,570	– 7,639	– 281	– 1,069	35	– 6,325	– 1,655	4,724	–
Nov	5,589	– 3,094	1,248	– 3,078	– 444	– 818	312	8,372	–
Dec	– 27,860	– 12,169	– 734	– 1,623	– 4,150	– 5,662	523	– 16,214	– 122
2015 Jan	10,747	17,476	1,453	– 284	9,886	6,421	1,547	– 8,277	–

***** For definitions, see the explanatory notes in the Statistical Supplement 2 Capital market statistics on p 21 ff. **1** Excluding registered bank debt securities. **2** Including cross-border financing within groups from January 2011. **3** Including Federal Railways Fund, Federal Post Office and Treuhand agency. **4** Gross sales means only initial sales of newly issued securities. **5** Maximum maturity according to the terms of issue. **6** Gross sales less redemptions.

VIII Capital market

3 Amounts outstanding of debt securities issued by residents *

€ million nominal value

End of year or month/ Maturity in years	Total	Bank debt securities 1					Corporate bonds (non-MFIs)	Public debt securities	*Memo item* Foreign DM/euro bonds issued by German-managed syndicates
		Total	Mortgage Pfandbriefe	Public Pfandbriefe	Debt securities issued by special purpose credit institutions	Other bank debt securities			
2003	2,605,775	1,603,906	158,321	606,541	266,602	572,442	55,076	946,793	192,666
2004	2,773,007	1,685,766	159,360	553,927	316,745	655,734	73,844	1,013,397	170,543
2005	2,914,723	1,751,563	157,209	519,674	323,587	751,093	83,942	1,079,218	134,580
2006	3,044,145	1,809,899	144,397	499,525	368,476	797,502	99,545	1,134,701	115,373
2007	3,130,723	1,868,066	133,501	452,896	411,041	870,629	95,863	1,166,794	85,623
2008	3,250,195	1,876,583	150,302	377,091	490,641	858,550	178,515	1,195,097	54,015
2009	3,326,635	1,801,029	151,160	296,445	516,221	837,203	227,024	1,298,581	32,978
2010	3,348,201	2 1,570,490	147,529	232,954	544,517	2 645,491	250,774	2 1,526,937	22,074
2011	3,370,721	1,515,911	149,185	188,663	577,423	600,640	247,585	1,607,226	16,085
2012	3,285,422	2 1,414,349	145,007	147,070	574,163	2 548,109	2 220,456	2 1,650,617	13,481
2013	3,145,329	1,288,340	127,641	109,290	570,136	481,273	221,851	1,635,138	10,422
2014	3,111,308	1,231,445	121,328	85,434	569,409	455,274	232,342	1,647,520	7,797
2014 July	3,125,595	1,252,508	121,889	91,975	574,320	464,324	233,112	1,639,975	7,919
Aug	3,141,617	1,257,088	120,602	92,412	574,915	469,158	232,002	1,652,527	7,919
Sep	3,138,149	1,254,343	121,095	91,204	573,834	468,209	233,168	1,650,639	7,919
Oct	3,133,579	1,246,703	120,815	90,135	573,869	461,885	231,513	1,655,363	7,919
Nov	3,139,168	1,243,609	122,062	87,057	573,424	461,066	231,825	1,663,734	7,919
Dec	3,111,308	1,231,445	121,328	85,434	569,409	455,274	232,342	1,647,520	7,797
2015 Jan	3,122,055	1,248,922	122,781	85,150	579,295	461,695	233,890	1,639,243	7,797
Breakdown by remaining period to maturity 3							**Position at end-January 2015**		
less than 2	1,141,068	569,537	47,231	40,953	242,156	239,197	45,396	526,136	2,991
2 to less than 4	632,447	278,051	33,130	21,239	144,838	78,844	40,256	314,139	1,505
4 to less than 6	476,214	175,861	23,290	11,629	90,400	50,541	38,985	261,368	146
6 to less than 8	274,521	88,770	10,817	5,268	45,279	27,406	19,394	166,358	266
8 to less than 10	232,372	49,600	5,901	3,590	22,047	18,063	12,963	169,809	1,340
10 to less than 15	94,854	32,275	2,255	2,159	16,710	11,150	9,790	52,790	571
15 to less than 20	71,974	11,745	30	174	5,249	6,293	6,611	53,617	10
20 and more	198,605	43,084	128	136	12,617	30,202	60,496	95,026	967

***** Including debt securities temporarily held in the issuers' portfolios. **1** Excluding debt securities handed to the trustee for temporary safe custody. **2** Sectoral reclassification of debt securities. **3** Calculated from month under review until final maturity for debt securities falling due en bloc and until mean maturity of the residual amount outstanding for debt securities not falling due en bloc.

4 Shares in circulation issued by residents *

€ million nominal value

Period	Share capital = circulation at end of period under review	Net increase or net decrease (–) during period under review	Change in domestic public limited companies' capital due to							*Memo item* Share circulation at market values (market capitalisation) level at end of period under review 2
			cash payments and exchange of convertible bonds 1	issue of bonus shares	contribution of claims and other real assets	contribution of shares, mining shares, GmbH shares, etc	merger and transfer of assets	change of legal form	reduction of capital and liquidation	
2003	162,131	– 6,585	4,482	923	211	513	– 322	– 10,806	– 1,584	851,001
2004	164,802	2,669	3,960	1,566	276	696	– 220	– 1,760	– 2,286	887,217
2005	163,071	– 1,733	2,470	1,040	694	268	– 1,443	– 3,060	– 1,703	1,058,532
2006	163,764	695	2,670	3,347	604	954	– 1,868	– 1,256	– 3,761	1,279,638
2007	164,560	799	3,164	1,322	200	269	– 682	– 1,847	– 1,636	1,481,930
2008	168,701	4,142	5,006	1,319	152	0	– 428	– 608	– 1,306	830,622
2009	175,691	6,989	12,476	398	97	–	– 3,741	– 1,269	– 974	927,256
2010	174,596	– 1,096	3,265	497	178	10	– 486	– 993	– 3,569	1,091,220
2011	177,167	2,570	6,390	552	462	9	– 552	– 762	– 3,532	924,214
2012	178,617	1,449	3,046	129	570	–	– 478	594	– 2,411	1,150,188
2013	171,741	– 6,879	2,971	718	476	–	– 1,432	– 619	– 8,992	1,432,658
2014	177,097	5,356	5,332	1,265	1,714	–	– 465	– 1,044	– 1,446	1,478,063
2014 July	173,470	524	668	255	31	–	– 48	– 219	– 164	1,409,428
Aug	173,650	180	189	474	–	–	– 145	– 115	– 223	1,389,822
Sep	175,138	1,488	1,621	125	23	–	– 29	– 125	– 127	1,401,240
Oct	176,375	1,237	563	–	780	–	– 15	– 27	– 63	1,389,691
Nov	176,551	176	235	–	–	–	35	17	– 111	1,483,086
Dec	177,097	546	178	1	625	–	– 11	13	– 260	1,478,063
2015 Jan	177,103	6	73	11	13	–	0	– 30	– 61	1,595,237

***** Excluding shares of public limited investment companies. **1** Including shares issued out of company profits. **2** Enterprises listed on the Regulated Market (the introduction of which marked the end of the division of organised trading segments into an official and a regulated market on 1 November 2007) or the Neuer Markt (stock market segment was closed down on 24 March 2003) are included as well as enterprises listed on the Open Market. Source: Bundesbank calculations based on data of the Herausgebergemeinschaft Wertpapier-Mitteilungen and the Deutsche Börse AG.

VIII Capital market

5 Yields and indices on German securities

Period	Yields on debt securities outstanding issued by residents [1]							Price indices [2,3]			
		Public debt securities			Bank debt securities			Debt securities		Shares	
			Listed Federal securities								
	Total	Total	Total	With a residual maturity of 9 and including 10 years [4]	Total	With a residual maturity of more than 9 and including 10 years	Corporate bonds (non-MFIs)	German bond index (REX)	iBoxx € Germany price index	CDAX share price index	German share index (DAX)
	% per annum							Average daily rate	End-1998 = 100	End-1987 = 100	End-1987 = 1000
2003	3.7	3.8	3.8	4.1	3.7	4.3	5.0	117.36	97.09	252.48	3,965.16
2004	3.7	3.7	3.7	4.0	3.6	4.2	4.0	120.19	99.89	268.32	4,256.08
2005	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.4	3.1	3.5	3.7	120.92	101.09	335.59	5,408.26
2006	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.8	4.0	4.2	116.78	96.69	407.16	6,596.92
2007	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.4	4.5	5.0	114.85	94.62	478.65	8,067.32
2008	4.2	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.5	4.7	6.3	121.68	102.06	266.33	4,810.20
2009	3.2	3.1	3.0	3.2	3.5	4.0	5.5	123.62	100.12	320.32	5,957.43
2010	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.7	2.7	3.3	4.0	124.96	102.95	368.72	6,914.19
2011	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.9	3.5	4.3	131.48	109.53	304.60	5,898.35
2012	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.6	2.1	3.7	135.11	111.18	380.03	7,612.39
2013	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.3	2.1	3.4	132.11	105.92	466.53	9,552.16
2014	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.2	0.9	1.7	3.0	139.68	114.37	468.39	9,805.55
2014 Sep	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.7	1.4	2.7	137.92	111.89	449.76	9,474.30
Oct	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.6	1.3	2.6	138.01	112.37	444.13	9,326.87
Nov	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	1.1	2.5	138.40	113.23	474.80	9,980.85
Dec	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	1.0	2.4	139.68	114.37	468.39	9,805.55
2015 Jan	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.8	2.3	140.04	116.78	509.65	10,694.32
Feb	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.7	2.2	140.18	116.47	543.06	11,401.66

1 Bearer debt securities with maximum maturities according to the terms of issue of over 4 years if their mean residual maturities exceed 3 years. Convertible debt securities, etc. debt securities with unscheduled redemption, zero-coupon bonds, floating-rate notes and bonds not denominated in euro are not included. Group yields for the various categories of securities are weighted by the amounts outstanding of the debt securities included in the calculation. Monthly figures are calculated on the basis of the yields on all the business days in a month. The annual figures are the unweighted means of the monthly figures. **2** End of year or month. **3** Source: Deutsche Börse AG. **4** Only debt securities eligible as underlying instruments for futures contracts; calculated as unweighted averages.

6 Sales and purchases of mutual fund shares in Germany

€ million

Period	Sales								Purchases					
		Open-end domestic mutual funds [1] (sales receipts)							Residents					
			Mutual funds open to the general public							Credit institutions including building and loan associations [2]		Other sectors [3]		
				of which										
	Sales = total purchases	Total	Total	Money market funds	Securities-based funds	Real estate funds	Specialised funds	Foreign funds [4]	Total	Total	*of which* Foreign mutual fund shares	Total	*of which* Foreign mutual fund shares	Non-residents [5]
2003	47,754	43,943	20,079	– 924	7,408	14,166	23,864	3,811	49,547	– 2,658	734	52,205	3,077	– 1,793
2004	14,435	1,453	– 3,978	– 6,160	– 1,246	3,245	5,431	12,982	10,267	8,446	3,796	1,821	9,186	4,168
2005	85,268	41,718	6,400	– 124	7,001	– 3,186	35,317	43,550	79,252	21,290	7,761	57,962	35,789	6,016
2006	47,264	19,535	– 14,257	490	– 9,362	– 8,814	33,791	27,729	39,006	14,676	5,221	24,330	22,508	8,258
2007	55,778	13,436	– 7,872	– 4,839	– 12,848	6,840	21,307	42,342	51,309	– 229	4,240	51,538	38,102	4,469
2008	2,598	– 7,911	– 14,409	– 12,171	– 11,149	799	6,498	10,509	11,315	– 16,625	– 9,252	27,940	19,761	– 8,717
2009	49,929	43,747	10,966	– 5,047	11,749	2,686	32,780	6,182	38,132	– 14,995	– 8,178	53,127	14,361	11,796
2010	106,190	84,906	13,381	– 148	8,683	1,897	71,345	21,284	102,591	3,873	6,290	98,718	14,994	3,598
2011	46,511	45,221	– 1,340	– 379	– 2,037	1,562	46,561	1,291	39,474	– 7,576	– 694	47,050	1,984	7,036
2012	111,609	89,942	2,084	– 1,036	97	3,450	87,859	21,667	115,031	– 3,062	– 1,562	118,093	23,229	– 3,422
2013	123,276	91,337	9,184	– 574	5,596	3,376	82,153	31,939	117,189	771	100	116,418	31,838	6,086
2014	127,129	88,804	4,177	– 471	1,431	944	84,627	38,324	132,773	969	– 1,753	131,804	40,077	– 5,642
2014 July	12,955	8,609	1,430	– 33	1,069	86	7,179	4,346	13,259	504	– 4	12,755	4,350	– 304
Aug	11,812	9,452	2,328	– 61	1,965	88	7,124	2,360	11,523	– 278	– 325	11,801	2,685	289
Sep	9,253	3,068	– 3,343	– 22	– 3,578	156	6,411	6,186	12,194	1,450	1,110	10,744	5,076	– 2,940
Oct	9,558	7,187	– 1,264	– 76	– 71	– 1,403	8,452	2,371	11,288	861	200	10,427	2,171	– 1,729
Nov	17,509	12,854	– 290	– 40	– 826	287	13,145	4,654	18,301	– 357	– 1,202	18,658	5,856	– 792
Dec	8,926	p) 9,846	p) 100	p) – 20	p) – 33	p) 316	p) 9,746	– 920	9,862	– 1,329	– 1,696	11,191	776	– 936
2015 Jan	23,983	21,924	3,817	– 69	3,058	433	18,106	2,059	22,497	2,405	1,434	20,092	625	1,486

1 Including public limited investment companies. **2** Book values. **3** Residual. **4** Net purchases or net sales (–) of foreign fund shares by residents; transaction values. **5** Net purchases or net sales (–) of domestic fund shares by non-residents; transaction values. — The figures for the most recent date are provisional; revisions are not specially marked. Some of the data from 2011 until 2014 have been revised by changes in the balance of payment statistics.

IX Financial accounts

1 Acquisition of financial assets and external financing of non-financial corporations (non-consolidated)

€ billion

Item	2011	2012	2013	2013 Q2	2013 Q3	2013 Q4	2014 Q1	2014 Q2	2014 Q3
Acquisition of financial assets									
Currency and deposits	0.89	– 1.80	1.59	– 18.88	41.18	13.48	– 10.58	– 6.18	17.53
Debt securities	4.86	– 2.65	0.28	– 2.02	1.70	– 0.56	1.33	0.28	– 0.09
short-term debt securities	2.15	– 2.61	1.56	– 0.63	0.78	– 0.38	1.79	– 0.13	– 0.44
long-term debt securities	2.71	– 0.03	– 1.28	– 1.39	0.92	– 0.18	– 0.46	0.41	0.35
Memo item									
Debt securities of domestic sectors	1.55	– 4.87	– 1.27	– 1.55	0.70	– 1.10	– 0.26	1.05	0.06
Non-financial corporations	.	.	0.81	– 0.11	0.41	– 0.55	0.03	0.34	– 0.32
Financial corporations	.	.	– 2.14	– 1.65	– 0.09	– 0.25	– 0.37	0.05	– 0.43
General government	.	.	0.07	0.21	0.38	– 0.31	0.08	0.66	0.80
Debt securities of the rest of the world	3.32	2.22	1.55	– 0.47	0.99	0.54	1.59	– 0.77	– 0.15
Loans	10.84	21.03	–15.70	– 0.50	4.23	– 21.53	10.71	1.18	15.68
short-term loans	18.09	13.84	7.07	– 0.80	2.81	– 2.34	12.22	3.86	15.97
long-term loans	– 7.26	7.19	–22.77	0.30	1.42	– 19.19	– 1.52	– 2.68	– 0.28
Memo item									
to domestic sectors	6.74	19.82	–22.78	– 8.20	2.93	– 13.70	8.24	4.69	7.06
Non-financial corporations	0.81	8.94	–16.55	– 7.63	2.32	– 10.24	3.92	1.29	5.34
Financial corporations	5.27	10.38	– 6.44	– 0.62	0.55	– 3.51	4.32	3.40	1.72
General government	0.67	0.50	0.21	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00
to the rest of the world	4.09	1.21	7.09	7.71	1.30	– 7.83	2.47	– 3.51	8.63
Equity and investment fund shares	58.21	42.07	29.06	– 6.74	9.65	9.27	11.44	3.45	23.02
Equity	49.96	42.26	21.41	– 6.93	8.20	6.92	10.27	5.63	21.89
Listed shares of domestic sectors	.	.	8.70	0.58	2.99	1.05	– 0.93	– 0.69	2.77
Non-financial corporations	.	.	9.65	1.12	3.03	1.11	– 0.94	– 0.79	2.29
Financial corporations	.	.	– 0.95	– 0.53	– 0.04	– 0.06	0.02	0.10	0.47
Listed shares of the rest of the world	.	.	13.01	7.63	2.33	2.75	2.47	6.22	– 0.64
Other equity [1]	47.99	43.76	– 0.30	– 15.14	2.87	3.13	8.73	0.10	19.77
Investment fund shares	8.25	– 0.20	7.65	0.19	1.45	2.35	1.17	– 2.18	1.13
Money market fund shares	0.29	0.03	– 0.15	– 0.07	0.22	– 0.27	0.48	– 0.16	– 0.01
Non-MMF investment fund shares	7.96	– 0.22	7.80	0.26	1.23	2.62	0.68	– 2.02	1.14
Insurance technical reserves	– 0.24	– 0.30	– 0.34	– 0.08	– 0.09	– 0.09	– 0.10	– 0.09	– 0.03
Financial derivatives	–13.58	0.72	6.49	2.39	1.56	0.62	– 2.62	– 0.20	– 0.07
Other accounts receivable	63.59	102.25	129.23	16.40	65.75	15.93	– 0.81	– 20.51	– 5.79
Total	124.56	161.32	150.61	– 9.43	123.97	17.12	9.37	– 22.06	50.26
External financing									
Debt securities	7.57	18.72	12.78	3.22	– 0.49	0.94	1.18	– 6.30	2.05
short-term securities	4.89	– 1.58	– 1.12	– 1.03	– 1.24	– 4.13	– 2.75	– 6.35	– 1.65
long-term securities	2.68	20.30	13.90	4.24	0.75	5.07	3.93	0.05	3.70
Memo item									
Debt securities of domestic sectors	.	.	5.29	0.49	1.24	0.21	2.47	1.78	– 0.14
Non-financial corporations	.	.	0.81	– 0.11	0.41	– 0.55	0.03	0.34	– 0.32
Financial corporations	.	.	3.04	0.57	0.06	0.75	2.34	1.12	0.25
General government	.	.	– 0.05	– 0.02	– 0.04	0.00	– 0.01	0.00	0.00
Households	.	.	1.50	0.05	0.81	0.01	0.11	0.32	– 0.07
Debt securities of the rest of the world	.	.	7.48	2.72	– 1.73	0.73	– 1.29	– 8.08	2.19
Loans	26.76	12.90	0.51	11.66	– 15.44	– 7.52	15.87	26.86	– 13.78
short-term loans	19.58	12.67	8.30	4.31	– 0.48	– 10.56	14.00	12.48	– 12.89
long-term loans	7.18	0.23	– 7.80	7.36	– 14.96	3.04	1.87	14.37	– 0.89
Memo item									
from domestic sectors	9.08	– 8.86	–31.24	– 4.16	– 12.29	– 21.93	19.39	20.10	– 7.00
Non-financial corporations	0.81	8.94	–16.55	– 7.63	2.32	– 10.24	3.92	1.29	5.34
Financial corporations	8.41	– 1.94	6.54	4.80	2.37	– 10.79	15.62	7.72	– 5.35
General government	– 0.14	–15.86	–21.23	– 1.32	– 16.98	– 0.90	– 0.16	11.09	– 6.99
from the rest of the world	17.68	21.77	31.74	15.83	– 3.16	14.42	– 3.52	6.76	– 6.71
Equity	26.77	12.29	11.99	2.19	1.35	6.81	2.31	2.88	5.04
Listed shares of domestic sectors	.	.	– 4.57	– 4.98	2.09	– 7.00	3.32	– 0.33	0.71
Non-financial corporations	.	.	9.65	1.12	3.03	1.11	– 0.94	– 0.79	2.29
Financial corporations	.	.	– 5.02	– 5.57	2.03	– 3.98	4.41	– 0.01	– 2.49
General government	.	.	– 0.98	– 0.93	– 0.07	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
Households	.	.	– 8.21	0.40	– 2.90	– 4.13	– 0.15	0.47	0.90
Quoted shares of the rest of the world	.	.	7.90	6.48	– 2.27	8.38	– 2.70	2.20	3.59
Other equity [1]	18.46	8.99	8.65	0.69	1.52	5.43	1.69	1.01	0.74
Insurance technical reserves	6.38	7.69	6.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
Financial derivatives and employee stock options	14.83	8.09	3.72	14.96	1.68	– 4.03	2.28	2.46	2.47
Other accounts payable	46.66	28.22	–12.49	– 16.92	16.90	– 11.27	– 2.48	– 0.92	18.18
Total	128.97	87.90	22.50	16.61	5.50	– 13.56	20.65	26.48	15.45

1 Including unlisted shares.

IX Financial accounts

2 Financial assets and liabilities of non-financial corporations (non-consolidated)

End-of-year level, end-of-quarter level; € billion

Item	2011	2012	2013	2013			2014		
				Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3
Financial assets									
Currency and deposits	380.3	414.3	412.2	357.0	395.2	412.2	373.3	359.5	390.2
Debt securities	52.6	51.9	48.2	47.4	48.9	48.2	49.7	50.2	50.3
short-term debt securities	6.3	3.6	5.1	4.7	5.5	5.1	6.9	6.8	6.4
long-term debt securities	46.4	48.3	43.0	42.7	43.4	43.0	42.8	43.4	43.9
Memo item									
Debt securities of domestic sectors	.	.	24.6	25.2	25.8	24.6	24.4	25.5	25.6
Non-financial corporations	.	.	4.7	4.8	5.2	4.7	4.7	5.0	4.7
Financial corporations	.	.	13.8	14.3	14.1	13.8	13.5	13.6	13.2
General government	.	.	6.1	6.1	6.5	6.1	6.2	6.9	7.7
Debt securities of the rest of the world	.	.	23.6	22.2	23.1	23.6	25.3	24.7	24.6
Loans	386.4	400.7	388.6	399.7	405.8	388.6	402.0	403.3	420.9
short-term loans	271.2	281.5	291.7	287.9	292.4	291.7	304.0	307.9	324.9
long-term loans	115.2	119.2	96.9	111.8	113.4	96.9	98.1	95.4	96.0
Memo item									
to domestic sectors	252.5	272.4	249.6	260.3	263.3	249.6	257.8	262.5	269.6
Non-financial corporations	190.8	199.8	183.2	191.1	193.4	183.2	187.1	188.4	193.7
Financial corporations	55.9	66.3	59.9	62.8	63.4	59.9	64.2	67.6	69.3
General government	5.8	6.3	6.5	6.4	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5
to the rest of the world	133.9	128.4	139.0	139.3	142.6	139.0	144.2	140.8	151.4
Equity and investment fund shares	1,436.5	1,597.7	1,756.9	1,607.8	1,669.7	1,756.9	1,761.7	1,781.4	1,821.6
Equity	1,313.3	1,468.8	1,618.8	1,475.9	1,534.1	1,618.8	1,620.8	1,639.5	1,676.4
Listed shares of domestic sectors	.	.	275.4	235.2	251.9	275.4	266.3	266.0	254.6
Non-financial corporations	.	.	269.8	230.1	246.7	269.8	260.5	260.5	248.9
Financial corporations	.	.	5.7	5.1	5.2	5.7	5.7	5.5	5.7
Listed shares of the rest of the world	.	.	63.8	57.8	60.8	63.8	66.9	73.3	72.6
Other equity [1]	1,084.2	1,199.8	1,279.6	1,182.9	1,221.5	1,279.6	1,287.7	1,300.2	1,349.1
Investment fund shares	123.1	129.0	138.1	131.9	135.6	138.1	140.9	141.9	145.2
Money market fund shares	–	–	1.1	1.1	1.4	1.1	1.6	1.5	1.4
Non-MMF investment fund shares	123.1	129.0	137.0	130.8	134.2	137.0	139.3	140.4	143.9
Insurance technical reserves	41.9	43.3	46.1	44.6	45.4	46.1	46.5	46.9	47.3
Financial derivatives	17.1	18.0	16.8	17.6	17.6	16.8	14.1	13.9	13.9
Other accounts receivable	790.4	829.1	861.0	839.8	850.1	861.0	839.5	822.8	832.5
Total	3,105.2	3,354.9	3,529.8	3,313.9	3,432.7	3,529.8	3,487.0	3,478.2	3,576.6
Liabilities									
Debt securities	110.7	130.9	138.9	141.3	137.5	138.9	142.5	138.0	143.1
short-term securities	16.1	14.6	13.4	18.8	17.6	13.4	10.7	4.4	2.7
long-term securities	94.6	116.3	125.4	122.4	119.9	125.4	131.8	133.6	140.4
Memo item									
Debt securities of domestic sectors	.	.	51.6	50.2	51.4	51.6	55.3	58.0	59.2
Non-financial corporations	.	.	4.7	4.8	5.2	4.7	4.7	5.0	4.7
Financial corporations	.	.	31.3	30.4	30.4	31.3	34.9	36.7	38.4
General government	.	.	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Households	.	.	15.6	14.9	15.7	15.6	15.7	16.2	16.0
Debt securities of the rest of the world	.	.	87.3	91.1	86.1	87.3	87.2	80.0	83.9
Loans	1,339.9	1,359.2	1,380.1	1,385.7	1,380.2	1,380.1	1,392.3	1,417.3	1,404.8
short-term loans	420.1	429.4	449.2	447.2	460.5	449.2	462.3	473.9	463.1
long-term loans	919.8	929.8	930.9	938.5	919.6	930.9	930.0	943.4	941.7
Memo item									
from domestic sectors	1,083.6	1,081.0	1,070.4	1,089.0	1,086.3	1,070.4	1,087.2	1,104.3	1,096.1
Non-financial corporations	190.8	199.8	183.2	191.1	193.4	183.2	187.1	188.4	193.7
Financial corporations	845.9	835.5	824.2	850.0	836.2	824.2	837.8	846.6	840.9
General government	46.9	45.7	63.0	47.9	56.7	63.0	62.3	69.4	61.4
from the rest of the world	256.3	278.2	309.7	296.7	293.8	309.7	305.1	313.0	308.8
Equity	1,851.9	2,124.3	2,426.0	2,143.5	2,259.1	2,426.0	2,435.8	2,458.1	2,418.7
Listed shares of domestic sectors	.	.	567.9	486.0	525.0	567.9	565.0	569.4	538.5
Non-financial corporations	.	.	269.8	230.1	246.7	269.8	260.5	260.5	248.9
Financial corporations	.	.	120.3	101.6	113.0	120.3	124.4	125.6	116.7
General government	.	.	31.2	24.4	28.0	31.2	30.5	32.0	30.5
Households	.	.	146.6	129.8	137.3	146.6	149.6	151.2	142.4
Quoted shares of the rest of the world	.	.	674.8	552.5	594.2	674.8	684.2	696.5	678.5
Other equity [1]	1,048.6	1,129.3	1,183.4	1,105.0	1,139.9	1,183.4	1,186.7	1,192.2	1,201.7
Insurance technical reserves	229.8	237.5	243.5	240.5	242.0	243.5	245.0	246.5	248.0
Financial derivatives and employee stock options	31.9	40.2	37.3	47.5	45.1	37.3	39.5	42.0	44.4
Other accounts payable	882.1	898.2	890.6	878.0	884.9	890.6	868.0	868.4	907.6
Total	4,446.3	4,790.3	5,116.3	4,836.5	4,948.8	5,116.3	5,123.1	5,170.3	5,166.7

1 Including unlisted shares.

IX Financial accounts

3 Acquisition of financial assets and external financing of households (non-consolidated)

€ billion

Item	2011	2012	2013	2013 Q2	2013 Q3	2013 Q4	2014 Q1	2014 Q2	2014 Q3
Acquisition of financial assets									
Currency and deposits	57.45	74.42	66.60	18.50	10.20	29.08	13.04	19.19	17.01
Currency	– 2.53	– 0.05	10.81	4.30	3.81	0.07	5.27	3.52	3.99
Deposits	59.98	74.47	55.79	14.20	6.39	29.01	7.77	15.67	13.01
Transferable deposits	33.64	90.08	89.41	25.65	16.37	28.95	8.42	19.91	11.88
Time deposits	17.75	– 5.21	– 9.78	– 2.34	– 4.94	1.47	2.37	1.31	0.94
Savings deposits (including savings certifikates)	8.60	–10.39	–23.85	– 9.12	– 5.04	– 1.40	– 3.03	– 5.56	0.19
Debt securities	– 3.03	–17.39	–17.81	– 6.21	– 2.39	– 2.47	– 2.12	– 2.52	– 7.47
short-term debt securities	0.07	– 0.26	– 0.36	0.01	– 0.28	– 0.20	0.11	– 0.08	– 0.39
long-term debt securities	– 3.10	–17.13	–17.45	– 6.22	– 2.11	– 2.28	– 2.24	– 2.44	– 7.09
Memo item									
Debt securities of domestic sectors	.	.	–14.86	– 5.26	– 2.61	– 2.53	– 2.27	– 2.64	– 5.92
Non-financial corporations	.	.	1.24	0.00	0.75	– 0.07	0.09	0.27	– 0.11
Financial corporations	.	.	–12.46	– 4.26	– 2.31	– 1.79	– 1.77	– 2.25	– 4.92
General government	.	.	– 3.64	– 1.00	– 1.05	– 0.67	– 0.60	– 0.65	– 0.89
Debt securities of the rest of the world	.	.	– 2.94	– 0.95	0.22	0.06	0.15	0.12	– 1.56
Equity and investment fund shares	6.79	– 3.51	9.63	6.34	– 2.15	– 3.89	8.19	10.69	7.55
Equity	19.41	– 0.08	– 0.41	2.94	– 3.05	– 4.36	3.44	3.79	1.00
Listed Shares of domestic sectors	.	.	– 5.63	1.10	– 3.49	– 4.89	0.51	2.07	0.25
Non-financial corporations	.	.	– 5.29	0.32	– 2.88	– 4.13	– 0.15	0.44	0.85
Financial corporations	.	.	– 0.35	0.77	– 0.61	– 0.76	0.66	1.63	– 0.60
Quoted shares of the rest of the world	.	.	2.99	0.71	0.18	0.50	1.91	0.65	0.08
Other equity [1]	5.63	2.58	2.24	1.13	0.26	0.03	1.02	1.06	0.68
Investment fund shares	–12.63	– 3.42	10.04	3.40	0.90	0.47	4.75	6.91	6.55
Money market fund shares	– 0.37	0.65	– 0.30	– 0.16	– 0.02	0.14	– 0.20	– 0.16	– 0.10
Non-MMF investment fund shares	–12.26	– 4.07	10.34	3.56	0.92	0.33	4.95	7.07	6.65
Non-life insurance technical reserves and provision for calls under standardised guarantees	13.12	19.87	20.46	5.08	5.04	5.17	4.33	4.26	4.21
Life insurance and annuity entitlements	13.05	29.66	35.06	8.76	8.74	8.73	13.39	5.99	3.54
Pension entitlement, claims of pension funds on pension managers, entitlements to non-pension benefits	30.09	27.37	22.57	5.04	0.70	4.19	8.75	6.68	5.35
Financial derivatives and employee stock options	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Other accounts receivable [2]	26.13	16.99	9.46	– 1.20	11.19	– 8.40	0.28	– 8.28	4.25
Total	143.59	147.41	145.97	36.30	31.33	32.40	45.86	36.02	34.43
External financing									
Loans	11.57	15.65	11.30	5.72	8.74	0.50	0.37	5.93	9.39
short-term loans	– 2.13	– 1.16	– 3.27	– 0.36	0.04	– 1.43	0.83	0.50	– 1.26
long-term loans	13.70	16.81	14.57	6.08	8.70	1.94	– 0.46	5.43	10.65
Memo item									
Mortage loans	11.24	18.59	18.19	5.28	8.34	3.64	0.75	5.75	9.31
Consumer loans	5.22	– 0.99	– 0.30	1.85	1.69	– 1.19	1.46	0.13	1.33
Entrepreneurial loans	– 4.90	– 1.95	– 6.59	– 1.41	– 1.28	– 1.95	– 1.84	0.04	– 1.25
Memo item									
Loans from monetary financial institutions	9.10	15.17	12.60	5.26	8.31	2.07	– 0.99	6.10	9.60
Loans from other financial institutions	2.47	0.48	– 1.30	0.46	0.43	– 1.57	1.35	– 0.17	– 0.21
Loans from general government and rest of the world	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Financial derivatives	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Other accounts payable	1.60	1.36	– 0.34	0.06	0.02	– 0.59	0.22	– 0.02	0.27
Total	13.16	17.01	10.96	5.78	8.76	– 0.08	0.59	5.91	9.66

1 Including unlisted shares. **2** Including accumulated interest-bearing surplus shares with insurance corporations.

IX Financial accounts

4 Financial assets and liabilities of households (non-consolidated)

End-of-year level, end-of-quarter level; € billion

Item	2011	2012	2013	2013			2014		
				Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3
Financial assets									
Currency and deposits	1,772.2	1,847.6	1,914.0	1,874.8	1,884.9	1,914.0	1,926.8	1,945.9	1,963.0
Currency	104.5	104.4	115.2	111.4	115.2	115.2	120.5	124.0	128.0
Deposits	1,667.7	1,743.2	1,798.8	1,763.4	1,769.8	1,798.8	1,806.3	1,821.9	1,835.0
Transferable deposits	727.1	818.3	907.8	862.5	878.8	907.8	916.0	935.9	947.8
Time deposits	261.2	255.9	245.9	249.4	244.4	245.9	248.2	249.5	250.5
Savings deposits (including savings certifikates)	679.4	669.0	645.1	651.6	646.5	645.1	642.1	636.5	636.7
Debt securities	211.0	200.1	179.0	184.1	182.0	179.0	177.7	176.4	168.9
short-term debt securities	3.1	3.1	2.7	3.1	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.4
long-term debt securities	208.0	197.0	176.3	181.0	179.2	176.3	174.9	173.6	166.5
Memo item									
Debt securities of domestic sectors	.	.	116.9	122.3	119.8	116.9	115.1	112.9	107.1
Non-financial corporations	.	.	14.2	13.6	14.4	14.2	14.2	14.7	14.5
Financial corporations	.	.	90.7	94.7	92.5	90.7	89.4	87.4	82.6
General government	.	.	12.0	13.9	12.9	12.0	11.5	10.9	10.0
Debt securities of the rest of the world	.	.	62.0	61.8	62.2	62.0	62.7	63.4	61.8
Equity and investment fund shares	759.3	820.2	885.9	835.6	857.2	885.9	901.6	923.4	928.9
Equity	403.8	446.8	487.6	453.6	467.8	487.6	496.3	502.8	497.2
Listed Shares of domestic sectors	.	.	167.4	148.4	156.5	167.4	170.5	171.5	163.0
Non-financial corporations	.	.	140.4	124.5	131.7	140.4	143.3	144.9	136.2
Financial corporations	.	.	26.9	23.9	24.8	26.9	27.1	26.6	26.9
Quoted shares of the rest of the world	.	.	55.8	49.4	52.7	55.8	57.9	60.6	63.2
Other equity [1]	237.4	255.7	264.4	255.7	258.7	264.4	267.9	270.7	271.0
Investment fund shares	355.5	373.4	398.3	382.0	389.4	398.3	405.3	420.6	431.7
Money market fund shares	23.5	23.9	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.2	4.1	4.0
Non-MMF investment fund shares	332.0	349.5	393.8	377.7	385.1	393.8	401.0	416.5	427.7
Non-life insurance technical reserves and provision for calls under standardised guarantees	266.2	283.1	301.1	292.1	296.6	301.1	305.5	309.7	313.9
Life insurance and annuity entitlements	774.3	809.1	847.3	828.3	837.8	847.3	861.5	868.2	872.0
Pension entitlement, claims of pension funds on pension managers, entitlements to non-pension benefits	641.4	677.0	707.1	690.3	696.2	707.1	715.9	722.6	727.9
Financial derivatives and employee stock options	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other accounts receivable [2]	38.4	37.1	36.7	37.0	36.8	36.7	36.7	36.7	36.5
Total	4,462.8	4,674.2	4,871.2	4,742.2	4,791.5	4,871.2	4,925.7	4,982.9	5,011.0
Liabilities									
Loans	1,523.9	1,538.4	1,548.9	1,540.5	1,548.5	1,548.9	1,549.3	1,555.2	1,564.6
short-term loans	72.8	71.5	66.4	68.8	68.7	66.4	67.2	67.7	66.5
long-term loans	1,451.0	1,467.0	1,482.5	1,471.7	1,479.9	1,482.5	1,482.0	1,487.5	1,498.1
Memo item									
Mortage loans	1,053.4	1,072.7	1,092.2	1,080.0	1,088.4	1,092.2	1,093.0	1,098.8	1,108.7
Consumer loans	200.4	194.3	188.7	191.9	190.2	188.7	190.1	189.9	190.6
Entrepreneurial loans	270.1	271.4	268.0	268.6	270.0	268.0	266.2	266.5	265.2
Memo item									
Loans from monetary financial institutions	1,432.5	1,446.6	1,458.4	1,448.8	1,456.4	1,458.4	1,457.4	1,463.5	1,473.1
Loans from other financial institutions	91.3	91.8	90.5	91.7	92.1	90.5	91.9	91.7	91.5
Loans from general government and rest of the world	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Financial derivatives	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other accounts payable	13.1	14.9	14.9	16.1	16.2	14.9	16.1	15.9	16.6
Total	1,536.9	1,553.4	1,563.7	1,556.6	1,564.8	1,563.7	1,565.4	1,571.0	1,581.2

1 Including unlisted shares. **2** Including accumulated interest-bearing surplus shares with insurance corporations.

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1 General government: deficit and debt level as defined in the Maastricht Treaty

Period	General government	Central government	State government	Local government	Social security funds	General government	Central government	State government	Local government	Social security funds
	€ billion					as a percentage of GDP				
	Deficit/surplus[1]									
2008	– 0.5	– 14.7	– 1.5	+ 9.3	+ 6.4	– 0.0	– 0.6	– 0.1	+ 0.4	+ 0.3
2009	– 74.5	– 38.0	– 19.3	– 2.7	– 14.4	– 3.0	– 1.5	– 0.8	– 0.1	– 0.6
2010 **2**	– 104.8	– 82.2	– 20.4	– 6.2	+ 3.9	– 4.1	– 3.2	– 0.8	– 0.2	+ 0.2
2011 **p**	– 23.3	– 27.1	– 13.0	+ 1.4	+ 15.4	– 0.9	– 1.0	– 0.5	+ 0.1	+ 0.6
2012 **p**	+ 2.6	– 14.7	– 5.7	+ 4.7	+ 18.3	+ 0.1	– 0.5	– 0.2	+ 0.2	+ 0.7
2013 **p**	+ 4.2	– 4.5	– 2.8	+ 5.3	+ 6.1	+ 0.1	– 0.2	– 0.1	+ 0.2	+ 0.2
2014 **pe**	+ 18.0	+ 11.4	+ 1.9	+ 1.3	+ 3.4	+ 0.6	+ 0.4	+ 0.1	+ 0.0	+ 0.1
2013 H1 **p**	+ 7.8	– 2.3	– 0.1	+ 6.2	+ 3.9	+ 0.6	– 0.2	– 0.0	+ 0.4	+ 0.3
H2 **p**	– 3.6	– 2.2	– 2.7	– 0.9	+ 2.2	– 0.3	– 0.2	– 0.2	– 0.1	+ 0.2
2014 H1 **pe**	+ 13.2	+ 1.2	– 0.0	+ 5.4	+ 6.6	+ 0.9	+ 0.1	– 0.0	+ 0.4	+ 0.5
H2 **pe**	+ 4.9	+ 10.2	+ 1.9	– 4.1	– 3.1	+ 0.3	+ 0.7	+ 0.1	– 0.3	– 0.2
	Debt level[3]									End of year or quarter
2008	1,660.2	1,010.8	539.1	125.6	1.5	64.9	39.5	21.1	4.9	0.1
2009	1,778.5	1,079.7	581.3	132.0	1.3	72.4	43.9	23.7	5.4	0.1
2010 **p**	2,067.4	1,318.4	628.0	137.4	1.3	80.3	51.2	24.4	5.3	0.1
2011 **p**	2,095.6	1,327.4	642.8	141.8	1.3	77.6	49.2	23.8	5.3	0.0
2012 **p**	2,173.6	1,372.3	671.5	145.6	1.2	79.0	49.9	24.4	5.3	0.0
2013 **pe**	2,159.5	1,376.1	652.5	148.2	1.3	76.9	49.0	23.2	5.3	0.0
2013 Q1 **pe**	2,162.1	1,372.5	663.3	147.0	1.2	78.6	49.9	24.1	5.3	0.0
Q2 **pe**	2,162.6	1,380.3	653.1	146.7	1.1	78.1	49.8	23.6	5.3	0.0
Q3 **pe**	2,143.9	1,365.8	646.1	147.4	1.1	76.9	49.0	23.2	5.3	0.0
Q4 **pe**	2,159.5	1,376.1	652.5	148.2	1.3	76.9	49.0	23.2	5.3	0.0
2014 Q1 **pe**	2,147.4	1,373.0	642.4	147.5	1.2	75.6	48.3	22.6	5.2	0.0
Q2 **pe**	2,154.7	1,381.4	640.2	148.3	1.1	75.3	48.3	22.4	5.2	0.0
Q3 **pe**	2,155.2	1,377.4	644.2	148.7	1.1	74.8	47.8	22.4	5.2	0.0

Sources: Federal Statistical Office and Bundesbank calculations. **1** The deficit/surplus in accordance with ESA 2010 corresponds to the Maastricht definition. **2** Including the €4.4 billion proceeds received from the 2010 frequency auction. **3** Quarterly GDP ratios are based on the national output of the four preceding quarters.

2 General government: revenue, expenditure and fiscal deficit/surplus as shown in the national accounts*

Period	Revenue				Expenditure						Deficit/ surplus	*Memo item* Total tax burden [1]
		of which				*of which*						
	Total	Taxes	Social contributions	Other	Total	Social benefits	Compensation of employees	Interest	Gross capital formation	Other		
	€ billion											
2008	1,111.8	585.9	412.4	113.4	1,112.3	592.5	189.1	68.5	51.4	210.8	– 0.5	1,003.1
2009	1,090.8	554.5	415.6	120.6	1,165.3	625.2	197.8	64.8	56.2	221.2	– 74.5	974.1
2010	1,110.4	556.2	426.2	128.1	**2** 1,215.3	634.7	203.5	63.3	58.9	**2** 254.8	**2** – 104.8	986.5
2011 **p**	1,179.5	598.9	442.2	138.3	1,202.7	634.6	208.2	67.1	61.2	231.7	– 23.3	1,045.8
2012 **p**	1,217.8	624.1	454.3	139.5	1,215.2	645.6	212.7	63.2	62.1	231.7	+ 2.6	1,082.9
2013 **p**	1,249.4	642.5	465.4	141.6	1,245.3	666.8	217.6	56.3	62.8	241.8	+ 4.2	1,112.2
2014 **pe**	1,293.8	665.9	481.6	146.3	1,275.8	691.6	223.9	50.6	63.1	246.6	+ 18.0	1,152.0
	as a percentage of GDP											
2008	43.5	22.9	16.1	4.4	43.5	23.2	7.4	2.7	2.0	8.2	– 0.0	39.2
2009	44.4	22.6	16.9	4.9	47.4	25.4	8.1	2.6	2.3	9.0	– 3.0	39.7
2010	43.1	21.6	16.5	5.0	**2** 47.2	24.6	7.9	2.5	2.3	**2** 9.9	**2** – 4.1	38.3
2011 **p**	43.7	22.2	16.4	5.1	44.6	23.5	7.7	2.5	2.3	8.6	– 0.9	38.7
2012 **p**	44.3	22.7	16.5	5.1	44.2	23.5	7.7	2.3	2.3	8.4	+ 0.1	39.4
2013 **p**	44.5	22.9	16.6	5.0	44.3	23.7	7.7	2.0	2.2	8.6	+ 0.1	39.6
2014 **pe**	44.6	22.9	16.6	5.0	43.9	23.8	7.7	1.7	2.2	8.5	+ 0.6	39.7
	Percentage growth rates											
2008	+ 2.9	+ 3.3	+ 2.0	+ 3.8	+ 3.7	+ 1.8	+ 2.7	+ 2.0	+ 7.9	+ 9.8	.	+ 2.8
2009	– 1.9	– 5.4	+ 0.8	+ 6.4	+ 4.8	+ 5.5	+ 4.6	– 5.4	+ 9.3	+ 5.0	.	– 2.9
2010	+ 1.8	+ 0.3	+ 2.5	+ 6.2	+ 4.3	+ 1.5	+ 2.9	– 2.4	+ 4.8	+ 15.1	.	+ 1.3
2011 **p**	+ 6.2	+ 7.7	+ 3.8	+ 8.0	– 1.0	– 0.0	+ 2.3	+ 6.0	+ 3.8	– 9.1	.	+ 6.0
2012 **p**	+ 3.3	+ 4.2	+ 2.7	+ 0.8	+ 1.0	+ 1.7	+ 2.1	– 5.9	+ 1.6	+ 0.0	.	+ 3.5
2013 **p**	+ 2.6	+ 3.0	+ 2.4	+ 1.5	+ 2.5	+ 3.3	+ 2.3	– 10.8	+ 1.0	+ 4.3	.	+ 2.7
2014 **pe**	+ 3.6	+ 3.6	+ 3.5	+ 3.3	+ 2.5	+ 3.7	+ 2.9	– 10.2	+ 0.5	+ 2.0	.	+ 3.6

Source: Federal Statistical Office. * Figures in accordance with ESA 2010. **1** Taxes and social contributions plus customs duties. **2** Including the €4.4 billion proceeds received from the 2010 frequency auction, which are deducted from other expenditure in the national accounts.

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3 General government: budgetary development (as per government's financial statistics)

€ billion

Period	Central, state and local government [1]									Social security funds [2]			General government, total		
	Revenue			Expenditure											
		of which			*of which* [3]										
	Total [4]	Taxes	Financial transactions [5]	Total [4]	Personnel expenditure	Current grants	Interest	Fixed asset formation	Financial transactions [5]	Deficit / surplus	Revenue [6]	Expenditure	Deficit / surplus	Revenue	Expenditure	Deficit / surplus
2008	665.7	561.2	13.9	674.9	180.2	272.8	67.2	35.0	18.5	– 9.2	485.5	479.0	+ 6.5	1,055.1	1,057.7	– 2.7
2009	623.0	524.0	7.1	713.1	187.1	286.6	63.4	38.6	34.8	– 90.1	492.1	506.0	– 14.0	1,013.4	1,117.5	– 104.0
2010	634.7	530.6	7.9	713.6	190.7	308.5	57.7	39.7	11.4	– 78.9	516.5	512.9	+ 3.7	1,033.7	1,108.9	– 75.2
2011 p	689.6	573.4	22.8	711.6	194.3	301.3	56.8	38.5	13.7	– 22.0	526.3	511.3	+ 15.0	1,104.2	1,111.2	– 7.0
2012 p	744.1	600.0	14.6	765.4	217.8	285.1	69.9	41.0	25.5	– 21.3	536.1	518.8	+ 17.3	1,170.0	1,174.0	– 4.0
2013 p	761.6	619.7	14.7	771.0	224.3	286.6	66.2	42.4	23.8	– 9.4	537.4	531.7	+ 5.7	1,198.5	1,202.2	– 3.7
2012 Q1 p	174.0	142.9	2.5	192.5	51.7	75.6	28.0	6.9	3.4	– 18.5	129.1	128.5	+ 0.7	274.8	292.6	– 17.8
Q2 p	190.4	150.4	2.7	179.8	52.8	68.0	17.2	8.2	3.2	+ 10.6	132.2	128.0	+ 4.2	296.2	281.5	+ 14.7
Q3 p	178.1	147.5	4.3	182.4	53.7	66.6	17.7	10.4	3.9	– 4.3	130.2	128.9	+ 1.3	282.5	285.6	– 3.0
Q4 p	199.1	159.4	4.9	209.3	58.7	73.4	6.8	14.2	14.8	– 10.2	143.4	133.3	+ 10.1	313.3	313.4	– 0.1
2013 Q1 p	177.8	148.6	2.6	187.2	53.5	74.8	22.5	5.9	2.9	– 9.3	128.5	132.3	– 3.8	281.2	294.3	– 13.1
Q2 p	193.5	155.3	4.8	184.2	54.4	68.6	14.2	8.4	8.0	+ 9.3	133.1	132.6	+ 0.5	301.7	291.9	+ 9.9
Q3 p	183.4	151.8	2.4	191.4	54.9	70.8	20.1	11.4	3.2	– 8.1	131.6	132.6	– 1.0	290.0	299.1	– 9.1
Q4 p	204.4	164.2	4.6	206.4	60.5	70.9	9.9	15.4	8.3	– 2.0	142.7	134.2	+ 8.5	321.6	315.1	+ 6.5
2014 Q1 p	186.8	153.6	2.0	192.3	56.0	77.7	20.1	7.6	2.3	– 5.5	132.8	136.1	– 3.3	294.6	303.4	– 8.8
Q2 p	191.9	157.4	2.2	186.3	56.2	71.8	9.8	9.5	8.2	+ 5.6	136.4	135.8	+ 0.6	303.3	297.1	+ 6.2

Source: Bundesbank calculations based on Federal Statistical Office data. **1** Annual figures based on the calculations of the Federal Statistical Office. Bundesbank supplementary estimations for the reporting years after 2011 that are not yet available. The quarterly figures do not contain the special purpose associations included in the annual calculations, but they do not contain numerous other off-budget entities which are assigned to the general government sector as defined in the national accounts. From 2012, also including the bad bank FMSW. **2** Furthermore, the annual figures do not tally with the sum of the quarterly figures, as the latter are all provisional. The quarterly figures for some insurance sectors are estimated. **3** The development of the types of expenditure recorded here is influenced in part by statistical changeovers. **4** Including discrepancies in clearing transactions between central, state and local government. **5** On the revenue side, this contains proceeds booked as disposals of equity interests and as loan repayments. On the expenditure side, this contains the acquisition of equity interests and loans granted. **6** Including central government liquidity assistance to the Federal Employment Agency.

4 Central, state and local government: budgetary development (as per government's financial statistics)

€ billion

Period	Central government			State government [2,3]			Local government [3]		
	Revenue [1]	Expenditure	Deficit / surplus	Revenue	Expenditure	Deficit / surplus	Revenue	Expenditure	Deficit / surplus
2008	292.8	304.6	– 11.8	276.2	275.7	+ 0.5	176.4	168.0	+ 8.4
2009	282.6	317.1	– 34.5	260.1	287.1	– 26.9	170.8	178.3	– 7.5
2010	288.7	333.1	– 44.4	266.8	287.3	– 20.5	175.4	182.3	– 6.9
2011 p	307.1	324.9	– 17.7	286.5	295.9	– 9.4	183.9	184.9	– 1.0
2012 p	312.5	335.3	– 22.8	311.0	316.1	– 5.1	200.0	198.5	+ 1.5
2013 p	313.2	335.6	– 22.4	324.3	324.2	+ 0.1	207.6	206.3	+ 1.3
2012 Q1 p	65.4	83.1	– 17.7	74.6	76.2	– 1.7	39.6	44.6	– 4.9
Q2 p	78.0	72.2	+ 5.8	75.8	74.4	+ 1.4	48.8	47.0	+ 1.8
Q3 p	77.1	85.1	– 8.0	77.5	78.7	– 1.2	50.7	48.9	+ 1.8
Q4 p	91.9	94.8	– 2.9	82.1	86.4	– 4.3	58.9	56.5	+ 2.4
2013 Q1 p	66.9	79.9	– 13.0	77.4	77.9	– 0.5	42.1	46.4	– 4.3
Q2 p	78.7	77.8	+ 0.9	81.5	78.1	+ 3.3	51.7	48.4	+ 3.4
Q3 p	77.4	85.2	– 7.8	78.7	78.9	– 0.2	51.5	52.1	– 0.5
Q4 p	90.2	92.7	– 2.5	85.8	88.6	– 2.9	60.3	57.9	+ 2.4
2014 Q1 p	69.8	80.5	– 10.7	80.3	81.0	– 0.7	45.1	49.9	– 4.8
Q2 p	77.7	76.7	+ 1.0	82.3	80.4	+ 1.9	54.9	52.2	+ 2.7
Q3 p	82.5	85.3	– 2.8	82.7	80.4	+ 2.3	53.9	54.5	– 0.6

Source: Bundesbank calculations based on Federal Statistical Office data. **1** Any amounts of the Bundesbank's profit distribution exceeding the reference value that were used to repay parts of the debt of central government's special funds are not included here. **2** Including the local authority level of the city-states Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg. **3** For state government from 2011, for local government from 2012: quarterly data of core budgets and off-budget entities which are assigned to the general government sector, up to and including 2013: excluding special purpose associations. Annual figures up to and including 2011: excluding off-budget entities, but including special accounts and special purpose associations based on the calculations of the Federal Statistical Office. For the following years, Bundesbank supplementary estimations.

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5 Central, state and local government: tax revenue

€ million

Period	Total	Central and state government and European Union				Local government [3]	Balance of untransferred tax shares [4]	*Memo item* Amounts deducted in the federal budget [5]
		Total	Central government [1]	State government [1]	European Union [2]			
2008	561,182	484,182	260,690	200,411	23,081	77,190	– 190	21,510
2009	524,000	455,615	252,842	182,273	20,501	68,419	– 34	24,846
2010	530,587	460,230	254,537	181,326	24,367	70,385	– 28	28,726
2011	573,352	496,738	276,598	195,676	24,464	76,570	+ 43	28,615
2012	600,046	518,963	284,801	207,846	26,316	81,184	– 101	28,498
2013	619,708	535,173	287,641	216,430	31,101	84,274	+ 262	27,775
2014	...	556,008	298,518	226,504	30,986	...	...	27,772
2013 Q1	148,936	126,532	63,351	52,078	11,103	15,051	+ 7,353	6,494
Q2	155,507	133,820	72,708	54,570	6,542	21,934	– 246	6,914
Q3	151,383	130,589	71,238	52,601	6,750	20,948	– 155	7,554
Q4	163,882	144,230	80,343	57,181	6,706	26,341	– 6,690	6,813
2014 Q1	153,971	130,986	64,962	54,529	11,495	15,287	+ 7,698	6,638
Q2	158,118	135,358	72,082	56,178	7,098	23,160	– 400	6,803
Q3	156,886	135,698	75,711	55,194	4,794	21,380	– 192	7,577
Q4	...	153,966	85,763	60,603	7,599	...	...	6,754
2014 Jan	.	38,677	18,984	16,881	2,811	.	.	2,213
2015 Jan	.	40,311	20,274	17,461	2,576	.	.	2,148

Sources: Federal Ministry of Finance, Federal Statistical Office and Bundesbank calculations. **1** Before deducting or adding supplementary central government grants, shares in energy tax revenue, compensation for the transfer of motor vehicle tax to central government and consolidation aid, which central government remits to state government. See the last column for the volume of these amounts which are deducted from tax revenue in the federal budget. **2** Custom duties and shares in VAT and gross national income accruing to the EU from central government tax revenue. **3** Including local government taxes in the city-states Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg. Including revenue from offshore wind farms. **4** Difference between local government's share in the joint taxes received by the state government cash offices in the period in question (see Table X. 6) and the amounts passed on to local government in the same period. **5** Volume of the positions mentioned under footnote 1.

6 Central and state government and European Union: tax revenue, by type

€ million

Period	Total [1]	Joint taxes									Central government taxes [7]	State government taxes [7]	EU customs duties	*Memo item* Local government share in joint taxes
		Income taxes [2]					Turnover taxes [5]			Local business tax transfers [6]				
		Total	Wage tax [3]	Assessed income tax	Corporation tax	Investment income tax [4]	Total	Turnover tax	Turnover tax on imports					
2008	515,498	220,483	141,895	32,685	15,868	30,035	175,989	130,789	45,200	6,784	86,302	21,937	4,002	31,316
2009	484,880	193,684	135,165	26,430	7,173	24,916	176,991	141,907	35,084	4,908	89,318	16,375	3,604	29,265
2010	488,731	192,816	127,904	31,179	12,041	21,691	180,042	136,459	43,582	5,925	93,426	12,146	4,378	28,501
2011	527,255	213,534	139,749	31,996	15,634	26,155	190,033	138,957	51,076	6,888	99,133	13,095	4,571	30,517
2012	551,785	231,555	149,065	37,262	16,934	28,294	194,635	142,439	52,196	7,137	99,794	14,201	4,462	32,822
2013	570,213	245,909	158,198	42,280	19,508	25,923	196,843	148,315	48,528	7,053	100,454	15,723	4,231	35,040
2014	593,039	258,875	167,983	45,613	20,044	25,236	203,110	154,228	48,883	7,142	101,804	17,556	4,552	37,031
2013 Q1	135,026	59,835	36,468	10,750	6,014	6,603	49,167	37,466	11,701	125	20,971	3,889	1,039	8,493
Q2	142,450	64,448	38,827	11,084	5,427	9,110	47,136	35,052	12,083	1,799	24,355	3,762	950	8,630
Q3	138,958	56,791	38,008	9,815	3,309	5,659	50,033	37,661	12,372	1,875	25,011	4,111	1,137	8,369
Q4	153,779	64,834	44,896	10,631	4,757	4,551	50,507	38,136	12,372	3,254	30,116	3,961	1,106	9,548
2014 Q1	140,035	62,941	39,035	11,808	5,610	6,487	50,533	38,904	11,629	134	20,893	4,481	1,053	9,049
Q2	144,418	65,233	40,767	11,963	5,068	7,435	49,166	37,194	11,972	1,785	22,874	4,318	1,042	9,059
Q3	144,482	60,838	40,538	10,022	4,314	5,965	51,148	38,733	12,415	1,911	24,945	4,395	1,244	8,783
Q4	164,104	69,863	47,642	11,820	5,052	5,349	52,264	39,397	12,867	3,312	33,091	4,361	1,214	10,139
2014 Jan	41,518	19,211	14,161	860	563	3,627	15,989	12,463	3,526	– 33	4,605	1,453	293	2,842
2015 Jan	43,223	19,272	14,995	868	385	3,024	16,280	12,683	3,597	– 0	5,466	1,855	350	2,911

Source: Federal Ministry of Finance and Bundesbank calculations. **1** This total, unlike that in Table X. 5, does not include the receipts from the equalisation of burdens levies, local business tax (less local business tax transfers to central and state government), real property taxes and other local government taxes, or the balance of untransferred tax shares. **2** Respective percentage share of central, state and local government in revenue: wage tax and assessed income tax 42.5:42.5:15, corporation tax and non-assessed taxes on earnings 50:50:-, final withholding tax on interest income and capital gains, non-assessed taxes on earnings 44:44:12. **3** After deducting child benefit and subsidies for supplementary private pension plans. **4** Final withholding tax on interest income and capital gains, non-assessed taxes on earnings. **5** The allocation of revenue to central, state and local government, which is adjusted at more regular intervals, is regulated in section 1 of the Revenue Adjustment Act. Respective percentage share of central, state and local government in revenue for 2014: 53.5:44.5:2.0. The EU share is deducted from central government's share. **6** Respective percentage share of central and state government for 2014: 22.4:77.6. **7** For the breakdown, see Table X. 7.

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7 Central, state and local government: individual taxes

€ million

Period	Central government taxes [1]								State government taxes [1]				Local government taxes		
														of which	
	Energy tax	Tobacco tax	Solidarity surcharge	Insurance tax	Motor vehicle tax [2]	Electricity tax	Spirits tax	Other	Motor vehicle tax [2]	Tax on the acquisition of land and buildings	Inheritance tax	Other [3]	Total	Local business tax [4]	Real property taxes
2008	39,248	13,574	13,146	10,478	.	6,261	2,126	1,470	8,842	5,728	4,771	2,596	52,468	41,037	10,807
2009	39,822	13,366	11,927	10,548	3,803	6,278	2,101	1,473	4,398	4,857	4,550	2,571	44,028	32,421	10,936
2010	39,838	13,492	11,713	10,284	8,488	6,171	1,990	1,449	.	5,290	4,404	2,452	47,780	35,712	11,315
2011	40,036	14,414	12,781	10,755	8,422	7,247	2,149	3,329	.	6,366	4,246	2,484	52,984	40,424	11,674
2012	39,305	14,143	13,624	11,138	8,443	6,973	2,121	4,047	.	7,389	4,305	2,508	55,398	42,345	12,017
2013	39,364	13,820	14,378	11,553	8,490	7,009	2,102	3,737	.	8,394	4,633	2,696	56,549	43,027	12,377
2014	39,758	14,612	15,047	12,046	8,501	6,638	2,060	3,143	.	9,339	5,452	2,764	...	...	...
2013 Q1	4,672	2,141	3,473	5,429	2,304	1,797	580	575	.	2,144	1,007	738	14,035	10,912	2,803
Q2	9,472	3,504	3,843	2,050	2,284	2,009	471	721	.	1,942	1,137	683	14,858	11,377	3,205
Q3	10,101	3,858	3,314	2,255	2,053	1,602	507	1,320	.	2,203	1,261	647	14,299	10,339	3,659
Q4	15,119	4,316	3,748	1,818	1,849	1,600	545	1,121	.	2,106	1,227	628	13,357	10,400	2,710
2014 Q1	4,675	2,477	3,577	5,642	1,861	1,550	556	555	.	2,385	1,314	782	14,070	10,829	2,880
Q2	9,868	3,708	3,955	2,096	2,517	1,718	470	– 1,458	.	2,149	1,501	668	15,485	11,684	3,495
Q3	10,029	3,735	3,498	2,423	2,265	1,716	499	779	.	2,387	1,331	677	14,316	10,458	3,529
Q4	15,185	4,691	4,016	1,886	1,859	1,653	535	3,266	.	2,418	1,306	638	...	...	...
2014 Jan	338	793	1,064	601	903	518	197	191	.	757	453	242	.	.	.
2015 Jan	246	513	1,079	1,218	1,057	621	189	542	.	875	751	229	.	.	.

Sources: Federal Ministry of Finance, Federal Statistical Office and Bundesbank calculations. **1** For the sum total, see Table X. 6. **2** As of 1 July 2009, motor vehicle tax revenue is attributable to central government. Postings to state government shown thereafter relate to the booking of cash flows. **3** Notably betting, lottery and beer tax. **4** Including revenue from offshore wind farms.

8 German pension insurance scheme: budgetary development and assets*

€ million

Period	Revenue [1,2]			Expenditure [1,2]			Deficit/ surplus	Assets [1,5]					*Memo item* Administrative assets
		of which			*of which*								
	Total	Contributions [3]	Payments from central government	Total	Pension payments	Pensioners' health insurance [4]		Total	Deposits [6]	Securities	Equity interests, mortgages and other loans [7]	Real estate	
2008	242,770	167,611	73,381	238,995	204,071	14,051	+ 3,775	16,531	16,313	36	56	126	4,645
2009	244,689	169,183	74,313	244,478	208,475	14,431	+ 211	16,821	16,614	23	64	120	4,525
2010	250,133	172,767	76,173	248,076	211,852	14,343	+ 2,057	19,375	18,077	1,120	73	105	4,464
2011	254,968	177,424	76,200	250,241	212,602	15,015	+ 4,727	24,965	22,241	2,519	88	117	4,379
2012	259,700	181,262	77,193	254,604	216,450	15,283	+ 5,096	30,481	28,519	1,756	104	102	4,315
2013	260,166	181,991	77,067	258,268	219,560	15,528	+ 1,898	33,114	29,193	3,701	119	100	4,250
2014 p	269,050	189,069	78,947	265,661	226,485	15,971	+ 3,389	36,442	32,901	3,317	129	94	4,275
2012 Q1	62,038	42,411	19,318	62,883	53,747	3,779	– 845	24,261	21,839	2,219	88	116	4,366
Q2	64,721	45,318	19,086	62,885	53,532	3,772	+ 1,836	26,026	23,950	1,869	92	115	4,356
Q3	63,669	44,188	19,193	64,275	54,788	3,866	– 606	25,968	23,265	2,509	94	100	4,328
Q4	68,656	49,337	19,059	64,262	54,683	3,858	+ 4,394	30,935	28,483	2,256	95	101	4,336
2013 Q1	62,211	42,779	19,173	64,193	54,940	3,871	– 1,982	28,616	26,044	2,356	106	110	4,292
Q2	64,751	45,399	19,090	64,188	54,660	3,858	+ 563	29,380	26,938	2,221	111	110	4,294
Q3	63,610	44,194	19,154	64,775	55,169	3,898	– 1,165	28,647	25,262	3,161	113	110	4,291
Q4	69,503	49,609	19,626	64,855	55,108	3,894	+ 4,648	33,667	29,201	4,251	114	101	4,290
2014 Q1	64,138	44,355	19,534	64,615	55,266	3,897	– 477	32,669	28,668	3,781	121	99	4,251
Q2	66,857	47,145	19,453	64,697	55,085	3,891	+ 2,160	35,181	31,167	3,791	126	97	4,260
Q3	66,129	45,992	19,865	66,801	56,909	3,991	– 672	33,678	30,264	3,191	129	94	4,256
Q4	71,927	51,577	20,096	69,548	59,225	4,192	+ 2,379	36,442	32,901	3,317	129	94	4,275

Sources: Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and German pension insurance scheme. * Excluding the German pension insurance scheme for the mining, railway and maritime industries. **1** The final annual figures do not tally with the quarterly figures, as the latter are all provisional. **2** Including financial compensation payments. Excluding investment spending and proceeds. **3** Including contributions for recipients of government cash benefits. **4** Including long-term care insurance for pensioners until 2004 Q1. **5** Largely corresponds to the sustainability reserves. End of year or quarter. **6** Including cash. **7** Excluding loans to other social security funds.

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9 Federal Employment Agency: budgetary development*

€ million

Period	Revenue				Expenditure							Deficit/ surplus	Deficit offsetting grant or loan from central government
	Total 1	of which			Total	of which							
		Contributions	Insolvency compensation levy	Central government subscriptions		Unemployment benefit 2	Short-time working benefits 3	Job promotion 4	Re-integration payment 5	Insolvency benefit payment	Administrative expenditure 6		
2008	38,289	26,452	673	7,583	39,407	13,864	544	8,586	5,000	654	4,495	– 1,118	–
2009	34,254	22,046	711	7,777	48,057	17,291	5,322	9,849	4,866	1,617	5,398	– 13,804	–
2010	37,070	22,614	2,929	7,927	45,213	16,602	4,125	9,297	5,256	740	5,322	– 8,143	5,207
2011	37,563	25,433	37	8,046	37,524	13,776	1,324	8,369	4,510	683	5,090	+ 40	–
2012	37,429	26,570	314	7,238	34,842	13,823	828	6,699	3,822	982	5,117	+ 2,587	–
2013	32,636	27,594	1,224	245	32,574	15,411	1,082	6,040	.	912	5,349	+ 61	–
2014	33,725	28,714	1,296	–	32,147	15,368	710	6,264	.	694	5,493	+ 1,578	–
2012 Q1	9,709	6,175	69	2,693	8,452	3,773	449	1,924	– 0	211	1,185	+ 1,257	–
Q2	8,331	6,620	78	872	7,816	3,457	229	1,762	0	329	1,191	+ 515	–
Q3	7,501	6,508	80	70	7,539	3,307	82	1,462	368	218	1,249	– 37	–
Q4	11,888	7,267	86	3,603	11,035	3,286	68	1,551	3,454	223	1,493	+ 853	–
2013 Q1	7,762	6,429	276	245	8,612	4,301	494	1,493	.	194	1,193	– 850	–
Q2	8,041	6,870	310	–	8,230	3,969	384	1,498	.	204	1,266	– 189	–
Q3	7,898	6,708	303	–	7,580	3,644	109	1,420	.	228	1,284	+ 318	–
Q4	8,935	7,587	335	–	8,153	3,497	96	1,630	.	287	1,606	+ 782	–
2014 Q1	7,844	6,696	299	–	8,693	4,379	311	1,605	.	199	1,239	– 849	–
Q2	8,352	7,143	331	–	8,036	3,902	197	1,593	.	211	1,259	+ 316	–
Q3	8,249	6,991	318	–	7,551	3,641	123	1,458	.	163	1,313	+ 698	–
Q4	9,280	7,884	347	–	7,868	3,446	79	1,609	.	122	1,682	+ 1,412	–

Source: Federal Employment Agency. * Excluding pension fund. **1** Excluding central government deficit offsetting grant or loan. **2** Unemployment benefit in case of unemployment. **3** Including seasonal short-time working benefits and restructuring short-time working benefits, restructuring measures and refunds of social security contributions. **4** Vocational training, measures to encourage job take-up, rehabilitation, compensation top-up payments and promotion of business start-ups. **5** Until 2012. From 2005 to 2007: compensatory amount. **6** Including collection charges to other statutory social security funds, excluding administrative expenditure within the framework of the basic allowance for job seekers.

10 Statutory health insurance scheme: budgetary development

€ million

Period	Revenue 1			Expenditure 1								Deficit/ surplus
	Total	of which		Total	of which							
		Contributions 2	Central government funds 3		Hospital treatment	Pharmaceuticals	Medical treatment	Dental treatment 4	Therapeutical treatment and aids	Sickness benefits	Administrative expenditure 5	
2008	162,516	155,883	2,500	161,334	52,623	29,145	25,887	10,926	9,095	6,583	8,680	+ 1,182
2009	169,837	158,662	7,200	170,825	55,977	30,696	27,635	11,219	9,578	7,258	8,949	– 988
2010 6	179,529	160,797	15,700	175,804	56,697	30,147	28,432	11,419	10,609	7,797	9,554	+ 3,725
2011	189,049	170,875	15,300	179,599	58,501	28,939	29,056	11,651	11,193	8,529	9,488	+ 9,450
2012	193,314	176,388	14,000	184,289	60,157	29,156	29,682	11,749	11,477	9,171	9,711	+ 9,025
2013	196,405	182,179	11,500	194,537	62,886	30,052	32,799	12,619	12,087	9,758	9,979	+ 1,867
2014 p	203,050	189,100	10,500	205,374	65,662	33,094	34,217	13,065	13,068	10,617	10,015	– 2,325
2012 Q1	46,433	42,249	3,500	45,971	15,579	7,424	7,502	2,971	2,664	2,336	2,195	+ 462
Q2	47,942	43,739	3,500	46,178	15,115	7,419	7,515	3,015	2,874	2,281	2,244	+ 1,764
Q3	47,653	43,648	3,499	45,842	15,049	7,221	7,342	2,843	2,872	2,220	2,283	+ 1,811
Q4	51,162	46,727	3,501	46,576	14,548	7,305	7,465	2,989	3,065	2,333	2,936	+ 4,586
2013 Q1	47,115	43,645	2,875	48,030	15,955	7,445	8,258	3,139	2,786	2,518	2,256	– 915
Q2	48,604	45,199	2,875	48,577	15,815	7,486	8,227	3,142	3,007	2,465	2,336	+ 26
Q3	48,337	44,917	2,875	48,435	15,839	7,456	8,149	3,070	3,043	2,356	2,378	– 98
Q4	52,127	48,392	2,875	49,451	15,295	7,759	8,200	3,218	3,264	2,409	2,958	+ 2,676
2014 Q1	49,164	45,113	3,500	50,990	16,868	8,097	8,582	3,262	3,029	2,693	2,313	– 1,827
Q2	49,290	46,757	1,769	51,332	16,463	8,234	8,600	3,304	3,282	2,651	2,404	– 2,042
Q3	49,992	46,637	2,634	51,035	16,335	8,266	8,392	3,152	3,313	2,607	2,391	– 1,043
Q4	54,604	50,593	2,597	52,017	15,997	8,496	8,642	3,347	3,444	2,665	2,907	+ 2,588

Source: Federal Ministry of Health. **1** The final annual figures do not tally with the sum of the quarterly figures, as the latter are all provisional. Excluding revenue and expenditure as part of the risk structure compensation scheme. **2** Including contributions from subsidised low-paid part-time employment. **3** Federal grant and liquidity assistance. **4** Including dentures. **5** Net, ie after deducting reimbursements for expenses for levying contributions incurred by other social insurance funds. Including administrative expenditure on disease management programmes. **6** Data on individual expenditure categories for 2010 only partly comparable with prior-year figures owing to a change in the statistical definition.

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11 Statutory long-term care insurance scheme: budgetary development

€ million

Period	Revenue [1]		Expenditure [1]						Deficit/ surplus	
				of which						
	Total	*of which* Contributions [2]	Total	Non-cash care benefits	In-patient care	Nursing benefit	Contributions to pension insurance scheme [3]	Administrative expenditure		
2008	19,785	19,608	19,163	2,605	9,054	4,225	868	941	+	622
2009	21,300	21,137	20,314	2,742	9,274	4,443	878	984	+	986
2010	21,864	21,659	21,539	2,933	9,567	4,673	869	1,028	+	325
2011	22,294	22,145	21,962	3,002	9,700	4,735	881	1,034	+	331
2012	23,082	22,953	22,988	3,135	9,961	5,073	881	1,083	+	95
2013	24,972	24,891	24,405	3,389	10,058	5,674	896	1,155	+	567
2014 **p**	25,910	25,831	25,455	3,558	10,264	5,938	939	1,212	+	456
2012 Q1	5,493	5,450	5,700	774	2,469	1,248	223	283	–	207
Q2	5,713	5,686	5,656	758	2,478	1,254	217	276	+	57
Q3	5,726	5,694	5,774	783	2,507	1,269	219	262	–	49
Q4	6,113	6,087	5,811	791	2,511	1,310	225	265	+	302
2013 Q1	5,907	5,871	5,916	805	2,489	1,359	212	294	–	9
Q2	6,229	6,207	6,037	827	2,498	1,436	217	289	+	192
Q3	6,183	6,166	6,205	868	2,534	1,441	223	290	–	21
Q4	6,635	6,619	6,171	865	2,537	1,451	221	278	+	464
2014 Q1	6,168	6,141	6,290	871	2,542	1,463	229	315	–	123
Q2	6,404	6,386	6,260	848	2,554	1,466	236	309	+	144
Q3	6,405	6,386	6,442	932	2,577	1,481	237	299	–	37
Q4	6,933	6,918	6,462	907	2,590	1,529	238	288	+	471

Source: Federal Ministry of Health. **1** The final annual figures do not tally with the sum of the quarterly figures, as the latter are all provisional. **2** Since 2005 including special contributions for childless persons (0.25% of income subject to insurance contributions). **3** For non-professional carers.

12 Central government: borrowing in the market

€ million

Period	Total new borrowing [1]		*of which* Change in money market loans	*of which* Change in money market deposits
	Gross [2]	Net		
2008	+ 233,356	+ 26,208	+ 6,888	+ 9,036
2009	+ 312,729	+ 66,821	– 8,184	+ 106
2010	+ 302,694	+ 42,397	– 5,041	+ 1,607
2011	+ 264,572	+ 5,890	– 4,876	– 9,036
2012	+ 263,334	+ 31,728	+ 6,183	+ 13,375
2013	+ 246,781	+ 19,473	+ 7,292	– 4,601
2014	+ 192,540	– 2,378	– 3,190	+ 891
2012 Q1	+ 72,603	+ 12,524	+ 8,251	– 2,380
Q2	+ 68,851	+ 13,623	+ 2,836	+ 19,969
Q3	+ 60,504	– 8,627	– 8,281	– 14,911
Q4	+ 61,376	+ 14,208	+ 3,376	+ 10,697
2013 Q1	+ 62,030	+ 9,538	+ 1,303	– 11,879
Q2	+ 73,126	+ 8,483	+ 11,024	+ 9,979
Q3	+ 48,764	– 11,984	– 13,555	– 18,090
Q4	+ 62,862	+ 13,436	+ 8,521	+ 15,389
2014 Q1	+ 43,862	– 3,551	– 9,267	– 9,556
Q2	+ 58,444	+ 9,500	+ 6,281	+ 10,589
Q3	+ 47,215	– 8,035	– 2,111	– 10,817
Q4	+ 43,018	– 292	+ 1,907	+ 10,675

Source: Federal Republic of Germany – Finance Agency. **1** Including the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund, the Investment and Repayment Fund and the Restructuring Fund for Credit Institutions. **2** After deducting repurchases.

13 Central, state and local government: debt by creditor*

€ million

Period (End of year or quarter)	Total	Banking system		Domestic non-banks		Foreign creditors **pe**
		Bundesbank	Credit institutions **pe**	Social security funds	Other [1]	
2008	1,564,590	4,440	435,600	62	314,588	809,900
2009	1,657,842	4,440	438,700	59	317,743	896,900
2010	1,732,531	4,440	399,900	21	382,670	945,500
2011	1,752,476	4,440	356,600	102	408,934	982,400
2012	1,790,284	4,440	425,700	70	284,374	1,075,700
2013 **p**	1,816,536	4,440	439,600	46	262,550	1,109,900
2012 Q1	1,765,630	4,440	398,100	91	347,999	1,015,000
Q2	1,779,703	4,440	409,900	92	317,771	1,047,500
Q3	1,771,856	4,440	429,400	92	277,624	1,060,300
Q4	1,790,284	4,440	425,700	70	284,374	1,075,700
2013 Q1 **p**	1,801,947	4,440	430,200	20	259,087	1,108,200
Q2 **p**	1,806,017	4,440	424,900	23	283,254	1,093,400
Q3 **p**	1,794,367	4,440	423,700	28	270,699	1,095,500
Q4 **p**	1,816,536	4,440	439,600	46	262,550	1,109,900
2014 Q1 **p**	1,809,142	4,440	437,500	21	235,781	1,131,400
Q2 **p**	1,821,390	4,440	439,300	16	249,334	1,128,300
Q3 **p**	1,817,786	4,440	443,200	16	267,430	1,102,700

Source: Bundesbank calculations based on data from the Federal Statistical Office. * Excluding direct intergovernmental borrowing. **1** Calculated as a residual.

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14 Central, state and local government: debt by category*

€ million

Period (End of year or quarter)	Total	Treasury discount paper (Bubills) 1	Treasury notes 2,3	Five-year Federal notes (Bobls) 2	Federal savings notes	Federal bonds (Bunds) 2	Day-bond	Direct lending by credit institutions 4	Loans from non-banks		Old debt	
									Social security funds	Other 4	Equalisation claims 5	Other 5,6
Central, state and local government												
2008	1,564,590	44,620	337,511	172,037	9,649	584,144	3,174	325,648	62	83,229	4,443	73
2009	1,657,842	105,970	361,727	174,219	9,471	594,999	2,495	300,927	59	103,462	4,442	71
2010	1,732,531	87,042	391,851	195,534	8,704	628,957	1,975	302,396	21	111,609	4,440	2
2011	1,752,476	60,272	414,250	214,211	8,208	644,894	2,154	292,179	102	111,765	4,440	2
2012 Q2	1,779,703	55,392	410,186	224,607	7,518	663,695	2,137	295,204	92	116,431	4,440	2
Q3	1,771,856	53,325	409,957	237,746	7,110	654,513	1,893	286,106	92	116,673	4,440	2
Q4	1,790,284	57,172	417,469	234,355	6,818	667,198	1,725	287,836	70	113,198	4,440	2
2013 Q1 p	1,801,947	56,911	416,586	248,589	6,354	666,922	1,580	289,193	20	111,350	4,440	2
Q2 p	1,806,017	57,919	415,548	234,612	5,890	679,494	1,516	295,105	23	111,469	4,440	2
Q3 p	1,794,367	54,808	417,120	247,942	4,970	672,215	1,464	279,657	28	111,721	4,440	2
Q4 p	1,816,536	50,128	423,441	245,372	4,488	684,951	1,397	291,948	46	110,323	4,440	2
2014 Q1 p	1,809,142	41,870	417,260	259,344	4,130	688,047	1,314	282,238	21	110,476	4,440	2
Q2 p	1,821,390	39,049	419,662	253,524	3,773	703,513	1,262	285,290	16	110,859	4,440	2
Q3 p	1,817,786	34,149	427,125	265,789	3,068	691,607	1,219	280,225	16	110,147	4,440	2
Central government 7,8,9,10												
2008	966,197	40,795	105,684	172,037	9,649	583,930	3,174	35,291	–	11,122	4,443	72
2009	1,033,017	104,409	113,637	174,219	9,471	594,780	2,495	18,347	–	11,148	4,442	70
2010	1,075,415	85,867	126,220	195,534	8,704	628,582	1,975	13,349	–	10,743	4,440	2
2011	1,081,304	58,297	130,648	214,211	8,208	644,513	2,154	9,382	–	9,450	4,440	2
2012 Q2	1,107,451	52,578	122,937	224,607	7,518	663,314	2,137	20,827	–	9,092	4,440	2
Q3	1,098,824	51,638	120,240	237,746	7,110	654,132	1,893	12,646	–	8,979	4,440	2
Q4	1,113,032	56,222	117,719	234,355	6,818	666,775	1,725	16,193	–	8,784	4,440	2
2013 Q1	1,122,570	54,962	113,866	248,589	6,354	666,499	1,580	17,469	–	8,811	4,440	2
Q2	1,131,053	56,494	111,826	234,612	5,890	678,971	1,516	28,735	–	8,568	4,440	2
Q3	1,119,069	54,539	110,074	247,942	4,970	671,692	1,464	15,246	–	8,702	4,440	2
Q4	1,132,505	50,004	110,029	245,372	4,488	684,305	1,397	23,817	–	8,652	4,440	2
2014 Q1	1,128,954	41,608	107,914	259,344	4,130	687,001	1,314	14,551	–	8,651	4,440	2
Q2	1,138,455	37,951	105,639	253,524	3,773	702,467	1,262	20,781	–	8,616	4,440	2
Q3	1,130,420	33,293	104,763	265,789	3,068	690,561	1,219	18,745	–	8,541	4,440	2
Q4	1,130,128	27,951	103,445	259,186	2,375	702,515	1,187	20,509	–	8,518	4,440	2
State government												
2008	483,875	3,825	231,827	.	.	.	.	179,978	3	68,241	.	1
2009	505,359	1,561	248,091	.	.	.	.	167,310	8	88,389	.	1
2010	528,619	1,176	265,631	.	.	.	.	167,353	1	94,459	.	1
2011	537,491	1,975	283,601	.	.	.	.	154,465	62	97,387	.	1
2012 Q2	536,354	2,814	287,249	.	.	.	.	143,830	52	102,409	.	1
Q3	537,827	1,687	289,717	.	.	.	.	143,606	52	102,764	.	1
Q4	540,822	950	299,750	.	.	.	.	138,684	52	101,386	.	1
2013 Q1 p	541,400	1,949	302,720	.	.	.	.	137,220	2	99,510	.	1
Q2 p	538,458	1,425	303,722	.	.	.	.	133,435	5	99,871	.	1
Q3 p	538,070	270	307,046	.	.	.	.	130,755	10	99,989	.	1
Q4 p	546,334	125	313,412	.	.	.	.	134,418	35	98,343	.	1
2014 Q1 p	540,545	261	309,346	.	.	.	.	132,432	10	98,495	.	1
Q2 p	542,959	1,098	314,024	.	.	.	.	128,920	5	98,913	.	1
Q3 p	546,951	856	322,362	.	.	.	.	125,452	5	98,276	.	1
Local government 11												
2008	114,518	.	–	.	.	214	.	110,379	60	3,866	.	.
2009	119,466	.	–	.	.	219	.	115,270	52	3,925	.	.
2010	128,497	.	–	.	.	375	.	121,695	20	6,407	.	.
2011	133,681	.	–	.	.	381	.	128,331	40	4,929	.	.
2012 Q2	135,898	.	–	.	.	381	.	130,547	40	4,930	.	.
Q3	135,205	.	–	.	.	381	.	129,854	40	4,930	.	.
Q4	136,430	.	–	.	.	423	.	132,960	18	3,029	.	.
2013 Q1 p	137,976	.	–	.	.	423	.	134,505	18	3,030	.	.
Q2 p	136,506	.	–	.	.	523	.	132,935	18	3,030	.	.
Q3 p	137,227	.	–	.	.	523	.	133,656	18	3,030	.	.
Q4 p	137,697	.	–	.	.	646	.	133,712	11	3,328	.	.
2014 Q1 p	139,643	.	–	.	.	1,046	.	135,256	11	3,330	.	.
Q2 p	139,977	.	–	.	.	1,046	.	135,590	11	3,330	.	.
Q3 p	140,414	.	–	.	.	1,046	.	136,027	11	3,330	.	.

Source: Bundesbank calculations based on data from the Federal Statistical Office. * Excluding direct intergovernmental borrowing. **1** Including Treasury financing paper. **2** Excluding issuers' holdings of their own securities. **3** Treasury notes issued by state government include long-term notes. **4** Mainly loans against borrowers' notes and cash advances. Including loans raised abroad. Other loans from non-banks, including loans from public supplementary pension funds and liabilities arising from the investment assistance levy. **5** Excluding offsets against outstanding claims. **6** Old debt mainly denominated in foreign currency, in accordance with the London Debts Agreement, old liabilities arising from housing construction and liabilities arising from housing construction by the former GDR's armed forces and from housing construction in connection with the return of the troops of the former USSR stationed in eastern Germany to their home country; excluding debt securities in own portfolios. **7** In contrast to the capital market statistics, the debt incurred through the joint issuance of Federal securities is recorded here under central government and its special funds in accordance with the agreed allocation ratios. **8** From December 2008, including debt of the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund. **9** From March 2009, including debt of the Investment and Repayment Fund. **10** From January 2011, including debt of the Restructuring Fund for Credit Institutions. **11** Including debt of municipal special purpose associations. Data other than year-end figures have been estimated.

XI Economic conditions in Germany

1 Origin and use of domestic product, distribution of national income

Item	2012	2013	2014	2012	2013	2014	2013 Q2	2013 Q3	2013 Q4	2014 Q1	2014 Q2	2014 Q3	2014 Q4
	Index 2010=100			Annual percentage change									
At constant prices, chained													
I Origin of domestic product													
Production sector (excluding construction)	107.3	107.5	109.0	1.4	0.2	1.4	0.9	1.1	2.5	3.3	0.1	1.2	0.8
Construction	104.1	103.8	107.6	0.1	– 0.3	3.7	– 0.4	1.8	2.7	11.8	2.1	0.6	2.5
Wholesale/retail trade, transport and storage, hotel and restaurant services	101.6	101.6	103.0	– 2.3	0.0	1.4	0.3	1.3	0.8	2.4	1.0	1.2	1.3
Information and communication	116.8	118.2	120.7	5.3	1.2	2.2	1.2	1.1	1.2	2.3	2.2	2.6	1.7
Financial and insurance activities	102.8	101.3	100.7	2.0	– 1.5	– 0.6	– 2.8	– 2.4	– 2.0	0.1	– 0.4	– 1.4	– 0.6
Real estate activities	101.3	101.9	103.0	– 2.0	0.5	1.1	0.3	0.4	0.7	1.1	1.2	1.4	0.7
Business services [1]	102.8	103.8	106.2	0.6	0.9	2.4	1.4	1.5	1.8	2.9	1.7	2.4	2.5
Public services, education and health	102.2	102.1	103.3	1.0	– 0.1	1.2	– 0.0	– 0.0	0.3	1.7	1.0	0.8	1.3
Other services	100.7	99.1	99.7	0.1	– 1.6	0.6	– 1.2	– 1.1	– 1.3	0.8	– 0.3	0.6	1.1
Gross value added	104.0	104.1	105.7	0.5	0.1	1.5	0.3	0.7	1.2	2.6	0.9	1.3	1.3
Gross domestic product [2]	104.0	104.1	105.8	0.4	0.1	1.6	0.5	0.8	1.0	2.6	1.0	1.2	1.6
II Use of domestic product													
Private consumption [3]	103.0	103.8	105.0	0.7	0.8	1.2	1.0	2.0	0.7	1.0	0.8	1.1	1.7
Government consumption	101.9	102.7	103.8	1.2	0.7	1.1	0.3	1.0	0.4	0.6	1.2	1.3	1.5
Machinery and equipment	102.9	100.5	104.8	– 3.0	– 2.4	4.3	– 0.2	0.1	0.1	7.9	3.6	4.1	2.4
Premises	109.1	109.0	112.9	0.6	– 0.1	3.6	0.7	2.6	2.2	13.2	1.5	– 0.1	1.8
Other investment [4]	106.9	108.2	109.5	0.1	1.3	1.2	1.3	0.7	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Changes in inventories [5, 6]	.	.	.	– 1.4	0.2	– 0.4	0.1	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.1	– 0.8	– 0.8
Domestic demand	102.1	102.7	104.0	– 0.9	0.7	1.3	0.9	2.3	1.0	2.4	1.2	0.4	1.0
Net exports [6]	.	.	.	1.3	– 0.5	0.4	– 0.4	– 1.4	0.0	0.3	– 0.1	0.8	0.7
Exports	111.1	112.8	117.2	2.8	1.6	3.9	1.9	1.6	4.3	3.9	2.2	4.6	4.7
Imports	107.1	110.5	114.2	– 0.0	3.1	3.4	3.1	5.2	4.9	3.6	3.0	3.1	3.7
Gross domestic product [2]	104.0	104.1	105.8	0.4	0.1	1.6	0.5	0.8	1.0	2.6	1.0	1.2	1.6
At current prices (€ billion)													
III Use of domestic product													
Private consumption [3]	1,539.5	1,571.5	1,604.7	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.4	3.3	1.8	2.1	1.8	2.1	2.4
Government consumption	521.3	541.2	561.5	3.1	3.8	3.7	3.3	4.6	3.2	3.5	4.0	3.8	3.6
Machinery and equipment	181.7	177.9	185.6	– 2.2	– 2.1	4.3	0.1	0.2	0.3	7.9	3.6	4.1	2.4
Premises	273.9	279.2	293.4	3.4	1.9	5.1	2.7	4.6	4.2	15.1	3.0	1.4	3.2
Other investment [4]	95.6	98.8	102.1	2.1	3.3	3.3	3.2	2.7	3.3	3.0	3.3	3.3	3.5
Changes in inventories [5]	– 23.9	– 22.3	– 32.8	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Domestic use	2,588.2	2,646.2	2,714.4	0.8	2.2	2.6	2.6	3.7	2.3	3.9	2.7	1.7	2.1
Net exports	161.7	163.3	189.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Exports	1,262.9	1,280.1	1,326.2	4.4	1.4	3.6	1.9	1.0	3.8	3.3	1.6	4.4	4.9
Imports	1,101.1	1,116.9	1,136.7	2.1	1.4	1.8	1.3	3.1	2.6	1.7	1.1	1.7	2.6
Gross domestic product [2]	2,749.9	2,809.5	2,903.8	1.9	2.2	3.4	2.8	2.7	2.9	4.5	2.8	2.9	3.2
IV Prices (2010=100)													
Private consumption	103.4	104.7	105.7	1.5	1.2	0.9	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.7
Gross domestic product	102.7	104.8	106.6	1.5	2.1	1.7	2.3	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.6
Terms of trade	97.1	98.5	99.8	– 0.5	1.5	1.3	1.8	1.5	1.7	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.3
V Distribution of national income													
Compensation of employees	1,389.7	1,428.3	1,481.1	3.8	2.8	3.7	2.6	2.8	2.8	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.6
Entrepreneurial and property income	665.7	671.6	691.9	– 3.3	0.9	3.0	4.7	1.3	4.5	7.3	– 0.3	3.6	0.9
National income	2,055.3	2,099.9	2,172.9	1.4	2.2	3.5	3.2	2.3	3.3	5.0	2.5	3.6	2.8
Memo item: Gross national income	2,822.2	2,881.9	2,972.2	1.9	2.1	3.1	3.0	2.3	2.8	4.3	2.3	3.1	2.8

Source: Federal Statistical Office; figures computed in February 2015. **1** Professional, scientific, technical, administration and support service activities. **2** Gross value added plus taxes on products (netted with subsidies on products). **3** Including non-profit institutions serving households. **4** Intellectual property rights (inter alia, computer software and entertainment, literary or artistic originals) and cultivated assets. **5** Including net increase in valuables. **6** Contribution of growth to GDP.

XI Economic conditions in Germany

2 Output in the production sector*

Adjusted for working-day variations **o**

		Production sector, total	of which: Construction	of which: Energy	Industry: Total	of which: by main industrial grouping: Intermediate goods	Capital goods	Durable goods	Non-durable goods	of which: by economic sector: Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products	Manufacture of computers, electronic and optical products and electrical equipment	Machinery and equipment	Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
		2010=100											
% of total	1	100.00	11.24	10.14	78.62	31.02	33.31	2.49	11.80	10.41	10.37	12.17	11.62
Period													
2011		106.7	107.0	95.6	108.1	107.0	111.9	104.2	101.3	109.2	110.2	113.2	112.6
2012		106.2	105.9	97.3	107.5	104.6	113.3	100.5	99.8	107.3	107.8	115.2	112.8
2013		106.4	105.6	96.4	107.8	104.4	114.0	100.1	100.7	108.3	106.0	113.7	114.8
2014	x	108.0	108.4	92.4	109.9	106.1	116.7	100.5	102.6	111.8	108.7	115.0	119.8
2013 Q4		111.0	119.3	99.7	111.2	103.6	121.0	102.8	105.8	109.2	108.3	123.1	116.9
2014 Q1		105.2	88.0	98.9	108.4	106.6	113.4	102.3	100.4	111.5	106.6	107.7	123.1
Q2		107.3	110.5	85.7	109.6	107.4	115.8	98.1	100.4	112.8	106.7	112.2	122.5
Q3		107.9	116.5	86.3	109.5	106.9	115.0	97.0	103.2	111.7	110.6	114.9	114.8
Q4	x	111.4	118.6	98.8	112.0	103.4	122.6	104.7	106.5	111.1	110.8	125.2	118.8
2014 Jan		98.0	73.4	103.7	100.8	101.6	101.4	93.5	98.7	105.3	98.3	96.9	108.2
Feb		102.4	85.4	94.3	105.9	103.8	111.5	101.0	96.4	108.4	104.5	103.5	124.0
Mar		115.1	105.2	98.6	118.6	114.5	127.3	112.4	106.1	120.9	117.1	122.8	137.2
Apr		106.9	108.6	88.5	109.1	107.8	113.6	98.1	101.9	112.7	105.4	108.1	123.1
May		105.2	107.6	85.5	107.4	105.6	113.2	94.7	98.4	110.5	103.7	108.9	120.9
June		109.7	115.4	83.0	112.4	108.7	120.7	101.5	100.9	115.3	110.9	119.5	123.4
July	2	110.9	119.5	84.6	113.1	110.2	120.6	96.7	102.7	115.1	111.3	114.2	130.3
Aug	2	100.0	111.8	84.8	100.3	101.9	99.6	83.8	101.3	104.9	105.6	106.5	84.4
Sep		112.9	118.1	89.5	115.1	108.7	124.7	110.4	105.5	115.2	114.9	124.1	129.6
Oct	x	113.6	120.7	97.9	114.6	110.7	120.4	107.9	109.7	117.4	113.9	116.5	125.4
Nov	x	115.7	121.1	97.2	117.3	109.4	127.8	112.1	109.6	119.1	116.1	123.1	134.2
Dec	x	105.0	113.9	101.4	104.2	90.0	119.5	94.1	100.1	96.9	102.3	136.1	96.8
2015 Jan	x,p	98.9	73.9	104.1	101.8	101.8	103.2	95.6	99.3	106.1	101.9	100.6	104.6
		Annual percentage change											
2011		+ 7.2	+ 7.9	– 4.5	+ 8.8	+ 7.5	+ 12.7	+ 4.8	+ 1.8	+ 9.7	+ 11.0	+ 14.0	+ 13.5
2012		– 0.5	– 1.0	+ 1.8	– 0.6	– 2.2	+ 1.3	– 3.6	– 1.5	– 1.7	– 2.2	+ 1.8	+ 0.2
2013		+ 0.2	– 0.3	– 0.9	+ 0.3	– 0.2	+ 0.6	– 0.4	+ 0.9	+ 0.9	– 1.7	– 1.3	+ 1.8
2014	x	+ 1.5	+ 2.7	– 4.1	+ 1.9	+ 1.6	+ 2.4	+ 0.4	+ 1.9	+ 3.2	+ 2.5	+ 1.1	+ 4.4
2013 Q4		+ 2.9	+ 2.5	– 0.4	+ 3.4	+ 3.4	+ 4.0	+ 2.3	+ 1.7	+ 4.4	+ 1.7	+ 2.4	+ 8.1
2014 Q1		+ 4.0	+ 14.3	– 5.8	+ 4.1	+ 3.9	+ 4.7	+ 1.6	+ 3.0	+ 5.9	+ 2.0	+ 1.7	+ 9.6
Q2		+ 1.2	+ 1.7	– 4.8	+ 1.8	+ 1.8	+ 1.8	± 0.0	+ 2.3	+ 3.4	+ 1.6	– 1.4	+ 5.7
Q3		+ 0.6	– 0.8	– 5.2	+ 1.4	+ 0.9	+ 1.9	– 1.9	+ 1.8	+ 2.1	+ 4.2	+ 2.5	+ 0.7
Q4	x	+ 0.4	– 0.6	– 0.9	+ 0.7	– 0.2	+ 1.3	+ 1.8	+ 0.6	+ 1.8	+ 2.2	+ 1.7	+ 1.7
2014 Jan		+ 4.8	+ 13.6	– 2.2	+ 4.9	+ 3.7	+ 7.2	+ 0.4	+ 2.5	+ 6.0	+ 1.5	+ 6.0	+ 12.7
Feb		+ 4.4	+ 16.5	– 5.4	+ 4.4	+ 5.2	+ 4.1	+ 2.4	+ 3.5	+ 6.0	+ 5.2	– 0.7	+ 9.7
Mar		+ 2.9	+ 13.1	– 9.6	+ 3.1	+ 3.1	+ 3.2	+ 1.9	+ 3.0	+ 5.6	– 0.4	+ 0.6	+ 7.1
Apr		+ 1.8	+ 3.5	– 6.2	+ 2.5	+ 4.2	+ 0.6	+ 0.4	+ 4.6	+ 4.9	+ 4.2	– 3.0	+ 4.2
May		+ 1.6	+ 0.7	– 2.8	+ 2.3	+ 0.5	+ 4.5	+ 3.0	– 0.1	+ 3.3	+ 0.9	+ 2.0	+ 9.3
June		+ 0.2	+ 0.9	– 5.4	+ 0.7	+ 0.7	+ 0.4	– 3.1	+ 2.5	+ 1.9	± 0.0	– 2.8	+ 3.7
July	2	+ 3.0	– 0.3	– 7.1	+ 4.6	+ 2.0	+ 8.0	– 0.3	+ 2.3	+ 3.8	+ 5.8	+ 1.0	+ 19.4
Aug	2	– 1.7	– 1.1	– 5.0	– 1.4	+ 0.7	– 4.4	– 1.8	+ 2.2	+ 2.3	+ 3.7	+ 3.7	– 19.5
Sep		+ 0.3	– 1.0	– 3.6	+ 0.8	– 0.1	+ 1.6	– 3.3	+ 1.1	+ 0.3	+ 3.2	+ 2.8	+ 1.2
Oct	x	+ 1.2	+ 0.6	– 1.2	+ 1.5	– 0.2	+ 3.0	+ 0.7	+ 1.4	+ 1.6	+ 3.2	+ 3.2	+ 4.2
Nov	x	– 0.3	– 0.1	– 2.2	– 0.3	– 0.6	– 0.2	+ 0.4	+ 0.5	+ 1.4	+ 0.5	+ 0.2	+ 0.1
Dec	x	+ 0.5	– 2.5	+ 0.8	+ 1.0	+ 0.3	+ 1.4	+ 4.9	± 0.0	+ 2.4	+ 3.2	+ 1.9	+ 0.7
2015 Jan	x,p	+ 0.9	+ 0.7	+ 0.4	+ 1.0	+ 0.2	+ 1.8	+ 2.2	+ 0.6	+ 0.8	+ 3.7	+ 3.8	– 3.3

Source of the unadjusted figures: Federal Statistical Office. * For explanatory notes, see Statistical Supplement Seasonally adjusted business statistics, Tables II.10 to II.12. **o** Using the Census X-12-ARIMA method, version 0.2.8. **1** Share of gross value added at factor cost of the production sector in the base year 2010. **2** Influenced by a change in holiday dates. **x** Provisional; adjusted in advance by the Federal Statistical Office, by way of estimates, to the results of the Quarterly Production Survey or the Quarterly Survey in the specialised construction industry, respectively.

XI Economic conditions in Germany

3 Orders received by industry *

Adjusted for working-day variations o

Period	Industry		of which: Intermediate goods		Capital goods		Consumer goods		of which: Durable goods		Non-durable goods	
	2010=100	Annual percentage change	2010=100	Annual percentage change	2010=100	Annual percentage change	2010=100	Annual percentage change	2010=100	Annual percentage change	2010=100	Annual percentage change
Total												
2010	99.5	+ 24.7	99.5	+ 27.9	99.5	+ 25.3	99.6	+ 5.3	99.5	+ 14.6	99.6	+ 2.5
2011	109.9	+ 10.5	109.1	+ 9.6	111.2	+ 11.8	103.8	+ 4.2	105.3	+ 5.8	103.3	+ 3.7
2012	106.9	– 2.7	104.2	– 4.5	109.2	– 1.8	103.8	± 0.0	99.5	– 5.5	105.3	+ 1.9
2013	109.4	+ 2.3	103.2	– 1.0	114.3	+ 4.7	105.9	+ 2.0	101.8	+ 2.3	107.4	+ 2.0
2014	112.6	+ 2.9	104.2	+ 1.0	118.8	+ 3.9	110.7	+ 4.5	102.6	+ 0.8	113.5	+ 5.7
2014 Jan	111.4	+ 6.3	108.0	+ 2.8	113.7	+ 8.4	112.6	+ 10.6	100.8	+ 1.9	116.7	+ 13.6
Feb	113.0	+ 5.9	106.0	+ 4.1	117.4	+ 6.6	116.9	+ 8.7	97.6	+ 2.2	123.5	+ 10.7
Mar	120.3	+ 0.4	113.7	– 1.4	126.0	+ 1.4	113.3	+ 3.5	113.1	+ 1.7	113.4	+ 4.1
Apr	112.4	+ 5.9	105.7	+ 2.6	117.9	+ 8.4	107.2	+ 4.9	108.2	+ 7.3	106.9	+ 4.1
May	110.5	+ 5.0	103.1	+ 0.2	116.3	+ 8.2	106.4	+ 5.2	99.6	+ 1.1	108.7	+ 6.6
June	113.3	– 2.2	106.2	+ 1.7	119.0	– 5.5	108.5	+ 6.1	105.4	– 2.7	109.5	+ 9.3
July	115.4	+ 6.0	106.2	+ 1.8	122.2	+ 9.4	113.6	+ 1.8	97.3	– 1.8	119.4	+ 2.9
Aug	100.7	+ 0.9	95.4	– 0.3	103.0	+ 0.9	111.0	+ 7.0	94.4	+ 3.1	116.8	+ 8.2
Sep	111.8	– 0.4	102.0	± 0.0	118.5	– 0.9	112.7	+ 0.7	107.5	– 3.6	114.4	+ 2.0
Oct	114.6	+ 3.1	106.8	– 0.7	120.2	+ 5.7	114.5	+ 2.2	108.1	– 1.7	116.8	+ 3.5
Nov	114.7	+ 0.1	104.4	– 1.5	122.2	+ 1.2	113.8	+ 0.9	106.0	– 1.5	116.5	+ 1.7
Dec	112.6	+ 4.5	92.7	+ 2.8	128.7	+ 5.5	97.9	+ 3.3	93.0	+ 5.1	99.5	+ 2.6
2015 Jan p	112.2	+ 0.7	106.3	– 1.6	116.5	+ 2.5	111.3	– 1.2	105.9	+ 5.1	113.3	– 2.9
From the domestic market												
2010	99.5	+ 18.7	99.5	+ 28.9	99.5	+ 13.1	99.6	+ 1.4	99.4	+ 4.5	99.6	+ 0.4
2011	109.8	+ 10.4	109.7	+ 10.3	110.8	+ 11.4	103.5	+ 3.9	110.2	+ 10.9	101.1	+ 1.5
2012	104.0	– 5.3	103.3	– 5.8	105.4	– 4.9	99.2	– 4.2	101.9	– 7.5	98.2	– 2.9
2013	104.4	+ 0.4	101.9	– 1.4	107.5	+ 2.0	100.4	+ 1.2	102.9	+ 1.0	99.5	+ 1.3
2014	105.7	+ 1.2	101.3	– 0.6	110.6	+ 2.9	103.2	+ 2.8	103.1	+ 0.2	103.2	+ 3.7
2014 Jan	106.2	+ 3.3	106.2	+ 1.2	106.5	+ 5.0	104.9	+ 6.3	102.6	– 1.8	105.7	+ 9.3
Feb	107.0	+ 3.3	104.2	+ 2.8	109.4	+ 3.8	109.7	+ 3.6	99.9	– 1.9	113.1	+ 5.3
Mar	116.8	+ 1.1	109.3	– 3.4	125.3	+ 5.0	111.0	+ 4.2	113.8	– 0.4	110.0	+ 6.1
Apr	107.7	+ 5.0	104.3	+ 2.7	112.3	+ 7.3	100.0	+ 4.7	107.5	+ 5.1	97.4	+ 4.6
May	104.7	+ 4.6	102.8	+ 1.6	107.8	+ 8.1	96.9	+ 1.8	96.8	+ 1.3	96.9	+ 1.9
June	105.7	– 0.8	102.9	+ 0.4	109.4	– 2.5	100.3	+ 3.5	107.1	+ 4.0	97.9	+ 3.4
July	108.0	+ 1.3	103.8	– 0.3	112.3	+ 2.6	107.9	+ 3.0	100.3	+ 1.3	110.6	+ 3.6
Aug	98.7	– 1.4	95.4	– 1.1	101.2	– 2.3	103.8	+ 2.4	95.7	+ 3.1	106.7	+ 2.2
Sep	102.1	– 3.7	96.9	– 4.0	106.9	– 3.9	105.0	– 0.1	110.2	– 3.0	103.2	+ 1.1
Oct	108.8	+ 3.2	102.1	– 1.4	115.9	+ 8.1	106.7	+ 1.1	111.0	– 5.4	105.2	+ 3.7
Nov	105.8	– 3.5	100.2	– 4.9	111.9	– 2.4	103.0	– 1.4	107.6	– 1.0	101.4	– 1.6
Dec	97.1	+ 3.3	87.9	± 0.0	107.8	+ 6.0	88.6	+ 4.9	84.8	+ 4.2	89.9	+ 5.0
2015 Jan p	105.4	– 0.8	101.7	– 4.2	109.5	+ 2.8	102.5	– 2.3	103.2	+ 0.6	102.2	– 3.3
From abroad												
2010	99.6	+ 29.9	99.6	+ 26.9	99.5	+ 34.3	99.6	+ 8.9	99.5	+ 25.2	99.6	+ 4.2
2011	110.0	+ 10.4	108.4	+ 8.8	111.4	+ 12.0	104.1	+ 4.5	101.0	+ 1.5	105.2	+ 5.6
2012	109.3	– 0.6	105.2	– 3.0	111.6	+ 0.2	107.7	+ 3.5	97.3	– 3.7	111.3	+ 5.8
2013	113.5	+ 3.8	104.7	– 0.5	118.5	+ 6.2	110.7	+ 2.8	100.9	+ 3.7	114.1	+ 2.5
2014	118.1	+ 4.1	107.6	+ 2.8	123.8	+ 4.5	117.2	+ 5.9	102.1	+ 1.2	122.3	+ 7.2
2014 Jan	115.7	+ 8.7	110.1	+ 4.5	118.2	+ 10.4	119.2	+ 14.2	99.2	+ 5.4	126.0	+ 16.9
Feb	117.8	+ 7.8	108.1	+ 5.7	122.3	+ 8.2	123.0	+ 13.1	95.6	+ 6.1	132.4	+ 14.9
Mar	123.2	– 0.1	118.9	+ 0.8	126.5	– 0.7	115.3	+ 2.9	112.5	+ 3.7	116.2	+ 2.6
Apr	116.3	+ 6.7	107.3	+ 2.5	121.4	+ 9.0	113.4	+ 5.0	108.9	+ 9.4	114.9	+ 3.6
May	115.2	+ 5.3	103.4	– 1.3	121.6	+ 8.3	114.5	+ 7.9	102.1	+ 1.1	118.8	+ 10.1
June	119.5	– 3.3	110.0	+ 3.1	124.9	– 7.1	115.5	+ 8.0	104.0	– 8.0	119.4	+ 13.9
July	121.5	+ 9.8	109.1	+ 4.3	128.3	+ 13.4	118.5	+ 0.9	94.6	– 4.5	126.8	+ 2.4
Aug	102.3	+ 2.8	95.5	+ 0.7	104.1	+ 2.9	117.2	+ 10.9	93.3	+ 3.0	125.3	+ 13.0
Sep	119.6	+ 1.8	108.1	+ 4.5	125.7	+ 0.7	119.2	+ 1.2	105.2	– 4.0	123.9	+ 2.7
Oct	119.3	+ 2.8	112.4	± 0.0	122.8	+ 4.3	121.1	+ 3.0	105.5	+ 1.8	126.6	+ 3.3
Nov	122.0	+ 2.9	109.4	+ 2.4	128.5	+ 3.0	123.1	+ 2.7	104.6	– 1.9	129.4	+ 3.9
Dec	125.2	+ 5.2	98.3	+ 5.7	141.6	+ 5.3	105.8	+ 2.1	100.1	+ 5.8	107.7	+ 0.9
2015 Jan p	117.8	+ 1.8	111.8	+ 1.5	120.8	+ 2.2	118.9	– 0.3	108.2	+ 9.1	122.7	– 2.6

Source of the unadjusted figures: Federal Statistical Office. * At current prices; for explanatory notes, see Statistical Supplement Seasonally adjusted business statistics, Tables II.14 to II.16. o Using the Census X-12-ARIMA method, version 0.2.8.

XI Economic conditions in Germany

4 Orders received by construction *

Adjusted for working-day variations o

Period	Total		Breakdown by type of construction										Breakdown by client 1			
			Building								Civil engineering		Industry		Public sector 2	
	Total		Total		Housing construction		Industrial construction		Public sector construction							
	2010 = 100	Annual percentage change	2010 = 100	Annual percentage change	2010 = 100	Annual percentage change	2010 = 100	Annual percentage change	2010 = 100	Annual percentage change	2010 = 100	Annual percentage change	2010 = 100	Annual percentage change	2010 = 100	Annual percentage change
2010	99.7	+ 1.4	99.7	+ 5.8	99.6	+ 9.6	99.7	+ 4.6	99.9	+ 3.0	99.7	– 2.7	99.7	+ 5.7	99.8	– 5.3
2011	107.2	+ 7.5	112.2	+ 12.5	120.5	+ 21.0	113.6	+ 13.9	91.8	– 8.1	102.2	+ 2.5	112.9	+ 13.2	96.1	– 3.7
2012	114.5	+ 6.8	121.4	+ 8.2	132.4	+ 9.9	124.2	+ 9.3	91.5	– 0.3	107.6	+ 5.3	118.5	+ 5.0	103.3	+ 7.5
2013	119.1	+ 4.0	126.5	+ 4.2	140.6	+ 6.2	128.1	+ 3.1	93.7	+ 2.4	111.7	+ 3.8	121.8	+ 2.8	107.6	+ 4.2
2014	118.5	– 0.5	127.2	+ 0.6	146.6	+ 4.3	126.8	– 1.0	90.5	– 3.4	109.9	– 1.6	121.8	± 0.0	104.0	– 3.3
2013 Dec	106.2	+ 13.7	120.0	+ 11.0	136.8	+ 11.7	121.3	+ 6.9	82.9	+ 29.9	92.5	+ 17.5	113.6	+ 8.0	86.5	+ 24.3
2014 Jan	93.0	+ 13.3	106.5	+ 17.8	112.9	+ 10.8	113.3	+ 22.4	73.7	+ 20.8	79.6	+ 7.9	110.7	+ 27.8	67.1	– 3.6
Feb	102.2	+ 4.0	112.9	+ 12.0	134.0	+ 23.6	114.3	+ 9.6	67.0	– 11.4	91.6	– 4.3	106.4	+ 2.0	85.3	– 3.1
Mar	138.9	+ 5.9	146.5	+ 9.9	165.2	+ 9.1	148.0	+ 12.6	105.2	+ 1.7	131.4	+ 1.9	141.2	+ 8.7	126.0	+ 1.4
Apr	134.0	+ 8.5	133.3	+ 2.5	170.1	+ 17.3	121.6	– 3.0	95.9	– 16.1	134.6	+ 15.1	125.4	+ 6.5	128.3	+ 6.4
May	127.7	+ 1.8	130.9	– 3.3	157.1	+ 10.5	122.9	– 12.5	103.0	– 3.5	124.5	+ 7.5	120.3	– 5.4	123.5	+ 5.5
June	132.2	– 9.4	140.0	– 11.2	163.1	– 10.4	133.1	– 15.9	114.8	+ 6.3	124.4	– 7.4	131.7	– 13.0	120.2	– 4.6
July	136.5	– 4.1	139.8	– 1.5	143.9	– 8.9	147.3	+ 3.5	109.5	+ 0.6	133.1	– 6.9	139.6	+ 4.9	130.3	– 10.5
Aug	121.5	– 1.9	122.5	– 1.3	127.0	– 12.3	130.7	+ 7.9	89.4	– 3.2	120.6	– 2.3	124.9	+ 4.7	115.9	– 3.3
Sep	121.8	– 3.3	130.0	– 4.3	149.0	– 2.6	128.9	– 2.9	96.2	– 13.2	113.5	– 2.3	123.3	– 5.5	109.3	– 1.1
Oct	113.6	– 3.3	129.3	+ 0.5	152.0	+ 7.5	129.4	– 3.9	84.6	– 1.2	97.9	– 8.0	119.1	– 4.9	92.6	– 7.3
Nov	99.4	– 6.8	113.0	– 5.5	130.2	+ 5.9	116.7	– 11.9	68.2	– 9.1	85.9	– 8.3	109.0	– 11.5	77.3	– 7.2
Dec	101.7	– 4.2	122.1	+ 1.8	154.4	+ 12.9	115.2	– 5.0	78.9	– 4.8	81.4	– 12.0	109.5	– 3.6	72.6	– 16.1

Source of the unadjusted figures: Federal Statistical Office. * At current prices; values exclusive of value-added tax; for explanatory notes, see Statistical Supplement Seasonally adjusted business statistics, table II.21. o Using the Census X-12-ARIMA method, version 0.2.8. 1 Excluding housing construction orders. 2 Including road construction.

5 Retail trade turnover, sales of motor vehicles *

Adjusted for calendar variations o

Period	Retail trade														Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	
					of which: by enterprises main product range 1											
	Total				Food, beverages, tobacco 2		Textiles, clothing foodwear and leather goods		Information and communications equipment		Construction and flooring materials, household appliances, furniture		Retail sale of pharmaceutical and medical goods, cosmetic and toilet articles			
	At current prices		At prices in year 2010		At current prices											
	2010 = 100	Annual percentage change	2010 = 100	Annual percentage change	2010 = 100	Annual percentage change	2010 = 100	Annual percentage change	2010 = 100	Annual percentage change	2010 = 100	Annual percentage change	2010 = 100	Annual percentage change	2010 = 100	Annual percentage change
2011	102.6	+ 2.5	101.0	+ 1.0	102.5	+ 2.3	101.6	+ 1.8	99.4	– 0.5	103.7	+ 3.7	100.5	+ 0.3	107.0	+ 7.8
2012	104.5	+ 1.9	100.9	– 0.1	105.1	+ 2.5	102.2	+ 0.6	99.0	– 0.4	104.5	+ 0.8	100.4	– 0.1	105.8	– 1.1
2013	106.3	+ 1.7	101.3	+ 0.4	109.0	+ 3.7	103.1	+ 0.9	95.4	– 3.6	102.3	– 2.1	103.1	+ 2.7	104.5	– 1.2
2014 3	108.6	+ 2.2	103.2	+ 1.9	111.6	+ 2.4	105.0	+ 1.8	95.2	– 0.2	102.7	+ 0.4	110.8	+ 7.5	107.6	+ 3.0
2014 Jan 3	99.3	+ 2.2	94.9	+ 1.1	101.3	+ 1.7	89.8	+ 3.7	98.8	– 2.1	88.1	– 1.0	105.1	+ 5.4	91.9	+ 8.5
Feb	96.1	+ 3.2	91.4	+ 2.4	100.6	+ 2.9	82.4	+ 7.3	82.7	– 3.0	90.5	+ 2.7	102.6	+ 7.0	96.1	+ 6.4
Mar	111.2	+ 2.9	104.9	+ 1.9	115.7	+ 3.5	110.0	+ 11.9	86.4	– 9.7	111.7	+ 3.5	109.2	+ 4.0	119.4	+ 5.1
Apr	108.5	+ 1.6	102.4	+ 1.0	113.6	+ 4.8	104.6	– 4.3	82.9	– 2.6	108.6	+ 0.5	109.6	+ 8.0	113.6	+ 2.2
May	107.8	+ 0.3	101.9	± 0.0	111.6	+ 1.3	106.6	+ 2.7	84.1	+ 1.3	104.0	– 3.5	106.7	+ 5.9	110.4	+ 0.5
June	107.1	+ 2.7	101.5	+ 2.5	113.8	+ 3.5	102.0	+ 1.4	83.2	– 1.5	99.7	– 1.4	109.3	+ 10.5	111.8	+ 1.7
July	107.9	+ 1.6	102.7	+ 1.3	112.2	+ 0.4	102.8	+ 0.3	89.8	+ 5.2	100.4	– 2.6	114.2	+ 7.5	109.5	+ 3.2
Aug	106.0	+ 2.5	100.9	+ 2.0	108.7	+ 0.7	106.0	+ 9.2	84.3	– 3.7	100.0	+ 2.0	106.5	+ 7.6	100.6	+ 3.1
Sep	104.9	+ 0.3	99.3	– 0.2	106.1	+ 2.5	106.9	– 6.7	91.4	– 2.5	99.8	– 2.0	108.2	+ 6.6	106.9	+ 1.6
Oct	112.2	+ 2.7	106.5	+ 2.6	113.6	+ 2.5	114.8	– 2.1	99.2	+ 2.9	109.1	+ 0.3	114.6	+ 8.0	116.3	+ 0.5
Nov	113.7	+ 1.5	108.4	+ 1.8	112.9	+ 0.7	109.2	– 1.0	110.6	+ 4.3	111.6	+ 1.3	116.2	+ 9.4	112.7	+ 0.4
Dec	128.3	+ 4.7	123.1	+ 5.2	129.0	+ 3.9	125.4	+ 4.9	149.2	+ 5.7	108.6	+ 5.0	127.3	+ 9.5	101.5	+ 3.8
2015 Jan	103.1	+ 3.8	99.7	+ 5.1	104.9	+ 3.6	91.9	+ 2.3	104.6	+ 5.9	92.0	+ 4.4	112.3	+ 6.9	...	...

Source of the unadjusted figures: Federal Statistical Office. * Excluding value-added tax; For explanatory notes, see Statistical Supplement Seasonally adjusted business statistics, Tables II.24. o Using the Census X-12-ARIMA method, version 0.2.8. 1 In stores. 2 Including stalls and markets. 3 Figures from January 2014 are provisional, in some cases revised, and particularly uncertain in recent months owing to estimates for missing reports.

XI Economic conditions in Germany

6 Labour market *

Period	Employment [1]		Employment subject to social contributions [2,3]					Solely jobs exempt from social contributions [2]	Short time workers [4]		Unemployment [5]		Unemployment rate [5,6] in %	Vacancies, [5,7] thousands
			Total		of which:					of which:		of which:		
	Thousands	Annual percentage change	Thousands	Annual percentage change	Production sector	Services excluding temporary employment	Temporary employment		Total	Cyclically induced	Total	Recipients of insured unemployment benefits		
					Thousands									
2010	41,020	+ 0.3	28,008	+ 1.0	8,421	18,693	675	5,025	503	429	3,239	1,076	7.7	359
2011	41,571	+ 1.3	28,687	+ 2.4	8,579	19,091	794	5,014	148	100	2,976	893	7.1	466
2012	42,033	+ 1.1	29,341	+ 2.3	8,738	19,600	773	4,981	112	67	2,897	902	6.8	478
2013	42,281	+ 0.6	29,713	+ 1.3	8,782	19,954	743	5,017	124	77	2,950	970	6.9	457
2014	[8] 42,652	[8] + 0.9	[9] 30,207	[9] + 1.7	[9] 8,861	[9] 20,337	[9] 770	[9] 5,033	...	[9] 49	2,898	933	6.7	490
2011 Q4	41,991	+ 1.3	29,228	+ 2.6	8,729	19,444	827	5,000	102	72	2,744	788	6.5	486
2012 Q1	41,564	+ 1.3	28,967	+ 2.7	8,630	19,367	758	4,943	201	82	3,075	999	7.3	472
Q2	41,948	+ 1.1	29,223	+ 2.5	8,706	19,510	771	4,983	77	65	2,876	847	6.8	499
Q3	42,226	+ 1.1	29,416	+ 2.1	8,776	19,604	798	5,006	56	43	2,856	885	6.7	493
Q4	42,394	+ 1.0	29,757	+ 1.8	8,840	19,919	766	4,990	113	76	2,782	878	6.6	446
2013 Q1	41,834	+ 0.7	29,385	+ 1.4	8,697	19,771	701	4,972	234	102	3,131	1,109	7.4	444
Q2	42,198	+ 0.6	29,573	+ 1.2	8,746	19,864	725	5,016	99	87	2,941	945	6.8	459
Q3	42,482	+ 0.6	29,776	+ 1.2	8,809	19,952	772	5,050	70	57	2,903	934	6.7	471
Q4	42,611	+ 0.5	30,118	+ 1.2	8,877	20,230	774	5,028	92	61	2,827	891	6.6	455
2014 Q1	42,141	+ 0.7	29,809	+ 1.4	8,759	20,099	730	4,991	178	58	3,109	1,078	7.2	452
Q2	42,586	+ 0.9	30,080	+ 1.7	8,828	20,251	753	5,043	72	56	2,886	900	[10] 6.6	487
Q3	42,858	+ 0.9	[9] 30,282	[9] + 1.7	[9] 8,895	[9] 20,339	[9] 799	[9] 5,067	...	[9] 37	2,860	909	6.6	512
Q4	[8] 43,023	[8] + 1.0	[9] 30,658	[9] + 1.8	[9] 8,962	[9] 20,659	[9] 798	[9] 5,033	...	[9] 44	2,738	846	6.3	510
2011 Oct	42,017	+ 1.3	29,274	+ 2.6	8,746	19,456	837	4,981	81	70	2,738	779	6.5	500
Nov	42,069	+ 1.3	29,278	+ 2.6	8,744	19,476	832	5,017	85	76	2,714	770	6.4	492
Dec	41,888	+ 1.3	29,046	+ 2.7	8,656	19,402	782	5,021	140	72	2,781	814	6.6	467
2012 Jan	41,538	+ 1.4	28,916	+ 2.9	8,620	19,330	755	4,944	206	82	3,085	1,011	7.3	452
Feb	41,513	+ 1.3	28,922	+ 2.7	8,610	19,352	749	4,909	230	87	3,110	1,029	7.4	473
Mar	41,640	+ 1.2	29,082	+ 2.7	8,663	19,437	756	4,935	167	78	3,028	956	7.2	491
Apr	41,802	+ 1.1	29,199	+ 2.6	8,698	19,505	763	4,964	83	71	2,964	893	7.0	499
May	41,973	+ 1.1	29,289	+ 2.4	8,724	19,548	778	5,002	77	65	2,855	831	6.7	499
June	42,069	+ 1.0	29,280	+ 2.2	8,733	19,519	790	5,032	71	58	2,809	817	6.6	499
July	42,103	+ 1.1	29,255	+ 2.3	8,737	19,478	804	5,038	54	42	2,876	885	6.8	500
Aug	42,208	+ 1.1	29,477	+ 2.0	8,793	19,645	801	4,986	47	34	2,905	910	6.8	493
Sep	42,367	+ 1.0	29,754	+ 1.8	8,865	19,858	787	4,958	66	54	2,788	862	6.5	485
Oct	42,463	+ 1.1	29,823	+ 1.9	8,866	19,936	780	4,972	85	70	2,753	846	6.5	468
Nov	42,483	+ 1.0	29,809	+ 1.8	8,848	19,965	766	5,010	98	85	2,751	864	6.5	451
Dec	42,237	+ 0.8	29,528	+ 1.7	8,747	19,856	714	5,018	156	72	2,840	924	6.7	421
2013 Jan	41,808	+ 0.7	29,334	+ 1.4	8,685	19,737	697	4,961	234	104	3,138	1,121	7.4	420
Feb	41,809	+ 0.7	29,345	+ 1.5	8,682	19,749	698	4,962	245	104	3,156	1,132	7.4	448
Mar	41,885	+ 0.6	29,423	+ 1.2	8,701	19,798	698	4,969	222	98	3,098	1,072	7.3	463
Apr	42,044	+ 0.6	29,562	+ 1.2	8,744	19,863	718	4,994	113	100	3,020	1,001	7.1	460
May	42,230	+ 0.6	29,637	+ 1.2	8,762	19,899	734	5,036	86	74	2,937	935	6.8	457
June	42,321	+ 0.6	29,616	+ 1.1	8,763	19,863	747	5,066	99	86	2,865	897	6.6	459
July	42,375	+ 0.6	29,596	+ 1.2	8,768	19,814	773	5,086	81	68	2,914	943	6.8	469
Aug	42,460	+ 0.6	29,843	+ 1.2	8,825	19,998	776	5,031	60	47	2,946	956	6.8	471
Sep	42,611	+ 0.6	30,165	+ 1.4	8,905	20,224	786	5,003	70	56	2,849	904	6.6	473
Oct	42,680	+ 0.5	30,181	+ 1.2	8,899	20,252	785	5,011	83	70	2,801	870	6.5	466
Nov	42,690	+ 0.5	30,149	+ 1.1	8,888	20,249	779	5,048	80	67	2,806	881	6.5	458
Dec	42,463	+ 0.5	29,884	+ 1.2	8,781	20,158	731	5,048	114	45	2,874	923	6.7	440
2014 Jan	42,071	+ 0.6	29,736	+ 1.4	8,738	20,054	726	4,977	189	63	3,136	1,104	7.3	425
Feb	42,110	+ 0.7	29,784	+ 1.5	8,749	20,085	728	4,976	193	57	3,138	1,105	7.3	456
Mar	42,241	+ 0.8	29,932	+ 1.7	8,796	20,158	742	4,990	152	55	3,055	1,026	7.1	476
Apr	42,444	+ 1.0	30,060	+ 1.7	8,825	20,240	749	5,030	77	60	2,943	938	6.8	485
May	42,596	+ 0.9	30,125	+ 1.6	8,835	20,289	750	5,060	72	56	2,882	893	[10] 6.6	481
June	42,717	+ 0.9	30,175	+ 1.9	8,853	20,292	779	5,087	66	52	2,833	869	6.5	495
July	42,763	+ 0.9	30,121	+ 1.8	8,859	20,217	800	5,100	54	40	2,871	909	6.6	502
Aug	42,817	+ 0.8	30,312	+ 1.6	8,903	20,358	802	5,046	44	32	2,902	934	6.7	515
Sep	42,993	+ 0.9	[9] 30,650	[9] + 1.6	[9] 8,992	[9] 20,593	[9] 812	[9] 5,022	...	[9] 39	2,808	885	6.5	518
Oct	43,100	+ 1.0	[9] 30,692	[9] + 1.7	[9] 8,985	[9] 20,651	[9] 809	[9] 5,030	...	[9] 48	2,733	836	6.3	517
Nov	[8] 43,101	[8] + 1.0	[9] 30,722	[9] + 1.9	[9] 8,971	[9] 20,716	[9] 801	[9] 5,040	...	[9] 47	2,717	834	6.3	515
Dec	[8] 42,867	[8] + 1.0	[9] 30,468	[9] + 2.0	[9] 8,870	[9] 20,627	[9] 755	[9] 5,039	...	[9] 36	2,764	867	6.4	498
2015 Jan	[8] 42,479	[8] + 1.0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3,032	1,043	7.0	485
Feb	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3,017	1,034	6.9	519

Sources: Federal Statistical Office; Federal Employment Agency. * Annual and quarterly figures: averages; calculated by the Bundesbank; deviations from the official figures are due to rounding. **1** Workplace concept; averages. **2** Monthly figures: end of month. **3** From January 2012, excluding all persons taking up federal voluntary service or a year of social or ecological work. **4** Number within a given month. **5** Mid-month level. **6** Relative to the total civilian labour force. **7** Excluding government-assisted forms of employment and seasonal jobs, including jobs located abroad. **8** Initial preliminary estimate by the Federal Statistical Office. **9** Unadjusted figures estimated by the Federal Employment Agency. In 2012 and 2013, the estimated values for Germany deviated from the final data by a maximum of 0.4 % for employees subject to social contributions, by a maximum of 0.9 % for persons solely in jobs exempt from social contributions, and by a maximum of 30.8 % for cyclically induced short-time work. **10** From May 2014, calculated on the basis of new labour force figures.

XI Economic conditions in Germany

7 Prices

Period	Consumer price index						Construction price index	Index of producer prices of industrial products sold on the domestic market 3	Index of producer prices of agricultural products 3	Indices of foreign trade prices		HWWI Index of World Market Prices of Raw Materials 4	
		of which											
	Total	Food	Other durable and non-durable consumer goods excluding energy 1	Energy 1	Services excluding house rents 2	House rents 2				Exports	Imports	Energy 5	Other raw materials 6
	2010 = 100												
	Index level												
2010	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
2011 7	102.1	102.2	100.8	110.1	101.0	101.3	102.9	105.3	113.4	103.3	106.4	132.2	113.5
2012 7	104.1	105.7	102.0	116.4	102.4	102.5	105.7	107.0	119.4	104.9	108.7	141.9	110.4
2013	105.7	110.4	103.0	118.0	103.8	103.8	107.9	106.9	120.7	104.3	105.9	133.1	101.0
2014	106.6	111.5	103.9	115.5	105.5	105.4	109.7	105.8	p 111.8	104.0	103.6	120.8	96.8
2013 Apr	105.1	110.0	103.3	118.2	101.8	103.5		107.1	124.8	104.7	106.4	127.8	104.0
May	105.5	111.1	103.2	117.7	103.2	103.6	107.7	106.8	124.5	104.5	106.0	129.0	103.3
June	105.6	111.5	102.9	117.6	103.7	103.7		106.7	122.2	104.1	105.3	127.1	100.7
July	106.1	111.2	102.4	118.8	105.1	103.9		106.6	119.4	104.2	105.4	133.7	99.9
Aug	106.1	110.3	102.4	118.6	105.3	104.0	108.2	106.5	119.2	104.2	105.5	135.3	98.1
Sep	106.1	109.9	103.4	119.1	104.3	104.1		106.8	120.8	104.2	105.5	135.7	97.3
Oct	105.9	110.1	103.9	117.5	103.6	104.1		106.6	121.3	103.9	104.8	130.1	95.3
Nov	106.1	110.4	103.9	116.4	104.3	104.4	108.4	106.5	122.3	103.9	104.9	130.3	96.3
Dec	106.5	112.1	103.3	116.8	105.5	104.5		106.6	122.4	103.8	104.9	131.5	96.6
2014 Jan	105.9	112.9	102.8	116.0	104.1	104.7		106.5	p 119.5	104.0	104.8	129.4	96.0
Feb	106.4	112.7	103.2	116.3	105.1	104.8	109.2	106.5	p 119.4	104.0	104.7	129.3	97.2
Mar	106.7	112.3	104.2	115.9	105.4	104.9		106.2	p 120.4	103.8	104.1	126.0	96.9
Apr	106.5	112.0	104.2	116.7	104.7	105.1		106.1	p 121.1	103.9	103.8	126.2	99.3
May	106.4	111.6	103.9	116.7	104.3	105.2	109.5	105.9	p 118.8	103.9	103.8	129.2	98.9
June	106.7	111.5	103.5	117.3	105.4	105.3		105.9	p 117.7	104.0	104.0	133.0	97.4
July	107.0	111.3	103.2	117.0	106.7	105.4		105.8	p 113.9	104.1	103.6	127.7	95.6
Aug	107.0	110.6	103.5	116.4	106.9	105.6	110.0	105.7	p 111.5	104.1	103.5	123.6	96.3
Sep	107.0	110.9	104.5	116.5	105.8	105.6		105.7	p 108.6	104.3	103.8	122.2	95.0
Oct	106.7	110.9	104.5	114.8	105.4	105.8		105.5	p 104.5	104.2	103.5	111.9	95.5
Nov	106.7	110.4	104.7	113.5	105.7	105.9	110.1	105.5	p 104.3	104.2	102.7	103.1	97.5
Dec	106.7	110.8	104.4	109.1	107.0	106.0		104.8	p 103.5	103.9	101.0	84.3	96.0
2015 Jan	105.5	111.4	103.6	105.6	105.2	106.1		104.2	p 103.6	104.4	100.2	71.4	97.7
Feb	106.5	112.3	104.0	107.8	106.7	106.2	...	...	...	...	...	86.2	97.2
	Annual percentage change												
2010	+ 1.1	+ 1.4	+ 0.6	+ 4.0	+ 0.5	+ 1.2	+ 0.9	+ 1.5	+ 13.5	+ 3.1	+ 7.1	+ 37.4	+ 34.2
2011 7	+ 2.1	+ 2.2	+ 0.8	+ 10.1	+ 1.0	+ 1.3	+ 2.9	+ 5.3	+ 13.4	+ 3.3	+ 6.4	+ 32.2	+ 13.5
2012 7	+ 2.0	+ 3.4	+ 1.2	+ 5.7	+ 1.4	+ 1.2	+ 2.7	+ 1.6	+ 5.3	+ 1.5	+ 2.2	+ 7.3	– 2.7
2013	+ 1.5	+ 4.4	+ 1.0	+ 1.4	+ 1.4	+ 1.3	+ 2.1	– 0.1	+ 1.1	– 0.6	– 2.6	– 6.2	– 8.5
2014	+ 0.9	+ 1.0	+ 0.9	– 2.1	+ 1.6	+ 1.5	+ 1.7	– 1.0	p – 7.4	– 0.3	– 2.2	– 9.2	– 4.2
2013 Apr	+ 1.2	+ 4.1	+ 1.2	+ 0.4	+ 0.5	+ 1.3		– 0.2	+ 6.3	– 0.4	– 3.0	– 14.0	– 5.6
May	+ 1.5	+ 5.4	+ 0.9	+ 1.6	+ 1.5	+ 1.3	+ 2.1	– 0.2	+ 8.0	– 0.5	– 2.9	– 8.2	– 6.2
June	+ 1.8	+ 5.4	+ 1.0	+ 3.0	+ 1.7	+ 1.3		+ 0.1	+ 7.5	– 0.7	– 2.2	+ 2.1	– 7.5
July	+ 1.9	+ 5.7	+ 1.2	+ 2.9	+ 1.4	+ 1.4		± 0.0	+ 4.0	– 0.8	– 2.6	– 2.1	– 14.5
Aug	+ 1.5	+ 4.9	+ 0.8	+ 0.5	+ 1.7	+ 1.4	+ 2.1	– 0.5	+ 0.8	– 1.0	– 3.4	– 9.3	– 14.1
Sep	+ 1.4	+ 4.7	+ 0.9	– 0.2	+ 1.7	+ 1.4		– 0.5	– 0.8	– 1.0	– 2.8	– 5.2	– 13.0
Oct	+ 1.2	+ 4.2	+ 0.9	– 0.5	+ 1.2	+ 1.3		– 0.7	– 1.5	– 1.0	– 3.0	– 7.0	– 12.3
Nov	+ 1.3	+ 3.2	+ 1.1	– 0.3	+ 1.6	+ 1.5	+ 2.0	– 0.8	– 2.6	– 1.1	– 2.9	– 5.9	– 10.0
Dec	+ 1.4	+ 3.8	+ 0.6	+ 1.1	+ 1.4	+ 1.6		– 0.5	– 1.9	– 1.0	– 2.3	– 3.5	– 9.3
2014 Jan	+ 1.3	+ 3.6	+ 1.1	– 1.8	+ 2.2	+ 1.5		– 1.1	p – 3.8	– 0.8	– 2.3	– 6.6	– 9.6
Feb	+ 1.2	+ 3.5	+ 1.0	– 2.7	+ 2.0	+ 1.5	+ 2.0	– 0.9	p – 4.2	– 0.7	– 2.7	– 8.8	– 9.1
Mar	+ 1.0	+ 2.2	+ 1.0	– 1.6	+ 1.6	+ 1.5		– 0.9	p – 3.1	– 1.0	– 3.3	– 7.6	– 10.0
Apr	+ 1.3	+ 1.8	+ 0.9	– 1.3	+ 2.8	+ 1.5		– 0.9	p – 3.0	– 0.8	– 2.4	– 1.3	– 4.5
May	+ 0.9	+ 0.5	+ 0.7	– 0.8	+ 1.1	+ 1.5	+ 1.7	– 0.8	p – 4.6	– 0.6	– 2.1	+ 0.2	– 4.3
June	+ 1.0	± 0.0	+ 0.6	– 0.3	+ 1.6	+ 1.5		– 0.7	p – 3.7	– 0.1	– 1.2	+ 4.6	– 3.3
July	+ 0.8	+ 0.1	+ 0.8	– 1.5	+ 1.5	+ 1.4		– 0.8	p – 4.6	– 0.1	– 1.7	– 4.5	– 4.3
Aug	+ 0.8	+ 0.3	+ 1.1	– 1.9	+ 1.5	+ 1.5	+ 1.7	– 0.8	p – 6.5	– 0.1	– 1.9	– 8.6	– 1.8
Sep	+ 0.8	+ 0.9	+ 1.1	– 2.2	+ 1.4	+ 1.4		– 1.0	p – 10.1	+ 0.1	– 1.6	– 9.9	– 2.4
Oct	+ 0.8	+ 0.7	+ 0.6	– 2.3	+ 1.7	+ 1.6		– 1.0	p – 13.8	+ 0.3	– 1.2	– 14.0	+ 0.2
Nov	+ 0.6	± 0.0	+ 0.8	– 2.5	+ 1.3	+ 1.4	+ 1.6	– 0.9	p – 14.7	+ 0.3	– 2.1	– 20.9	+ 1.2
Dec	+ 0.2	– 1.2	+ 1.1	– 6.6	+ 1.4	+ 1.4		– 1.7	p – 15.4	+ 0.1	– 3.7	– 35.9	– 0.6
2015 Jan	– 0.4	– 1.3	+ 0.8	– 9.0	+ 1.1	+ 1.3		– 2.2	p – 13.3	+ 0.4	– 4.4	– 44.8	+ 1.8
Feb	+ 0.1	– 0.4	+ 0.8	– 7.3	+ 1.5	+ 1.3	...	...	...	...	...	– 33.3	± 0.0

Source: Federal Statistical Office and Bundesbank calculation based on data provided by the Federal Statistical Office; for the Index of World Market Prices of Raw Materials: HWWI. **1** Electricity, gas and other fuels. **2** Net rents. **3** Excluding value-added tax. **4** For the euro area, in euro. **5** Coal and crude oil (Brent). **6** Food, beverages and tobacco as well as industrial raw materials. **7** From May 2011 and from January 2012, increase in tobacco tax.

XI Economic conditions in Germany

8 Households' income *

Period	Gross wages and salaries 1		Net wages and salaries 2		Monetary social benefits received 3		Mass income 4		Disposable income 5		Saving 6		Saving ratio 7
	€ billion	Annual percentage change	€ billion	Annual percentage change	€ billion	Annual percentage change	€ billion	Annual percentage change	€ billion	Annual percentage change	€ billion	Annual percentage change	As percentage
2007	969.3	3.3	648.9	2.9	356.4	– 0.7	1,005.3	1.6	1,540.7	1.8	157.1	3.6	10.2
2008	1,008.1	4.0	670.8	3.4	358.4	0.6	1,029.2	2.4	1,579.0	2.5	165.1	5.1	10.5
2009	1,009.5	0.1	672.6	0.3	383.5	7.0	1,056.1	2.6	1,564.2	– 0.9	155.7	– 5.7	10.0
2010	1,039.0	2.9	702.2	4.4	388.0	1.2	1,090.1	3.2	1,605.0	2.6	159.3	2.3	9.9
2011	1,087.7	4.7	728.5	3.7	383.2	– 1.2	1,111.6	2.0	1,666.0	3.8	159.2	– 0.1	9.6
2012	1,131.7	4.0	756.4	3.8	389.4	1.6	1,145.7	3.1	1,699.0	2.0	159.5	0.2	9.4
2013	1,165.5	3.0	777.2	2.8	398.3	2.3	1,175.6	2.6	1,728.5	1.7	157.0	– 1.6	9.1
2014	1,210.2	3.8	804.6	3.5	409.5	2.8	1,214.1	3.3	1,770.4	2.4	165.6	5.5	9.4
2013 Q3	288.1	3.1	196.4	3.1	99.9	2.3	296.3	2.8	436.5	3.1	34.3	1.2	7.8
Q4	321.9	3.0	214.0	2.6	98.0	1.8	311.9	2.3	434.4	1.7	32.2	0.5	7.4
2014 Q1	281.7	3.9	187.6	3.5	103.8	2.3	291.4	3.1	437.2	2.2	54.9	3.1	12.6
Q2	295.5	3.9	192.5	3.7	100.2	1.3	292.8	2.9	438.6	2.1	39.0	4.8	8.9
Q3	299.1	3.8	203.3	3.5	102.4	2.5	305.7	3.2	446.4	2.3	35.5	3.6	8.0
Q4	333.9	3.7	221.1	3.3	103.1	5.3	324.2	3.9	448.1	3.2	36.2	12.5	8.1

Source: Federal Statistical Office; figures computed in February 2015. * Households including non-profit institutions serving households. 1 Residence concept. 2 After deducting the wage tax payable on gross wages and salaries and employees' contributions to the social security funds. 3 Social security benefits in cash from the social security funds, central, state and local government and foreign countries, pension payments (net), private funded social benefits, less social contributions on social benefits, consumption-related taxes and public charges. 4 Net wages and salaries plus monetary social benefits received. 5 Mass income plus operating surplus, mixed income, property income (net), other current transfers received, income of non-profit institutions serving households, less taxes (excluding wage tax and consumption-related taxes) and other current transfers paid. Including the increase in claims on company pension funds. 6 Including the increase in claims on company pension funds. 7 Saving as a percentage of disposable income.

9 Negotiated pay rates (overall economy)

Period	Index of negotiated wages 1								*Memo item:* Wages and salaries per employee 3	
	On an hourly basis		On a monthly basis							
			Total		Total excluding one-off payments		Basic pay rates 2			
	2010=100	Annual percentage change	2010=100	Annual percentage change	2010=100	Annual percentage change	2010=100	Annual percentage change	2010=100	Annual percentage change
2007	93.9	1.4	93.7	1.5	93.4	1.5	92.9	1.5	95.3	1.4
2008	96.5	2.7	96.4	2.8	96.2	3.0	95.9	3.2	97.6	2.4
2009	98.4	2.0	98.3	2.0	98.4	2.3	98.3	2.5	97.6	– 0.1
2010	100.0	1.6	100.0	1.7	100.0	1.7	100.0	1.8	100.0	2.5
2011	101.8	1.8	101.8	1.8	101.8	1.8	101.8	1.8	103.3	3.3
2012	104.5	2.7	104.5	2.6	104.8	2.9	104.7	2.9	106.1	2.7
2013	107.0	2.4	107.0	2.4	107.3	2.4	107.3	2.5	108.4	2.1
2014	110.3	3.0	110.1	2.9	110.3	2.8	110.3	2.9	111.2	2.7
2013 Q3	109.2	2.4	109.2	2.3	109.5	2.4	107.8	2.4	106.8	2.2
Q4	119.6	2.3	119.6	2.3	120.0	2.4	108.1	2.3	118.5	2.2
2014 Q1	102.2	3.1	102.1	3.0	101.9	2.5	109.1	2.5	104.8	3.0
Q2	103.5	3.2	103.4	3.1	103.6	3.1	110.2	3.3	108.9	2.7
Q3	112.3	2.8	112.2	2.8	112.5	2.8	110.9	2.8	109.6	2.6
Q4	123.1	2.9	122.9	2.8	123.3	2.8	111.2	2.9	121.4	2.5
2014 July	130.2	2.9	130.0	2.8	130.4	2.9	110.8	3.0	.	.
Aug	103.3	2.7	103.2	2.7	103.5	2.6	110.9	2.7	.	.
Sep	103.4	2.9	103.3	2.8	103.7	2.8	111.0	2.8	.	.
Oct	103.5	2.9	103.4	2.9	103.8	2.8	111.1	2.9	.	.
Nov	159.8	2.8	159.7	2.8	160.2	2.8	111.2	2.8	.	.
Dec	105.8	2.9	105.7	2.9	106.0	2.8	111.2	2.9	.	.
2015 Jan	104.0	0.9	103.9	0.9	104.0	2.3	111.4	2.3	.	.

1 Current data are normally revised on account of additional reports. 2 Excluding one-off payments and covenants (capital formation benefits, special payments, such as annual bonuses, holiday pay, Christmas bonuses (13th monthly salary payment) and retirement provisions). 3 Source: Federal Statistical Office; figures computed in February 2015.

XI Economic conditions in Germany

10 Assets, equity and liabilities of listed non-financial groups *

End-of-year/end-of-quarter data

Period	Assets									Equity and liabilities						
			of which				*of which*				Liabilities					
												Long-term		Short-term		
															of which	
	Total assets	Non-current assets	Intangible assets	Tangible assets	Financial assets	Current assets	Inventories	Trade receivables	Cash [1]	Equity	Total	Total	*of which* Financial debt	Total	Financial debt	Trade payables
	Total (€ billion)															
2010	1,748.4	1,077.5	334.5	459.6	213.2	670.9	169.5	170.2	132.6	514.7	1,233.7	657.9	354.8	575.8	147.1	151.4
2011	1,838.5	1,116.0	340.0	477.4	232.9	722.5	190.6	180.4	119.3	537.8	1,300.7	663.6	347.3	637.2	176.8	161.1
2012	1,904.5	1,178.1	380.2	490.5	240.8	726.4	189.8	179.1	126.0	561.5	1,343.0	719.5	380.8	623.5	179.5	160.6
2013	1,938.4	1,196.1	387.1	499.5	241.0	742.3	189.0	179.8	139.0	576.1	1,362.3	726.4	383.1	635.9	191.5	166.8
2013 Q4	1,938.4	1,196.1	387.1	499.5	241.0	742.3	189.0	179.8	139.0	576.1	1,362.3	726.4	383.1	635.9	191.5	166.8
2014 Q1 r	1,973.5	1,203.9	388.5	502.5	252.6	769.6	197.1	193.6	142.8	578.2	1,395.3	741.0	384.0	654.3	194.4	164.3
Q2	1,982.5	1,224.8	394.0	505.9	261.9	757.6	200.9	189.9	123.3	568.7	1,413.8	763.3	395.0	650.5	199.7	162.6
Q3 p	2,043.4	1,263.4	403.1	522.2	267.8	780.0	206.8	190.0	136.0	586.1	1,457.3	793.2	407.0	664.0	200.7	172.0
	as a percentage of total assets															
2010	100.0	61.6	19.1	26.3	12.2	38.4	9.7	9.7	7.6	29.4	70.6	37.6	20.3	32.9	8.4	8.7
2011	100.0	60.7	18.5	26.0	12.7	39.3	10.4	9.8	6.5	29.3	70.8	36.1	18.9	34.7	9.6	8.8
2012	100.0	61.9	20.0	25.8	12.6	38.1	10.0	9.4	6.6	29.5	70.5	37.8	20.0	32.7	9.4	8.4
2013	100.0	61.7	20.0	25.8	12.4	38.3	9.8	9.3	7.2	29.7	70.3	37.5	19.8	32.8	9.9	8.6
2013 Q4	100.0	61.7	20.0	25.8	12.4	38.3	9.8	9.3	7.2	29.7	70.3	37.5	19.8	32.8	9.9	8.6
2014 Q1 r	100.0	61.0	19.7	25.5	12.8	39.0	10.0	9.8	7.2	29.3	70.7	37.6	19.5	33.2	9.9	8.3
Q2	100.0	61.8	19.9	25.5	13.2	38.2	10.1	9.6	6.2	28.7	71.3	38.5	19.9	32.8	10.1	8.2
Q3 p	100.0	61.8	19.7	25.6	13.1	38.2	10.1	9.3	6.7	28.7	71.3	38.8	19.9	32.5	9.8	8.4
	Groups with a focus on the production sector (€ billion) [2]															
2010	1,383.0	814.2	213.9	355.8	189.5	568.8	152.2	135.1	105.4	400.6	982.4	515.3	258.3	467.1	125.4	108.1
2011	1,474.2	860.6	221.7	373.8	214.9	613.6	172.3	143.6	92.7	421.6	1,052.6	530.5	260.8	522.2	151.2	116.7
2012	1,540.6	921.2	258.9	387.9	222.1	619.5	172.5	140.4	98.1	443.8	1,096.8	581.7	286.6	515.1	161.0	116.5
2013	1,559.6	933.2	259.1	398.7	224.1	626.4	172.7	140.0	106.6	457.3	1,102.3	580.9	285.9	521.4	170.7	118.6
2013 Q4	1,559.6	933.2	259.1	398.7	224.1	626.4	172.7	140.0	106.6	457.3	1,102.3	580.9	285.9	521.4	170.7	118.6
2014 Q1 r	1,596.1	941.8	260.1	401.1	236.3	654.3	181.1	152.5	110.4	457.3	1,138.8	597.3	290.0	541.5	173.9	121.6
Q2	1,604.2	956.5	260.9	403.7	245.0	647.7	184.7	147.7	97.0	451.5	1,152.7	617.5	301.8	535.2	177.9	118.2
Q3 p	1,647.8	986.3	265.4	418.1	249.8	661.5	190.7	146.2	102.1	461.3	1,186.5	640.3	310.4	546.2	176.5	125.4
	as a percentage of total assets															
2010	100.0	58.9	15.5	25.7	13.7	41.1	11.0	9.8	7.6	29.0	71.0	37.3	18.7	33.8	9.1	7.8
2011	100.0	58.4	15.0	25.4	14.6	41.6	11.7	9.7	6.3	28.6	71.4	36.0	17.7	35.4	10.3	7.9
2012	100.0	59.8	16.8	25.2	14.4	40.2	11.2	9.1	6.4	28.8	71.2	37.8	18.6	33.4	10.5	7.6
2013	100.0	59.8	16.6	25.6	14.4	40.2	11.1	9.0	6.8	29.3	70.7	37.3	18.3	33.4	10.9	7.6
2013 Q4	100.0	59.8	16.6	25.6	14.4	40.2	11.1	9.0	6.8	29.3	70.7	37.3	18.3	33.4	10.9	7.6
2014 Q1 r	100.0	59.0	16.3	25.1	14.8	41.0	11.3	9.6	6.9	28.7	71.4	37.4	18.2	33.9	10.9	7.6
Q2	100.0	59.6	16.3	25.2	15.3	40.4	11.5	9.2	6.1	28.1	71.9	38.5	18.8	33.4	11.1	7.4
Q3 p	100.0	59.9	16.1	25.4	15.2	40.1	11.6	8.9	6.2	28.0	72.0	38.9	18.8	33.2	10.7	7.6
	Groups with a focus on the services sector (€ billion)															
2010	365.4	263.3	120.6	103.8	23.7	102.1	17.4	35.1	27.2	114.0	251.4	142.6	96.5	108.8	21.7	43.3
2011	364.3	255.4	118.3	103.6	17.9	108.9	18.3	36.8	26.6	116.2	248.1	133.1	86.5	115.0	25.6	44.4
2012	363.8	256.9	121.3	102.6	18.7	106.9	17.4	38.7	27.9	117.7	246.1	137.7	94.2	108.4	18.4	44.2
2013	378.8	262.9	128.0	100.8	16.8	115.9	16.3	39.8	32.4	118.8	260.0	145.4	97.1	114.5	20.9	48.2
2013 Q4	378.8	262.9	128.0	100.8	16.8	115.9	16.3	39.8	32.4	118.8	260.0	145.4	97.1	114.5	20.9	48.2
2014 Q1 r	377.4	262.1	128.4	101.4	16.4	115.3	16.0	41.1	32.4	120.9	256.5	143.7	94.0	112.8	20.5	42.7
Q2	378.3	268.4	133.1	102.2	16.9	109.9	16.2	42.1	26.2	117.2	261.1	145.8	93.2	115.3	21.8	44.4
Q3 p	395.6	277.1	137.7	104.2	18.1	118.5	16.1	43.8	33.9	124.8	270.8	152.9	96.6	117.9	24.2	46.5
	as a percentage of total assets															
2010	100.0	72.1	33.0	28.4	6.5	27.9	4.8	9.6	7.4	31.2	68.8	39.0	26.4	29.8	5.9	11.9
2011	100.0	70.1	32.5	28.5	4.9	29.9	5.0	10.1	7.3	31.9	68.1	36.5	23.8	31.6	7.0	12.2
2012	100.0	70.6	33.4	28.2	5.1	29.4	4.8	10.6	7.7	32.4	67.7	37.9	25.9	29.8	5.1	12.1
2013	100.0	69.4	33.8	26.6	4.4	30.6	4.3	10.5	8.6	31.4	68.6	38.4	25.6	30.2	5.5	12.7
2013 Q4	100.0	69.4	33.8	26.6	4.4	30.6	4.3	10.5	8.6	31.4	68.6	38.4	25.6	30.2	5.5	12.7
2014 Q1 r	100.0	69.5	34.0	26.9	4.3	30.6	4.2	10.9	8.6	32.0	68.0	38.1	24.9	29.9	5.4	11.3
Q2	100.0	70.9	35.2	27.0	4.5	29.1	4.3	11.1	6.9	31.0	69.0	38.5	24.7	30.5	5.8	11.7
Q3 p	100.0	70.0	34.8	26.3	4.6	30.0	4.1	11.1	8.6	31.6	68.4	38.7	24.4	29.8	6.1	11.8

***** Non-financial groups listed in Germany which publish IFRS consolidated financial statements on a quarterly basis and make a noteworthy contribution to value added in Germany. Excluding groups in real estate activities. **1** Including cash equivalents. **2** Including groups in agriculture and forestry.

XI Economic conditions in Germany

11 Revenues and operating income of listed non-financial groups *

Period	Revenues		Operating income before depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA [1])		Operating income before depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA [1]) as a percentage of revenues					Operating income (EBIT)		Operating income (EBIT) as a percentage of revenues				
					Weighted average		Distribution [2]					Weighted average		Distribution [2]		
							First quartile	Median	Third quartile					First quartile	Median	Third quartile
	€ billion	Annual change in % [3]	€ billion	Annual change in % [3]	%	Annual change in percentage points [3]	%	%	%	€ billion	Annual change in % [3]	%	Annual change in percentage points [3]	%	%	%
	Total															
2005	1,077.4	.	150.6	.	14.0	.	6.4	12.0	17.7	72.7	.	6.8	.	3.1	6.9	11.7
2006	1,209.4	10.6	155.0	3.4	12.8	– 0.9	7.1	11.5	17.5	75.7	3.4	6.3	– 0.4	3.8	7.6	11.4
2007	1,234.0	4.4	173.8	15.0	14.1	1.3	7.8	12.7	18.4	95.5	27.5	7.7	1.4	4.2	8.4	13.1
2008	1,307.5	6.4	164.5	– 5.6	12.6	– 1.6	5.8	11.6	17.6	80.9	– 16.6	6.2	– 1.7	2.5	6.6	12.1
2009	1,175.4	– 10.5	138.4	– 16.4	11.8	– 0.8	4.0	9.5	15.8	57.9	– 28.0	4.9	– 1.2	0.3	5.1	9.3
2010	1,340.0	13.2	184.7	30.4	13.8	1.8	6.0	11.2	18.6	100.4	64.9	7.5	2.3	3.1	6.5	12.1
2011	1,434.5	8.4	180.1	– 0.3	12.6	– 1.1	5.5	10.7	17.4	94.6	– 5.4	6.6	– 1.0	2.7	6.6	11.9
2012	1,552.2	6.6	192.6	3.4	12.4	– 0.4	5.1	10.1	17.5	97.0	– 7.1	6.3	– 0.9	1.8	6.1	11.0
2013	1,557.4	– 0.5	189.2	– 2.5	12.2	– 0.3	5.0	10.2	18.4	99.9	6.2	6.4	0.4	1.8	5.8	10.8
2012 Q1	379.9	9.0	47.6	– 0.3	12.5	– 1.2	3.9	9.2	16.4	29.0	– 3.8	7.6	– 1.0	0.2	5.0	11.0
Q2	382.4	7.2	47.1	9.3	12.3	0.2	4.8	9.9	17.0	27.7	10.6	7.2	0.2	1.2	6.5	11.4
Q3	384.3	7.1	48.7	4.3	12.7	– 0.3	4.8	10.3	17.2	16.6	– 49.8	4.3	– 3.9	1.7	6.2	11.9
Q4	406.6	3.3	49.1	0.7	12.1	– 0.3	4.0	10.8	18.5	23.6	24.1	5.8	1.0	0.1	6.4	12.4
2013 Q1	376.2	– 1.2	45.4	– 5.9	12.1	– 0.6	2.4	8.3	15.7	26.4	– 10.9	7.0	– 0.8	– 1.4	4.5	10.0
Q2	393.6	1.1	48.3	– 1.4	12.3	– 0.3	4.1	9.2	16.7	27.3	– 4.8	6.9	– 0.4	0.9	4.9	10.2
Q3	384.3	– 1.6	47.9	– 1.0	12.5	0.1	5.2	10.4	16.5	25.6	99.8	6.7	3.5	1.3	5.8	11.8
Q4	406.7	– 0.3	47.6	– 1.6	11.7	– 0.2	5.2	11.1	19.5	20.5	– 12.4	5.0	– 0.7	0.9	6.7	12.6
2014 Q1 r	381.7	0.2	50.2	9.1	13.2	1.1	3.8	8.8	16.1	30.6	15.4	8.0	1.1	0.0	5.1	10.1
Q2	386.7	– 1.7	47.9	0.1	12.4	0.2	4.6	9.7	16.9	26.4	– 1.9	6.8	– 0.0	1.3	5.7	11.1
Q3 p	394.7	3.0	49.8	3.9	12.6	0.1	5.4	11.3	18.3	28.6	8.6	7.2	0.4	1.8	6.8	12.7
	Groups with a focus on the production sector [4]															
2005	807.7	.	109.5	.	13.6	.	6.5	12.0	17.7	52.3	.	6.5	.	2.9	7.8	11.5
2006	898.7	9.8	114.9	6.4	12.8	– 0.4	7.7	12.2	17.6	55.8	7.2	6.2	– 0.2	4.1	8.1	11.4
2007	900.5	3.8	129.6	16.8	14.4	1.6	7.8	12.7	17.6	73.8	33.0	8.2	1.8	5.0	8.6	12.5
2008	966.1	7.2	122.6	– 6.1	12.7	– 1.8	5.8	11.3	15.6	62.0	– 17.1	6.4	– 1.9	2.4	6.7	11.4
2009	854.1	– 11.5	97.7	– 19.9	11.4	– 1.2	2.9	9.2	14.0	41.9	– 31.0	4.9	– 1.4	– 1.3	4.7	8.8
2010	999.2	15.7	139.0	38.1	13.9	2.3	6.3	11.2	16.2	77.7	70.0	7.8	2.5	2.9	7.0	11.9
2011	1,098.9	10.6	131.9	– 2.6	12.0	– 1.6	5.3	10.7	16.2	74.8	– 6.5	6.8	– 1.3	2.1	6.8	11.2
2012	1,194.0	7.6	144.1	5.5	12.1	– 0.2	5.2	10.2	15.9	83.0	2.9	7.0	– 0.3	1.8	6.2	9.8
2013	1,195.9	– 0.6	140.9	– 2.2	11.8	– 0.2	4.3	10.2	15.5	75.1	– 5.1	6.3	– 0.3	1.2	5.6	9.8
2012 Q1	297.1	10.6	38.9	2.7	13.1	– 1.0	4.8	9.7	15.5	25.8	– 0.9	8.7	– 1.0	0.8	5.8	11.0
Q2	294.0	8.2	35.8	9.8	12.2	0.2	5.4	10.2	15.8	22.0	12.5	7.5	0.3	1.6	6.6	10.2
Q3	292.4	8.3	35.0	4.7	12.0	– 0.4	5.3	10.3	15.0	19.2	– 11.0	6.6	– 1.2	1.7	5.7	10.7
Q4	311.4	3.7	34.3	5.3	11.0	0.2	3.4	10.5	16.6	16.0	14.5	5.1	0.5	– 1.2	5.3	11.0
2013 Q1	292.2	– 1.4	36.2	– 7.5	12.4	– 0.8	2.4	8.4	14.3	22.6	– 13.6	7.7	– 1.1	– 1.4	4.7	9.4
Q2	303.3	1.4	36.0	– 2.1	11.9	– 0.4	3.6	9.1	15.2	20.6	– 8.4	6.8	– 0.7	0.4	5.0	9.4
Q3	290.7	– 2.2	34.1	– 0.4	11.7	0.2	4.9	10.3	15.1	17.5	15.3	6.0	1.0	0.8	5.7	10.1
Q4	311.6	– 0.4	34.6	1.9	11.1	0.3	4.5	10.7	15.5	14.3	– 7.6	4.6	– 0.4	0.0	6.0	10.4
2014 Q1 r	298.0	0.3	39.1	6.6	13.1	0.8	3.8	8.8	14.3	25.0	10.5	8.4	0.8	0.2	5.2	8.8
Q2	297.2	– 2.1	36.1	0.7	12.1	0.3	4.0	9.4	15.3	20.5	0.3	6.9	0.2	1.1	5.3	10.6
Q3 p	300.0	3.6	36.3	6.4	12.1	0.3	4.2	10.3	16.0	20.9	13.1	7.0	0.6	1.2	6.3	10.3
	Groups with a focus on the services sector															
2005	269.7	.	41.0	.	15.2	.	6.3	12.0	17.7	20.4	.	7.6	.	3.1	5.3	12.1
2006	310.7	12.9	40.0	– 5.0	12.9	– 2.4	6.8	11.2	16.7	19.9	– 7.0	6.4	– 1.3	3.2	6.4	11.2
2007	333.5	6.4	44.2	9.3	13.3	0.4	7.0	12.7	20.6	21.8	9.6	6.5	0.2	3.3	7.8	14.2
2008	341.4	4.0	41.9	– 3.7	12.3	– 1.0	5.9	12.5	19.7	19.0	– 14.6	5.6	– 1.2	2.8	6.6	12.7
2009	321.3	– 7.4	40.8	– 4.9	12.7	0.3	4.7	10.7	20.3	16.0	– 16.3	5.0	– 0.5	1.7	5.7	12.7
2010	340.8	5.8	45.7	8.7	13.4	0.3	5.9	10.8	19.9	22.7	46.7	6.7	1.7	3.3	5.9	12.4
2011	335.6	1.5	48.2	7.6	14.4	0.8	5.7	10.6	20.9	19.8	– 0.8	5.9	– 0.1	3.2	6.4	13.8
2012	358.2	3.0	48.5	– 3.3	13.5	– 0.9	5.1	10.0	23.2	13.9	– 47.1	3.9	– 3.0	2.1	5.7	14.0
2013	361.5	– 0.1	48.2	– 3.5	13.3	– 0.5	5.3	9.9	21.1	24.8	91.7	6.9	3.0	2.7	5.9	12.2
2012 Q1	82.8	3.1	8.7	– 13.4	10.6	– 1.9	2.9	7.7	20.3	3.2	– 27.2	3.8	– 1.3	– 0.7	4.0	11.9
Q2	88.4	3.8	11.3	7.8	12.8	0.5	4.1	9.7	20.9	5.7	2.6	6.5	– 0.1	0.7	5.2	14.6
Q3	91.9	3.1	13.7	3.3	14.9	0.0	4.4	11.1	20.6	– 2.6	– 147.5	– 2.9	– 13.2	1.6	7.5	13.5
Q4	95.2	1.9	14.8	– 10.1	15.5	– 2.0	5.2	11.4	25.4	7.7	55.9	8.0	2.7	1.9	7.8	15.9
2013 Q1	84.0	– 0.6	9.2	1.4	10.9	0.2	2.4	7.8	20.0	3.8	14.9	4.5	0.6	– 1.6	4.4	12.3
Q2	90.3	– 0.3	12.2	1.0	13.5	0.2	4.9	9.4	19.2	6.7	12.0	7.4	0.8	1.2	4.8	13.9
Q3	93.5	0.5	13.8	– 2.8	14.8	– 0.5	5.7	10.7	21.0	8.1	307.7	8.6	12.5	2.0	6.2	13.1
Q4	95.1	0.1	13.0	– 11.1	13.6	– 1.7	6.4	13.2	24.0	6.2	– 24.2	6.6	– 1.9	2.0	8.1	16.1
2014 Q1 r	83.7	– 0.4	11.1	20.2	13.3	2.3	3.8	8.9	21.2	5.6	50.2	6.7	2.2	– 0.4	4.6	13.1
Q2	89.5	– 0.4	11.9	– 1.7	13.3	– 0.2	4.8	10.4	18.7	6.0	– 9.8	6.7	– 0.7	1.4	6.0	13.0
Q3 p	94.7	1.1	13.5	– 2.9	14.2	– 0.6	7.1	13.1	24.6	7.7	– 3.4	8.1	– 0.4	3.1	7.8	13.8

***** Non-financial groups listed in Germany which publish IFRS consolidated financial statements on a quarterly basis and make a noteworthy contribution to value added in Germany. Excluding groups in real estate activities. **1** Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation. **2** Quantile data are based on the groups' unweighted return on sales. **3** Adjusted for substantial changes in the basis of consolidation of large groups and in the reporting sample. See the explanatory notes in the Statistical Supplement Seasonally adjusted business statistics. **4** Including groups in agriculture and forestry.

XII External sector

1 Major items of the balance of payments of the euro area *

€ million

Item	2013	2014 p	2014 Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4 p	Oct	Nov	Dec p
A Current account	+ 214,030	+ 235,515	+ 35,182	+ 42,611	+ 72,238	+ 85,484	+ 29,815	+ 26,488	+ 29,181
1 Goods									
Exports	1,916,346	1,943,282	469,444	484,837	489,114	499,887	177,889	163,325	158,673
Imports	1,701,571	1,701,713	424,760	423,806	426,878	426,269	152,442	140,330	133,497
Balance	+ 214,775	+ 241,569	+ 44,684	+ 61,031	+ 62,236	+ 73,618	+ 25,447	+ 22,995	+ 25,176
2 Services									
Receipts	641,184	686,873	155,394	170,473	181,983	179,023	59,936	56,122	62,965
Expenditure	570,109	608,731	136,828	148,524	162,156	161,223	53,848	50,207	57,168
Balance	+ 71,076	+ 78,140	+ 18,566	+ 21,950	+ 19,824	+ 17,800	+ 6,088	+ 5,915	+ 5,797
3 Primary income									
Receipts	598,900	583,154	146,452	156,591	137,790	142,321	42,001	43,047	57,273
Expenditure	527,309	523,493	123,063	163,019	122,075	115,336	35,488	34,946	44,902
Balance	+ 71,590	+ 59,661	+ 23,390	– 6,429	+ 15,715	+ 26,985	+ 6,513	+ 8,101	+ 12,371
4 Secondary income									
Receipts	87,561	88,602	19,959	23,822	21,530	23,291	7,312	7,209	8,770
Expenditure	230,975	232,461	71,417	57,763	47,070	56,211	15,545	17,732	22,934
Balance	– 143,412	– 143,859	– 51,458	– 33,942	– 25,539	– 32,920	– 8,233	– 10,523	– 14,164
B Capital account	+ 21,348	+ 20,612	+ 5,941	+ 4,099	+ 4,112	+ 6,460	+ 1,742	+ 2,196	+ 2,522
C Financial account (Increase: +)	+ 450,545	+ 347,787	+ 60,574	+ 79,737	+ 68,623	+ 138,853	+ 36,032	+ 79,480	+ 23,341
1 Direct investment	+ 27,369	+ 68,648	+ 21,042	– 1,106	+ 27,649	+ 21,063	+ 946	+ 28,544	– 8,427
By resident units abroad	+ 508,928	+ 50,797	+ 12,340	– 14,869	+ 56,097	– 2,771	+ 10,014	+ 17,037	– 29,822
By non-resident units in the euro area	+ 481,561	– 17,850	– 8,702	– 13,762	+ 28,448	– 23,834	+ 9,068	– 11,507	– 21,395
2 Portfolio investment	+ 15,200	+ 115,167	– 52,606	– 43,060	+ 76,470	+ 134,363	+ 47,367	+ 11,359	+ 75,637
By resident units abroad	+ 271,433	+ 441,321	+ 72,706	+ 157,144	+ 114,599	+ 96,872	+ 16,282	+ 45,890	+ 34,700
Equity and Investment fund shares	+ 172,922	+ 132,656	+ 20,325	+ 67,310	+ 27,331	+ 17,690	– 10,793	+ 9,130	+ 19,353
Long-term debt securities	+ 91,890	+ 235,624	+ 39,650	+ 73,136	+ 61,401	+ 61,437	+ 21,582	+ 37,702	+ 2,153
Short-term debt securities	+ 6,621	+ 73,037	+ 12,730	+ 16,697	+ 25,866	+ 17,744	+ 5,493	– 943	+ 13,194
By non-resident units in the euro area	+ 256,232	+ 326,156	+ 125,312	+ 200,206	+ 38,128	– 37,490	– 31,084	+ 34,531	– 40,937
Equity and Investment fund shares	+ 157,283	+ 245,611	+ 60,621	+ 109,995	+ 65,732	+ 9,263	+ 28,396	+ 3,589	– 22,722
Long-term debt securities	+ 85,933	+ 48,333	+ 60,746	+ 65,782	– 42,667	– 35,528	– 33,519	+ 37,524	– 39,533
Short-term debt securities	+ 13,017	+ 32,208	+ 3,944	+ 24,428	+ 15,062	– 11,226	– 25,962	– 6,583	+ 21,319
3 Financial derivatives and employee stock options	+ 33,089	+ 43,412	+ 5,501	+ 16,124	+ 16,150	+ 5,637	+ 651	+ 3,384	+ 1,602
4 Other investment	+ 370,106	+ 116,102	+ 84,134	+ 107,357	– 50,308	– 25,081	– 13,936	+ 35,401	– 46,546
Eurosystem	+ 58,821	+ 52,507	+ 23,818	+ 17,242	+ 14,507	– 3,060	+ 4,007	– 2,028	– 5,039
General government	– 9,174	+ 10,273	– 3,201	– 4,366	+ 643	+ 17,197	+ 1,730	+ 2,348	+ 13,119
MFIs (excluding the Eurosystem)	+ 254,234	+ 100,069	+ 72,273	+ 78,150	– 38,437	– 11,917	– 632	+ 32,840	– 44,125
Enterprises and households	+ 66,224	– 46,745	– 8,754	+ 16,332	– 27,022	– 27,301	– 19,041	+ 2,241	– 10,501
5 Reserve assets	+ 4,782	+ 4,458	+ 2,503	+ 422	– 1,338	+ 2,871	+ 1,004	+ 791	+ 1,076
D Net errors and omissions	+ 215,166	+ 91,662	+ 19,451	+ 33,028	– 7,726	+ 46,909	+ 4,475	+ 50,796	– 8,362

* Source: ECB, according to the international standards of the Balance of Payments Manual in the 6th edition of the International Monetary Fund.

XII External sector

2 Major items of the balance of payments of the Federal Republic of Germany (balances)

€ million

Period	Current account						Balance of capital account [4]	Financial account (Net lending: + / net borrowing: -)		Errors and omissions [5]
	Total	Goods (fob/fob) [1]	*of which* Supplementary trade items [2]	Services (fob/fob) [3]	Primary income	Secondary income		Total	*of which* Reserve assets	
2000 r	– 36,962	+ 64,061	+ 1,645	– 58,370	– 12,722	– 29,931	+ 5,091	– 42,531	– 5,844	– 10,660
2001 r	– 7,912	+ 101,273	+ 3,321	– 62,833	– 17,195	– 29,156	– 3,258	+ 947	– 6,032	+ 12,117
2002 r	+ 41,701	+ 142,103	+ 6,008	– 45,440	– 25,596	– 29,367	– 4,010	+ 8,029	– 2,065	– 29,661
2003 r	+ 31,215	+ 130,021	– 2,105	– 48,694	– 18,933	– 31,179	+ 5,920	+ 47,555	– 445	+ 10,420
2004 r	+ 100,835	+ 153,166	– 6,859	– 38,748	+ 16,895	– 30,479	– 119	+ 112,832	– 1,470	+ 12,116
2005 r	+ 106,140	+ 157,010	– 6,068	– 40,660	+ 20,965	– 31,175	– 2,334	+ 96,432	– 2,182	– 7,374
2006 r	+ 135,939	+ 161,447	– 4,205	– 34,759	+ 41,571	– 32,320	– 1,328	+ 157,134	– 2,934	+ 22,523
2007 r	+ 169,595	+ 201,989	– 922	– 35,032	+ 36,483	– 33,845	– 1,597	+ 183,158	+ 953	+ 15,160
2008 r	+ 143,317	+ 184,521	– 3,586	– 31,608	+ 24,865	– 34,462	– 893	+ 121,326	+ 2,008	– 21,097
2009 r	+ 141,117	+ 141,167	– 6,064	– 19,909	+ 55,018	– 35,159	– 1,858	+ 117,837	– 3,200	– 21,423
2010 r	+ 145,101	+ 161,146	– 5,892	– 27,477	+ 51,101	– 39,669	+ 1,219	+ 92,759	+ 1,613	– 53,560
2011 r	+ 164,552	+ 163,426	– 8,900	– 32,471	+ 69,102	– 35,505	+ 1,642	+ 120,849	+ 2,836	– 45,345
2012 r	+ 187,345	+ 196,579	– 10,694	– 35,905	+ 66,811	– 40,139	+ 1,427	+ 157,461	+ 1,297	– 31,312
2013 r	+ 182,020	+ 207,597	– 5,236	– 44,755	+ 60,247	– 41,069	+ 1,142	+ 207,920	+ 838	+ 24,758
2014 r	+ 219,690	+ 229,301	– 6,351	– 39,112	+ 66,922	– 37,421	+ 2,826	+ 243,827	– 2,564	+ 21,311
2012 Q1 r	+ 44,191	+ 49,259	– 1,784	– 7,876	+ 17,777	– 14,969	– 319	+ 23,296	+ 963	– 20,576
Q2 r	+ 42,538	+ 49,797	– 3,096	– 8,079	+ 6,359	– 5,538	+ 525	+ 30,817	+ 769	– 12,245
Q3 r	+ 45,856	+ 52,191	– 2,392	– 15,516	+ 17,714	– 8,533	+ 1,342	+ 40,448	+ 59	– 6,750
Q4 r	+ 54,761	+ 45,332	– 3,422	– 4,435	+ 24,962	– 11,099	– 120	+ 62,900	– 494	+ 8,260
2013 Q1 r	+ 41,192	+ 51,585	– 1,335	– 10,480	+ 14,868	– 14,781	+ 420	+ 36,822	+ 86	– 4,791
Q2 r	+ 43,005	+ 54,180	+ 1,595	– 10,657	+ 6,433	– 6,951	+ 760	+ 58,926	+ 72	+ 15,160
Q3 r	+ 37,651	+ 49,141	– 4,067	– 16,907	+ 14,402	– 8,985	+ 438	+ 48,587	– 785	+ 10,498
Q4 r	+ 60,170	+ 52,691	– 1,429	– 6,712	+ 24,543	– 10,352	– 476	+ 63,585	+ 1,464	+ 3,891
2014 Q1 r	+ 49,522	+ 53,324	+ 1,177	– 7,203	+ 17,539	– 14,138	+ 2,182	+ 60,008	– 565	+ 8,304
Q2 r	+ 46,694	+ 54,760	– 1,105	– 8,031	+ 5,808	– 5,843	+ 542	+ 57,204	– 610	+ 9,968
Q3 r	+ 56,214	+ 61,097	– 2,693	– 16,591	+ 18,790	– 7,082	+ 783	+ 68,150	+ 332	+ 11,153
Q4 r	+ 67,260	+ 60,119	– 3,729	– 7,287	+ 24,785	– 10,358	– 681	+ 58,464	– 1,722	– 8,115
2012 Aug r	+ 12,908	+ 17,035	– 853	– 6,633	+ 5,870	– 3,363	+ 608	+ 13,430	+ 389	– 86
Sep r	+ 16,712	+ 17,552	– 729	– 3,948	+ 6,048	– 2,939	+ 772	+ 26,352	– 281	+ 8,868
Oct r	+ 15,330	+ 16,276	– 1,123	– 4,360	+ 6,637	– 3,224	+ 212	+ 15,412	+ 176	– 130
Nov r	+ 18,954	+ 17,519	– 787	– 1,960	+ 6,428	– 3,033	+ 343	+ 21,658	– 308	+ 2,360
Dec r	+ 20,477	+ 11,537	– 1,512	+ 1,885	+ 11,896	– 4,842	– 675	+ 25,831	– 361	+ 6,029
2013 Jan r	+ 9,623	+ 14,421	– 427	– 3,871	+ 4,363	– 5,290	+ 173	– 10,275	+ 493	– 20,070
Feb r	+ 11,015	+ 16,197	– 1,411	– 3,425	+ 4,907	– 6,664	– 113	+ 12,821	– 321	+ 1,918
Mar r	+ 20,554	+ 20,966	+ 502	– 3,183	+ 5,598	– 2,826	+ 360	+ 34,275	– 86	+ 13,361
Apr r	+ 15,512	+ 19,987	+ 498	– 2,425	+ 194	– 2,244	+ 188	+ 20,636	+ 56	+ 4,937
May r	+ 11,969	+ 16,471	+ 1,917	– 4,221	+ 1,842	– 2,124	+ 268	+ 9,952	– 22	– 2,285
June r	+ 15,525	+ 17,722	– 820	– 4,010	+ 4,398	– 2,584	+ 304	+ 28,338	+ 38	+ 12,508
July r	+ 11,540	+ 16,143	– 1,005	– 6,491	+ 5,062	– 3,174	+ 126	+ 4,633	– 654	– 7,033
Aug r	+ 7,446	+ 12,722	– 1,776	– 6,786	+ 5,032	– 3,522	+ 184	+ 24,787	+ 425	+ 17,157
Sep r	+ 18,666	+ 20,276	– 1,285	– 3,629	+ 4,309	– 2,289	+ 128	+ 19,168	– 556	+ 374
Oct r	+ 15,941	+ 18,903	– 362	– 5,875	+ 5,565	– 2,651	+ 514	+ 16,097	– 212	– 358
Nov r	+ 21,585	+ 19,822	+ 192	– 2,141	+ 6,010	– 2,107	+ 176	+ 21,190	+ 407	– 571
Dec r	+ 22,644	+ 13,966	– 1,258	+ 1,305	+ 12,968	– 5,594	– 1,166	+ 26,299	+ 1,269	+ 4,820
2014 Jan r	+ 14,164	+ 15,962	– 748	– 2,809	+ 5,244	– 4,233	+ 1,500	+ 1,295	– 375	– 14,370
Feb r	+ 13,310	+ 17,277	– 9	– 2,773	+ 5,843	– 7,038	+ 433	+ 23,490	– 898	+ 9,747
Mar r	+ 22,049	+ 20,085	+ 1,933	– 1,621	+ 6,452	– 2,867	+ 249	+ 35,224	+ 708	+ 12,927
Apr r	+ 16,872	+ 18,601	– 329	– 1,811	+ 3,250	– 3,168	+ 194	+ 29,427	+ 151	+ 12,361
May r	+ 12,252	+ 17,921	– 1,532	– 2,343	– 2,332	– 993	– 54	+ 12,165	– 631	– 33
June r	+ 17,570	+ 18,238	+ 756	– 3,877	+ 4,891	– 1,682	+ 402	+ 15,611	– 130	– 2,360
July r	+ 20,648	+ 22,871	– 1,837	– 5,526	+ 6,061	– 2,759	– 8	+ 18,353	+ 431	– 2,287
Aug r	+ 11,333	+ 14,558	– 675	– 6,909	+ 5,884	– 2,200	+ 439	+ 14,135	+ 166	+ 2,363
Sep r	+ 24,233	+ 23,668	– 182	– 4,156	+ 6,844	– 2,123	+ 352	+ 35,662	– 265	+ 11,078
Oct r	+ 22,245	+ 23,474	– 1,539	– 5,587	+ 6,604	– 2,246	– 109	+ 12,335	+ 203	– 9,802
Nov r	+ 19,000	+ 18,356	– 480	– 2,536	+ 6,608	– 3,427	+ 134	+ 21,758	+ 30	+ 2,625
Dec r	+ 26,014	+ 18,290	– 1,710	+ 836	+ 11,573	– 4,685	– 706	+ 24,371	– 1,955	– 938
2015 Jan p	+ 16,790	+ 15,833	– 900	– 2,416	+ 7,723	– 4,351	+ 26	– 5,463	+ 372	– 22,280

1 Excluding freight and insurance costs of foreign trade. **2** For example, warehouse transactions for the account of residents and the deduction of goods returned. Deductions of exports and imports in connection with goods for processing; including freight and insurance costs of foreign trade. **3** Including freight and insurance costs of foreign trade. **4** Including net acquisition/disposal of non-produced non-financial assets. **5** Statistical errors and omissions, resulting from the difference between the balance on the financial account and the balances on the current account and the capital account.

XII External sector

3 Foreign trade (special trade) of the Federal Republic of Germany, by country and group of countries *

€ million

Country / group of countries		2012	2013	2014	2014 Aug	2014 Sep	2014 Oct	2014 Nov	2014 Dec	2015 Jan p
All countries 1	Exports	1,095,766	1,093,115	1,133,540	83,888	102,293	103,925	95,969	90,096	89,906
	Imports	905,925	898,164	916,636	70,011	80,276	81,861	78,086	71,151	74,030
	Balance	+ 189,841	+ 194,950	+ 216,905	+ 13,877	+ 22,017	+ 22,063	+ 17,883	+ 18,944	+ 15,876
I European countries	Exports	751,071	748,156	770,934	56,284	68,537	69,975	65,792	59,133	...
	Imports	629,305	633,706	650,482	47,544	56,150	57,821	56,106	50,019	...
	Balance	+ 121,766	+ 114,451	+ 120,452	+ 8,740	+ 12,387	+ 12,154	+ 9,686	+ 9,114	...
1 EU member states (28)	Exports	622,674	623,472	657,162	47,664	58,644	59,714	56,181	50,786	...
	Imports	504,494	513,463	533,513	38,709	46,632	47,865	45,901	41,055	...
	Balance	+ 118,180	+ 110,009	+ 123,649	+ 8,956	+ 12,012	+ 11,849	+ 10,280	+ 9,732	...
Euro-area (18) countries	Exports	407,666	403,592	414,894	29,250	36,599	37,591	35,193	32,067	...
	Imports	339,072	342,401	351,393	25,219	30,624	31,163	30,151	26,950	...
	Balance	+ 68,593	+ 61,191	+ 63,501	+ 4,030	+ 5,975	+ 6,429	+ 5,042	+ 5,117	...
of which										
Austria	Exports	56,591	56,276	56,234	4,219	5,107	5,198	4,717	4,132	...
	Imports	36,419	36,793	36,432	2,594	3,247	3,278	3,042	2,818	...
	Balance	+ 20,172	+ 19,484	+ 19,802	+ 1,624	+ 1,860	+ 1,920	+ 1,675	+ 1,314	...
Belgium and Luxembourg	Exports	49,424	47,980	47,767	3,624	4,212	4,284	3,912	3,814	...
	Imports	40,528	42,033	43,122	3,456	3,893	3,900	3,745	3,049	...
	Balance	+ 8,896	+ 5,947	+ 4,646	+ 167	+ 319	+ 383	+ 167	+ 765	...
France	Exports	102,911	99,980	102,067	6,605	8,942	9,242	8,616	7,959	...
	Imports	64,035	64,018	67,552	4,377	5,913	5,870	5,842	5,125	...
	Balance	+ 38,875	+ 35,962	+ 34,514	+ 2,228	+ 3,030	+ 3,372	+ 2,774	+ 2,834	...
Italy	Exports	55,529	53,247	54,481	3,307	5,047	4,932	4,618	3,872	...
	Imports	47,957	46,930	48,487	3,282	4,079	4,368	3,959	3,620	...
	Balance	+ 7,572	+ 6,317	+ 5,994	+ 25	+ 968	+ 564	+ 659	+ 252	...
Netherlands	Exports	70,381	70,970	73,145	5,741	6,274	6,359	6,377	5,824	...
	Imports	85,738	88,680	88,137	6,807	7,555	7,570	7,606	6,995	...
	Balance	– 15,357	– 17,709	– 14,992	– 1,067	– 1,281	– 1,212	– 1,229	– 1,171	...
Spain	Exports	31,047	31,349	34,935	2,269	3,029	3,295	3,021	2,845	...
	Imports	23,206	23,639	25,009	1,492	2,186	2,221	2,167	1,997	...
	Balance	+ 7,841	+ 7,709	+ 9,926	+ 778	+ 842	+ 1,073	+ 854	+ 848	...
Other EU member states	Exports	215,008	219,880	242,268	18,415	22,046	22,122	20,988	18,720	...
	Imports	165,421	171,062	182,120	13,489	16,008	16,702	15,749	14,105	...
	Balance	+ 49,587	+ 48,818	+ 60,148	+ 4,925	+ 6,038	+ 5,421	+ 5,239	+ 4,615	...
of which										
United Kingdom	Exports	73,283	75,488	84,067	6,208	7,629	7,395	7,295	6,583	...
	Imports	42,820	42,513	42,295	3,326	3,588	3,621	3,579	3,249	...
	Balance	+ 30,462	+ 32,975	+ 41,772	+ 2,882	+ 4,041	+ 3,774	+ 3,716	+ 3,334	...
2 Other European countries	Exports	128,398	124,684	113,772	8,620	9,892	10,261	9,611	8,346	...
	Imports	124,811	120,242	116,969	8,835	9,518	9,956	10,206	8,964	...
	Balance	+ 3,586	+ 4,442	– 3,197	– 215	+ 374	+ 305	– 595	– 618	...
of which										
Switzerland	Exports	48,933	46,924	46,270	3,570	3,950	4,322	3,905	3,376	...
	Imports	37,775	38,321	39,329	2,802	3,132	3,601	3,577	2,960	...
	Balance	+ 11,158	+ 8,603	+ 6,941	+ 768	+ 819	+ 721	+ 328	+ 416	...
II Non-European countries	Exports	340,980	341,213	359,131	27,171	33,410	33,685	29,977	30,774	...
	Imports	276,620	264,459	266,154	22,467	24,126	24,040	21,980	21,132	...
	Balance	+ 64,360	+ 76,754	+ 92,977	+ 4,704	+ 9,284	+ 9,645	+ 7,998	+ 9,642	...
1 Africa	Exports	21,920	21,803	22,602	1,670	2,076	2,085	1,852	2,023	...
	Imports	24,145	23,108	20,172	1,572	2,010	1,757	1,593	1,585	...
	Balance	– 2,224	– 1,305	+ 2,430	+ 98	+ 67	+ 328	+ 259	+ 438	...
2 America	Exports	128,703	130,427	135,530	10,210	12,851	12,576	11,495	11,371	...
	Imports	80,549	75,023	73,715	6,082	6,140	6,619	5,818	5,806	...
	Balance	+ 48,154	+ 55,404	+ 61,815	+ 4,128	+ 6,712	+ 5,957	+ 5,677	+ 5,565	...
of which										
United States	Exports	86,971	89,348	96,077	7,167	9,664	9,077	8,339	8,019	...
	Imports	51,070	48,582	48,600	4,147	3,971	4,293	3,774	3,884	...
	Balance	+ 35,901	+ 40,766	+ 47,477	+ 3,020	+ 5,693	+ 4,784	+ 4,565	+ 4,136	...
3 Asia	Exports	179,630	179,038	191,421	14,531	17,629	18,113	15,826	16,665	...
	Imports	167,873	162,960	169,354	14,533	15,715	15,455	14,260	13,575	...
	Balance	+ 11,757	+ 16,077	+ 22,068	– 2	+ 1,914	+ 2,659	+ 1,566	+ 3,090	...
of which										
Middle East	Exports	32,503	32,754	35,611	2,452	3,428	3,623	2,839	3,494	...
	Imports	8,134	8,921	7,828	603	644	675	782	643	...
	Balance	+ 24,369	+ 23,833	+ 27,784	+ 1,849	+ 2,784	+ 2,947	+ 2,057	+ 2,851	...
Japan	Exports	17,138	17,076	16,919	1,248	1,604	1,584	1,350	1,312	...
	Imports	21,910	19,492	19,056	1,471	1,726	1,724	1,451	1,402	...
	Balance	– 4,772	– 2,416	– 2,137	– 223	– 122	– 141	– 102	– 90	...
People's Republic of China 2	Exports	66,746	66,912	74,504	5,728	6,682	6,873	6,135	6,274	...
	Imports	78,529	74,544	79,349	6,827	7,783	7,427	6,989	6,727	...
	Balance	– 11,783	– 7,633	– 4,845	– 1,099	– 1,101	– 554	– 854	– 453	...
Emerging markets in South-East Asia 3	Exports	45,651	45,894	48,563	3,836	4,435	4,605	4,056	4,216	...
	Imports	37,428	36,672	38,643	3,287	3,439	3,544	3,214	3,069	...
	Balance	+ 8,223	+ 9,222	+ 9,920	+ 550	+ 995	+ 1,061	+ 842	+ 1,147	...
4 Oceania and polar regions	Exports	10,727	9,946	9,578	760	853	910	804	715	...
	Imports	4,054	3,368	2,913	281	261	210	309	166	...
	Balance	+ 6,672	+ 6,578	+ 6,664	+ 480	+ 592	+ 700	+ 495	+ 549	...

* Source: Federal Statistical Office. Exports (fob) by country of destination, imports (cif) by country of origin. Individual countries and groups of countries according to the current position. Euro-area including Latvia. **1** Including fuel and other supplies for ships and aircraft and other data not classifiable by region. **2** Excluding Hong Kong. **3** Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.

XII External sector

4 Services and Primary income of the Federal Republic of Germany (balances)

€ million

Period	Services									Primary income	
		of which									
	Total	Manufacturing services [1]	Transport	Travel [2]	Financial services	Charges for the use of intellectual property	Telecommunications, computer and information services	Other business services	Government goods and services [3]	Compensation of employees	Investment income
2010	– 27,477	+ 1,070	– 8,381	– 32,775	+ 8,762	+ 871	+ 670	– 3,912	+ 2,863	+ 1,557	+ 47,948
2011	– 32,471	+ 567	– 8,533	– 33,755	+ 7,823	+ 2,389	+ 857	– 6,787	+ 2,939	+ 3,314	+ 64,707
2012	– 35,905	+ 178	– 10,199	– 35,422	+ 8,784	+ 3,020	+ 1,404	– 9,547	+ 3,103	+ 3,616	+ 62,193
2013	– 44,755	+ 0	– 12,063	– 37,713	+ 8,181	+ 3,522	– 858	– 6,358	+ 3,076	+ 1,069	+ 57,979
2014	– 39,112	– 26	– 13,079	– 36,793	+ 6,333	+ 4,284	+ 2,472	– 2,859	+ 2,930	+ 1,036	+ 65,034
2013 Q2	– 10,657	– 2	– 2,809	– 8,184	+ 1,512	+ 853	– 406	– 1,877	+ 818	+ 55	+ 7,253
Q3	– 16,907	– 65	– 2,507	– 16,855	+ 2,669	+ 796	+ 295	– 1,092	+ 736	– 304	+ 15,627
Q4	– 6,712	+ 92	– 3,527	– 7,004	+ 2,570	+ 1,204	+ 1,008	– 1,446	+ 717	+ 486	+ 20,118
2014 Q1	– 7,203	+ 111	– 3,566	– 5,708	+ 1,294	+ 1,114	+ 124	– 388	+ 753	+ 873	+ 17,665
Q2	– 8,031	+ 69	– 3,080	– 8,399	+ 1,721	+ 1,063	+ 619	– 351	+ 782	+ 50	+ 6,597
Q3	– 16,591	– 39	– 3,216	– 15,411	+ 1,757	+ 807	+ 171	– 882	+ 719	– 275	+ 20,061
Q4	– 7,287	– 168	– 3,217	– 7,276	+ 1,561	+ 1,300	+ 1,557	– 1,238	+ 677	+ 388	+ 20,711
2014 Mar	– 1,621	+ 63	– 1,131	– 2,499	+ 585	+ 418	+ 429	+ 407	+ 263	+ 281	+ 6,528
Apr	– 1,811	– 2	– 1,086	– 1,608	+ 598	+ 444	– 46	– 306	+ 283	+ 22	+ 3,485
May	– 2,343	+ 11	– 1,019	– 2,370	+ 686	+ 456	– 29	– 399	+ 247	+ 36	– 2,113
June	– 3,877	+ 60	– 975	– 4,422	+ 437	+ 163	+ 695	+ 353	+ 252	– 8	+ 5,225
July	– 5,526	– 46	– 1,155	– 4,377	+ 860	+ 246	– 389	– 702	+ 237	– 106	+ 6,413
Aug	– 6,909	– 1	– 960	– 6,498	+ 496	+ 332	+ 106	– 445	+ 250	– 79	+ 6,315
Sep	– 4,156	+ 7	– 1,101	– 4,536	+ 402	+ 229	+ 453	+ 265	+ 231	– 91	+ 7,332
Oct	– 5,587	– 46	– 1,275	– 4,604	+ 414	+ 334	+ 143	– 629	+ 259	+ 160	+ 6,856
Nov	– 2,536	– 21	– 1,082	– 1,913	+ 503	+ 381	+ 159	– 502	+ 238	+ 126	+ 6,894
Dec	+ 836	– 101	– 860	– 759	+ 644	+ 584	+ 1,255	– 106	+ 180	+ 103	+ 6,961
2015 Jan	– 2,416	+ 23	– 1,024	– 1,404	+ 901	+ 187	– 175	– 776	+ 278	+ 266	+ 7,834

1 Includes fees for processing goods that are not owned by the processor. **2** Since 2001, the sample results of a household survey have been used on the expenditure side. **3** Domestic public authorities' receipts from and expenditure on services, not included elsewhere; including the receipts from foreign military bases.

5 Secondary income of the Federal Republic of Germany (balances)

€ million

Period	General government			All sectors excluding general government [2]		
		of which			*of which*	
	Total	Total	Current international cooperation [1]	Current taxes on income, wealth etc.	Total	Personal transfers between resident and nonresident households [3]	*of which* Workers' remittances
2010	– 39,669	– 24,953	– 4,720	+ 4,156	– 14,717	– 3,035	– 3,035
2011	– 35,505	– 21,001	– 4,475	+ 6,718	– 14,504	– 2,977	– 2,977
2012	– 40,139	– 25,752	– 5,451	+ 5,206	– 14,387	– 2,952	– 2,952
2013	– 41,069	– 26,176	– 4,106	+ 8,199	– 14,893	– 3,250	– 3,229
2014	– 37,421	– 24,305	– 5,143	+ 11,090	– 13,116	– 3,476	– 3,451
2013 Q2	– 6,951	– 3,324	– 757	+ 3,867	– 3,628	– 807	– 807
Q3	– 8,985	– 5,624	– 802	+ 1,459	– 3,361	– 820	– 807
Q4	– 10,352	– 5,842	– 922	+ 1,501	– 4,510	– 815	– 807
2014 Q1	– 14,138	– 11,117	– 1,678	+ 2,054	– 3,021	– 870	– 863
Q2	– 5,843	– 1,671	– 764	+ 5,989	– 4,172	– 869	– 863
Q3	– 7,082	– 3,781	– 1,049	+ 1,651	– 3,301	– 870	– 863
Q4	– 10,358	– 7,735	– 1,652	+ 1,396	– 2,623	– 866	– 863
2014 Mar	– 2,867	– 1,794	– 121	+ 780	– 1,073	– 290	– 288
Apr	– 3,168	– 1,503	– 258	+ 1,129	– 1,665	– 290	– 288
May	– 993	+ 270	– 331	+ 2,948	– 1,263	– 290	– 288
June	– 1,682	– 439	– 176	+ 1,912	– 1,243	– 289	– 288
July	– 2,759	– 1,775	– 452	+ 379	– 984	– 289	– 288
Aug	– 2,200	– 1,383	– 326	+ 471	– 817	– 291	– 288
Sep	– 2,123	– 623	– 271	+ 801	– 1,500	– 290	– 288
Oct	– 2,246	– 1,521	– 371	+ 271	– 725	– 289	– 288
Nov	– 3,427	– 2,610	– 491	+ 143	– 817	– 289	– 288
Dec	– 4,685	– 3,604	– 790	+ 981	– 1,081	– 288	– 288
2015 Jan	– 4,351	– 3,442	– 1,463	+ 649	– 909	– 294	– 294

1 Excluding capital transfers, where identifiable. Includes current international cooperation and other current transfers. **2** Includes insurance premiums and claims (excluding life insurance policies). **3** Transfers between resident and non-resident households.

6 Capital account of the Federal Republic of Germany (balances)

€ million

Period	Total	Non-produced non-financial assets	Capital transfers
2010	+ 1,219	+ 2,304	– 1,085
2011	+ 1,642	+ 1,148	+ 494
2012	+ 1,427	+ 1,743	– 316
2013	+ 1,142	+ 1,111	+ 31
2014	+ 2,826	+ 2,736	+ 90
2013 Q2	+ 760	+ 672	+ 88
Q3	+ 438	+ 692	– 255
Q4	– 476	– 430	– 46
2014 Q1	+ 2,182	+ 934	+ 1,248
Q2	+ 542	+ 811	– 269
Q3	+ 783	+ 725	+ 58
Q4	– 681	+ 266	– 947
2014 Mar	+ 249	+ 113	+ 136
Apr	+ 194	+ 166	+ 28
May	– 54	+ 353	– 407
June	+ 402	+ 291	+ 110
July	– 8	+ 233	– 241
Aug	+ 439	+ 272	+ 167
Sep	+ 352	+ 220	+ 132
Oct	– 109	+ 130	– 238
Nov	+ 134	+ 388	– 255
Dec	– 706	– 252	– 454
2015 Jan	+ 26	– 9	+ 35

XII External sector

7 Financial account of the Federal Republic of Germany (net)

€ million

Item	2012	2013	2014	2014						2015
				Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Nov	Dec	Jan
I Net domestic investment abroad (Increase: +)	+ 376,169	+ 36,997	+ 293,211	+ 91,493	+ 114,705	+ 78,048	+ 8,964	+ 76,104	– 80,010	+ 183,823
1 Direct investment	+ 77,735	+ 53,360	+ 88,717	+ 23,791	+ 28,577	+ 19,891	+ 16,458	+ 7,425	+ 11,466	+ 5,913
Equity	+ 61,084	+ 34,189	+ 70,251	+ 18,628	+ 22,853	+ 11,398	+ 17,373	+ 8,901	+ 5,901	+ 8,764
of which Reinvestment of earnings [1]	+ 21,052	+ 14,523	+ 22,241	+ 8,496	+ 5,714	+ 6,452	+ 1,579	+ 4,195	– 6,063	+ 4,816
Debt instruments	+ 16,651	+ 19,172	+ 18,465	+ 5,164	+ 5,725	+ 8,492	– 915	– 1,476	+ 5,564	– 2,851
2 Portfolio investment	+ 109,712	+ 143,233	+ 149,427	+ 43,201	+ 41,279	+ 29,438	+ 35,510	+ 22,785	+ 4,395	+ 12,362
Shares [2]	+ 11,675	+ 19,019	+ 10,610	+ 3,084	+ 4,761	– 563	+ 3,328	– 15	+ 5,047	– 971
Investment fund shares [3]	+ 21,667	+ 31,939	+ 38,324	+ 10,684	+ 8,644	+ 12,892	+ 6,105	+ 4,654	– 920	+ 2,059
Long-term debt securities [4]	+ 75,913	+ 87,772	+ 99,068	+ 24,007	+ 26,837	+ 19,462	+ 28,763	+ 16,927	+ 4,056	+ 7,204
Short-term debt securities [5]	+ 456	+ 4,503	+ 1,425	+ 5,426	+ 1,038	– 2,353	– 2,686	+ 1,218	– 3,789	+ 4,070
3. Financial derivatives and employee stock options [6]	+ 24,386	+ 24,286	+ 31,783	+ 5,210	+ 10,056	+ 9,521	+ 6,996	+ 4,418	+ 41	+ 4,552
4. Other investment [7]	+ 163,040	– 184,720	+ 25,848	+ 19,856	+ 35,403	+ 18,867	– 48,277	+ 41,446	– 93,956	+ 160,624
Monetary financial institutions [8]	– 66,080	– 56,647	+ 76,332	+ 31,734	+ 45,184	+ 1,780	– 2,366	+ 33,307	– 54,040	+ 78,928
Long-term	– 47,912	– 50,495	+ 21,176	+ 3,255	– 4,485	+ 9,844	+ 12,562	– 279	+ 10,954	+ 5,761
Short-term	– 18,169	– 6,152	+ 55,156	+ 28,479	+ 49,669	– 8,064	– 14,928	+ 33,586	– 64,994	+ 73,167
Enterprises and households [9]	– 13,394	+ 10,049	– 14,629	+ 26,707	– 3,314	– 6,408	– 31,615	+ 4,472	– 30,673	+ 22,295
Long-term	+ 337	+ 910	+ 852	– 777	– 881	+ 773	+ 1,738	+ 4	+ 1,568	+ 117
Short-term	– 13,731	+ 9,139	– 15,481	+ 27,485	– 2,432	– 7,181	– 33,353	+ 4,468	– 32,241	+ 22,178
General government	+ 49,836	+ 7,397	+ 14,024	+ 2,065	+ 1,790	+ 5,392	+ 4,777	+ 4,508	– 2,223	+ 4,976
Long-term	+ 49,846	+ 15,078	– 2,372	– 4,444	+ 3,361	+ 16	– 1,305	– 144	– 703	+ 126
Short-term	– 10	– 7,681	+ 16,396	+ 6,509	– 1,571	+ 5,376	+ 6,082	+ 4,652	– 1,520	+ 4,850
Bundesbank	+ 192,679	– 145,519	– 49,880	– 40,651	– 8,258	+ 18,103	– 19,074	– 841	– 7,021	+ 54,424
5. Reserve assets	+ 1,297	+ 838	– 2,564	– 565	– 610	+ 332	– 1,722	+ 30	– 1,955	+ 372
II Net foreign investment in the reporting country (Increase: +)	+ 218,708	– 170,922	+ 49,384	+ 31,485	+ 57,501	+ 9,897	– 49,499	+ 54,345	– 104,380	+ 189,286
1 Direct investment	+ 42,110	+ 44,385	+ 5,508	+ 8,241	+ 5,859	– 2,625	– 5,968	+ 3,648	– 10,862	– 2,337
Equity	+ 9,959	+ 7,499	+ 22,527	+ 5,123	– 1,363	+ 7,927	+ 10,841	+ 1,727	+ 3,476	+ 2,175
of which Reinvestment of earnings [1]	+ 2,552	+ 585	+ 5,427	+ 3,005	– 712	+ 2,166	+ 968	– 806	+ 623	+ 1,368
Debt instruments	+ 32,150	+ 36,886	– 17,020	+ 3,118	+ 7,222	– 10,551	– 16,809	+ 1,921	– 14,337	– 4,511
2 Portfolio investment	+ 54,951	– 21,263	+ 21,680	+ 8,280	+ 22,808	+ 1,328	– 10,735	+ 10,064	– 19,963	+ 15,737
Shares [2)]	+ 2,281	+ 5,024	+ 8,328	– 5,610	+ 8,250	+ 2,743	+ 2,946	+ 979	– 340	– 5,870
Investment fund shares [3]	– 3,422	+ 6,086	– 5,642	– 77	+ 848	– 2,955	– 3,457	– 792	– 936	+ 1,486
Long-term debt securities [4]	+ 56,198	– 9,467	+ 21,410	+ 6,883	+ 13,637	– 5,550	+ 6,441	+ 18,684	– 13,105	+ 5,392
Short-term debt securities [5]	– 107	– 22,907	– 2,417	+ 7,085	+ 73	+ 7,090	– 16,665	– 8,807	– 5,581	+ 14,729
3. Other investment [7]	+ 121,648	– 194,044	+ 22,196	+ 14,964	+ 28,834	+ 11,194	– 32,796	+ 40,633	– 73,556	+ 175,886
Monetary financial institutions [8]	+ 51,508	– 158,237	+ 32,495	+ 32,738	+ 3,422	+ 29,893	– 33,557	+ 29,295	– 61,500	+ 103,208
Long-term	– 10,250	– 16,733	– 14,555	– 3,017	– 5,115	– 5,748	– 675	+ 826	– 656	+ 220
Short-term	+ 61,758	– 141,504	+ 47,050	+ 35,755	+ 8,537	+ 35,640	– 32,882	+ 28,470	– 60,843	+ 102,988
Enterprises and households [9]	+ 8,668	– 8,583	+ 4,141	+ 9,464	+ 2,098	– 631	– 6,789	+ 4,805	– 7,069	+ 17,099
Long-term	– 56	– 13,790	– 5,331	– 2,132	– 684	– 1,579	– 936	+ 824	– 1,205	+ 2,978
Short-term	+ 8,724	+ 5,207	+ 9,473	+ 11,596	+ 2,782	+ 948	– 5,853	+ 3,981	– 5,864	+ 14,121
General government	– 31,011	– 1,577	– 5,594	– 3,957	+ 5,402	– 3,123	– 3,916	+ 1,622	– 924	+ 461
Long-term	+ 35,994	+ 9,302	– 914	– 1,798	+ 1,572	+ 203	– 892	– 908	– 48	– 687
Short-term	– 67,005	– 10,878	– 4,680	– 2,160	+ 3,829	– 3,326	– 3,023	+ 2,530	– 876	+ 1,149
Bundesbank	+ 92,482	– 25,647	– 8,846	– 23,281	+ 17,913	– 14,945	+ 11,466	+ 4,911	– 4,063	+ 55,117
III Net financial account (Net lending: + / net borrowing: -)	+ 157,461	+ 207,920	+ 243,827	+ 60,008	+ 57,204	+ 68,150	+ 58,464	+ 21,758	+ 24,371	– 5,463

1 Estimate based on data on direct investment stocks abroad and in the Federal Republic of Germany (see Special Statistical Publication 10). **2** Including participation certificates. **3** Including reinvestment of earnings. **4** Up to and including 2012, without accrued interest. Long-term: original maturity of more than one year or unlimited. **5** Short-term: original maturity up to one year. **6** Balance of transactions arising from options and financial futures contracts as well as employee stock options. **7** Includes in particular loans, trade credits as well as currency and deposits. **8** Excluding Bundesbank. **9** Includes the following sectors: financial corporations (excluding monetary financial institutions) as well as non-financial corporations, households and non-profit institutions serving households.

XII External sector

8 External position of the Bundesbank since the beginning of European monetary union °

€ million

End of year or month	Reserve assets and other claims on non-residents								Liabilities vis-à-vis non-residents 3,4	Net external position (col 1 less col 9)
	Total	Reserve assets				Other claims on non-euro-area residents 1,3	Claims within the Eurosystem (net) 2	Other claims on residents in other euro-area member states		
		Total	Gold and gold receivables	Reserve position in the International Monetary Fund and special drawing rights	Foreign currency reserves					
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1999 Jan 5	95,316	93,940	29,312	8,461	56,167	140	1,225	11	8,169	87,146
1999	141,958	93,039	32,287	8,332	52,420	9,162	39,746	11	6,179	135,779
2000	100,762	93,815	32,676	7,762	53,377	313	6,620	14	6,592	94,170
2001	76,147	93,215	35,005	8,721	49,489	312	– 17,385	5	8,752	67,396
2002	103,948	85,002	36,208	8,272	40,522	312	18,466	167	9,005	94,942
2003	95,394	76,680	36,533	7,609	32,538	312	17,945	456	10,443	84,951
2004	93,110	71,335	35,495	6,548	29,292	312	20,796	667	7,935	85,175
2005	130,268	86,181	47,924	4,549	33,708	350	42,830	906	6,285	123,983
2006	104,389	84,765	53,114	3,011	28,640	350	18,344	931	4,819	99,570
2007	179,492	92,545	62,433	2,418	27,694	350	84,064	2,534	16,005	163,488
2008	230,775	99,185	68,194	3,285	27,705	350	128,668	2,573	30,169	200,607
2009	323,286	125,541	83,939	15,969	25,634	350	189,936	7,460	9,126	314,160
2010	524,695	162,100	115,403	18,740	27,957	50	337,869	24,676	14,620	510,075
2011	714,662	184,603	132,874	22,296	29,433	50	475,942	54,067	46,557	668,106
2012	921,002	188,630	137,513	22,344	28,774	50	668,617	63,706	106,496	814,506
2013	721,741	143,753	94,876	20,798	28,080	50	523,103	54,834	57,214	664,527
2014	678,804	158,745	107,475	20,624	30,646	50	473,224	46,785	20,311	658,492
2012 June	992,341	190,248	136,094	23,320	30,834	50	741,198	60,845	84,880	907,461
July	1,000,019	199,419	144,217	23,769	31,434	50	739,837	60,713	101,674	898,345
Aug	1,023,617	197,776	143,507	23,520	30,749	50	764,080	61,711	101,494	922,123
Sep	974,478	203,337	150,373	23,295	29,669	50	708,090	63,002	95,757	878,721
Oct	991,439	196,910	144,172	23,154	29,585	50	731,983	62,496	123,787	867,652
Nov	988,534	197,486	145,110	22,771	29,606	50	727,755	63,242	112,190	876,344
Dec	921,002	188,630	137,513	22,344	28,774	50	668,617	63,706	106,496	814,506
2013 Jan	878,587	184,947	134,745	21,953	28,249	50	629,884	63,707	103,899	774,688
Feb	871,508	183,222	132,131	22,011	29,079	50	625,519	62,717	96,300	775,208
Mar	852,611	188,447	136,454	22,403	29,590	50	601,669	62,446	80,341	772,271
Apr	857,433	173,980	122,844	22,096	29,040	50	620,813	62,590	94,482	762,951
May	832,746	169,105	118,228	21,984	28,893	50	602,136	61,456	82,781	749,965
June	798,888	150,825	100,280	21,926	28,618	50	588,423	59,590	69,145	729,743
July	807,165	158,611	109,338	21,650	27,623	50	589,372	59,133	71,106	736,059
Aug	808,649	164,477	114,714	21,434	28,330	50	586,531	57,591	69,088	739,560
Sep	796,646	156,452	107,819	21,296	27,337	50	583,271	56,874	65,950	730,697
Oct	785,449	154,486	106,477	20,922	27,086	50	574,400	56,514	85,712	699,737
Nov	761,730	148,010	99,631	20,907	27,473	50	557,391	56,280	70,398	691,332
Dec	721,741	143,753	94,876	20,798	28,080	50	523,103	54,834	57,214	664,527
2014 Jan	716,868	149,930	100,432	21,110	28,388	50	512,734	54,154	53,965	662,902
Feb	718,317	152,432	104,678	20,589	27,165	50	511,610	54,225	43,789	674,528
Mar	687,557	150,615	102,179	20,586	27,850	50	482,453	54,440	34,434	653,123
Apr	692,956	150,048	101,564	20,950	27,534	50	490,066	52,792	53,041	639,916
May	680,888	148,949	100,274	21,125	27,550	50	479,240	52,649	52,748	628,140
June	678,136	153,017	104,600	20,795	27,622	50	474,195	50,875	43,267	634,869
July	660,521	154,885	105,317	21,162	28,406	50	455,926	49,660	17,254	643,267
Aug	681,324	156,411	106,079	21,133	29,199	50	476,681	48,182	15,697	665,626
Sep	696,802	156,367	104,629	21,864	29,873	50	492,298	48,088	18,051	678,751
Oct	681,790	154,133	101,929	21,753	30,450	50	481,086	46,521	25,515	656,275
Nov	682,969	155,424	103,245	21,564	30,615	50	480,244	47,251	27,894	655,075
Dec	678,804	158,745	107,475	20,624	30,646	50	473,224	46,785	20,311	658,492
2015 Jan	751,062	176,741	121,607	21,383	33,751	50	527,644	46,628	73,154	677,908
Feb	744,552	172,120	116,647	21,317	34,157	50	525,743	46,639	63,107	681,445

o Claims and liabilities vis-à-vis all countries within and outside the euro area. Up to December 2000, the levels at the end of each quarter are shown, owing to revaluations, at market prices; within each quarter, however, the levels are computed on the basis of cumulative transaction values. From January 2001, all end-of-month levels are valued at market prices. **1** Including loans to the World Bank. **2** Including the balances in the Bundesbank's cross-border payments within the Eurosystem. From November 2000, including the TARGET positions which were previously shown (in columns 6 and 9) as bilateral assets and liabilities vis-à-vis national central banks outside the Eurosystem. **3** See footnote 2. **4** Excluding allocations of special drawing rights (SDR) by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for an amount of SDR 12,059 million. **5** Euro opening balance sheet of the Bundesbank as at 1 January 1999.

XII External sector

9 Assets and liabilities of enterprises in Germany (other than banks) vis-à-vis non-residents *

€ million

End of year or month	Claims on non-residents							Liabilities vis-à-vis non-residents						
			Claims on foreign non-banks							Liabilities vis-à-vis foreign non-banks				
					from trade credits							from trade credits		
	Total	Balances with foreign banks	Total	from financial operations	Total	Credit terms granted	Advance payments effected	Total	Loans from foreign banks	Total	from financial operations	Total	Credit terms used	Advance payments received
All countries														
2011	698,599	242,387	456,212	285,123	171,089	155,392	15,697	871,795	172,099	699,696	538,839	160,857	95,131	65,726
2012	740,809	271,964	468,845	294,248	174,597	158,825	15,772	910,837	170,262	740,575	578,391	162,184	94,292	67,892
2013	779,109	280,526	498,583	319,761	178,822	163,734	15,088	920,620	142,676	777,944	616,341	161,603	94,646	66,957
2014	812,778	276,370	536,408	351,186	185,222	170,423	14,799	922,628	148,746	773,882	609,827	164,055	97,641	66,413
2014 Aug	828,510	305,745	522,765	344,240	178,525	163,514	15,012	950,640	154,672	795,968	637,730	158,238	89,413	68,825
Sep	842,488	308,897	533,590	347,362	186,229	171,498	14,730	944,880	153,485	791,396	625,641	165,755	97,919	67,836
Oct	833,063	301,799	531,264	344,021	187,243	172,163	15,080	936,683	147,885	788,798	624,896	163,902	96,542	67,360
Nov	835,661	306,643	529,018	339,568	189,450	174,558	14,892	943,386	148,893	794,492	628,957	165,536	98,315	67,221
Dec r	812,778	276,370	536,408	351,186	185,222	170,423	14,799	922,628	148,746	773,882	609,827	164,055	97,641	66,413
2015 Jan	843,584	304,191	539,394	356,541	182,853	168,034	14,819	943,236	165,641	777,595	616,041	161,554	92,153	69,401
Industrial countries [1]														
2011	615,925	240,265	375,660	258,453	117,207	104,915	12,292	785,925	169,535	616,390	502,139	114,251	80,491	33,760
2012	653,244	269,560	383,684	265,387	118,297	104,957	13,339	824,118	167,853	656,265	542,976	113,289	79,107	34,181
2013	689,637	277,223	412,414	291,000	121,414	108,082	13,332	833,922	141,307	692,615	579,018	113,597	78,921	34,676
2014	713,600	271,498	442,103	317,132	124,971	111,871	13,100	835,644	147,572	688,072	572,267	115,805	80,626	35,178
2014 Aug	732,412	300,379	432,034	313,460	118,573	105,380	13,193	863,917	153,525	710,392	601,286	109,106	73,398	35,708
Sep	745,290	303,943	441,347	316,251	125,096	112,069	13,027	858,108	152,247	705,861	588,496	117,365	81,551	35,814
Oct	733,979	296,958	437,021	311,458	125,563	112,246	13,317	850,605	146,719	703,887	587,725	116,162	80,665	35,497
Nov	736,260	301,731	434,529	306,582	127,947	114,805	13,142	856,754	147,724	709,030	591,697	117,333	81,980	35,353
Dec r	713,600	271,498	442,103	317,132	124,971	111,871	13,100	835,644	147,572	688,072	572,267	115,805	80,626	35,178
2015 Jan	744,500	299,770	444,730	321,199	123,531	110,278	13,253	853,591	164,402	689,189	576,790	112,399	75,857	36,542
EU member states [1]														
2011	508,071	225,583	282,488	196,132	86,356	76,472	9,884	660,137	157,465	502,672	421,679	80,993	54,370	26,623
2012	541,602	247,534	294,068	209,426	84,642	74,167	10,474	695,152	156,550	538,602	458,488	80,114	53,607	26,507
2013	582,038	262,788	319,249	232,788	86,461	75,934	10,527	699,765	127,084	572,681	493,383	79,298	52,975	26,323
2014	600,437	256,437	344,001	255,518	88,483	77,872	10,611	700,737	133,331	567,406	486,649	80,757	53,878	26,879
2014 Aug	623,784	285,495	338,289	253,099	85,190	74,576	10,614	726,703	141,309	585,394	508,943	76,451	49,129	27,322
Sep	630,811	288,791	342,019	252,516	89,504	79,038	10,466	717,585	139,121	578,464	495,724	82,741	55,423	27,317
Oct	621,010	280,968	340,042	250,053	89,989	79,233	10,756	713,440	136,711	576,730	494,821	81,909	54,787	27,123
Nov	622,332	286,158	336,174	243,882	92,292	81,755	10,537	722,564	137,831	584,733	501,297	83,436	56,257	27,179
Dec r	600,437	256,437	344,001	255,518	88,483	77,872	10,611	700,737	133,331	567,406	486,649	80,757	53,878	26,879
2015 Jan	631,063	284,247	346,816	258,372	88,444	77,737	10,708	721,286	153,817	567,468	488,587	78,881	51,149	27,732
of which: **Euro-area member states** [2]														
2011	372,493	171,907	200,586	142,530	58,056	52,125	5,931	529,244	103,827	425,417	370,898	54,519	37,188	17,331
2012	392,642	188,317	204,325	149,452	54,873	48,975	5,898	572,475	110,053	462,423	408,485	53,937	36,741	17,196
2013	422,440	196,101	226,339	170,696	55,643	49,469	6,175	593,680	100,922	492,758	439,537	53,221	36,389	16,832
2014	444,124	201,453	242,671	186,318	56,353	50,132	6,220	591,186	105,388	485,798	433,325	52,472	35,555	16,918
2014 Aug	453,341	218,279	235,062	181,413	53,649	47,478	6,171	620,618	112,386	508,232	457,309	50,923	33,387	17,536
Sep	458,430	219,970	238,459	182,603	55,856	49,562	6,294	609,169	108,838	500,331	445,969	54,363	36,921	17,441
Oct	451,050	213,120	237,930	181,249	56,681	50,383	6,298	603,879	106,135	497,745	443,418	54,326	37,041	17,285
Nov	456,701	220,732	235,969	177,609	58,359	52,231	6,128	613,245	109,135	504,110	448,973	55,137	37,810	17,327
Dec r	444,124	201,453	242,671	186,318	56,353	50,132	6,220	591,186	105,388	485,798	433,325	52,472	35,555	16,918
2015 Jan	470,003	223,152	246,852	189,734	57,118	50,831	6,286	611,030	123,093	487,938	435,833	52,105	34,513	17,593
Emerging economies and developing countries [3]														
2011	82,674	2,122	80,552	26,670	53,882	50,477	3,405	85,870	2,564	83,306	36,700	46,606	14,640	31,966
2012	87,552	2,404	85,147	28,858	56,289	53,856	2,432	86,688	2,409	84,279	35,415	48,864	15,181	33,683
2013	89,466	3,303	86,163	28,759	57,403	55,647	1,756	86,694	1,368	85,325	37,323	48,002	15,723	32,280
2014	99,174	4,872	94,302	34,051	60,251	58,552	1,699	86,982	1,174	85,808	37,560	48,248	17,014	31,234
2014 Aug	96,095	5,366	90,729	30,778	59,951	58,133	1,818	86,722	1,147	85,575	36,444	49,131	16,014	33,117
Sep	97,198	4,955	92,243	31,111	61,132	59,429	1,703	86,771	1,237	85,533	37,144	48,389	16,367	32,022
Oct	99,079	4,840	94,238	32,562	61,676	59,914	1,763	86,075	1,166	84,909	37,171	47,737	15,875	31,862
Nov	99,396	4,912	94,484	32,985	61,499	59,749	1,750	86,629	1,169	85,460	37,260	48,200	16,333	31,868
Dec r	99,174	4,872	94,302	34,051	60,251	58,552	1,699	86,982	1,174	85,808	37,560	48,248	17,014	31,234
2015 Jan	99,085	4,421	94,664	35,342	59,322	57,756	1,566	89,645	1,239	88,406	39,251	49,155	16,296	32,859

* The assets and liabilities vis-à-vis non-residents of banks (MFIs) in Germany are shown in Table 4 of Section IV, "Banks". Statistical increases and decreases have not been eliminated; to this extent, the changes in totals are not comparable with the figures shown in Table XI.7. From December 2012 onwards, the results base on a extended survey and a new calculation method. **r** Corrected. **1** From July 2013 including Croatia. **2** From January 2011 including Estonia; from January 2014 including Latvia; from January 2015 including Lithuania. **3** All countries that are not regarded as industrial countries. Up to December 2010 including Netherlands Antilles; from January 2011 including Bonaire, St.Eustatius, Saba and Curacao and St.Martin (Dutch part); up to June 2013 including Croatia.

XII External sector

10 ECB's euro foreign exchange reference rates of selected currencies *

EUR 1 = currency units ...

Yearly or monthly average	Australia AUD	Canada CAD	China CNY [1]	Denmark DKK	Japan JPY	Norway NOK	Sweden SEK	Switzerland CHF	United Kingdom GBP	United States USD
1999	1.6523	1.5840	.	7.4355	121.32	8.3104	8.8075	1.6003	0.65874	1.0658
2000	1.5889	1.3706	[2] 7.6168	7.4538	99.47	8.1129	8.4452	1.5579	0.60948	0.9236
2001	1.7319	1.3864	7.4131	7.4521	108.68	8.0484	9.2551	1.5105	0.62187	0.8956
2002	1.7376	1.4838	7.8265	7.4305	118.06	7.5086	9.1611	1.4670	0.62883	0.9456
2003	1.7379	1.5817	9.3626	7.4307	130.97	8.0033	9.1242	1.5212	0.69199	1.1312
2004	1.6905	1.6167	10.2967	7.4399	134.44	8.3697	9.1243	1.5438	0.67866	1.2439
2005	1.6320	1.5087	10.1955	7.4518	136.85	8.0092	9.2822	1.5483	0.68380	1.2441
2006	1.6668	1.4237	10.0096	7.4591	146.02	8.0472	9.2544	1.5729	0.68173	1.2556
2007	1.6348	1.4678	10.4178	7.4506	161.25	8.0165	9.2501	1.6427	0.68434	1.3705
2008	1.7416	1.5594	10.2236	7.4560	152.45	8.2237	9.6152	1.5874	0.79628	1.4708
2009	1.7727	1.5850	9.5277	7.4462	130.34	8.7278	10.6191	1.5100	0.89094	1.3948
2010	1.4423	1.3651	8.9712	7.4473	116.24	8.0043	9.5373	1.3803	0.85784	1.3257
2011	1.3484	1.3761	8.9960	7.4506	110.96	7.7934	9.0298	1.2326	0.86788	1.3920
2012	1.2407	1.2842	8.1052	7.4437	102.49	7.4751	8.7041	1.2053	0.81087	1.2848
2013	1.3777	1.3684	8.1646	7.4579	129.66	7.8067	8.6515	1.2311	0.84926	1.3281
2014	1.4719	1.4661	8.1857	7.4548	140.31	8.3544	9.0985	1.2146	0.80612	1.3285
2014 Jan	1.5377	1.4884	8.2368	7.4614	141.47	8.3927	8.8339	1.2317	0.82674	1.3610
Feb	1.5222	1.5094	8.3062	7.4622	139.35	8.3562	8.8721	1.2212	0.82510	1.3659
Mar	1.5217	1.5352	8.5332	7.4638	141.48	8.2906	8.8666	1.2177	0.83170	1.3823
Apr	1.4831	1.5181	8.5984	7.4656	141.62	8.2506	9.0329	1.2189	0.82520	1.3813
May	1.4755	1.4951	8.5658	7.4641	139.74	8.1513	9.0298	1.2204	0.81535	1.3732
June	1.4517	1.4728	8.4698	7.4588	138.72	8.2149	9.0914	1.2181	0.80409	1.3592
July	1.4420	1.4524	8.3940	7.4564	137.72	8.3880	9.2327	1.2150	0.79310	1.3539
Aug	1.4306	1.4548	8.1965	7.4551	137.11	8.2522	9.1878	1.2118	0.79730	1.3316
Sep	1.4246	1.4196	7.9207	7.4449	138.39	8.1798	9.1929	1.2076	0.79113	1.2901
Oct	1.4436	1.4214	7.7635	7.4448	136.85	8.3136	9.1797	1.2078	0.78861	1.2673
Nov	1.4432	1.4136	7.6411	7.4415	145.03	8.4912	9.2384	1.2027	0.79054	1.2472
Dec	1.4928	1.4216	7.6330	7.4402	147.06	8.9802	9.4043	1.2026	0.78830	1.2331
2015 Jan	1.4390	1.4039	7.2269	7.4406	137.47	8.9320	9.4167	[3] 1.0940	0.76680	1.1621
Feb	1.4568	1.4199	7.0960	7.4501	134.69	8.6188	9.4901	1.0618	0.74051	1.1350

***** Averages: Bundesbank calculations based on the daily euro foreign exchange reference rates published by the ECB; for additional euro foreign exchange reference rates, see Statistical Supplement 5, Exchange rate statistics. **1** Up to March 2005, ECB indicative rates. **2** Average from 13 January to 29 December 2000. **3** Discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate on 15 January 2015.

11 Euro-area member states and irrevocable euro conversion rates in the third stage of European Economic and Monetary Union

From	Country	Currency	ISO currency code	EUR 1 = currency units ...
1999 January 1	Austria	Austrian schilling	ATS	13.7603
	Belgium	Belgian franc	BEF	40.3399
	Finland	Finnish markka	FIM	5.94573
	France	French franc	FRF	6.55957
	Germany	Deutsche Mark	DEM	1.95583
	Ireland	Irish pound	IEP	0.787564
	Italy	Italian lira	ITL	1,936.27
	Luxembourg	Luxembourg franc	LUF	40.3399
	Netherlands	Dutch guilder	NLG	2.20371
	Portugal	Portuguese escudo	PTE	200.482
	Spain	Spanish peseta	ESP	166.386
2001 January 1	Greece	Greek drachma	GRD	340.750
2007 January 1	Slovenia	Slovenian tolar	SIT	239.640
2008 January 1	Cyprus	Cyprus pound	CYP	0.585274
	Malta	Maltese lira	MTL	0.429300
2009 January 1	Slovakia	Slovak koruna	SKK	30.1260
2011 January 1	Estonia	Estonian kroon	EEK	15.6466
2014 January 1	Latvia	Latvian lats	LVL	0.702804
2015 January 1	Lithuania	Lithuanian litas	LTL	3.45280

XII External sector

12 Effective exchange rates of the Euro and indicators of the German economy's price competitiveness *

1999 Q1=100

Period	Effective exchange rate of the Euro						Indicators of the German economy's price competitiveness						
	EER-19 1				EER-38 2		Based on the deflators of total sales 3				Based on consumer price indices		
							26 selected industrial countries 4						
	Nominal	In real terms based on consumer price indices	In real terms based on the deflators of gross domestic product 3	In real terms based on unit labour costs of national economy 3	Nominal	In real terms based on consumer price indices	Total	Euro-area countries	Non-euro-area countries	37 countries 5	26 selected industrial countries 4	37 countries 5	56 countries 6
1999	96.3	96.0	96.1	96.1	96.5	95.8	97.8	99.5	95.7	97.5	98.2	98.0	97.7
2000	87.1	86.6	85.9	85.3	87.9	85.8	91.6	97.2	84.9	90.7	92.9	91.9	90.9
2001	87.7	87.2	86.6	84.2	90.5	87.0	91.3	96.1	85.7	90.0	92.9	91.4	90.8
2002	90.1	90.4	89.5	87.5	95.0	90.7	92.0	95.2	88.2	90.5	93.5	92.0	91.8
2003	100.7	101.5	100.5	98.7	106.9	101.6	95.4	94.3	97.4	94.7	97.1	96.6	96.8
2004	104.5	105.3	103.3	102.1	111.5	105.4	95.7	93.1	99.8	95.0	98.5	98.0	98.4
2005	102.9	103.8	101.2	100.2	109.5	102.8	94.5	91.7	98.8	92.8	98.5	96.9	96.7
2006	102.8	103.8	100.6	99.3	109.4	102.2	93.3	90.1	98.3	91.1	98.7	96.5	95.9
2007	106.3	106.6	102.6	101.1	112.9	104.2	94.2	89.3	102.2	91.5	100.9	97.9	97.1
2008	109.4	108.7	103.9	104.0	117.1	106.2	94.4	87.9	105.4	90.5	102.3	97.9	97.2
2009	110.7	109.4	104.9	106.9	119.9	107.2	94.5	88.6	104.5	90.9	101.9	98.0	97.6
2010	103.6	101.8	96.7	99.4	111.6	98.4	92.0	88.2	97.9	87.5	98.9	94.0	92.4
2011	103.4	101.0	94.9	97.3	112.3	97.9	91.7	88.0	97.4	86.8	98.4	93.2	91.9
2012	97.9	95.8	89.6	92.0	107.2	93.2	89.8	88.0	92.4	84.3	96.1	90.4	89.0
2013	101.7	99.2	92.6	94.6	112.2	96.5	92.2	88.4	98.1	86.2	98.5	92.3	91.0
2014	102.3	98.9	...	...	114.8	p 97.0	p 92.8	p 89.2	98.5	p 86.8	p 98.6	p 92.5	p 91.7
2011 Nov	102.6	100.2	93.7	94.2	112.3	97.7	90.9	87.9	95.4	86.0	97.7	92.8	91.7
Dec	100.9	98.5			110.4	96.1					97.0	91.9	90.7
2012 Jan	99.0	96.6			108.2	94.0					96.3	90.9	89.5
Feb	99.7	97.5	91.1	94.2	108.5	94.5	90.2	87.8	93.5	84.8	96.9	91.4	89.8
Mar	99.9	97.6			108.8	94.6					97.1	91.4	89.9
Apr	99.5	97.4			108.6	94.5					96.8	91.2	89.8
May	98.1	95.9	89.9	93.1	107.4	93.3	89.9	88.0	92.5	84.5	96.1	90.5	89.1
June	97.3	95.2			106.7	92.8					95.8	90.2	88.9
July	95.4	93.5			104.4	91.0					95.0	89.2	87.7
Aug	95.3	93.3	87.7	90.4	104.5	90.9	89.1	88.0	90.5	83.5	95.2	89.2	87.8
Sep	97.3	95.3			106.7	92.8					95.9	90.1	88.7
Oct	97.8	95.8			107.4	93.2					96.0	90.2	88.8
Nov	97.3	95.2	89.8	90.3	106.8	92.6	90.2	88.1	93.1	84.5	96.0	90.1	88.6
Dec	98.7	96.6			108.4	93.9					96.6	90.6	89.2
2013 Jan	100.4	98.3			110.0	95.1					97.6	91.6	90.1
Feb	101.7	99.3	92.3	95.4	111.3	96.0	91.5	88.2	96.6	85.8	98.2	92.2	90.6
Mar	100.3	98.1			109.6	94.7					97.7	91.5	89.8
Apr	100.5	98.1			109.9	94.7					98.1	91.8	90.1
May	100.6	98.4	92.6	95.1	110.1	94.9	92.1	88.5	97.7	86.1	98.3	91.9	90.2
June	101.6	99.3			112.1	96.5					98.5	92.4	91.1
July	101.6	99.3			112.1	96.5					98.7	92.4	91.1
Aug	102.3	99.8	93.0	96.0	113.5	97.6	92.3	88.4	98.4	86.2	98.7	92.5	91.5
Sep	102.1	99.4			113.4	97.3					98.7	92.5	91.5
Oct	102.9	100.1			114.3	97.8					98.9	92.7	91.7
Nov	102.7	99.8	92.5	92.0	114.3	97.6	93.0	88.7	99.7	87.0	99.0	92.8	91.8
Dec	103.9	101.0			115.9	98.9					99.4	93.4	92.5
2014 Jan	103.5	100.5			116.0	98.9					99.3	93.2	92.5
Feb	103.6	100.7	95.1	p 97.8	116.4	99.1	93.3	88.9	100.3	87.5	99.1	93.2	92.6
Mar	104.7	101.6			117.6	99.9					99.4	93.7	93.0
Apr	104.6	101.3			117.1	99.2					99.3	93.6	92.7
May	103.9	100.4	94.7	p 97.8	116.2	98.1	93.2	89.2	99.6	87.5	99.0	93.2	92.2
June	103.1	99.6			115.2	97.3					98.7	92.9	91.8
July	102.7	99.1			114.7	96.8					98.7	92.8	91.7
Aug	102.0	98.5	p 92.2	p 95.4	114.1	96.2	92.4	89.0	97.6	86.3	98.5	92.4	91.3
Sep	100.5	97.0			112.5	94.8					98.2	91.8	90.7
Oct	99.6	96.1			112.0	94.2					p 97.7	p 91.2	p 90.3
Nov	99.6	96.1	...	...	112.3	94.3	p 92.4	p 89.6	96.6	p 85.9	p 97.8	p 91.2	p 90.4
Dec	99.7	96.0			113.4	p 94.9					p 97.7	p 91.1	p 90.6
2015 Jan	95.9	p 92.2			109.3	p 91.1					p 95.8	p 89.0	p 88.4
Feb	94.0	p 90.2	...	...	107.4	p 89.3	...	...	...	...	p 95.0	p 88.1	p 87.5

***** The effective exchange rate corresponds to the weighted external value of the currency concerned. The method of calculating the indicators of the German economy's price competitiveness is consistent with the procedure used by the ECB to compute the effective exchange rates of the euro (see Monthly Report, November 2001, pp 50-53, May 2007, pp 31-35 and February 2012, pp 34-35). For more detailed information on methodology see the ECB's Occasional Paper No 134 (www.ecb.int). A decline in the figures implies an increase in competitiveness. **1** ECB calculations are based on the weighted averages of the changes in the bilateral exchange rates of the euro against the currencies of the following countries: Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hong Kong, Hungary, Japan, Norway, Poland, Romania, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Where price and wage indices were not available, estimates were used. **2** ECB calculations. Includes countries belonging to the EER-19 group (see footnote 1) and additional Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Philippines, Russian Federation, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela. **3** Annual and quarterly averages. **4** Euro-area countries (from 2001 including Greece, from 2007 including Slovenia, from 2008 including Cyprus and Malta, from 2009 including Slovakia, from 2011 including Estonia, from 2014 including Latvia, from 2015 including Lithuania) as well as Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. **5** Euro-area countries and countries belonging to the EER-19 group. **6** Euro-area countries and countries belonging to the EER-38 group (see footnote 2).

Overview of publications by the Deutsche Bundesbank

This overview provides information about selected recent economic and statistical publications by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Unless otherwise indicated, these publications are available in both English and German, in printed form and on the Bundesbank's website.

The publications are available free of charge from the Communication Division. For a small fee to cover costs, a file which is updated monthly and contains approximately 40,000 time series published by the Bundesbank can be obtained on CD-ROM from the Division Statistical data processing, mathematical methods or downloaded from the Bundesbank-ExtraNet site. Orders should be sent, in writing, to one of the addresses listed on the reverse of the title page. Selected time series can also be downloaded from the internet.

Annual Report

Financial Stability Review

Monthly Report

For information on the articles published between 2000 and 2014 see the index attached to the January 2015 Monthly Report.

Monthly Report articles

April 2014

- On the reliability of international organisations' estimates of the output gap
- Implications of the Eurosystem's monetary operations during the financial crisis
- Some approaches to explaining the behaviour of inflation since the last financial and economic crisis

May 2014

- The current economic situation in Germany

June 2014

- Outlook for the German economy – macroeconomic projections for 2014 and 2015 and an outlook for 2016
- Europe's new recovery and resolution regime for credit institutions
- Changes in the methodology and classifications of the balance of payments and the international investment position
- Cash withdrawals at the point of sale: motives for use and implications for cash holding

July 2014

- Exchange rates and financial stress
- Germany's statutory health insurance scheme: past developments and future challenges
- Consolidated financial statement statistics as a contribution to the extended corporate analysis: approach and initial results
- Analyses of the importance of the insurance industry for financial stability

August 2014

- The current economic situation in Germany

September 2014
- Ownership structure in the German equity market: general trends and changes in the financial crisis
- The reform of financial relations in the German federal system
- The performance of German credit institutions in 2013

October 2014
- Methodological changes in the financial accounts – background, approach and selected results
- The German economy in the international division of labour: a look at value added flows
- Launch of the banking union: the Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe

November 2014
- The current economic situation in Germany

December 2014
- Outlook for the German economy – macroeconomic projections for 2015 and 2016
- German enterprises' profitability and financing in 2013

January 2015
- The role of trade in goods in the development of global imbalances
- The Common Credit Assessment System for assessing the eligibility of enterprises

February 2015
- The current economic situation in Germany

March 2015
- Approaches to strengthening the regulatory framework of European monetary union
- The importance of macroprudential policy for monetary policy
- German balance of payments in 2014
- Securities holdings statistics for analysing holdings of securities in Germany and Europe: methodology and results

Statistical Supplements to the Monthly Report

1 Banking statistics[1, 2]
2 Capital market statistics[1, 2]
3 Balance of payments statistics[1, 2]
4 Seasonally adjusted business statistics[1, 2]
5 Exchange rate statistics[2]

Special Publications

Makro-ökonometrisches Mehr-Länder-Modell, November 1996[3]

Europäische Organisationen und Gremien im Bereich von Währung und Wirtschaft, May 1997[3]

Die Zahlungsbilanz der ehemaligen DDR 1975 bis 1989, August 1999[3]

The market for German Federal securities, May 2000

Macro-Econometric Multi-Country Model: MEMMOD, June 2000

Bundesbank Act, September 2002

Weltweite Organisationen und Gremien im Bereich von Währung und Wirtschaft, March 2003[3]

Die Europäische Union: Grundlagen und Politikbereiche außerhalb der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, April 2005[3]

Die Deutsche Bundesbank – Aufgabenfelder, rechtlicher Rahmen, Geschichte, April 2006[3]

European economic and monetary union, April 2008

For footnotes, see p 86•.

Special Statistical Publications

1 Banking statistics guidelines, January 2014[2, 4]

2 Bankenstatistik Kundensystematik, January 2014[2, 3]

3 Aufbau der bankstatistischen Tabellen, July 2013[2, 3]

4 Financial accounts for Germany 2008 to 2013, June 2014[2]

5 Hochgerechnete Angaben aus Jahresabschlüssen deutscher Unternehmen von 2006 bis 2012, December 2013[2, 3]

6 Verhältniszahlen aus Jahresabschlüssen deutscher Unternehmen von 2010 bis 2011, May 2014[2, 3]

7 Notes on the coding list for the balance of payments statistics, September 2013[2]

8 The balance of payments statistics of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2nd edition, February 1991[o]

9 Securities deposits, August 2005

10 Foreign direct investment stock statistics, April 2014[1, 2]

11 Balance of payments by region, July 2013

12 Technologische Dienstleistungen in der Zahlungsbilanz, June 2011[3]

Discussion Papers*

42/2014
Who trades on momentum?

43/2014
Updating the option implied probability of default methodology

44/2014
A network view on interbank market freezes

45/2014
Cross-border liquidity, relationships and monetary policy: evidence from the Euro area interbank crisis

46/2014
Banking market structure and macroeconomic stability: are low-income countries special?

01/2015
Employment, hours and optimal monetary policy

02/2015
The term structure of interest rates and the macroeconomy: learning about economic dynamics from a FAVAR

03/2015
Centrality-based capital allocations

04/2015
Financial frictions and global spillovers

o Not available on the website.
* As of 2000 these publications have been made available on the Bundesbank's website in German and English. Since the beginning of 2012, no longer subdivided into series 1 and series 2.
For footnotes, see p 86•.

Banking legislation

1 Bundesbank Act and Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, June 1998

2 Gesetz über das Kreditwesen, January 2008[3]

2a Solvabilitäts- und Liquiditätsverordnung, February 2008[3]

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1 Only the headings and explanatory notes to the data contained in the German originals are available in English.
2 Available on the website only.
3 Available in German only.
4 Only some parts of the Special Statistical Publications are provided in English. The date refers to the German issue, which may be of a more recent date than the English one.