

DISCUSSION

Balleer, Gehrke, Lechthaler, Merkl 2014: Does Short-Time Work Save Jobs? A Business Cycle Analysis

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Motivation

- STW as explanation for the labor market performance during the Great Recession?
- STW encourages to adjust labor input along the intensive margin instead of the extensive margin
- how important was the discretionary component of STW for the German labor market performance during the Great Recession?

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Purpose/Result

- disentangle effects of rule-based and discretionary STW components on output and unemployment
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Approach

- step 1: estimate (semi-)elasticity of the rule-based component of STW with respect to output
- step 2: estimate effects of discretionary STW policy on unemployment
- step 3: develop model to rationalize ineffectiveness of discretionary policy and conduct simulation analysis

Ineffectiveness of Discretionary STW (1)

- firing threshold $\epsilon_t > \nu_t^f$

$$\nu_t^f = a_t - w_t - c_f + \frac{\beta \mathbb{E}[J_{t+1}] + f - C(K(\nu_t^f))}{1 - K(\nu_t^f)}$$

- short-time work threshold $\nu_t^f > \epsilon_t > \nu_t^k$

$$\nu_t^k = a_t - w_t - c_f - D_t + \beta \mathbb{E}J_{t+1}$$

Ineffectiveness of Discretionary STW (2)

- one-period change in D_t : continuation value and wage are unaffected (collective bargaining)
- multi-period change in D_t : economic meaning of unit increase in D_t and autocorrelation of 0.5?
- does a multi-period adjustment of D_t reflect an extension of the eligibility period of STW?
- surprising result (i.i.d. cost shocks and low probability of ending up in STW)?

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Effectiveness of Rule-Based STW

- automatic stabilization mechanism
 - share of workers on STW: countercyclical
 - average hours reduction of workers on STW: procyclical
- increase in firing rate: 2.4 (STW) and 2.2 (no STW)
⇒ sufficient to generate substantially different volatility in unemployment rate?
- effect of business cycle indexed D_t ?

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Bargaining

- collective bargaining introduces inflexibility that is partly reduced by STW
- more flexible labor markets (Nash-Bargaining over wages): effect of STW is reduced
- even more flexible labor markets (Nash-Bargaining over wages and separation rate): effect of STW is zero?

Calibration

- fixed cost of production to *match* volatility of unemployment
⇒ volatility is not targeted
- logistic distribution for explicit threshold values
 - analytical results for impulse response
 - model structure leads to poly-log and zeta functions
- disperse production cost distribution: $\sigma(\epsilon) \approx \sqrt{\pi}$
⇒ calibrated threshold substantially higher than actual productivity (normalized to unity)?

Minor Points

- balanced budget in each period
- flexibility and resilience of labor market and effectiveness of short-time work (US vs. Germany)
 - why did Italy under-perform?
 - what about policy recommendations for Spain?
- STW as measure to avoid loss of job specific skills: dynamic aspects of STW are missing