

The Fiscal Multiplier Morass: A Bayesian Perspective
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The Fiscal Multiplier Morass: A Bayesian Perspective

- **Objective:** Paper studies how model assumptions may constrain empirical inferences. Focus on fiscal multipliers.
 - Main model: New-Keynesian open economy with rule-of-thumb agents.
 - Four more restrictive alternatives: No openness, no rule-of-thumb, no nominal rigidities, no real frictions => Basic RBC.
 - Computational exercise: Start with Bayesian priors on the parameters. Translate them into priors about fiscal multipliers. No data.
- **Main findings:** Multipliers smallest in basic RBC – greatest in New-Keynesian closed economy. (Documented in Tables 3 and 7.)
- **Quibble:** Draft received last week – different topic than advertised.

Where is the Morass?

- Paper focuses on models: Different models – different multipliers.
- Greater sources of confusion:
 1. **Fiscal policy has many degrees of freedom – too many policy options:**

Types of spending, forms of taxation, ways in which current policy may influence expectations about future policy.

=> Many multipliers conditional on any given model.

=> Difficult to understand what policy experiment is at issue.
 - Assumptions here: Experiment = Shock to G. Bayesian priors over fiscal rules that specify how fiscal shocks propagate.
- 2. **What is the choice problem?** Shocks are exogenous—no choice.
 - Unclear how multipliers relate to optimal policy choices.

If “Fiscal Multiplier” is the answer:
What is the question?

1. **Naïve perspective:** Policy makers are asking about multipliers to determine the impact of discretionary fiscal policy “interventions.”
Caution: Lucas Critique!
 2. **Cynical citizen’s view:** Politics = series of random shocks. Fiscal multipliers are about resulting effects (harmful fluctuations?)
 3. **Sympathetic view:** Policy makers ask about multipliers because they seek advice how to react to *non-policy* disturbances (e.g. a financial crisis).
=> **Question is how to find optimal policy responses to real shocks.**
- **Conjecture:** if fiscal policy is formalized in terms of reaction functions, fiscal multipliers *may* help to determine the optimal response coefficients to shocks.

Simple Example

- Model of the economy: $Y_t = \beta \cdot G_t + \varepsilon_t^Y$. Exogenous ε_t^Y , $\sigma_Y^2 = \text{var}(\varepsilon_t^Y)$.
- Policy reaction function: $G_t = -\gamma \cdot \varepsilon_t^Y + \varepsilon_t^G$ Choice of response γ .

Shock ε_t^G = discretionary policy; determines $\sigma_G^2 = \text{var}(\varepsilon_t^G)$.

Note that $\beta = \frac{dY_t}{d\varepsilon_t^G} = \frac{\Delta Y_t}{\Delta G_t} \Big|_{\Delta \varepsilon_t^G}$ is the government spending multiplier.

1. Suppose fluctuations in Y are undesirable: $U \approx -E[Y_t^2] = \sigma_Y^2(1 - \beta\gamma)^2 + \sigma_G^2\beta^2$

=> Optimal policy is $\gamma^* = \frac{1}{\beta}$, and $\sigma_G^* = 0$, so $\varepsilon_G^* \equiv 0$.

- **Fiscal multiplier provides intuition:** If $\beta \gg 0$, small γ suffices to stabilize Y.

2. Suppose agents also care about stable G: $U \approx -E[Y_t^2 + \alpha G_t^2]$.

Then $\gamma^* = \frac{\beta}{\beta^2 + \alpha}$ (Inverse-U shaped with maximum at $\beta = \sqrt{\alpha}$); and $\sigma_G^* = 0$.

- **Intuition:** $\beta > 0$ justifies $\gamma > 0$ even if G is destabilized. But link is not simple!
- **Robust conclusion: Policy shocks are undesirable.**

So multiplier effects of policy shocks are an odd way to think about policy.

Propagation of Shocks & Choice of Policies

- Paper considers dynamic fiscal policy rules.
 - Bayesian priors over policy a major departure from the literature
 - => Coefficients in policy rules are random variables.
- Raises questions, e.g.: How permanent is the fiscal shock? How accommodating is monetary policy?
 - => Fiscal multipliers here are in effect “mixing” the effects of many different “policy experiments”.
 - Matters for impact effects via expectations. Matters for present value multipliers.
 - Obscures role of monetary accommodation. (E.g.: Is $\text{Prob}(\text{Taylor principle}) < 1$?)
- Economic interpretation is unclear:
 - Are policy makers themselves uncertain about future fiscal/monetary policy?
 - Constructive suggestion: Do Bayesian analysis for economic parameters conditional on deterministic parameters for policy.

Why exactly do we care about present value multipliers?

A Simple Dynamic Example

- Model of the economy: $Y_t = \beta_0 G_t - \beta_1 G_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^Y$, Given $\beta_0, \beta_1 > 0$.
- Policy reaction function: $G_t = -\sum_{i \geq 0} \gamma_i \varepsilon_{t-i}^Y + \varepsilon_t^G$. Choices $\{\gamma_i\}_{i \geq 0}$.
 - Impact multiplier: $\left. \frac{\Delta Y_t}{\Delta G_t} \right|_{\Delta \varepsilon_t^G} = \beta_0$
 - PV-multiplier for 2 periods: $\left. \frac{\Delta Y_t + R^{-1} \Delta Y_{t+1}}{\Delta G_t + R^{-1} \Delta G_{t+1}} \right|_{\Delta \varepsilon_t^G} = \beta_0 - R^{-1} \beta_1$. Same for all $k \geq 2$.
- Optimal policy to stabilize Y is $\gamma_0^* = \frac{1}{\beta_0}$, $\gamma_i^* = \frac{\beta_1}{\beta_0} \gamma_{i-1}^*$.
 - Optimal instantaneous response again related to the impact multiplier ($\gamma_0^* = \frac{1}{\beta_0}$)
 - Negative lagged effect means output would fall if stimulus is withdrawn quickly.
- No clear role for the present value multiplier
 - Bounded policy responses, if $\beta_1 < \beta_0 \Leftrightarrow$ Positive PV multiplier with $R=1$.
 - May argue that (PV of “cost” of stimulus) $\sim 1/(\text{multiplier})$; but so what?

Analogy to Monetary Policy

- Standard economic approach to monetary policy:
 - Focus on coefficients in policy rules (e.g., in Taylor rule).
 - Tradeoffs are about fluctuations (variances, given agreement on level).
 - Monetary policy shocks are undesirable (merely create noise).
 - Prefer systematic, rule-bound policy over discretion.
- Same principles applied to fiscal policy suggests:

Search for optimal responses to non-policy shocks is more promising than worrying about multiplier effects of discretionary interventions.

Bayesian Perspective: Priors over what?

- Paper allows priors over just about all variables: Why not over models?
 - For example: Discrete prior distribution $p(A_j)$ over A_j
 - Restricted models would have positive probability of being “correct”.
- Scope for sensitivity analysis: How much confidence in a restricted model is needed to be confident about its implications?
 - Example (from Table 3):
 $P(\Delta Y/\Delta G > 1 | \text{Basic RBC}) = 0.0$; $P(\Delta Y/\Delta G > 1 | \text{NK non-saver}) = 88\%$
If $P(\text{Basic RBC}) = P(\text{NK non-saver}) = 50\% \Rightarrow P(\Delta Y/\Delta G > 1) = 44\%$
- Note: Priors over policies also seem to matter:
 $P(\Delta Y/\Delta G > 1 | \text{PMAF}) = 100\%$

Bayesian Priors and Nested Models

- General model #5: New Keynesian open economy.
 - Model #4: restricts import and export parameters = 0
 - Model #3: restricts share of non-savers = 0
 - Model #2: restricts price and wage stickiness parameters = 0
 - Model #1: restricts parameters for real frictions = 0
- Note: **Restricted models = General model with “strong” priors.**
 - => All comparative results must due to different priors.
 - Given Model-5 priors, Models 1-4 are false with probability ONE.
 - In Table 3, most of the 90% intervals for priors over parameter *exclude* the values imposed by Models 1-4.
 - In what sense are the restrictive model *nested alternatives*?
The priors appear to be mutually exclusive with Prob=1.

Final Comments

- Is there an agenda?

Page 14: The preceding RBC models were unable to produce ... long run positive values, implying a New Keynesian-style model is necessary to produce long run multipliers that encourage discretionary expansionary policy.

(Similar quotes elsewhere; my underlining)

- How informative are the data?
 - Sufficient to overturn strong priors over models?
 - Open question here: inferences without data.
- Overall: Bayesian priors are an interesting way to characterize relevant properties of economic models.