

# Commodity price uncertainty co-movement: Does it matter for global economic growth?

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
*Prediction tools for Central Banks*  
IIF - Bundesbank workshop, Frankfurt  
25 Feb. 2022

# Motivations

- Uncertainty is an old concept (Knight, 1921), but many new measures are available.

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- Uncertainty is an old concept (Knight, 1921), but many new measures are available.
- Well known measure of uncertainty: Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (Baker, Bloom, Davis, 2016)



# Motivations

- Another measure of uncertainty: VIX, a proxy for financial market volatility



# Motivations

- Evidence of negative correlation between uncertainty fluctuations and macroeconomic activity
- Literature tries to show evidence of causality from uncertainty shocks to macro (Bernanke, 1983; Bloom, 2009 + many others ...)
- Uncertainty comes from various sources: Financial markets (VIX), Economic policy (EPU), real activity (Jurado et al. 2015) ...
- Part of literature also focuses on *oil uncertainty* shocks (Elder and Serletis, 2010, Jo, 2014) and points out significant recessionary effects on U.S. activity.
- Here: we focus on **commodity uncertainty** shocks as a whole and we assess their impact on economic activity (Investment, Exports, Consumption, GDP)

# Motivations

- Why looking at commodities? Because the strong co-movement is helpful to understand oil prices ... (Poncela et al., 2020; Alquist et al. 2020)
- Delle Chiaie, Ferrara, Giannone (JAE, 2022) show that by estimating a DFM for all commodities:
  - Common movements on commodities likely reflect a global demand shock (using a narrative approach)
  - Sector-specific movements likely reflect supply shock
- Here: we focus on disentangling **common commodity price uncertainty** vs **commodity-specific price uncertainty**

# What do we do in this paper?

- We consider various 12 commodity prices split into 3 groups: metal, agricultural and energy
- We measure uncertainty on each commodity price by taking the quarterly realized variance starting from daily returns (uncertainty=volatility)
- We extract the common uncertainty factor underlying all the commodities through a DFM with block structure (Kose et al., 2003), as well as the 3 group-specific factors.
- Then we sequentially integrate those factors into small-scale SVARs for a bunch of ADV and EME countries and compute IRFs to various commodity uncertainty shocks

# What are the main take-aways?

- 1 A global commodity uncertainty shock depresses investment and exports, for both ADVs and EMEs, much more than VIX and EPU: 1 sd shock generates a drop of about 2% after 2 quarters (also true for GDP and consumption)
- 2 No evidence of a bounce-back after a global commodity uncertainty shock for both ADVs/EMEs: this shock leads to a long-run adverse impact on the level of investment and thus on potential growth
- 3 Our approach is a way to disentangle between *bad* and *good* outcomes of oil price uncertainty shocks:
  - 1 *bad* draws are coming from the global uncertainty component embedded in oil price uncertainty and common with other commodity price uncertainty
  - 2 *good* draws are coming from the oil sector uncertainty



# Related literature

This paper relates to 3 main research fields:

- 1 Macroeconomic impact of oil price uncertainty shocks
- 2 Literature on comovement in commodity prices and how it is useful to understand oil prices
- 3 Good vs Bad outcomes of uncertainty shocks

## Related literature 1/3

- Macroeconomic impact of uncertainty shocks is known to be negative, both from theory (*real option* theory and financial frictions, Bernanke, 1983; Bloom, 2009, 2014; ... ) and empirics (Bloom, 2009, Baker et al., 2016, Leduc and Liu, 2016, ...)
- True for investment, consumption and output, but also international trade (Feng et al., 2017, Gervais, 2018; Tam, 2018 ...)
- Impact on EMEs much larger than on ADVs (Carriere-Swallow and Cespedes, 2013)
- Existing alternative measure of uncertainty (VIX, EPU, macro, oil ...) leading to relatively similar results. On oil price uncertainty: Guo and Kliesen, 2005; Elder and Serletis, 2010; Jo, 2014 ...

## Related literature 2/3

- Emerging literature on the strong comovement among commodity prices in level (agricultural, metal, energy), see Alquist, Bhattarai and Coibion (2020), Poncela, Senra, Sierra (2020) or Delle Chiaie, Ferrara, Giannone (2022)
- Delle Chiaie et al. (2022) estimate in real-time a decomposition of any commodity price into demand (=common component) and supply drivers
- Fernandez et al. (2017, 2018) also point out the significant role of commodities for global business cycles

## Related literature 3/3

- In theory, uncertainty shocks do not necessarily lead to negative macro outcomes. 2 theoretical channels outlined in Bloom (2014):
  - 1 **Growth-option**: uncertainty can encourage investment if it increases the size of the potential prize
  - 2 **Oi-Hartman-Abel effect**: companies can expand to exploit good outcomes and contract to insure against bad outcomes
- Empirical evidence of positive effects in macro by Forni, Gambetti and Sala (2021) (upside vs downside uncertainty) and in finance by Segal et al. (2015)
- As regards oil price uncertainty, empirical evidence by Mohn and Misund (2009) (also for copper mining by Marmer and Slade (2018))
- Theoretical rationale by Punzi (2019): DSGE in which households and companies consume more today when higher uncertainty

# Measuring uncertainty

- We get log-returns from  $n = 12$  daily commodity future prices for: agricultural (corn, cotton, soybeans, wheat), metals (copper, gold, silver, platinum) and energy (crude oil, heating oil, petroleum, gasoline).
- We estimate quarterly commodity price uncertainty for any commodity  $i$  using realized variances:

$$RV_{i,t} = \frac{252}{T} \sum_{d=1}^T (r_{t,d}^i - r^i)^2 \quad (1)$$

- We cover the period ranging from 1988q1 to 2016q4

# Estimating the Global Uncertainty (GLUN) Factor

- We get  $n = 12$  quarterly realized variances from 3 groups
- We estimate the following DFM: quarterly commodity price uncertainty for any commodity  $i$  using realized variances:

$$RV_{i,t} = \beta_i^C F_t^C + \beta_i^g F_t^g + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (2)$$

where  $F_t^C$  is the common factor and  $F_t^g$  are the 3 group factors ( $g=1,2,3$ )

- Residuals are supposed to follow an AR(p) process:

$$\varepsilon_{i,t} = \sum_{l=1}^p \psi_{i,l} \varepsilon_{i,t-l} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (3)$$

# Estimating the Global Uncertainty (GLUN) Factor

- Unobserved factors are also supposed to follow AR(p) processes:

$$F_t^C = \sum_{l=1}^p \psi_l^C F_{t-l}^C + \nu_t^C \quad (4)$$


and for  $g = 1, 2, 3$ :

$$F_t^g = \sum_{l=1}^p \psi_l^g F_{t-l}^g + \nu_t^g \quad (5)$$

where  $\nu_t^C \sim \mathbf{N}(0, \sigma_C^2)$  and  $\nu_t^g \sim \mathbf{N}(0, \sigma_g^2)$




- All the innovations are supposed to be White Noise and mutually orthogonal.
- Parameter estimation is carried out using Bayesian methods

# Global Uncertainty (GLUN) Factor





# Group-Specific Uncertainty Factors



# Assessing IRFs using SVARs

- Let's consider a standard SVAR(p) model of the following form for a set of  $k$  variables contained in the vector  $Y_t$ :

$$A_0 Y_t = c + A_1 Y_{t-1} + \dots + A_p Y_{t-p} + \varepsilon_t \quad (6)$$

where  $A_0$  is the matrix of contemporaneous variables,  $A_1$  to  $A_p$  are matrices of coefficients controlling the dynamics and  $\varepsilon_t$  is a vector of structural shocks

## Assessing IRFs using SVARs

- Following Caggiano et al. (2014), we estimate small-scale SVAR models with 4 variables in the following order:

$$Y_t = (un_t, \pi_t, x_t, i_t)'$$

where  $un_t$  is the previously estimated commodity uncertainty factor,  $\pi_t$  is the quarterly inflation rate,  $x_t$  is a given macroeconomic variable of interest expressed in growth rate and  $i_t$  is the nominal policy interest rate

- A robustness check is carried out by putting commodity prices first, leading to similar results.
- We estimate this model for a bunch of 24 ADV and EME countries

# Assessing IRFs using SVARs

- As usual with SVARs,  $A_0$  has to be identified
- Here we follow the Bloom's (2009) strategy by putting directly the exogeneous shock into the model as defined by

$$un_t = F_t^C \times \mathbf{1}_t(event) \quad (7)$$


where  $\mathbf{1}_t(event)$  is the indicator function that takes 1 if an uncertainty event occurs and 0 otherwise

- The definition of uncertainty events that we take is the one proposed by Piffer and Podstawski (2018) stemming from a narrative approach.


# IRFs from a Global Uncertainty shock: Investment

- We compute IRFs from the 24 SVARs applied to each country:  
Evidence of negative impact on **Investment** growth after a global uncertainty shock

Responses of advanced economies INV to exogenous GLUN shock




Responses of emerging economies INV to exogenous GLUN shock




# IRFs from a Global Uncertainty shock: Investment

- We summarize the information for ADVs and EMEs

INV response of advanced economies to exogenous GLUN shock



INV response of emerging economies to exogenous GLUN shock




- Large negative impact, especially EMEs
- Lack of bounce-back after uncertainty stops, leading to both short-term and long-term adverse effects (permanent loss in the level of investment, meaning lower potential growth)


# IRFs from a Global Uncertainty shock: Exports

- We compute IRFs from the 24 SVARs applied to each country: Evidence of negative impact on **Exports** growth after a global uncertainty shock

Responses of advanced economies EXP to exogenous GLUN shock





Responses of emerging economies EXP to exogenous GLUN shock



# IRFs from a Global Uncertainty shock: Exports

- Median IRF for ADVs and EMEs:



- As for Investment, Large negative impact, especially EMEs
- Lack of bounce-back after uncertainty stops, leading to both short-term and long-term adverse effects



# IRFs from Global Uncertainty: GDP and Consumption

- Evidence of negative impact of global commodity uncertainty on GDP and household consumption




Figure: *ADVs*




Figure: *EMEs*

# Comparing with other shocks: Investment

- Comparison VIX /EPU shocks: Stronger negative IRF from GLUN
- Lack of bounce-back after a GLUN shock, in opposition to other shocks for ADVs (Carriere-Swallow and Cespedes, JIE, 2013)




Figure: *ADV*s




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




Figure: *ADV*s






Figure: *EMEs*

# IRFs from Group-Uncertainty shocks: Investment

- Comparison between group-specific uncertainty shocks on Investment, once we account for global component
- Metals: strongly negative / Energy: Slightly positive




Figure: *ADV*s




Figure: *EME*s

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


Figure: *ADVs*




Figure: *EMEs*


# Oil price uncertainty shocks: Good vs Bad outcomes

- Let's focus specifically on energy/oil price uncertainty shock
- Large literature showing negative macro impact of oil price uncertainty shock (Elder and Serletis, 2010; Jo, 2014)
- Yet in principle, uncertainty shock are likely to generate positive outcomes : *growth option theory* (Bloom, 2014)
- Only few empirical evidence: Forni, Gambetti and Sala (2021) in macro or Segal et al. (2015) in finance
- Punzi (2019) puts forward a SOE DSGE model in which oil price uncertainty shocks generate positive macro outcomes


# IRFs from Energy shocks: Investment

- Evidence of overall positive response at country level:  
Country-specific IRFs from an energy price uncertainty shock after controlling from global uncertainty component

Responses of advanced economies INV to exogenous ENUN shock

Figure: *ADVs*

Responses of emerging economies INV to exogenous ENUN shock

Figure: *EMEs*

# Oil price uncertainty shock: Good vs Bad outcomes


- We carry out various exercises:
- 1/ Estimate IRF from *pure* oil price uncertainty shock (ie common factor on the 4 energy price volatilities)
- 2/ Estimate IRF from good/bad commodity uncertainty shocks
- 3/ Supply or Demand shocks?




# IRFs from Energy shocks: Investment

- Comparison between various energy uncertainty shocks on Investment

INV response of advanced economies to exogenous 1-factor GLUN shock



INV response of advanced economies to exogenous 2-factor GLUN shock



INV response of advanced economies to exogenous 1-factor ENUN shock






Figure: *ADVs*

INV response of emerging economies to exogenous 1-factor GLUN shock



INV response of emerging economies to exogenous 2-factor GLUN shock



INV response of emerging economies to exogenous 1-factor ENUN shock




Figure: *EMEs*

## Pure oil price uncertainty shock

- 1 A *pure* energy price uncertainty shock leads to a negative effect on economic activity, as usually highlighted in the literature
- 2 The effect is the same as a global commodity price uncertainty shock  
→ An energy uncertainty shock is likely to reflect only global uncertainty
- 3 When decomposing energy (=oil) price uncertainty into two main components, (i) part of uncertainty that comoves with other non-energy commodities and (ii) part of uncertainty that is specific to the energy market, the results suggest that those two components will have on average opposite effects on economic activity
- 4 So our approach: a way to disentangle **“bad”** vs **“good”** oil price uncertainty shocks

## Another strategy to identify Good vs Bad shocks

Robustness check: Does another strategy to identify good/bad shocks lead to different results?

- 1 We identify a *bad* uncertainty commodity shock when associated with an *increase* in commodity prices, and conversely
- 2 We use the Bry-Boschan algorithm to identify increase and decrease in the GSCI index
- 3 This identification strategy leads to similar results as regards IRFs (see Figure next slide)

# Another strategy to identify Good vs Bad shocks

- Investment responses to good/bad commodity price uncertainty shock







Figure: *ADVs*





Figure: *EMEs*

# Supply or Demand shocks?

- 1 Are commodity price uncertainty shocks acting as demand or supply shocks?
- 2 Not a structural model here, but looking simultaneously at inflation is helpful: a demand shock send output and prices in the same direction, while a supply shock send them in opposite directions
- 3 By looking at IRFs (see Figure next slide), we get that global commodity price uncertainty acts as a **demand** shock, while a specific oil price uncertainty shock tends to act more as a *supply* shock.

# Supply or Demand shocks?

- IRFs of inflation to global uncertainty shock and the 3 commodity-specific uncertainty shocks



# Conclusions

- A global commodity price uncertainty shock depresses investment and exports, for both ADVs and EMEs, much more than VIX and EPU shocks, acting as a demand shock
- No evidence of a bounce-back after a global commodity price uncertainty shock for both ADVs/EMEs, leading to permanent losses
- Our approach is a way to disentangle between *bad* and *good* outcomes of oil price uncertainty shocks:
  - ① *bad* draws are coming from the global uncertainty component embedded in oil price uncertainty and common with other commo price uncertainty
  - ② *good* draws are coming from the oil sector uncertainty